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2Abstract
This thesis examines the economic development of industrial 
engineering in Austria-Hungary between 1870 and 1913.
The pattern of sectoral change in Austria's machine- 
building industry is investigated in Chapter Two. New 
output estimates indicate that mechanical engineering took 
a course quite different from that suggested in recent 
historiography. Austria's capital goods sector was subject 
to prolonged stagnation during the "Great Depression" of 
the 1870s and 1880s. But during the subsequent two decades 
mechanical engineering made a large and rising contribution 
to overall industrial growth.
Chapter Three is concerned with the rise of industrial 
machine-building in Hungary. Based on new output estimates, 
the chapter traces the phases and origins of a process 
which accounted for a markedly faster expansion of 
mechanical engineering than in the Western half of the 
Habsburg Empire.
Chapter Four provides an analysis of the financial and 
investment behaviour of major machine-building firms. The 
growth of companies, the pattern of their investment, the 
volume and forms of finance varied significantly between 
firms and over time. The main factors accounting for 
differential rates of company growth were the diverging 
development of demand in the various machine-building 
branches, the impact of the business cycles in Austria and 
Hungary, and individual firms' preparedness to pursue 
external expansion.
The structure, volume, and direction of the Habsburg 
Monarchy's trade in machinery are examined in Chapter Five. 
The study of import tariffs and input price diffentials 
yields results which suggest that, after the turn of the 
century, the competitive position of Austro-Hungarian 
engineering was impeded by an inept tariff policy.
The thesis argues that the course of industrial engineering 
lends strong support to the notion of a "Great Depression" 
in Austria. Once the depression had been overcome, however, 
the machine-building industry became one of the two main 
sectoral sources of growth in industry - despite the 
effects of an unfavourable tariff policy. Machinery output 
in Hungary grew at a faster rate than in Austria. Yet its 
impact on total manufacturing growth was somewhat smaller 
than in Austria since Hungarian industry as a whole also 
expanded more rapidly.
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INTRODUCTION
The process of industrialization, its timing and pace are 
the themes which dominate much of recent research and 
writing in Habsburg economic history1. As a quantitative 
study of the economic development of industrial machine- 
building in late nineteenth century Austria-Hungary2, this 
thesis aims at contributing to the understanding of some of 
the sectoral aspects of industrialization and economic 
growth.
In fairly general terms, industrialization can be viewed as 
a process of absolutely and relatively increasing
1 A brief account of the "research boom in Habsburg economic 
history" is given in the introduction to Good, D.F., The 
Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1984), pp.7-10. Recent monographs in the field 
include Rudolph, R.L., Banking and Industrialization in 
Austria-Hungary: the Role of Banks in the Industrialization 
of the Czech Crownlands, 1873 - 1914 (Cambridge, 1976) ;
Komlos, J., The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union. 
Economic Development in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth 
Century, (Princeton, 1983), and Stature, Nutrition, and 
Economic Development in the Eighteenth Century Habsburg 
Monarchy: The 'Austrian' Model of the Industrial Revolution 
(Princeton, 1989). Most recently David Good examined 
Alexander Gerschenkron's work in the light of Austria- 
Hungary's industrialization experience; see his "Austria- 
Hungary", Patterns of European Industrialization. The 
Nineteenth Century, eds. R. Sylla and G. Toniolo (London, 
1991), pp.218-247.
2 Austria-Hungary and the Habsburg Empire are used 
interchangeably with reference to the territory controlled 
by the Habsburgs until the end of World War I. The 
Ausgleich of 1867 established the so-called Dual Monarchy. 
The Empire was split into two relatively autonomous parts 
with one capital in Vienna and the other in Budapest: 
Austria (Cisleithania) and Hungary (Transleithania). Most 
scholars use these rather than the more cumbersome, 
official names.
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utilization of capital; the share of the two other factors 
of production, labour and land, is decreasing over time3. 
The machine-building industry is, then, a key sector for 
its "output constitutes replacement of or additions to the 
economy's stock of physical capital"4. Indeed, recently 
presented evidence suggests not only a close long-run 
association between machinery investment and productivity 
growth at the macro level, but also the likely direction of 
causality: to a large extent, the argument runs, output per 
worker rose in the past because of high rates of investment 
in machinery5. Viewed in this light, rising expenditure on 
capital goods appears not as a mere concomitant of economic 
expansion but as a strategic factor accounting for growth.
However, surprisingly little attention has been focused so 
far on Austria-Hungary's capital goods sector. On the eve 
of World War I, Austria-Hungary's machine-building industry 
ranked amongst the leading producers of the world in terms 
of total output and employment, surpassed only by the 
United States, Britain, and Germany6. But studies
3 Reitschuler, S., Die Stellung der Maschinenindustrie im 
ProzeB der Industrial isierung (Cologne and Opladen, 1963), 
p. 31.
4 Rosenberg, N., "Capital Goods, Technology, and Economic 
Growth", N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology 
(Cambridge, 1976), p.143.
5 De Long, J.B., "Productivity Growth and Machinery 
Investment: A Long-Run Look, 1870-1980", JEH 52 (1992)
No.2, pp.307-324.
6 Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten, Denkschrift iiber 
die Maschinenindustrie der Welt. Bestimmt fur das Kommittee 
B des vorbereitenden Ausschusses der internationalen 
Wirtschaftskonferenz des Volkerbundes (Berlin, 1926), 
pp.22, 26. Russia is ranked fourth and Austria-Hungary 
fifth in terms of engineering employment and production. 
But the data reproduced in this source clearly refer only 
to Austria proper; they correspond exactly to figures 
provided in other sources. If output and employment in 
Hungarian machine-building are added to the respective 
figures for Austria, then the combined total is well above 
the level of Russian output, but still slightly below
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comparable in scope to those of Saul and Floud for Britain7 
or the work of Barth, Schroter, and Becker on the German 
machine-building industry8 have not been produced for 
engineering in the Habsburg Empire9. The aim of this thesis 
is to close at least part of this apparent gap in the 
literature. Its focus is on the economic development of 
mechanical engineering10. Electrical engineering was
Russia's level of employment. It seems particularly 
surprising that France should have had a smaller machine- 
building sector than Austria-Hungary. But the figures 
reproduced in the Denkschrift are implicitly confirmed by 
Levy-Leboyer and Lescure who point out that in 1913 French 
production of machinery represented only 6 per cent of the 
combined output of Britain and Germany and less than 5 per 
cent of that of the United States; Levy-Leboyer, M., and 
Lescure, M., "France", Patterns of European 
Industrialization, eds. Sylla and Toniolo, p.157. These 
percentages match with the data reproduced in the 
Denkschrift.
7 Saul, S.B., "The Market and the Development of the 
Mechanical Engineering Industries in Britain, 1890-1914", 
EHR 2nd ser. XX (1967) No.l, pp.111-130, and "The Machine- 
Tool Industry in Britain to 1914", BH 10 (1968) No.l, 
pp.22-43; Floud, R.C., The British Machine-Tool Industry 
1850-1914 (Cambridge, 1976).
8 Barth, E., Entwicklungslininen der deutschen 
Maschinenbauindustrie von 1870 bis 1914 (Berlin, 1973); 
Schroter, A., "Die Entstehung der deutschen 
Maschinenbauindustrie in der ersten Halfte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts", A. Schroter and W. Becker, Die deutsche 
Maschinenbauindustrie in der industriellen Revolution 
(Berlin, 1962), pp.11-133; and, in the same volume, Becker, 
W., "Die Entwicklung der deutschen Maschinenbauindustrie 
von 1850 bis 1870", pp.135-285.
9 An exception is Arnost Klima's "The Beginnings of the 
Machine-Building Industry in the Czech Lands in the First 
Half of the 19th Century", JEEH 4 (1975) No.l, pp.49-78.
10 Occasional reference is also made to closely related 
engineering branches, especially the production of railway 
cars which was often carried out by firms otherwise active 
in mechanical engineering. Because of the heterogeneity of 
the engineering sector's output there was no uniform usage 
or definition of the term machine-building at the time. 
However, reflecting this heterogeneity, the organizational 
structure of the German machine-builders' association can 
serve to illustrate the scope of what throughout the thesis 
will be referred to as mechanical engineering. The
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already perceived by contemporaries as a new, separate 
branch distinctly different from classical machine- 
building; it is, therefore, left aside in this study11. The 
same holds for motor car manufacturing which as an industry 
emerged only towards the end of the period under review12.
The course of analysis is organized in five chapters. 
Chapter II outlines sectoral change in Austria's machine- 
building industry. New output estimates are employed to 
determine the phases of expansion and contraction in 
Austrian machinery production and to assess the industry's
association was organized in thirteen divisons relating to 
major product groups (each of them composed of several sub­
groups) :
I machine tools
II textile machines
III agricultural machines and implements
IV locomotives
V power machines
VI working machinery
VII plant equipment and machinery for iron and steel works
and rolling mills
VIII mechanical conveyors (cranes, lifts, elevators, etc.) 
and scales
IX machinery for the paper-making and graphical
industries
X machinery for the food processing and chemical
industries
XI dressing/separation and crushing machines
XII special machines and machinery parts
XIII apparatus
Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten, Denkschrift iiber 
die Maschinenindustrie, p.63. This grouping is in
accordance with the contemporary description of the sector 
by Fischer, H., "Die Maschinenindustrie in Osterreich", Die 
GroB-Industrie Osterreichs, vol.I (Vienna, 1908), pp.99- 
105.
11 Kareis, J., "Elektrotechnik", Entwicklung von Industrie 
und Gewerhe in Osterreich in den Jahren 1848 - 1888, eds. 
Commission der Jubilaums-Gewerbe-Ausstellung, (Vienna, 
1888), pp.274-305; Zickler, C. , "Die elektrotechnische 
Industrie", Die GroB-Industrie Osterreichs, vol.Ill 
(Vienna, 1898), pp.175-190.
12 Matis, H. and Bachinger, K., "Osterreichs industrielle 
Entwicklung", Die Hahsburger Monarchie 1848-1918, vol.l: 
Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, ed. A. Brusatti (Vienna, 
1973), pp.184-185.
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performance during and after the Great Depression of the 
1870s and 1880s. The value of output, the number and size 
of engineering firms, the workforce employed, the regional 
allocation of the industry, the pattern of product 
specialization, sectoral productivity, and the respective 
changes over time are the problems focused on.
Chapter III examines, in a similar fashion, the emergence 
and expansion of industrial machine-building in Hungary. 
Again, new output estimates are used to trace the 
industry's advancement in the late nineteenth century.
The fourth chapter complements the previous discussion of 
overall sectoral development with a less aggregate analysis 
of the financial and investment behaviour of machine- 
building firms in Austria and Hungary. It outlines the 
processes of internal and external company growth which 
were associated with changes in the demand for capital and 
in the provision of funds. Annual balance-sheet data 
derived from a sample of eight leading engineering joint- 
stock companies are used to examine these changes over time 
and the diverging experience of individual firms.
In Chapter V, the economic development of Austria-Hungary's 
machine-building industry is placed in its international 
context. This chapter is concerned with the structure, 
volume, and direction of the Habsburg Monarchy's trade in 
machinery and the associated intertemporal changes. The 
competitive position of Austro-Hungarian machine-building 
is examined in the light of input price differentials and 
the tariff structure.
In the concluding chapter of this thesis, the results 
derived in the previous chapters are put into a broader 
perspective. It is concerned with the machine-building 
industry's relevance for economic growth and the process of 
industrialization in late nineeteenth century Austria- 
Hungary .
19
n
THE MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY IN AUSTRIA: 
AN OUTLINE OF SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT
1. Phases of Expansion and Contraction
In 1870, Austria's machine-building industry produced 
machinery worth approximately 90 million crowns. By 1912, 
the gross value of the industry's annual output had reached 
a level of almost 650 million crowns in current prices1. 
The four and a half decades between the Austro-Hungarian 
Compromise of 1867 and the outbreak of World War I, 
clearly, were a time of rapid expansion in mechanical 
engineering. Over the period as a whole the machine- 
building industry grew faster than most other branches of 
industry (Tables II. 1 and II.2)2. But, irrespectively, the 
new estimates presented here suggest that output in 
Austrian machine-building expanded at a rate well below the 
level previously assumed. This holds for the whole period 
1870 to 1913 as well as for shorter intervals therein. It 
will be shown below that growth in industrial engineering 
was volatile and often discontinuous. Phases of vigorous 
growth in production alternated with periods of stagnation
1 For the new estimates of Austrian machine-building output, 
the methods employed and the data used in their derivation 
and a critique of earlier attempts to approximate 
production see Appendix A. Estimates of machinery output in 
both current and constant (1913) prices are reproduced in 
Appendix A, Table A.13, columns (1) and (2).
2 For a sectoral breakdown of Austria's manufacturing 
production see Komlos, J., The Habsburg Monarchy as a 
Customs Union. Economic Development in Austria-Hungary in 
the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 1983), Appendix E, Table
E.6.
and even absolute contraction3. 
Table II.1
COMPOUND RATES OF GROWTH OF MACHINERY PRODUCTION IN 
CONSTANT 1913 PRICES (PER CENT PER ANNUM)
1870-1913 4.49 1890-1900 6.65
1870-1880 1.86 1900-1913 4.05
1880-1890 5.60
Peak-to-peak measures:
1872-1912 3.94 1872-1894* 2.83
1872-1882 -0.02 1894-1912* 5.32
1882-1894* 5.26
1894-1901* 4.98
1901-1912 5.53
No output peak in 1894 but strong positive deviation from trend. 
Source: Appendix A, Table A.13, column (2).
3 Apart from expansion over a specific decade (e.g. 1870- 
1880), output growth was generally measured from the peak 
of one business cycle to the peak of the subsequent cycle. 
Thus the rate of growth of potential output was obtained. 
The advantage of this measure lies in that it does not 
disguise possibly important turning points as moving 
averages often do. A difficulty with peak-to-peak 
measurement, however, is the implicit assumption of full 
factor utilization at the peaks. If at one of the peaks 
capacity was not fully utilized, the growth rate would be 
underestimated for that cycle and overestimated during the 
subsequent cycle. See, for example, Komlos, Customs Union, 
note to Table 4.19, p.145, and Solomou, S., Phases of 
Economic Growth, 1850-1973 (Cambridge, 1990), p.17.
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Figure 11.1: Output in Austrian Machine-Building (Mill. Crowns; 1313 Prices)
656.3216
463.4334
Trend
Z70.0771
Output
76.6543
1870 13131881 1832 1303
Source: Appendix A, Table A.13, column (2).
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Table II.2
COMPOUND RATES OF GROWTH IN AUSTRIAN INDUSTRY
(PER CENT PER ANNUM)
M MM MMC
1871-1912 2.36 2.56 2.36
1871-1884 1.80 2.10 1.86
1884-1895 2.51 2.77 2.32
1895-1902 1.77 1.94 2.08
1902-1912 3.37 3.38 3.24
1871-1895 2.13 2.41 2.07
1895-1912 2.68 2.78 2.76
Key: M 
MM 
MMC
manufacturing 
manufacturing, mining 
manufacturing, mining, construction
Source: Komlos, Customs Union, Appendix E, Table E.4.
Figure II.2 shows that for most of the period to 1913 the 
indices of machine-building output and total manufacturing 
production follow a similar path. As one might expect, a 
rise of industrial output in the long run was associated 
with expanding demand for industrial equipment. Both 
domestic production as well as imports of machinery from 
abroad grew in response to industrial and agricultural 
needs for capital goods4. Nevertheless, some significant 
differences in both the pace and the pattern of development 
are striking (see also Tables II. 1 and II. 2). While 
manufacturing output rose by approximately 2.4 per cent 
between 1871 and 1912, production of machinery expanded by 
about 3.9 per cent on annual average. Though industrial 
engineering expanded faster than most other manufacturing 
sectors, it was at the same time the sector most exposed to 
cyclical output fluctuations: deviations from the trend of 
production were clearly more pronounced in machine-building 
than in other sections of the manufacturing industry for
4 See Appendix D, Tables D.l and D.2 on the development of 
the Habsburg Empire's and Austria's imports and exports of 
machinery.
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Figure II.2: Indices of Austrian Industrial Output (1513=100; 1913 Prices)
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Sources: App. A, Table A.13, col.(2); Komlos, Customs Union, App. E, Table E.4.
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which comparable output estimates are available; this holds 
especially for the 1870s and 1880s (Figure II.3)5. Pigou 
observed that shipbuilding and engineering were the 
industries with the largest amplitudes in (cyclical) 
fluctuations in late nineteenth century Britain6. The 
explanation forwarded for the particular cyclical 
responsiveness of the capital goods sector - or as Pigou 
termed it "the instrumental industries" - includes several 
elements.
Machinery is not used up in a single act of production but 
continues to function in future. Consequently, there is 
always a stock of capital goods already produced alongside 
the output of machinery in the current period. Suppose 
actual or expected demand in machinery-using consumers' 
goods industries, for example, rises: "If, then, it is
decided to increase the production of, say, cotton goods by 
20 per cent in conditions such that, in order to do this, 
the supply of cotton machinery has to be increased by 10 
per cent, the 10 per cent increase in the supply of cotton 
machinery will involve a very much larger increase, perhaps 
an increase of 80 per cent or 100 per cent, in the new 
production, including, of course, that part of the new 
production ... which is needed for replacements and 
repairs, of that machinery"7. This relationship between the 
demand for machinery, the existing stocks of capital goods 
and their supply in the current period provides an 
explanation of why, in general, a given expansion in the 
production of consumers' goods is likely to involve an even 
faster percentage increase in machinery production. Yet the 
extra output of machinery in years of high demand implies
5 Trend was computed as a log-linear function using ordinary 
least sqares estimation.
6 Pigou, A.C., Industrial Fluctuations (London, 2nd ed., 
1929), p.13. Pigou used employment rather than output data 
as sufficient statistics on the latter were not available; 
ibid., pp.10-11.
7 Ibid., p.108.
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an enlarged stock of capital goods at the disposal of 
machinery users in later years. If demand contracts in a 
downswing and returns to pre-upswing levels, it is 
confronted with this larger capital-stock which had been 
built up in times of rising demand. As a result, the lower 
level of demand will now give rise to smaller demand for 
new machinery than it used to before the upswing. Machinery 
purchases may be confined to replacements only. "Thus the 
upward fluctuation of industrial activity above the normal 
carries with it a subsequent downward fluctuation below the 
normal when the stimulus is removed and not merely a 
subsequent return to the normal”8.
The data in Tables II.1 and II.2 and the plots in Figures
II.2 and II.3 indicate that machine-building was hit more 
severely by the impact of the post-1873 depression than the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. While total manufacturing 
output fell by 0.32 per cent on annual average between 1871 
and 18799, engineering production virtually collapsed and 
shrunk at an annual rate of more than 4 per cent (1872- 
1878). For most branches of Austrian manufacturing, signs 
of recovery began to show in the late 1870s. Pre-depression 
levels of output were generally achieved during the early 
1880s10. In the capital goods sector, however, recovery 
came much later. Output fluctuated at levels below the 
long-run trend until the early 1890s (Figure II.3). Much of 
the rise in output during the 1880s should thus be 
interpreted as recovery growth rather than genuine 
expansion (Table II. 1). Only towards the very end of the 
decade was there any sustained advance above pre-crash 
levels of production.
8 Ibid., p.109.
9 Komlos, Customs Union, Appendix E, Table E.4.
10 Ibid.
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Figure II.3: Deuiations fron Trend of Production (Per Cent of Trend)
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Based on the evidence on output growth and fluctuations 
presented so far, expansion in Austrian machine-building 
can be perceived as a sequence of five major phases:
1. rapid expansion up to 1872;
2. years of severe depression between 1873 and 1880;
3. a period of slow improvement through the 1880s;
4. full recovery by 1888 and rapid growth to the turn of 
the century;
5. a decade of further expansion interrupted by two brief 
recessions in 1902-1903 and 1910.
This pattern is distinctly different from that implied in 
Richard Rudolph's output calculations for Austrian machine- 
building11. According to his estimates, the industry grew 
significantly faster between 1870 and 1913 than the new 
output estimates used here indicate. His figures suggest, 
moreover, that there was no significant downturn in 
engineering activity during the 1870s and 1880s (Table
II.3)12. This index has been widely used - most notably in 
the context of the debate on the "Great Depression” in 
Austria. But it conveys a course of development which is at 
odds with both the quantitative and the qualitative 
evidence available. The next section is, therefore, 
concerned with a re-assesssment of the machine-building 
industry's situation in the 1870s and 1880s. It precedes 
the discussion of the sources of engineering growth during
11 Rudolph, R., "The Pattern of Austrian Industrial Growth 
from the Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century", 
Austrian History Yearbook XI (1975), Table 2; and Banking 
and Industrialization in Austria-Hungary. The Role of Banks 
in the Industrialization of the Czech Crownlands, 1873-1914 
(Cambridge, 1976), Table A.3, p.207. For a critical 
discussion of the data and methods used by Rudolph see 
Appendix A, section I.
12 Rudolph's index shows a fall in output for 1881 to 1883. 
But this decline is merely the result of a sharp increase 
in rail production directly reducing iron and steel 
consumption in machine-building. The compensating increases 
in wrought iron output and iron and steel imports are not 
accounted for in his estimation procedure; Rudolph, Banking 
and Industrialization, Tables A.3, A.18 and A.19, pp.207- 
224. See also Appendix A, section I.
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the last two decades before the First World War, which 
follows in the third section.
Table II.3
RUDOLPH ESTIMATES OF GROWTH IN AUSTRIAN MACHINE-BUILDING
(PER CENT PER ANNUM)
1870-1913
1870-1880
1880-1890
8.00
3.50
15.30
1890-1900
1900-1913
9.30
5.30
Peak-to-peak measures:
1885-1896
1896-1900'
10.79
8.94
1900-1912 6.29
No output peak in 1896 but strong positive deviation from trend.
Source: Rudolph, "Pattern of Industrial Growth", Table 2; 
and Banking and Industrialization, Table A.3, p.207.
2. Machine-Building and the "Great Depression" in Austria
In a 1974 article and in his 1984 book, David Good 
critically examined the notion of a "Great Depression" in 
Austria between 1873 and 189613. This notion is
particularly associated with the work of Eduard Marz and 
Herbert Matis. Drawing on Schumpeter's and Kondratieff's 
concepts of development, Marz and Matis argue that Austrian 
economic growth between 1848 and 1913 was characterized by 
a long-wave pattern with trend breaks in 1873 and 18 9 614.
13 Good, D.F., "Stagnation and 'Take-Off' in Austria, 1873- 
1913", EHR 2nd ser. XXVII (1974) No.l, pp.72-87, and The 
Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1984), pp.164-185.
14 Marz, E., "Zur Genesis der Schumpeterschen Theorie der 
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung", On Political Economy and 
Econometrics, Essays in Honour of Oskar Lange (Warsaw, 
1965), pp.370-380, and Osterreichische Industrie- und 
Bankpolitik in der Zeit Franz Josephs T. (Vienna, 1968); 
Matis, H., Osterreichs Wirtschaft 1848-1913: Konjunkturelle 
Dynamik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel im Zeitalter Franz 
Josephs J. (Berlin, 1972).
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They distinguish three discrete periods: an expansionary 
phase from 1848 to 1873 dominated by railway construction; 
a second period, containing the great depression in the 
aftermath of the 1873 Viennese stock market crash, lasted 
until 1896; it was characterized by price deflation and 
slow growth in real output; and finally, a phase of rapid 
growth between 1896 and 1913 supported by the rise of new 
industries and re-armament15. Good disagrees with the view 
that Austria's economic growth slowed down after the 1873 
crash. He argues, with reference to the results of his own 
research and the work of Nachum Gross and Richard Rudolph, 
that the economy's performance between 1873 and 1896 did 
not diverge significantly from its growth record during the 
subsequent business cycles16. "The picture which emerges 
... confirms the conclusion ... that the entire period 
1873-1913 was one of steady, uninterrupted growth in the 
Austrian economy with no break in the secular trend"17. 
This assessment of the pattern of growth was challenged by 
John Komlos18. He accepts the traditional hypothesis of a 
slowdown in Austria's economy after 1873 and maintains that 
much of the evidence cited in support of the revisionist
15 Marz' summarized his view of Austrian economic 
development in the nineteenth century in "Die 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Donaumonarchie im 
19.Jahrhundert", Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1985), 
pp.367-392. See also Kernbauer, H., and Marz, E., "Das 
Wirtschaftswachstum in Deutschland und Osterreich von der 
Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg - Eine 
vergleichende Darstellung", Historische Konjunktur- 
forschung, eds. W.H. Schroder and R. Spree (Stuttgart, 
1981), pp.47-59.
16 Good, Economic Rise, p. 172. Cf. Gross, N.T., 
"Industrialization in Austria in the Nineteenth Century" 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1966), pp.61-66, and Rudolph, Banking and 
Industrialization, pp.12-13.
17 Good, "Stagnation", p.83.
18 Komlos, J., "Is the Depression in Austria after 1873 a 
'Myth'?", EHR 2nd ser. XXXI (1978) No.2, pp.287-289; Good's 
reply, "The Great Depression and Austrian Growth after 
1873", is published in the same issue, pp.290-294.
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view is based on heavily biased data and procedures of 
output adjustment that disguise significant cyclical 
turning points19. This is not the place to review the 
discussion on the "Great Depression" in more detail20. It 
suffices to outline the main positions in this ongoing 
debate as a background against which to project the 
machine-building industry's performance after 1873.
In a comment on the early 1880s Rudolph remarks: "The
machine-building industry was now developing a strong 
footing in the economy, and its major output during the 
boom consisted of equipment for the mining and sugar 
industries, as well as numerous steam engines and 
boilers"21. Good, examining the process of recovery in the 
late 1870s and early 1880s, finds that "the expansion was 
led by the same industries that prospered in the 1867-1873 
period. Growth in the machine-building sector was vigorous 
due to mechanization in the sugar and textile industries 
and to the diffusion of steam engines and boilers 
throughout Austrian industry"22. Kernbauer and Marz, too,
19 See the comment on the state of research on Austrian 
industrial growth in Komlos, Customs Union, pp.238-254. 
Good has shown that smoothing Komlos' annual index of 
industrial production by use of five-year-moving averages - 
as a means of removing the more extreme fluctuations in the 
annual data - yields results broadly in support of his 
thesis; see Good, Economic Rise, pp.173-176. Komlos,
preferring peak-to-peak measurement of growth, criticizes 
the loss of information involved in such data smoothing; 
Komlos, J., Review of D.F. Good, The Economic Rise of the 
Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914. JEEH 18 (1989) No.2, pp.452-
455.
20 On this debate see also Mosser, A., Die
Industrieaktiengesellschaft in Osterreich 1880-1913: 
Versuch einer historischen Bilanz- und Betriebsanalyse
(Vienna, 1980), pp.171-194, and his review of D.F. Good, 
The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914.
Mitteilungen des osterreichischen Staatsarchivs 40 (1987), 
pp.455-457.
21 Rudolph, Banking and Industrialization, p.28.
22 Good, Economic Rise, p. 165.
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conclude that rapid expansion in the metal-working and 
machine-building industries dominated the cycle in the 
early 1880s23. As has been shown above, the new estimates 
of Austrian machine-building output presented here do not 
confirm this view. On the contrary, they suggest a steep 
downturn in production from the 1872 peak, followed by a 
period of prolonged stagnation in industrial engineering. 
Between 1874 and 1891, machinery output only once (1882) 
reached or surpassed its trend level (Figure II.1). Much of 
the rise in output during the 1880s can thus be interpreted 
as recovery growth rather than genuine expansion (Table 
II.1). Full recovery of production in terms of a return to 
trend levels and advances above its pre-crash volume was 
not achieved before the end of the decade.
It will be argued below that the poor growth record of 
Austrian engineering between 1873 and the mid-1880s can be 
explained by the disappearance of those forces that 
accounted for the industry's rapid expansion in the 
preceding boom of 1867 to 1872.
This boom unfolded in the climate of political and 
institutional stability following the 1867 Dual Settlement 
between Austria and Hungary. The economic upsurge was 
fuelled primarily by an expansion in the money supply and 
the Hungarian "miracle harvest" of 1867/6824. New paper 
money was issued by the government to finance the Prussian 
and Italian wars. The record harvests came at a time of 
poor harvests elsewhere in Europe. Consequently, grain 
exports from Austria-Hungary were stimulated in response to 
particularly high foreign demand. The uspswing in 
agriculture facilitated a cumulative increase in activity 
throughout the economy. Agricultural incomes rose as prices 
for both grain and land began to climb and, as a result, 
demand for consumer goods grew. The sharp growth in freight
23 Kernbauer and Marz, "Wirtschaftswachstum", p.53.
24 See Matis, Osterreichs Wirtschaft, pp. 153-161.
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traffic intensity associated with buoyant cereal exports 
initiated an unprecedented expansion of the railway 
network. "Even those railway lines hitherto unprofitable 
now yielded substantial returns, a virtual 'railway boom' 
of almost American dimensions began with the length of 
track and rolling stock expanding”25. Austria's railway 
network grew from 5,273 kilometres in 1869 to 10,331 
kilometres in 1875. Never before and never thereafter were 
more new tracks laid in one year than in each of the years 
1871 and 1872 (Figure II.4). Similarly, Hungary's railways 
system were enlarged at quite the same rate26. With rising 
demand for rails, engines and rolling stock the railways 
provided a major stimulus for the producer goods and 
capital goods industries27. Austria's pig iron production 
rose from 182,670 tons in 1867 to more than 320,000 tons in 
1873; and steel output grew by 43 per cent per annum28. But 
the boom years of 1867 to 1873 were associated with rising 
output not only in producer goods industries and 
agriculture, but also, in response to generally rising 
incomes, with rapid growth in manufacturing of consumer 
goods such as sugar, beer and textiles29. New productive 
capacity in industry was installed and large joint-stock 
operations played an increasingly important role: a total 
of 463 industrial establishments were either newly founded 
or converted into joint-stock enterprises between 1866 and 
1873. 116 sugar factories came into being, 61 construction 
corporations were founded, 45 mining companies were set up, 
43 new breweries and 28 textile factories entered the
25 Ibid., p. 158.
26 Matlekovits, A. v., Das Konigreich Ungarn, vol. II 
(Leipzig, 1900), pp.661-663.
27 Cf. Matis, Osterreichs Wirtschaft, pp. 186-191.
28 For sources see Appendix A, Table A.7.
29 See Komlos, Customs Union, Appendix E, Table E.6, on the 
development of output in the various manufacturing 
branches.
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market as joint-stock companies30. To put the scale of 
founding activity in these years into perspective: between 
1851 and 1865 only 21 new industrial joint-stock companies 
were set up, whereas for 1874 to 1890 new formations of 
industrial joint-stock companies amounted to 7731.
Faced with rising demand for railway related output and 
growing orders of equipment from an expanding industrial 
sector, the domestic machine-building industry was well 
placed to benefit from the Grunderzeit boom32. "In 1872 the 
demand for machinery of all kinds rose to such an extent 
that the most important establishments had to turn down 
orders - despite the increase in workforce and auxiliary 
equipment, the expansion of workshops, and recourse to 
working at night, during Sundays and bank holidays"33. The 
demands on engineering capacity necessitated expansion of 
the existing productive apparatus and induced some of 
Austria's most important machine-building companies to 
incorporate34.
30 Somary, F., Die Aktiengesellschaften in Osterreich 
(Vienna, 1902), p.9.
31 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
32 According to Komlos' index of industrial production 
(mining, manufacturing, construction) industrial output 
rose by almost 8.6 per cent on annual average from 1867 to 
1872; Komlos, Customs Union, Appendix E, Table E.4.
33 Handels- und Gewerbekammer Wien, Bericht iiber die 
Verkehrsverhaltnisse wahrend des Jahres 1872-1874 
(hereafter HK-Bericht Wien), p.134.
34 For example: Maschinen- und Waggonbaufabrik AG Simmering 
(1869) ; Wiener Lokomotivfabrik AG (1869); Prager 
Maschinenbau AG, vorm. Ruston, Bromovsky & Ringhoffer 
(1869); Erste bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik in Prag
(1871); Erste Brunner Maschinenfabrik AG (1872); 
Maschinenbau AG, vorm. Breitfeld, DanSk & Co., Prague
(1872). See Somary, Aktiengesellschaften, p.49.
34
Figure II.4: Annual Additions to Austrian Railway Network (Kilometres)
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Source: See Appendix A, Table A.10.
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The impact of railway construction on engineering is well 
illustrated by the case of Vienna's locomotive industry - 
around 1870 probably the most important single branch of 
Austrian machine-building. In 1870, prior to the peak of 
the railway boom, the value of locomotive and tender 
production of Austria's three producers of locomotives - 
the k.k. priv. osterreichische Staatsbahn (Vienna) and the 
two factories of G.Sigl in Vienna and Wiener Neustadt - 
accounted for approximately 18 per cent of the country's 
total machine-building output35. Up to 1873 output of 
railway engines rose rapidly. But once pre-1873 orders from 
domestic and foreign customers were completed in 1874, and 
partly still in 1875, the factories began to run out of 
work36. Neither the few state owned nor the privately run 
railway companies required new machinery - and the supply 
to foreign markets was a shortlived interlude allowing for 
only partial compensation37. The collapse of the private 
railways after the 1873 crash led to a virtual cessation of 
new railway construction in Austria (Figure II.4)38. In 
Hungary, further expansion of the network came to a 
standstill39. The fall in related demand for engines and 
rolling stock caused the Viennese manufacturers' output and 
employment to drop dramatically. Production of locomotives 
fell from an annual average of 334 in 1870-1874 to 118 in 
1875-1880. The example of the 'Actiengesellschaft der
35 Handelsministerium, "Statistik der osterreichischen 
Industrie 1870", NIHV, vol.3 (1874), No.2, pp.116, 145. See 
also Appendix A, Table A.6.
36 HK-Bericht Vienna 1875, p. 41.
37 Ibid.. See also Appendix D, Table D.9.
38 A brief discussion of the disintegration of the private 
railway companies after 1873 which eventually led to the 
re-establishment of state-owned railway lines in Austria is 
to be found in Bachinger, K., "Das Verkehrswesen", Die 
Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, vol.l: Die wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung, ed. A. Brusatti (Vienna, 1973), pp. 292-303.
39 Cf. Chapter III, section 3, Table III.9.
36
Locomotivfabrik, vormals G.Sigl' (Wiener Neustadt) is 
indicative: the number of people employed in the workshops 
of this company - the biggest and most important producer 
of railway engines - rose from 2,460 in 1872 to its peak of 
2,826 in 1874. Output of locomotives and tenders peaked 
already in 1873 but due to previous foreign orders there 
was work left to be finished in 1874 and 1875, partly 
compensating for diminished domestic orders. Of the 172 
locomotives produced in 1872 only 8 were exported; in 1873, 
when production reached 179 engines, already 78 of these 
were sent abroad; the export share came to its maximum in 
1874 and 1875 when 150 and 117 locomotives out of a 
production of 168 and 134, respectively, were delivered to 
foreign countries. But by 1876 this source for employment 
had dried up: in the first half of the year only 21
locomotives were produced and deliveries of tenders - which 
were at 129 in 1875 - decreased to a mere 17. The value of 
output plummeted from 3,829,450 florins to 992,369 florins 
in 1876. Both the number of employed workers as well as 
working hours fell as a consequence of contracting demand. 
By 1876 only 650 people had kept their jobs at the 
'Locomotivfabrik' in Wiener Neustadt, and a considerable 
number of these were being employed for only two or three 
days per week40. However, as shown in Table II.4, these 
conditions of insufficient demand and low employment were 
not confined to one establishment but affected all major 
producers of railway equipment for most of the 1870s and 
1880s41. Though turnover and employment improved again 
during the early 1880s in response to a new railway 
programme, the peak levels of employment in Vienna's
40 HK-Bericht Wien 1875, p.42.
41 G.Sigl's machine-building firm in Vienna never fully 
recoverd - with employment fluctuating between 200 and 400 
workers - and was eventually closed in 1887. The company at 
Hernals - a producer mainly of railway cars founded in 1869 
- went into liquidation in 1876. See Mathis, F., Big 
Business in Osterreich. Osterreichs Unternehmen in 
Kurzdarstellungen, Vienna 1987, pp.144, 284.
railway engineering industry of the early 1870s were never 
repeated.
Table II.4
EMPLOYMENT IN VIENNESE ENGINEERING COMPANIES 
(NUMBERS OF WORKERS)
SVI SWN STEG FLO SIM HER Total
1872 1,436 2,460 1,338 748 1,186 720 7 880
1873 1,286 2,639 1,294 833 870 883 7 805
1874 1,139 2,826 1,006 633 523 240 6 367
1875 760 2,041 486 410 521 257 4 475
1876 420 654 420 345 394 191 2 424
1877 374 1,021 485 332 464 267 2 943
1878 307 1,177 713 588 557 458 3 800
1879 200 676 548 220 570 178 2 392
1880 188 590 500 482 502 262 2 524
1881 205 1,900 622 862 700 401 4 690
1882 273 2,172 950 1,105 800 710 6 010
1883 322 2,323 940 1,035 1,026 870 6 516
1884 290 1,887 815 952 950 765 5 659
1885 243 1,774 719 875 1,034 917 5 562
1886 226 1,222 581 419 711 454 3 613
1887 - 957 704 332 932 406 3 331
1888 - 1,239 999 596 1,006 - 3 840
1889 - 1,559 1,174 684 1, 060 - 4 477
1890 — 1,407 1,041 624 1,118 — 4 190
Keys SVI = G. Sigl, Vienna
SWN
STEG =
FLO
SIM
HER
vorm.Locomot ivf abr ik,
osterr.-ungar.
Actien-Gesellschaft der 
G.Sigl, Wiener Neustadt 
Maschinenfabrik der priv. 
Staatseisenbahn-Gesellschaft, Vienna 
Wiener Locomotivfabriks-AG, Floridsdorf 
Maschinen- und Waggonfabriks-AG, vorm. H.D. Schmid, 
Simmering
Hernalser Maschinen- und Waggon-Fabrik von C. v.Milde 
& Co.oc •
Sources: HK-Bericht Wien 1872-1874, p.13 6; 1877, p. 63;
1879, p.62; 1881, p.52; 1883, p.73; 1885, p.75; 1886, p.78; 
1887, p.73; 1889, p.85; 1891, p.87.
Throughout the late nineteenth century, railway 
construction in Austria was carried out sporadically . But 
the related erratic changes in demand for locomotives and 
rolling stock never exercised such pressure as in the 
1870s, because the relative importance of railway related
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machine-building within the engineering industry as a whole 
declined during the later periods. In the early 1870s 
locomotive engineering was at the centre of Austrian 
machine-building. Hence a downturn in this branch had an 
immediate effect on overall machine-building output. The 
sharp decline in total engineering production, however, 
suggests that contraction hit virtually all branches of the 
industry.
The consumer goods industries whose expansion in the boom 
years provided a stimulus for machinery production were now 
also in crisis. While the dominant Bohemian sugar industry 
recovered relatively fast with pre-crash levels of 
production realized again in 1878/7942, other light 
industries remained in agony. The output of beer dropped by 
almost 17 per cent between 1873 and 1880 and did not make 
up for the difference until 188743. Similarly, the 
development of the woollen textiles industry meant that 
little relief was to be expected from that side either44. 
The index of Austrian manufacturing output fell by 11 per 
cent between 1872 and 1873. The 1871 peak was reached again 
as late as 188145. But for the machine-building industry, 
whose output had risen much faster in the pre-crash 
expansion than that of other manufacturing branches, 1873 
marked the beginning of a downturn more severe than that in 
Austrian industry as a whole. In the 1874 trough, output 
was 40 per cent below the 1872 level. Although the pre­
crash peak was briefly realized again in 1882, production 
in mechanical engineering fell below this mark in the 
following years to 1887. This renewed downturn was related 
to the world sugar crisis. Austrian output of sugar fell by
42 Brousek, K.M., Die GroBindustrie Bohmens 1848-1918 
(Munich, 1987), pp.90-91.
43 Komlos, Customs Union, Appendix E, Table E.6.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., Table E.4.
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almost 40 per cent between 1885 and 188646. In turn, demand 
for plant equipment contracted and caused a rapid fall in 
production of those engineering branches that worked 
largely for the sugar industry, notably in Bohemia and 
Moravia47.
The rapid growth in machinery output in the pre-1873 boom 
years implied an enlarged stock of capital goods in the 
economy in later years. As aggregate demand contracted 
after 1873, with sales and output of industrial goods 
falling and only gradually returning to pre-crash levels, 
it was confronted with this larger capital stock. Machinery 
purchases during the mid-1870s to mid-1880s were thus 
largely confined to replacements only. At a time when 
railroad construction ceased to be a driving force behind 
the expansion of machine-building the industrial sector 
could not fill the gap. Low rates of manufacturing growth 
meant little net investment in capital goods and, 
consequently, demand for steam engines and plant equipment 
recovered only slowly48.
3. Growth and Productivity: 189 0 to 1913
Full recovery in Austrian machine-building was finally 
achieved by the late 1880s in the wake of accelerating 
growth in the industrial economy. Domestic demand for 
machinery was rising as manufacturers began exceeding the 
limitations of mere replacement investment by installing 
new capacity49. Favourable harvests in Russia, Hungary and 
Roumania, the primary export markets for Austrian
46 Ibid., Table E.6.
47 HK-Bericht Wien 1884, pp.81-82; 1885, pp.80-81; 1886,
pp.82-83; Handels- und Gewerbekammer Briinn, Bericht der 
Handels- und Gewerbekammer in Briinn (hereafter HK-Bericht 
Briinn) 1884, p. 17.
48 HK-Bericht Wien 1885, pp.75-82.
49 HK-Bericht Wien 1888, p.78.
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agricultural machinery, provided a further stimulus50. 
Though interrupted by two recessions in 1902-1903 and 1910, 
the ensuing long-run upswing in Austria's mechanical 
engineering industry lasted until the eve of World War I. 
Clearly, the process of expansion was sustained by a 
general rise in demand for capital goods from a growing 
domestic industrial sector. But the marked trend 
acceleration in Austrian machinery production we observe 
for the post-1890 period was also related to the emergence 
of new, additional sources of growth. These accounted for 
a pace of advancement strikingly different from that of 
other industries51. The main factors which contributed to 
pushing output levels above the longer run trend during 
most years between 1890 and 1913 were the development and 
application of new technologies, a rise in agriculture's 
machinery requirements, and a favourable development of 
machinery trade between the mid-1880s and the turn of the 
century. Moreover, in the years immediately preceding World 
War I, Austria-Hungary pursued an expansive re-armament 
programme52. Some of the output growth in the machine- 
building industry was most probably related to the effects 
of increased military orders and the associated expansion 
of armaments and ship-building concerns like the Skoda 
works in Pilsen/Plzefi and the Stabilimento Tecnico 
Triestino, especially from 191053.
Mechanical engineering directly benefitted from the rapid 
growth in electricity generation and usage which set in 
during the 1880s. Austria's first central power stations
50 Ibid., pp.85-87.
51 Cf. the discussion below, section 5.
52 Cf. Paulinyi, A., "Die Industriepolitik in Ungarn und in 
Osterreich und das Problem der okonomischen Integration 
(1889-1914)", Zeitschrift fiir Wirtschaf ts- und
Sozialwissenschaften (1977) No.2, pp.139-141.
53 Marz, E., Osterreichische Bankpolitik in der Zeit der 
groBen Wende 1913-1923 (Vienna, 1981), pp.27, 30-31.
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were built in this period54. Demand for water turbines and 
steam engines, as sources of moving power for generators, 
rose in response to the growing number of privately and 
publicly owned power plants which supplied electricity for 
communications, industry, and private households55. Between 
1907 and 1913, the number of power plants in Austria rose 
from 446 to 854; their output of electricity increased 
annually by more than 18 per cent on average. About 57 per 
cent of generating energy was provided by steam engines, 38 
per cent by water power and the remaining 5 per cent by 
internal combustion engines56. Moravia employed almost a 
third of all Austrian workers primarily engaged in steam 
technology and so was the country's leading region in 
manufacturing of steam engines and boilers57. Output data
54 Matis, H. and Bachinger, K., "Osterreichs industrielle 
Entwicklung", Die Habsburger Monarchie 1848-1918, vol.l: 
Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, ed. A. Brusatti (Vienna, 
1978), p.185.
55 Cf. HK-Bericht Briinn 1890, p.54. The records of Austria's 
two leading producers of water turbines, the Leobersdorfer 
Maschinenfabriks-AG and the Voith works in St. Polten, 
indicate an extremely wide range of customers for their 
products, including small-scale rural flour mills requiring 
less than 10 horse-power per unit and large central hydro­
electric power stations with turbine installations of up to 
8,000 horse-power per unit.
J.M. Voith AG, Turbinenbau, St. Polten/Austria (hereafter 
VSP) : (1) Verzeichnis der von der Leobersdorfer
Maschinenfabriks-AG gelieferten Turbinen; (2) Leobersdorfer 
Maschinenfabriks-AG, Wasserturbinen, Lieferungen seit dem 
Jahre 1900. Werksarchiv Voith GmbH, Heidenheim/Germany 
(hereafter VWA): Verzeichnis der von der Firma J.M. Voith 
fur Osterreich-Ungarn gelieferten Turbinenanlagen (1870 to 
1912).
56 K.k. osterreichisches Handelsmuseum, Materialien zur 
osterreichischen Produktions- und Betriebsstatistik 
(Vienna, 1916), p.12.
57 The respective shares of Bohemia and Lower Austria were 
slightly lower; k.k. Statistisches Zentralkommission, 
"Ergebnisse der gewerblichen Betriebszahlung vom 3. Juni 
1902” (hereafter "Betriebszahlung 1902"), Osterreichische 
Statistik (hereafter OStat), vol. 75, 1. Heft, 2.Abtlg. 
(1907), Table II, pp.18-19; 3.Heft (1905), Table I, pp.4-5; 
9.Heft (1906), Table I, p.11; 10.Heft (1905), Table I, p.8.
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for Brno show that in the two decades around the turn of 
the century, electric power generating plants had become 
the second most important industrial customer of steam 
engine and steam turbine manufacturers; only the textile 
industries maintained larger orders58.
The appearance of the internal combustion engine opened 
hitherto largely untapped sources of demand for power 
machines. Small workshops and factories, in particular, 
which by the turn of the century still employed the 
majority of workers in Austrian industry59, made increasing 
use of gas, petrol, and - somewhat later - Diesel
engines60. For these establishments, the internal 
combustion engine offered a credible alternative to costly 
steam power, since it was more efficient when operating 
intermittently or at less than full load, “conditions 
frequently found in small industry”61.
A shift towards more capital intensive modes of production 
in agriculture provided a major and lasting stimulus to the 
growth of the machine-building sector. The large share of 
people employed in farming and the low degree of
mechanization in Austrian agriculture implied ample scope 
for potential improvement during the late nineteenth
century. In 1890, more than 62 per cent of the total labour 
force were still employed in agriculture and forestry. By 
1910 this share had fallen to 53 per cent62. Yet in 1902, 
only a third of all agricultural operations in Cisleithania 
made use of any kind of machinery; the three most
58 HK-Bericht Briinn 1900, pp.126-127; 1910, pp.81-89.
59 See the discussion below, section 4.
60 Cf. HK-Bericht Wien 1889, pp.87-89; 1897, pp.95-96; 1904, 
pp.102-104; 1911, p.83.
61 Landes, D.S., The Unbound Prometheus. Technological 
Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 
1750 to the Present (Cambridge, 1969), p.280.
62 Sandgruber, R., Osterreichische Agrarstatistik 1750-1918 
(Munich, 1978), Table 51, p.114.
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widespread implements, namely chaff-cutters, cleaning and 
sorting machinery, and threshing-machines, were employed 
respectively in only 28, 13, and 11 per cent of all
operations63. The temporal coincidence of rapidly growing 
imports and expanding production indicates that there was 
a genuine rise in domestic demand for farm equipment after 
the turn of the century64. The sector invested heavily in 
labour saving technology and equipment which allowed more 
intensive cultivation of the soil. As Sandgruber points 
out, productivity growth in Austrian agriculture was indeed 
particularly fast in the post-1900 years when compared to 
the previous decades65. However, the trade statistics 
suggest that growth in Austrian output of agricultural 
machines was not only a function of rising domestic demand, 
but also of increases in machinery requirements elsewhere. 
Austrian exports of farming implements and machines rose 
rapidly, especially after the mid-1890366.
Finally, the effects of the course of Austria-Hungary's 
foreign trade in machinery as a whole from the late 1880s 
to the early 1900s should be considered. For several 
reasons which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
V below, the growth of imports was slower than that of 
domestic output and, despite considerable export growth, 
the degree of import penetration was temporarily falling. 
As a result, domestic manufacturers were left with a larger 
share of a growing machinery market. Austrian machine- 
building firms were thus in a better position to exploit 
any increases in demand than was the case during the 1880s.
63 Ibid., Tables 52 and 53, pp. 116-117.
64 See Appendix A, Table A.12c, and Appendix D, Table D.10.
65 Ibid., p.113 and Table 51, p.114, for data on yield-per- 
hectare and labour productivity.
66 Appendix D, Table D.10. For a fuller discussion of 
Austria's and the Habsburg Empire's trade in agricultural 
machinery see Chapter V, section 2.
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The growth of machine-building output went along with a 
rapid expansion of the labour force. Employment in 
mechanical engineering grew from about 33,000 workers in 
1889 to more than 80,000 in 1911, an increase of about 4 
per cent on annual average67.
Table II.5
AVERAGE LABOUR FORCE IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING
1889/1893 37,517 1904/1908 70,738
1894/1898 48,245 1909/1911 80,493
1899/1903 59,128
Note: Averages based on annual data.
Sources: k.k. Ministerium des Innern, Die Gebarung und die 
Ergebnisse der Unfallstatistik der Arbeiter-Unfall-
Versicherungsanstalten 1889-1896 (Vienna, 1891-1898);
Ergbnisse der Unfallstatistik der fiinfjahrigen 
Beobachtungsperiode 1897-1901, 1902-1906, 1907-1911
(Vienna, 1904-1914); see Appendix A, Tables A.12a to A.12e, 
for detailed references.
According to the records of the Austrian workers' insurance 
system, much of the rise in engineering employment was 
accounted for by rapid growth in the manufacture of 
agricultural machinery. In 1891, fewer than 3,400 workers 
were employed in the production of farming machines and 
equipment; by the turn of the century the number had risen 
to 6,800 and in 1911, more than 13,000 people worked in 
this branch of mechanical engineering. In contrast, the 
relative importance of locomotive engineering was 
declining. The labour force in this branch of machine- 
building fluctuated strongly between a minimum of 2,457 
workers (1892) and a maximum of 5,832 (1908), but average 
employment levels did not rise over time. As a result, the 
share of locomotive engineering in total machine-building
67 See Table II.5 for sources.
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employment gradually fell68. Similarly, while the share of 
agricultural machinery in total machine-building output 
rose from approximately 8 per cent in 1897/99 to almost 12 
per cent in 1909/11, the production of locomotives 
decreased from 11 per cent to less than 7 per cent69. 
However, frequent re-classifications and the lack of 
sufficiently disaggregate data in the insurance statistics 
do not permit a detailed examination of the growth 
experience in the various branches of the industry70. The 
category of general machine-building includes all sections 
of mechanical engineering which are not explicitly 
specified in the statistics. This refers to the production 
of steam engines, other engines, machinery for the sugar, 
brewing, mining, and iron and steel industries, all types 
of working machines, and machine tools. The labour force 
employed in engineering branches subsumed under this 
extremely broad category accounted for 53 per cent of total 
machine-building employment in 1900 and 44 per cent in 
19ll71. Similar percentages apply to this section's share 
in total output in mechanical engineering. In brief, one 
half of the machine-building industry, probably including
68 Ibid.
69 See Appendix A, Tables A. 12b, A. 12c, and A. 13, column 
(1). It should be noted, that the data for gross production 
in machine-building given in Appendix A, Tables A.12a to 
A.12e, are grouped according to the wage-sum/production 
ratios used to estimate output; this does not necessarily 
imply inclusion in the same branch of machine-building in 
the strict sense. Table A.12b, for example, comprises the 
output figures for branches as diverse as locomotive 
engineering, general machine-building, and the production 
of looms.
70 Locomotive engineering and the production of agricultural 
machinery are the only two branches of mechanical 
engineering for which meaningful employment data are 
available for the early 1890s. Figures for the size of the 
labour force in other branches are either not provided at 
all, or refer to completely unspecified categories such as 
large machine-building factories or simply machinery 
locksmiths and repair shops.
71 For sources see Table II.5.
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some of its most important branches, is covered only with 
summary values for employment or output. Alternative 
employment data, based on a 1902 business census, are, 
therefore, presented in Table II.672. The degree of branch 
differentiation is not higher than that provided by the 
insurance statistics, but at least we obtain some measure 
of the relative importance of steam engine production. 
Almost 20 per cent of all workers in Austrian mechanical 
engineering were employed in this section of the machine- 
building industry.
Table II.6
EMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTION IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, 1902
number of 
workers
per cent
(1) steam engines 12,198 19.9
(2) other engines 837 1.4
(3) agricultural machinery 10,062 16.4
(4) sewing machines 1,870 3.0
(5) milling machines 1,987 3.2
(6) other machines 34,441 56.1
(7) total 61,395 100.0
Source: Statistisches Zentralkommission, "Betriebszahlung
1902”, OStat, vol. 75, 1. Heft, 2.Abtlg. 
pp.18-19.
(1907), Table II,
These employment figures suggest that, at the turn of the 
century, the production of steam engines and agricultural 
machinery were probably the most important sections of 
mechanical engineering in Austria. This finding is fully 
supported by the results of a factory survey in 1906, 
according to which the two branches together accounted for
72 It should be noted that the 1902 business census aimed at 
a comprehensive record of all productive activity. Thus the 
number of employees in mechanical engineering as a whole 
and in its branches recorded in the census is somewhat 
higher than that reported in the Unfallstatistik for 1902.
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30 per cent of the total labour force in mechanical 
engineering73. The structure of Austria's foreign trade, 
too, indicates that steam technology and agricultural 
machinery were the two main areas of engineering activity. 
Exports accounted for approximately 40 per cent of Austrian 
output of agricultural implements. If trade with Hungary is 
included, Austria maintained a positive balance of trade in 
agricultural machinery since the early 1880s, with a 
particularly fast expansion in exports to foreign countries 
after the turn of the century74. The same holds for 
Austria's trade in steam engines, at least from the early 
1890s onwards75.
A plausible explanation for this pattern of industrial 
specialization may be found in the size of the market. As 
Nathan Rosenberg has shown, the development of a country's 
capital goods sector is critically dependent on the ability 
to specialize production76. But the degree of 
specialization, i.e. the extent to which a firm or branch 
of an industry concentrates on the production of only a few 
more or less standardized types, is largely determined by 
the level of demand for these items. If total demand is 
restricted as a result of limited product market size, 
firms will be forced to maintain a relatively large product 
programme in order to fully employ their factors of 
production and are thus unable to realize economies of 
specialization. Austria, and Hungary to an even larger
73 k.k. Handelsministerium, Arbeitsstatistisches Amt, Die 
Arbeitszeit in den Fabriksbetrieben Osterreichs (hereafter 
Fabrikszahlung 1906) (Vienna, 1907), Table IV, pp.264-268.
74 Cf. Chapter V, section 2, Table V.4, and Appendix D, 
Table D.10.
75 Appendix D, Table D.8, and Magyar Kir. Kozponti 
Statisztikai Hivatal, "A Magyar Szent Korona Orszagainak 
1882-1913. £vi Kulkereskedelmi Forgalma", Magyar 
Statisztikai Kozlemenyek 63 (Budapest, 1923), pp.304-305.
76 Rosenberg, N., "Capital Goods, Technology, and Economic 
Growth", N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology 
(Cambridge, 1976), pp.141-150.
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extent, was a country with a large agricultural sector 
relative to industry. One would therefore expect a 
relatively large part of machine-building to be geared 
towards catering for the machinery needs of agriculture. 
Similarly, power machines like steam engines were used in 
virtually all branches of industry. The actual and 
potential market for these machines was thus significantly 
larger than that for highly specialized machinery like, for 
example, machine-tools or spinning machines.
The production process in a firm or an industry can be 
examined at various levels and from different angles. One 
may, for example, study the methods of management, the 
training of the labour force, the rate of investment in 
capital equipment or other elements of industrial 
behaviour77. But often the sources available do not provide 
the information sufficient for a separate analysis of these 
components. This holds especially if, as in this study, an 
industrial sector as a whole rather than a single firm is 
the subject of interest. Changes in productivity, though, 
are a widely employed summary measure which serves to 
reflect the collective effects of these components on 
output. For all elements of the productive process together 
contribute to changes in the productivity of the factors of 
production. A concept which aims at measuring the changing 
efficiency in the use of all inputs is that of total factor 
productivity78. Here, however, we are confined to the 
measurement of changes in the productivity of labour inputs 
only, because the lack of adequate data does not permit the 
computation of changes in total factor productivity in
77 Cf. Floud, R.D., The British Machine Tool Industry, 1850- 
1914 (Cambridge, 1976), p.184.
78 A comprehensive account of the concept of total factor 
productivity and its measurement is given in Matthews, 
R.C.O., Feinstein, C.H., and Odling-Smee, J.C., British 
Economic Growth 1856-1973 (Oxford, 1982), pp.198-213, 589- 
598.
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Austrian machine-building79.
The labour input is measured in man-years. Unfortunately, 
no adjustments could be made for changes in the quality of 
labour and for variations in working hours80. The results 
obtained indicate that the rise in output was sustained not 
only by an absolute increase in employment but by a 
continuous upward trend in labour productivity (Figure 
II.5).
79 The direct measurement of changes in total factor 
productivity by subtracting the rate of change of total 
factor inputs from the rate of change of output is not 
feasible because of the lack of sufficiently representative 
data on inputs of physical capital. An alternative method, 
which avoids some of the problems involved in the accurate 
measurement of inputs, is that employed by Roderick Floud 
who examined the change in total factor productivity in a 
British machine tool firm. He proceeds from a Cobb-Douglas 
production function which exhibits constant returns to 
scale. The so-called dual approach is used to transform the 
function in such way that output and inputs are measured in 
terms of their prices and not in physical units. Further 
transformation of the equation so obtained yields a linear 
function where the rate of growth in total factor 
productivity equals the sum of the weighted rates of growth 
of input prices minus the growth rate of the price of 
output. See Floud, Machine Tool Industry, pp.184-202. 
However, this approach, too, cannot be used to compute 
changes in total factor productivity in Austrian machine- 
building. Though material input prices and wage rates are 
available, and interest rates could be used as a proxy for 
the price of capital, an independent output price series is 
lacking. The computation of the average unit price per ton 
of iron and steel inputs as a proxy is not feasible since 
the input series has a slight upward bias over time. The 
resulting unit value series would be virtually meaningless. 
The price index used to deflate output had to be based on 
input prices and is thus of no help with this particular 
problem either. See the discussion in Appendix A.
80 For 1891 to 1911, the employment data given in 
Ministerium des Innern, Unfallstatistik, refer to "full 
time employees". This is a standardized measure arrived at 
by dividing the total number of days worked by 300 which 
was regarded as the usual number of working days per annum 
for a person employed full time. Judged by the figures for 
1891 to 1896, for which data on both categories are 
available, the annual average number of employees was only 
slightly higher than that of "full time employees". For 
1889 and 1890, the annual average of the number of insured 
employees only is available.
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Figure II.5: Output per Worker in Austrian Machine-Building (1000 Crowns)
6.3942
Output in Constant (1913) Prices
5.7220
Output in Current Prices
5.0497
4.3774
1889 1895 1901 1907 1911
Sources: See Appendix A, Tables A.12a to A.12e, A.13, columns (1) and (2).
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Output per worker (in constant prices) in mechanical 
engineering displayed a trend rate of growth of 
approximately 0.8 per cent between 1889 and 191181. The 
next section examines the question to what extent the 
growth in the labour force and the rise in labour 
productivity were accompanied by changes in the size 
structure of the industry and in the prevailing scale of 
production.
4. Plant Size and Location of Austrian Machine-Building
Table II.7 below presents data on plant size and employment 
in 1902 and 1906. A significant part of productive activity 
was carried out on a fairly small scale. About 15 per cent 
of the labour force in mechanical engineering were employed 
in workshops with 20 workers or fewer. Compared with 
Austrian industry as a whole, though, machine-building 
displayed a high degree of employment concentration in 
larger plants. More than half of all workers in Austrian 
industry were employed in workshops with fewer than 10 
staff; establishments with more than 50 workers provided 
employment for only 34 per cent of the industrial labour 
force82. In mechanical engineering, though, three quarters 
of the work force were employed in factories with more than 
50 workers. The smallest manufacturing units with fewer 
than 10 employees accounted for less than 10 per cent of 
total employment in machine-building83.
81 Trend in output per worker was computed as a log-linear 
function using ordinary least squares estimation. The years 
1889 to 1911 delimit the period for which data on the size 
of the labour force are available.
82 Good, Economic Rise, Table 32, p. 194.
83 In Table II.7, the data for 1902 in the "1 to 5", "6 to 
10" and "11 to 20" size classes have been grouped together 
into one "1 to 20" class to conform to 1906 definitions for 
comparabi1ity.
Table II.7
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PLANT SIZE AND EMPLOYMENT IN MACHINE-BUILDING
1902 1906
size class establ. workers establ workers
1-20 2,091 8,983 80 1,223
21-50 201 6,514 221 7,353
51-100 121 8,514 124 8,985
101-300 84 13,757 109 18,204
301-1,000 33 17,557 38 18,813
>1,000 5 6,070 5 6,129
Total 2,535 61,395 577 60,707
Sources: (1) 1902: See Table II.6. (2) 1906
Handelsministerium, Fabrikszahlung 1906 , Table IV, pp.264
268.
Using the results of the 1902 census, Good differentiates 
four basic patterns of industrial concentration in 
Austria84. The first pattern is that in which large-scale 
enterprises, especially those employing more than 1,000, 
dominate their sector. Mining and the iron and steel 
industry, in particular, belong in this group.
A second pattern is formed by those industries which, 
despite a relatively high share of large-scale operations, 
were dominated neither by small-scale nor large-scale 
enterprises. Here, medium-scale operations were dominant 
with more than 50 per cent of employees attached to firms 
in the 11 to 300 staff category. Giant operations employing 
more than 1,000 workers were present, but their shares in 
total sectoral employment fell below those of their 
counterparts in the extractive and iron industries or in 
the industries of pronounced bipolarity. The sectors 
included in this group of predominantly intermediate sized 
operations are chemicals, construction, stone and glass, 
central power generation and graphics. Wood products,
84 The following section relies on Good, Economic Rise, 
pp.196-198.
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clothing and leather products were sectors still in the 
handicraft stage of production. They fall into the third 
pattern where the majority of workers were employed in 
small workshops with less than five employees. The last 
pattern identified by Good refers to those sectors which 
were characterized by a bipolar structure of employment 
distribution. "Thousands of small handicraft operations co­
existed with the rapid emergence of large-scale, 
capitalistically organized operations"85. The textile 
industry, metal-working, foodstuffs production and the 
broadly defined engineering sector86 displayed bipolarity, 
though with varying degrees of emphasis on either small- 
scale or large-scale operations.
Using Good's criterion for medium-scale operation, i.e. the 
dominance of employment in the 11 and 300 workers range, 
mechanical engineering was a sector characterized mainly by 
medium-scale operations with a strong leaning towards 
large-scale production. Bipolarity was not a feature of the 
employment distribution in this branch of the engineering 
industries. Almost 52 per cent of the labour force in 
machine-building were employed in plants of middle size (11 
to 300) , about 28 per cent in large-scale factories (301 to 
1,000) and about one tenth in giant plants employing more 
than 1,000 people (see Table II.7)87.
85 Good, Economic Rise, pp. 197-198.
86 The 1902 census differentiated 19 broad industrial 
categories which were broken down into 273 subsectors. 
"Mechanical engineering" as referred to in this thesis 
(which includes the production of steam engines, other 
engines, agricultural machinery, sewing machines, milling 
equipment and general machinery, as listed in Table II.6) 
is part of the broad engineering category but does not 
include, for example, clock-making, the manufacture of 
scientific and musical instruments or the production of 
armaments, coaches and railway cars encompassed in this 
category. See also Good, Economic Rise, note 12, p.198.
87 Classification as either small, medium or large-scale is 
mainly a matter of definition. Good's changing usage of 
size definitions, though, is somewhat confusing: in Table 
34, brackets of "1 to 5", "6 to 10" and "over 50" are used
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The results of the business census 1902 and the factory 
census 1906 cannot be compared directly without further 
adjustment. The aim of the 1902 census was to obtain a 
comprehensive statistical record of all productive 
activity, whether handicraft based or industrial. The 1906 
census, in contrast, focused on factories only, i.e. on 
establishments generally employing more than 20 workers88. 
This size criterion, reflecting contemporary terminology 
and definitions89, was also applied in the 1890 business 
survey90. Standardizing the data for 1902 and 1906 by 
excluding all manufacturing units with less than 20 
employees yields indicators which allow an assessment of 
changes in the average size of engineering plants (Table 
II.8)91.
as indicators of small, middle and large firm size. Because 
of the high employment share of plants with more than 50 
employees, chemicals, construction and power plants are 
classified in this table as part of the first, large-scale 
pattern. Yet in the accompanying text these sectors are 
described as being dominated by medium-scale operations 
since they displayed a particularly high share of 
employment in the 11 to 300 range. Similarly, production of 
leather goods is categorized in Table 34 as of 
predominantly middle size only to be downgraded to small- 
scale status. See Good, Economic Rise, pp.196-197.
88 Handelsmuseum, Mater ialien zur Produktions- und 
Betriebsstatistik, pp.VI-VII.
89 Otruba, G., "Quantitative, strukturelle und regionale 
Dynamik des Industrialisierungsprozesses in Osterreich- 
Ungarn vom Ausgang des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ausbruch 
des ersten Weltkriegs", Vom Kleingewerbe zur GroBindustrie, 
ed. H. Winkel (Berlin, 1975), pp.116, 127.
90 K.k. Handelsministerium, Statistisches Departement, 
"Statistik der osterreichischen Industrie 1890", 
Nachrichten iiber Industrie, Handel und Verkehr (NIHV) , 
vol.54 (1894), p.X.
91 If anything, the explicit exclusion of establishments 
with less than 20 employees is likely to cause an upward 
bias in the average number of workers per factory relative 
to the 1890 data for which no such adjustment could be 
made.
Table II.8
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MACHINE-BUILDING FACTORIES 1890 - 1906
establishments workers workers/establ
1890
1902
1906
304
444
497
35,445
52,412
59,484
117
118 
120
Sources: Table II.7 and Handelsministerium, "Statistik der 
osterreichischen Industrie 1890", NIHV, vol.54 (1894),
pp.132-133.
These results suggest that there was virtually no growth in 
the average number of employees per machine-building 
factory. The average factory size may, however, be an 
inadequate indicator of the predominant scale of 
production, as an increasing share of workers may have 
found employment in large factories while the employment 
share of small plants fell over time. The figures in Table 
II. 7 indicate that there was no shift in employment 
concentration from small and medium sized factories to 
units employing 100 workers or more between 1902 and 1906. 
Possible changes in previous periods cannot be measured due 
to a lack of adequate data. However, the apparent 
stagnation in average factory size can be explained 
plausibly with the influence of two factors. These suggest 
that stagnation in average plant size was not necessarily 
a symptom of slackening sectoral expansion but rather an 
indication of a fairly dynamic development.
New firm entries rapidly increased the industry's ranks 
during the 1890s and the early 1900s. The number of 
machine-building plants rose by more than 3 per cent on 
annual average between 1890 and 1906 (Table II.8). To the 
extent that, in general, young firms tended to start 
operation with a smaller workforce than that employed in 
already established older companies, the rise in the number 
of machinery producers implied some downward pressure on 
the average employment size of manufacturing units. The
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mergers and acquisitions movement among the leading 
machine-building firms which gathered pace in the decade 
before the turn of the century may have led to some 
increase in the average plant size of the companies 
involved. But growth in the scale of operation does not 
appear to have been the predominant rationale behind these 
moves. Rather than the realization of economies of scale, 
engineering firms aim at gains derived from improved 
specialization. These, however, were not neceesarily 
related to growth in the size of operation at the plant 
level. When legal entities, i.e. companies, merged, in most 
instances this did not imply a reduction in the number of 
plants operated which would have caused an increase in the 
number of workers per factory92.
Austria's machine-building sector showed a fairly high 
degree of regional concentration, as can be seen in Table 
II.9 below93. Mechanical engineering was located chiefly in 
Bohemia, Lower Austria, and Moravia, i.e. the economically 
most advanced regions where indigenous machine-building 
originated in the first half of the nineteenth century94.
92 Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter IV provide a more detailed 
discussion of the problem of specialization in the context 
of company mergers and cartelization attempts in Austrian 
machine-building.
93 The data presented in this table are at best rough 
indicators of the main trends rather than accurate measures 
of locational change. The four industrial surveys (1870, 
1880, 1885, 1890) all employed different minimum size
criteria for firms to be included. Either certain business 
tax thresholds or definitions of "factory establishment" 
were used. The business census of 1902, it has been 
mentioned above, aimed at including all manufacturing 
establishments and the labour force employed. Its results 
are, therefore, probably more representative than those of 
the surveys.
94 Cf. Fischer, H., "Die Maschinenindustrie in Osterreich", 
Die GroB-Industrie Osterreichs, vol.I (Vienna, 1908), 
pp.95-109; Die hundertjahrige Geschichte der Ersten 
Brunner Maschinen-Fabriksgesellschaft in Briinn 1821 bis 
1921 (Leipzig, 1921), pp.17-87; Klima, A., "The Beginning 
of the Machine-Building Industry in the Czech Lands in the
Table II.9
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REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY 
(PERCENTAGE SHARE IN TOTAL LABOUR FORCE)
1870 1880 1885 1890 1902
Bohemia 18.8 29.8 25.8 30.8 31.4
Low. Austria 39.2 25.2 37.0 30.7 33.6
Moravia 10.4 19.0 14.4 19.0 20.1
Other 31.6 26.0 22.8 19.5 14.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: (1) Handelsministerium, 11 Statist ik der
osterreichischen Industrie 1870, 1880, 1885, 1890”, NIHV, 
vols. 3 (1874) No.2, p.109; 28 (1884), pp.94-97; 38
(1888/89), pp.106-109; 54 (1894), pp.132-133. (2)
Statistische Zentralkommission, "Betriebszahlung 1902”, 
OStat, vol. 75, l.Heft, 2.Abtlg. (1907), Table VIII, pp.96- 
97; 3.Heft (1905), Table II, p.18; 9.Heft (1906), Table II, 
p.56; 10.Heft (1905), Table II, p.34.
Though pockets of engineering activity continued to exist 
elsewhere, notably in Silesia and in the ship-building 
areas in and around Trieste, the relative locational 
importance of industrial centres like Vienna, Prague, 
Pilsen/Plzefi, and Brno increased. The employment share of 
other regions declined over time. Growth in Austria's 
machine-building industry was thus associated with a 
further accentuation in its pattern of spatial 
distribution.
The sharp deline in Lower Austria's employment share 
between 1870 and 1880 can plausibly be explained with the 
crisis in railway related machine-building which was 
located largely in Vienna and its surroundings. The
First Half of the 10th Century”, JEEH 4 (1975) No.l, pp.49- 
78; Slokar, J., Geschichte der osterreichischen Industrie 
und ihrer Forderung unter Kaiser Franz I. (Vienna, 1914), 
pp.609-623. See Good, Economic Rise, pp.148-156, for a 
discussion of regional disparities of economic development; 
his Table 24, p.150, shows that income per capita in 1911- 
1913 was highest in Lower Austria (850 crowns), Bohemia 
(761 crowns), and Moravia (648 crowns), with an Austrian 
average of 569 crowns.
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temporary recovery of this branch of engineering in the 
early to mid-1880s brought with it a rise in the region's 
employment share. However, in the longer run it was the 
Bohemian lands, in particular, that became increasingly 
important centres of Austrian machine-building95. The share 
of Bohemia and Moravia in total machine-building employment 
rose from 30 per cent in 1870 to more than 50 per cent at 
the turn of the century (Table II.9). This shift in the 
locus of industrial machine-building corresponds well with 
locational change in Austrian industry at large96. For in 
other industrial sectors, too, the Bohemian lands' part in 
output and employment increased significantly in the late 
nineteenth century. In metallurgy and mining, for example, 
the shift in activity from Alpine Austria towards the 
Bohemian lands took place largely in response to a more 
favourable endowment with natural resources. In contrast to 
the Alpine regions, which had virtually no anthracite coal 
and whose lignite deposits were not well suited for coking, 
the Bohemian lands were abundantly supplied with both 
anthracite and burnable lignite. The introduction of the 
Thomas-Gilchrist process allowed using Bohemia's high 
phosphorous content iron ore. As a result, the Bohemian 
lands' share in Austria's iron ore mining rose from 11 per 
cent in 1880 to 33 per cent in 1910, while their share in 
output of pig iron and cast iron increased from 37 to 58 
per cent, and from 84 to 90 per cent, respectively97. If, 
in addition, the preeminence of the Bohemian lands in coal 
mining is taken into account98, then it seems plausible to 
view at least part of the locational change in Austria's
95 The Bohemian crownlands included Bohemia proper, Moravia, 
and Silesia.
96 The following paragraph relies on Good, Economic Rise, 
pp.129-135; see also Matis and Bachinger, "Osterreichs 
industrielle Entwicklung", pp.222-232.
97 Good, Economic Rise, Table 21, p. 132.
98 Ibid.
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machine-building industry as a response to the shifts in 
the regional resource base of its major material inputs, 
namely iron and steel, and coal for fuel. Furthermore, 
mining and the iron and steel industry were large and 
rapidly growing sectors in the late nineteenth century and 
as such important customers of the machine-building 
industry99. Thus closer proximity to both input and output 
markets contributed to the rising concentration of machine- 
building capacity in the Bohemian lands100.
5. Conclusion
The discussion in the previous sections was largely 
concerned with the forces that shaped the machine-building 
industry's course over time. Output growth in mechanical 
engineering has been examined in relation to major changes 
in demand for machinery. But little has been said, so far, 
about how the machine-building industry has influenced the 
course of development in either individual manufacturing 
branches or in the industrial sector as a whole.
The data on iron and steel consumption in Austrian machine- 
building allow at least a partial assessment of the 
relationship between the engineering sector and the 
suppliers of its main inputs, the iron and steel industry. 
Changes in engineering output went along with changes in
99 Percentage shares in total industrial value added (mining 
and manufacturing):
sector 1870 1913
mining 12.0 19.4
iron 15.6 23.9
Source: Calculated from data in Komlos, Customs Union,
Appendix E, Tables E.6 and E.12.
100 Similar locational effects emanated from the machinery 
demand of the sugar and chemical industries. Almost all of 
Austria's production of sugar in the late nineteenth 
century was accounted for by the Bohemian lands, and three 
quarters of the chemical industry's output was produced in 
this region. See Good, Economic Rise, pp.132-134, and 
Rudolph, Banking and Industrialization, p.54.
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material inputs and were thus transmitted backwards by a 
change in demand for those inputs. The data presented in 
Table 11.10 indicate that expansion or contraction in the 
machine-building industry, through its large share in total 
iron and steel consumption, must have led to significant 
backward linkage effects101. The contraction of mechanical 
engineering in the 1870s, for example, implied a 
considerable fall in its demand for inputs and deliveries 
of iron and steel to the machine-building industry 
declined. When engineering growth accelerated again in the 
late 1880s and 1890s, the industry absorbed a rapidly 
rising amount of iron and steel, directly contributing to 
the steel sectors' expansion.
Table 11.10
MACHINE-BUILDING DEMAND FOR IRON AND STEEL AS PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
Production Consumption
1870-1874 78.4 54.8
1874-1879 64.1 60.4
1880-1884 61.2 54.0
1885-1889 59.8 55.2
1890-1899 72.3 65.7
1900-1913 71.1 68.4
Source: Appendix 
(2).
A, Tables A.7 to A.9, and A. 11, colum]
Forward linkages refer to the relationship between an 
industry (or firm) and other industries (or firms) which 
use its output as an input. A change in output or price
101 This holds even if allowance is made for a substantial 
margin of error. The volume of iron and steel consumption 
associated with machine-building is likely to be somewhat 
over-estimated throughout the period 1870 to 1913 as a 
result of accounting for only a minimum proportion of iron 
and steel used in other industries. See Appendix A, section
I.
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will be transmitted forward to the users of its product, 
e.g. a firm may reduce its sales prices in response to 
increased output. Similarly, changes in product quality are 
conveyed to machinery users. At the sectoral level, the 
measurement of such forward linkages is impeded by severe 
data problems. Little can be said about changes in product 
quality and thus, over the longer run, about the associated 
changes in the quality of the stock of capital goods 
employed in other sectors. These changes, however, directly 
influence that part of potential growth in those sectors 
which is determined by the input factor combination. Output 
in mechanical engineering is extremely heterogenous, 
ranging from simple agricultural devices to complex steam 
turbines or machine tools. The machine-building industry 
thus provides products for a large variety of markets. 
Intertemporal changes in output prices and product quality 
are likely to differ markedly between these markets.
Though no direct inferences can be made about the existence 
and strength of forward linkages, the concept of relative 
contributions to growth in total industry permits an 
assessment of the relative importance of mechanical 
engineering in Austria. As a first step, a new series of 
total manufacturing output was derived by combining value 
added in machine-building with the sectoral data included 
in Komlos' manufacturing index102. This series shows 
cyclical peaks in 1872, 1884, 1895, 1902 and 1912 between 
which growth was measured. The contribution of each 
industrial sector to overall manufacturing growth is given 
as a percentage share of the overall growth rate103.
102 A proportion of 53 percent was used to convert gross 
output (Appendix A, Table A.13, column (2)) into value 
added in machine-building; see Fellner, F., "Das 
Volkseinkommen Osterreichs und Ungarns", Statistische 
Monatsschrift XLII (1916), pp.570-571.
103 The absolute, non-annualized overall rate of change of 
manufacturing output (Yt) between two points of time equals 
the sum of the structurally weighted rates of growth of the
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The data presented in Table 11.11 below point to the 
increasing impact of growth in mechanical engineering. 
Despite the machine-building industry's relatively small 
share in total manufacturing output - approximately 12 to 
13 per cent during the 1890s - it became the main driving 
force pushing Austrian industrial growth. During the last 
two major business cycles, more than a quarter of output 
growth in total manufacturing was contributed by mechanical 
engineering alone104. By the turn of the century, the 
industrial branch which was so severely hit during the 
Great Depression of the 1870s and 1880s had, finally, 
become a leading sector.
individual manufacturing sectors (M*t to M9t) :
Yt-i Yt-i ' ’ ' Yt-i
The relative contribution of a single sector to total
manufacturing growth equals the product of the sector's
rate of growth and its share in total manufacturing output 
in the year against which growth is measured. The sum of 
all sectors' relative contributions to growth equals the 
rate of growth of total manufacturing output. Here, the 
contribution of each sector to total manufacturing growth 
is expressed as a percentage of total manufacturing growth.
104 Much of the engineering sector's similarly large 
contribution to industrial growth during the 1884 to 1895
cycle should be interpreted as an outcome of recovery
growth rather than genuine expansion; see this chapter, 
section2.
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Table 11.11
RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDUSTRIAL GROWTH (PER CENT)
Branch 1872-84 1884-95 1895- 1902 1902-12
Machines -5.02 23.82 25. 20 27.08
Iron 35.90 15.04 22. 01 32.18
Electricity - 1.85 4. 01 5.68
Cotton 47.26 26.62 16. 64 21.66
Wool -4.41 5.04 13. 04 4.91
Flour 8.67 1.62 6. 18 5.27
Sugar 11.68 9.31 -1. 09 -1.71
Beer 5.91 14.55 13. 04 4.73
Spirits — 2.16 0.82 0.17
Total
Growth p.a.
100
1.70
100
2.96
100
1.99
100
3.87
Sources: Appendix A, Table A.13, column (2); Komlos,
Customs Union, Appendix E, Table E.6.
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m
THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING IN HUNGARY
1. The Pattern of Output Growth
During the late nineteenth century, Hungary's machine- 
building industry expanded at a significantly faster pace 
than Austrian engineering. While Hungarian machinery output 
accounted for only 12 per cent of total Austro-Hungarian 
production in the early 1870s, this share had risen to 
almost a quarter on the eve of World War I. It will be 
argued in this chapter that five factors, in particular, 
account for the diverging rates of growth. Firstly, 
industrial machine-building in Hungary started from a 
substantially lower level of activity in the early 1870s. 
Thus even relatively modest absolute increases of output 
led to substantial rises in the rate of growth. Secondly, 
new areas of demand for capital goods opened up with the 
expansion of the industrial sector as a whole which also 
grew more rapidly than in the Western half of the Empire. 
A third factor which came into play was the effect of 
railway construction. Though new track was laid in a 
similarly volatile fashion, the completion of the Hungarian 
network was carried out at a faster rate. Consequently, 
Hungary's share in the length of the Monarchy's railway 
system increased substantially over time. Apart from the 
temporary collapse of construction subsequent to the 
railway boom of the early 1870s and the brief decline after 
the turn of the century, there was no significant slow-down 
in building activity. The demand for machinery associated 
with the railways and their expansion, therefore, continued 
to benefit Hungarian engineering at a time when similar 
effects in Austria were petering out. Fourthly, Hungarian
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agriculture became increasingly capital-intensive during 
this period. Its demand for machinery and implements and 
that of the associated food-processing industries provided 
a persistent stimulus to the domestic producers of those 
goods. Finally, the Hungarian government pursued a 
deliberate industrialization policy which both directly and 
indirectly supported the creation of a national capital 
goods industry. Yet before some of the more specific causes 
of faster growth of Hungarian machine-building are examined 
in more detail, a brief look should be taken at the pattern 
of output expansion in the industry.
The plot of machinery output in Figure III.l and the growth 
rates reproduced in Table III.l suggest conceptualizing 
development in four major cycles of varying growth
intensity. During the first cycle up to a peak in 1885,
machinery output increased at an annual average rate of 
more than 6 per cent. Hungarian machine-building was thus, 
clearly, less affected by the stock-market crash of 1873 
than Austrian engineering. Though production fell briefly 
to a trough in 1874, pre-crash levels of output were 
surpassed again as early as 18761. The second phase up to 
the mid-1890s was characterized by a substantial
acceleration in output growth. The value of Hungarian
machinery production nearly trebled between the early 1880s 
and 1895. However, in the following cycle up to 1902, 
output growth slowed down significantly to a rate of little
1 This is not to say that Hungarian manufacturing or the 
machine-building industry, in particular, were immune to 
the impact of the 1873 crash. Several newly incorporated 
engineering firms went bankrupt at the time; Komlos, 
Customs Union, p.131. Turnover of the two leading Budapest 
engineering firms, Ganz and Schlick, regained its pre­
crisis level only towards the late 1870; see Matlekovits, 
A. v., Das Konigreich Ungarn, vol. II (Leipzig, 1900), 
pp.335-336. Similarly, estimated nominal output (i.e. 
production in current prices) of Hungarian engineering 
stayed at levels below the 1871 peak until 1880. But in 
real terms, sectoral output did not decline at the same 
rate and for the same length of time as in Austria; see 
Appendix A, Table A.21, columns (1) and (2).
Figure III.l: Output in Hungarian Machine-Building (Mill. Crowns; 1913 Prices)
250.7621
171.1838
Output
91.6056
Trend
12.0273
1870 1881 1892 1903 1913
Source: Appendix A, Table A.21, column (2).
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more than 3 per cent. But it should be noted that this 
amounted to a faster increase than that estimated for 
Hungarian industry as a whole during this period (Table
III.2). The last full cycle in Hungarian engineering took 
place in the decade before the outbreak of the First World 
War. It included a period of rapid expansion stretching 
from a trough in 1903 to a peak in 1908. Production grew by 
almost 6 per cent per annum between 1902 and 1908. 
Thereafter, however, output virtually stagnated and just 
about reached again its 1908 level after a downturn in 1909 
to 1911.
Table III.l
COMPOUND RATES OF GROWTH OF MACHINERY PRODUCTION IN 
CONSTANT 1913 PRICES (PER CENT PER ANNUM)
1870-1913 6.31 1890-1900 6.86
1870-1880 4.26 1900-1913 3.33
1880-1890 11.88
Peak-to-peak measures:
1871-1912 5.97 1871-1895 7.86
1871-1885 6.26 1895-1912 3.36
1885-1895 10.15
1895-1902 3.13
1902-1912 3.53
Source: Appendix A, Table A. 21, column (2).
A comparison with John Komlos' index of industrial 
production shows that the periodicity of this expansionary 
process is largely congruent with the temporal pattern of 
overall growth in Hungarian manufacturing (Figure III.2). 
Periods of expansion and stagnation generally coincided for 
the two series. Yet significant differences emerge as to 
the rates of growth and the intensity of output 
fluctuations. It has been shown in the previous chapter, 
that Austrian machine-building expanded faster in the long 
run than total industrial production. At the same time, 
engineering seemed more responsive to changes in the
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Figure III.2: Indices of Hungarian Industrial Output (1913=100; 1913 Prices)
100.6240
69.2981
Manufacturing
37.9722
Mach i ne-Bu i1d i ng
6.6463
1870 1881 1892 1903 1913
Sources: App. A, Table A.21, col.(2); Komlos, Customs Union, App. E, Table E.4.
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business cycle. A similar pattern can also be observed for 
Hungary.
Table III.2
COMPOUND RATES OF GROWTH IN HUNGARIAN INDUSTRY 
(PER CENT PER ANNUM)
M MM MMC
1871-1913 3.80 3.72 3.08
1871-1883 5.21 4.59 3.08
1883-1896 3.58 3.76 3.82
1896-1903 1.63 1.92 0.73
1903-1913 3.94 3.91 3.77
1871-1896 4.36 4.16 3.47
1896-1913 2.51 3.09 2.98
Keys M 
MM 
MMC
manufacturing 
manufacturing, mining 
manufacturing, mining, construction
Source: Komlos, J., The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs
Union. Economic Development in Austria-Hungary in the 
Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 1983), Appendix E, Table 
E.4.
Between 1870 and 1913, and during most sub-periods in this 
span of time, Hungary's machine-building industry grew 
markedly faster than the country's manufacturing sector as 
a whole (Tables III.l and III.2). Consequently, the share 
of machinery output in total manufacturing value added 
increased over time. In 1870/74, mechanical engineering 
accounted on average for about 8 per cent of Hungary's 
total manufacturing output. Twenty years later, this share 
had risen to more than 15 per cent, and by 1909/13, more 
than 17 per cent of manufacturing output originated in the 
nachine-building industry, despite the stagnation in 
engineering growth after 19082.
2 A proportion of 53 per cent was used to convert gross 
output (Appendix A, Table A.21, column (2)) into value 
added in machine-building; see Fellner, F., "Das 
Volkseinkommen Osterreichs und Ungarns", Statistische
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Assessing the changes in industrial growth between 183 0 and 
1913, Komlos attaches particular significance to the years 
following the 1873 crash: "While Austria and much of
Western Europe were in the throes of the Great Depression 
of 1873-1896 ... Hungary was undergoing its first
widespread wave of industrialization"3. Between 1871 and 
1883, manufacturing output is estimated to have grown by 
more than 5 per cent on annual average - a rate well above 
those achieved in earlier and subsequent periods (Table
III.2)4. Judged solely by the growth rates achieved, it 
would appear that it was rather expansion during the next 
cycle from 1885 to 1895 that stood out as exceptionally 
fast in the long-run pattern of machine-building output. It 
has been shown in the previous chapter that Austrian 
machine-building, too, expanded rapidly during this period. 
The important difference is, however, that much of the 
output growth in Austrian engineering was clearly recovery 
related as the 1885 output level, though representing a 
peak, was still well below the 1872 peak5.
However, the momentum achieved could not be maintained for 
long. First signs of a slowdown in the Hungarian economy 
had already appeared in 1898-996. Industrial output had 
begun to decline in 1900, without having much immediate
Monatsschrlft XLII (1916), pp.570-571. The series so 
obtained was combined with the sectoral value added data 
included in Komlos' index of manufacturing output. His 
index is composed of eight sub-series representing output 
of the following: beer, iron, distilled spirits (from
1880), sugar, cotton textiles, flour, woolen textiles (from 
1906), and electricity (from 1891); Komlos, Customs Union, 
Appendix E, Table E.5.
3 Komlos, Customs Union, p.131.
4 See Komlos, Customs Union, Table 4.19, p.145, for 
Hungarian industrial growth during pre-1870s business 
cycles.
5 See Chapter II, Table II.1 and Figure II.1.
6 Berend, I.T. and Ranki, G., The Development of the 
Manufacturing Industry in Hungary, 1900-1944. Studia 
Historica 19 (Budapest, 1960), p.6.
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effect on mechanical engineering, yet temporarily recovered 
and reached a new peak in 1903. In the following year, 
however, total manufacturing production fell by more than 
6 per cent7. Berend and Ranki emphasize the gravity of this 
downturn and conclude that it was more severe than "in the 
leading capitalist countries, the United States, Germany, 
France, England or Russia"8. Preceding the drop in total 
manufacturing production by about a year, output in 
mechanical engineering fell by almost 11 percent in 1903 as 
the decline in railway construction, the collapse of 
industrial investment, and a setback in agricultural 
purchases following the poor harvest in 1901 drastically 
reduced demand for the industry's output9.
Again, machine-building proved a sector most vulnerable to 
a general decline in economic activity. But after passing 
through the trough in 1903, Hungarian machine-building 
picked up again in response to the increase in investment 
demand associated with the revival of the industrial 
economy at large, which was now expanding at a rate 
significantly higher than that achieved between the mid- 
1890s and 1903 (Table III.2). Furthermore, the resumption 
of railway construction in Hungary led to a rise in demand 
for railway equipment10. Output of machinery expanded at a 
rate of almost 6 per cent per annum between the peaks of 
1902 and 1908 - a figure well above that realized during 
the previous cycle and above the average achieved in other 
branches of manufacturing. It is, therefore, difficult to
7 Komlos, Customs Union, Appendix E, Table E.4.
8 Berend and Ranki, Manufacturing Industry, p.8. The 
downturn in the German economy and its effect on the 
machine-building industry are extensively discussed in 
Steller, P., "Die Maschinenindustrie Deutschlands", Die 
Storungen im Wirtschaftsleben Deutschlands wahrend der 
Jahre 1900ff., vol. 3, Schriften des Vereins fiir 
Socialpolitik 107, eds. Verein fiir Socialpolitik (Leipzig, 
1903), pp.1-74.
9 Berend and R&nki, Manufacturing Industry, pp. 6-7.
10 See Table III.9 below.
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agree with Berend and R&nki who view the years after the 
turn of the century as a period of slow development in the 
machine-building industry11. Real stagnation came only 
after 1908, when the industry failed to recover fully from 
the 1909-11 downturn and did not return to a level of 
output near to its estimated long-run trend12.
Just as overall industrial growth rates in Austria and 
Hungary seemed out of phase with one another between 1870
and 1913, so were the rates of expansion in machine-
building13. And while Hungarian industry as a whole made 
greater advances over time than Austrian manufacturing, 
output in machine-building, too, increased more rapidly
than in the Western half of the Empire. But two features of 
development were common to industrial engineering in both 
countries. Firstly, in terms of output growth the machine- 
building industry was one of the most dynamic industrial 
sectors, and secondly, fluctuations in engineering output 
were more pronounced than those in other branches of
manufacturing. The evidence suggests that machine-building 
was an industrial sector particularly exposed to the impact 
of the business cycle (Figure III.3).
11 Berend and R6nki, Manufacturing Industry, pp.18-20.
12 The continued fast growth in Hungarian imports of 
machinery suggests that it was not a lack of absolute 
demand which acted as a brake on output growth; see Chapter 
V, Table V.l. Apparently, an increasing proportion of 
demand for machinery was directed towards those products 
which the domestic machine-building industry could not 
supply in sufficient quantities and qualities or at 
competitive prices. See Chapter V, section 5, for a 
discussion of effective protection in Austro-Hungarian 
machine-building.
13 See Chapter II, Tables II.1 and II.2, and Komlos, Customs 
Union, pp.131-132.
73
Figure III.3: Deviations from Trend of Production (Per Cent of Trend)
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29.2094
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Sources: App. A, Table A .21, col.(2); Konlos, Customs Union, App. E, Table E.4.
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2. The Structure of the Industry and the Composition of 
its Output
The pattern of output expansion outlined in the previous 
section was sustained by both the enlargement of existing 
establishments and the foundation of new machine-building 
factories. The phases of most rapid growth in production 
generally coincided with periods when new company 
formations were at their highest level.
Though some of the most important machine-building firms 
were founded already in the 1850s and 1860s, it was in the 
last two decades of the nineteenth century that the number 
of new manufacturers rose significantly. More than half of 
the 83 engineering plants covered in the Hungarian 
industrial survey of 1898 were set up in the 1880s and 
1890s. A summary is given in Table III.3 below14.
Table III.3
FOUNDATION OF ENGINEERING FACTORIES EXISTING IN 1898
(NUMBER OF FIRMS)
pre-1850 11 1870-1879 11
1850-1859 6 1880-1889 20
1860-1869 11 1890-1898 24
Source: Kereskedelmiigyi Magyar Kir. Miniszter, "Gep-gy&rtas 
es Kozlekedesi Eszkozok Gyartasa", A Magyar Korona 
Orszagainal Gyaripara az 1898. £vben, V. part, ed. J. 
Sztereny (Budapest, 1901), (hereafter "Gepgy^rtas 1898"), 
pp.21-23.
By far the largest part of these plants was set up in 
Budapest. Out of the 73 machine-building establishments
14 As only those firms which were still in operation in 1898 
are included, the figures give a somewhat biased impression 
of founding activity. Quite a few of the machine-building 
firms newly incorporated in the late 1860s and early 1870s, 
for example, went bankrupt in the 1873 crash; Komlos, 
Customs Union, p.131.
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included in the 1898 survey, 32 were located in Budapest15. 
In 1906, 37 out of 101 factories were situated in the
capital16. The impression of a regionally highly 
concentrated industry is confirmed when referring to the 
leading joint-stock companies in Hungarian machine- 
building17. The contemporary sources focus on proximity to 
sufficiently large markets for the output of a still fairly 
unspecialized industry and the availability of skilled 
labour as the main reasons for the accumulation of machine- 
building firms in Budapest, the country's commercial and 
political centre18.
Tables III.4 to III.6 provide data on the number of 
establishments in the industry, the size of plants and the 
level of employment in engineering. The 1898 and 1906 
figures for the number of establishments and the labour 
force are probably lower bounds as the surveys did not 
cover firms with fewer than 20 employees19. According to 
the Austrian industrial census for 1902 less than a fifth 
of all machine-building establishments in the Western half 
of the Monarchy employed more than 20 workers. Their work
15 The share of Budapest plants is even higher when only 
factories employing more than 200 people are taken into 
account; Kereskedelmiigyi Miniszter, "Gep-gyartas 1898”, 
pp.14-18.
16 Magyar Kir. Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, A Magyar 
Korona Orszagainak Gyaripara az 1906. £vben, II. vol., II. 
part, ed. A. Edvi lies (Budapest, 1911), (hereafter 
Gyaripar 1906), pp.554-561.
17 See the list of Hungarian machine-building joint-stock 
companies in Appendix B: three quarters of the firms 
included in the sample were registered in Budapest.
18 Kereskedelmiigyi Miniszter, "Gep-gyartas 1898", p. 19. A 
further explanation may be found in the benefits derived 
from being located at the communications centre of the 
domestic economy. Direct access to both river- and rail- 
transportation implied the ability to serve several 
locationally separate markets from one centre.
19 Kereskedelmiigyi Miniszter, "Gep-gyartas 1898", pp.4-5; 
Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Gyaripar 1906, pp.546.
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force, however, accounted for 85 per cent of the total20.
Table III.4
NUMBER OF ENGINEERING ESTABLISHMENTS IN HUNGARY
1891 1898 1906
(1) engineering: 59 83 113
machine-building 48 73 102
ship-building 7 5 5
railway car prod. 2 3 3
other 2 2 3
(2) repair works 18 44 48
(3) total 77 127 161
Sources: (1) 1891, 1898: Kereskedelmiigyi Miniszter, "Gep-
gy&rtas 1898”, pp.9-11 , 14-18. (2) 1906: Kozponti
Statisztikai Hivatal, Gyaripar 1906, pp. 554-561.
Table III.5
SIZE OF ENGINEERING ESTABLISHMENTS IN HUNGARY
size class
1891 1898 1906
engin. repair
20 - 100 41 68 63 24
101 - 200 16 16 19 6
201 - 500 13 23 13 9
501 - 1,000 3 9 11 6
>1,000 4 11 7 3
total 77 127 113 48
Source: Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, 
vol., II. part, Tables I and II, p.552.
Gyaripar 1906, II.
A tentative comparison of the available figures would 
suggest that relatively more Hungarian plants fall into 
the upper size-categories than Austrian machine-building 
factories. Excluding the firms with fewer than 20 workers 
from the Austrian figures and adjusting the size-categories
20 See Chapter II, Table II.7.
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to ensure compatibility between the two data sets yields 
indicators as reproduced in Table III.6 below.
Table III.6
SIZE OF ENGINEERING FACTORIES IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 1906
establishments 
Austria* Hungary1*
size class
20 - 100 345 63
101 - 1,000 147 43
>1,000 5 7
total 497 113
* machine-building
b engineering
Sources: (1) Austria: Chapter II, Table II.7. (2) Hungary: 
Table III.5.
Unfortunately, no sectoral employment data are available 
other than the aggregates given in the two industrial 
surveys of 1898 and 1906, and the figures produced in the 
workers' accident insurance statistics for 1911 and 1912. 
The data for 1898 and 1906 differentiate only between 
employment in engineering plants and employment in railway 
and shipping repair shops, i.e. it is not possible to 
ascertain the exact size of the workforce in machine- 
building proper (mechanical engineering) as exemplified in 
Table III.7. In order to facilitate at least some rough 
comparison between the various employment data, two 
approximations of the workforce in machine-building have 
been prepared for 1898 and 1906. It was assumed that the 
number of workers in mechanical engineering corresponded to 
the share of machine-building in total engineering output, 
or: all branches of engineering had the same level of
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output per worker (Table III.7)21. The figures imply that 
Hungary's machine-building industry employed approximately 
one-third of the labour force in Austrian machine-building.
Table III.7
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN HUNGARIAN ENGINEERING
1898 1906 1911 1912
Engineering 24,483 33,055
Repair Shops 10,248 11,674
Machine-Building 14,445* 22,477* 28,025 33,213
* Approximations based on shares of machine-building output in
total engineering production (1898: .59; 1906: .68).
Sources: (1) 1898: Kereskedelmiigyi Miniszter, "Gep-gyartas 
1898", pp.93-96, 131. (2) 1906: Kozponti Statisztikai
Hivatal, Gyaripar 1906, II. vol., II. part, pp.551-552, 
716-717. (3) 1911, 1912: Magyar Kir. Allami Munkas-
biztositcisi Hivatal, A magyar kiralyi allami 
munkcisbiztositasi hivatalnak az 1907. evi XIX. tbrvenyezikk 
177. §-a alapjcin a kereskedelmiigyi magyar kiralyi minister 
el6 terjesztett jelentesb az orszagos munkasbetegsegelyzo 
es baleset-biztosito penzt&r miikbdeserbl 1911-1912, vol. 
II, (Szeged, 1914; Budapest, 1917), tetelsz&ma 199-214, 
219, 254-255.
In 1911 - the only year for which fully compatible wage­
bill and employment data exist for the two countries22 - 
the value of output per worker in Austrian machine-building 
was about 9 per cent higher than the equivalent measure in 
Hungarian mechanical engineering23. Meaningful calculations
21 The figures obtained for 1898 and 1906 probably 
underestimate the level of employment in mechanical 
engineering relative to the 1911 and 1912 data as only 
firms employing more than twenty people were included in 
the 1898 and 1906 surveys.
22 See Appendix A, Tables A. 12a to A.12e and A. 15, for 
sources.
23 Hungarian machine-building output went through a trough 
in 1911 while Austrian production was on the rise. Assuming 
that changes in the labour force were not fully 
proportional to output fluctuations, much of the
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of changes in labour productivity over time, however, are 
rendered impossible by the lack of further data24.
Data on the structure of Hungary's machine-building output 
prove useful in identifying those product areas which in 
terms of relative size and growth were of particular 
significance for the process of expansion as a whole. The 
figures presented in Table III.8 indicate the predominance 
of four such product areas: agricultural machinery; flour 
milling and food processing machinery; railway technology 
and steam technology25. Output of agricultural machines and 
implements, for example, accounted for more than 13 per 
cent (16 per cent) of total machinery production in 1898 
(1906). Locomobiles, i.e. portable steam engines, were 
predominantly used in agriculture. If production of these 
machines is also included, the share of machinery for 
agriculture in total Hungarian machinery output rises to 
about 20 and 24 per cent, respectively. Machinery for the 
flour milling industry was most probably more important 
than the data in Table III.8 suggest. According to Berend 
and Rdnki, manufacture of machines and installations for 
the milling industry represented 30 percent of the total 
value of machine-building output in 1909. The substantial 
difference to the figures for flour milling machinery given 
in Table III.8 probably results from the inclusion, in 
their data, of machinery other than milling apparatus in a
productivity differential may be a reflection of 
temporarily underutilized resources rather than a genuine 
gap in labour productivity. See Appendix A, Tables A. 13 and 
A.21, for production data and Chapter II, Table II.7, for 
data on employment in Austrian machine-building.
24 Even at the level of the individual firm it was not 
possible to gather sufficient employment data which could 
be matched to the available production data, e.g. for Ganz, 
in an attempt to compute some basic measures of labour 
productivity.
25 Cf. Berend, I.T. and Ranki, G., "Ungarns wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung 1848-1918", Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, 
vol. 1: Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, ed. A. Brusatti 
(Vienna, 1973), p.503.
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narrow sense, such as power generators, transporters, and 
elevators which were also used in mills26.
The discussion of the sources of sectoral growth in the 
next paragraph will explicitly relate to these product 
areas and the market link they established between the 
machine-building industry and other sectors of the economy.
26 Berend and Ranki, Manufacturing Industry, p. 19.
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Table III.8
OUTPUT COMPOSITION IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 
(MILLION CURRENT CROWNS)
1 . steam boilers
1898
2.94
1906
7.17
2. steam engines & turbines 2.39 4.18
3. int. combustion engines 0.32 3.74
4. locomotives & tenders 9.90 4.85
5. components of locomotives 1.17 4.28
6.
& railway cars 
locomobiles 3.74 6.68
7. water turbines & wheels 0.43 1.27
8. agricultural machinery 8.35 14.31
9. flour milling machinery 4.17 4.82
10. food processing machinery 0.51 2.25
11. chemical plant equipment 0.12 0.89
12. stone-, ceramics- & glass­ 0.23 0.95
13.
works machinery 
paper-making-, binding- & 0.40 0.60
14.
printing machines 
textile machines 0.90 2.00
15. cranes & transmissions 1.40 3.84
16. pumps & compressors 1.73 3 .26
17. wood-working machinery 0.25 0.67
18. metal-working machinery 1.50 1.42
19. iron works equipment 0.86 1.32
20. mining & steel milling 0.13 0.32
21.
machines
railway equipment 5.07 2.68
22. iron construction 7.43 6.86
23. casting & components 3.85 6.76
24. other machinery & repairs 3.89 3.90
Total 61.67 89.00
Sources: (1) 1898: Kereskedelmiigyi Miniszter, "Gep-gyartcLs 
1898”, pp.93-96. (2) 1906: Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal,
Gy&ripar 1906, II. vol., II. part, Tables XXXIII to LXI, 
pp.617-717.
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3. The Sources of Growth in Hungarian Machine-Building
The Impact of Railway Construction. Between 1869 and 1913, 
Hungary's network of railway lines increased from a total 
of 2,736 kilometres to 21,798 kilometres. This amounts to 
an annual average rate of expansion of 4.8 per cent, about 
1.4 percentage points above the equivalent Austrian rate. 
But construction of new track varied significantly over 
time. Periods of rapid expansion alternated with phases of 
only little construction activity (Table III.9). After the 
first railway boom in the 1850s and temporary stagnation in 
the 1860s, railway construction became "the dynamic leading 
sector of the first Hungarian Griinderzeit" in the early 
1870s27. With the depression in the aftermath of the 1873 
crisis railway building slowed down markedly, only to 
accelerate again in a new railway boom starting in the 
early 1880s and lasting up to the turn of the century28. 
Apart from strengthening the competitive position of 
Hungarian agricultural exports and from fostering inter- 
and intra-regional division of labour through unification 
of the internal market, railway construction in Hungary 
directly stimulated the domestic iron and engineering 
industries after 18 6729. The operation of a rapidly 
expanding network called for the supply of locomotives, 
rolling stock and general railway machinery and equipment.
27 Katus, L., "Transport Revolution and Economic Growth in 
Hungary", Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in 
the Nineteenth Century. Essays, ed. J. Komlos (New York, 
1983), p.191.
28 Ibid.
29 Katus, "Transport Revolution", pp.199-201.
83
Table III.9
ADDITIONS TO RAILWAY 
(KILOMETRES)
NETWORKS
Austria Hungary
1870-1874 4,433 3,686
1875-1879 1,648 636
1880-1884 1,799 1,656
1885-1889 1,958 2,156
1890-1894 1,188 2,267
1895-1899 2,481 3,791
1900-1904 1,841 889
1905-1909 1,756 2,438
1910-1913 604 1,543
Sources: (1) Austria: k.k. Statistische Central-Commission, 
Statistisches Jahrbuch der osterreichischen Monarchie 1873, 
IV, pp.2-3, 8-9; 1874, IV, pp.4-5, 13 (Vienna, 1874-1875); 
Osterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch fiir die im 
Reichsrathe vertretenen Konigreiche und Lander 1882, p.192; 
1914, p.191 (Vienna, 1883, 1915). (2) Hungary: Magyar Kir.
Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Magyar Statisztikai fivkonyv 
1912, p.245; 1913, p.170 (Budapest, 1913-1914).
While in the 1870s most of the railways were still owned 
and operated by private companies30, the government bought 
two engineering firms, both of which were being financially 
liquidated, merged them, and reconstituted the new 
establishment in 1870 as machine-building and railway car 
plant of the Hungarian State Railway Company31. The purpose 
of this factory was to satisfy the Railway Company's demand 
for machinery. The first Hungarian standard gauge 
locomotive was built in these works in 1873. With low 
levels of new construction, demand for locomotives was 
muted and, consequently, the plant produced on average only
30 Between 1876 and 1891 the Hungarian state bought 5,000 
kilometres of railways owned by 12 private companies. After 
1891 about 85 percent of Hungary's railways were owned or 
operated by the state; Katus, "Transport Revolution", 
pp.190-192.
31 Matlekovits, A. v., Das Konigreich Ungarn, vol. II 
(Leipzig, 1900), p.330.
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five new engines per year between 1874 and 1880. Yet with 
the onset of renewed building activity in the early 1880s, 
output of locomotives picked up; by 1890 51 locomotives 
were made in the plant and only five years later deliveries 
reached an annual level of 171 engines32.
Ganz, too, was heavily involved in railway engineering. The 
firm produced hard-rimmed cast iron railway wheels and 
railway crossings from the 1850s onwards, with output 
reaching a maximum at the time of the railway boom in the 
early 1870s33. The downturn in both domestic and foreign 
railway construction after 1873 caused a decline in the 
production of these railway items. But already in 1879, 
just at the onset of a new railway boom, Ganz bought the 
First Hungarian Waggon Factory in 1879 and almost 
instantaneously benefited from a fast increase in 
turnover34. Ganz and the machine-building plant of the 
State Railway Company are just two examples from a list of 
companies working in railway engineering. Schlick, Weitzer 
and the Hungarian Waggon- and Machine-Building Company 
(Gyor) are other large firms which throughout the late 
nineteenth century kept a substantial part of their 
capacity for railway related production.
In 1898, more than 26 per cent of machine-building output 
was related to railway needs. Eight years later this share 
had halved to 13 per cent in response to the donwturn in 
construction activity at around the turn of the century 
(Table III.9).
32 Ibid. , p. 331.
33 Magyar Orszagos Leveltar (hereafter MOL), Leveltari 
Leltarak 35: Ganz £s Tarsa Villamoss^gi-, Gep-, Vagon- fcs 
Hajogyar RT., Hofherr-Schrantz-Clayton-Shuttleworth Magyar 
Gepgyari Miivek RT., Repertorium, vol. I., prepared by G. 
Szilcigyi (Budapest, 1965), pp.7-8* For production data see 
Matlekovits, Konigreich Ungarn, vol. II, pp.332-335.
34 Matlekovits, Konigreich Ungarn, vol. II, pp.33 3-335. See 
also Chapter IV, section 3.
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The Machinery Demand of Agriculture and the Food-Processing 
Industries. On the eve of World War I, Hungary was still a 
predominantly agricultural country. In 1910, 60 per cent of 
the gainfully employed population was working in 
agriculture; industrial labour accounted for less than 18 
per cent35. Agriculture contributed almost 64 per cent of 
the country's national income36. The food-processing 
industries, in turn, held a share of nearly 48 per cent in 
Hungary's industrial production; output of the flour- 
milling industry alone accounted for more than 20 per cent 
of total industrial production37. From 1867 more than 3 0 
per cent of the country's wheat production was exported, an 
increasing share of which as flour. In the decades before 
1914, Hungary became the second largest flour exporter 
after the United States38. "The food-processing sector 
remained Hungary's most important manufacturing sector 
until World War I”39.
Under those conditions it seems not surprising to find the 
output structure of Hungarian machine-building heavily 
geared towards the machinery needs of the flour-mills and 
agriculture. It has been shown above that the data on 
domestic production of agricultural implements, flour 
milling and food processing machinery presented in Table 
III.8 almost certainly represent lower bounds for domestic 
machinery deliveries to the respective sectors. Steam 
engines and boilers, for example, were needed to power the
35 Berend, I.T., Ranki, G., "Das Niveau der Industrie 
Ungarns zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts im Vergleich zu dem 
Europas", Separatum Studia Historica 51 (Budapest, 1961), 
p.274.
36 Fellner, F. v., "Das Volkseinkommen Osterreichs und 
Ungarns", Statistische Monatsschrift XLII (1916), p.594.
37 Ibid., pp.548, 619-620.
38 Katus, "Transport Revolution", p.184.
39 Komlos, Customs Union, p. 132.
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rising number of steam mills40. From the 1870s until the 
mid-1890s Hungary's flour industry was developing at a 
rapid pace. Output grew at an average annual rate of almost 
4 per cent between 1874 and 189441. The advances made in 
the flour industry went along with significant innovations 
in milling technology. In the mid-1870s the Ganz works 
patented and introduced a new type of cast roller milling 
stool. The Hungarian mills quickly adopted the new milling 
machines which soon also appeared on foreign markets42. 
However, after 1896 both exports and production of the 
flour industry stagnated and, finally, ceased to develop in 
response to both a decrease in foreign demand and 
stagnation of Austria's demand43. Manufacturers of milling 
machinery faced sales that were virtually stagnating. This 
might explain why output of milling machinery remained more 
or less constant after 1898 (Table III.8).
The producers of agricultural implements and machines, in 
contrast, experienced a period of most rapid and above 
average growth. Nominal production rose by almost 7 per 
cent on annual average between 1898 and 1906. The evidence 
suggests that rapid expansion in this branch of machine- 
building continued for at least another half decade44. The 
driving force, surely, must have been increased 
mechanization in Hungary's agriculture rather than an 
increase in foreign demand for Hungarian machines. The
40 See Komlos, Customs Union, Table 4.13, p.136 on the 
distribution of flour mills in Hungary by power source.
41 Komlos, Customs Union, Appendix E, Table E.5.
42 MOL, Leveltari Leltarak 35: Ganz, pp. 9-10; see also 
Matlekovits, Konigreich Ungarn, vol. II, p.334, for data on 
exports and production of the new milling machines.
43 Komlos, Customs Union, pp. 141-142.
44 Using the sources given in Appendix A, Tables A. 3 and 
A. 15, output of agricultural machines in 1911 can be 
approximated on the basis of wage-bill data and wage­
bill/turnover ratios as 21.55 current million crowns. The 
rate of growth between 1906 and 1911 was then 8.5 percent 
per annum.
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explanatory notes of the foreign trade statistics emphasize 
that Hungarian machine-building proved unable to meet the 
rapidly rising domestic demand in the late nineteenth 
century. And this, in turn, resulted from advances made in 
the intensification of agricultural production45.
The Effects of Industrial Policy. Since the early 1880s, 
the Hungarian government became increasingly involved in 
attempts to direct the course of industrialization. The 
first of a series of increasingly ambitious laws concerning 
financial support of the industrial sector was passed in 
1881. It stipulated only a few crucial measures including 
tax and local charge exemption for new factories and the 
use of small subsidies. Nine years later the limits for tax 
and charges exemption were widened and the level of 
subsidies was increased. A minor change came again in 1899 
when small industry and cooperatives were included; the 
level of average annual subsidies rose once again46. 
However, fundamental changes to the rules and measures 
governing industrial policy were carried out in 1907. The 
new law of the same year defined four groups of benefits:
45 Magyar Kir. Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, "A Magyar 
Szent Korona Orszagainak 1882-1913. £vi Kiilkereskedelmi 
Forgalma", Magyar Statisztikai Kozlemenyek 63 (Budapest, 
1923), p.63. See also Berend and Ranki, "Ungarns 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung", pp.493-494; Katus, L., 
"Economic Growth in Hungary during the Age of Dualism, 
1867-1918", Social-Economic Researches on the History of 
East-Central Europe. Studia Historica 62, ed. E. Pamleny 
(Budapest, 1970), pp.47-48. Scott Eddie computed an average 
annual rate of growth of agricultural output per worker of 
approximately 1.5 per cent during the late nineteenth 
century. This rate compares not unfavourably with those 
calculated for other countries and may to some extent serve 
as an indicator of the impact that increased machine 
utilization made on Hungarian agriculture; see Eddie S., 
"Agricultural Production and Output per Worker in Hungary, 
1870-1913", JEH 28 (1968) No.l, pp.209-217.
46 For a brief description of the policy measures applied 
between 1881 and 1906 see Sugar, 0., Die Industrial is ierung 
Ungarns unter Beihilfe des Staates und der Kommunen 
(Leipzig, 1908), pp.12.
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state benefits (tax exemptions, etc.)/ direct financial 
support (subsidies or participation of government in stock 
capital), preferential treatment in relations with the 
public sector, and support for the construction of worker's 
homes47. The one measure of the new law which in the 
following years seemed most effective was the stipulation 
that, in general, all public sector institutions had to 
purchase from domestic rather than foreign firms. Foreign 
manufacturers wishing to do business with the Hungarian 
government had to open factories in the country48. It 
should be emphasized that even Austria, for that matter, 
was regarded as a foreign country. As the volume of 
subsidies to industry was small relative to total 
industrial production49, discrimination assumed particular 
significance. The examples of two firms, Hofherr-Schrantz 
and Marchegger, are indicative.
In 1900, Hofherr-Schrantz (Vienna) - one of the two leading 
manufacturers of agricultural machinery in the Habsburg 
Empire - opened a new plant in Kispest50. Previously the 
firm was represented in Hungary only by sales subsidiaries 
and repair-shops founded in the early 1880s. In terms of
47 Ibid., p. 19.
48 Ibid. , p.21.
49 See Paulinyi, A., "Die Industriepolitik in Ungarn und in 
Osterreich und das Problem der okonomischen Integration 
(1880-1914)", Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialwissenschaften (1977) 2, Tables 1 and 2, p.159. The 
machine-building industry participated with a share of 5.7 
percent in total industrial subsidies during 1900 and 1909; 
that amounted to 2.15 million crowns over ten years. At 
that time, output in the industry varied between 94 and 160 
million crowns per annum. Consequently, it is difficult to 
see that these subsidies should have had any fundamental 
effect on the industry.
50 The following section relies on MOL, Leveltari Leltarak 
35, Repertorium, vol.II: Hofherr-Schrantz-Clayton- 
Shuttleworth Magyar Gepgyari Miivek Rt., pp. 129-131. See 
also 100 Jahre Hofherr-Schrantz, 1857-1957 (Vienna, 1957) 
and Matis, Big Business, p.152.
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output and employment, the new establishment soon exceeded 
the old Viennese factory and became the main operation of 
the firm. The move of production facilities to Hungary was 
primarily influenced by the consideration that Hungary was 
the agricultural centre of the Empire and, secondly, that 
it was closer to the Balkan states and their important 
markets for agricultural implements. In 1908, the Vienna 
and the Kispest establishments were divided into two 
formally independent joint-stock companies51. The evidence 
suggest that with respect to the Hungarian operation, 
prospects of government support at least contributed to 
this decision. The firm in Kispest had contacted the 
Hungarian Ministry of Trade applying for state benefits in 
support of the enlargement of its operations. Eventually, 
tax exemptions were granted for a period of 15 years 
pending compliance with a set of conditions. For example, 
the firm had to be transformed into an independent joint- 
stock company registered in Hungary; the plant was to be 
equipped according to the latest state of technology; a 
minimum amount of new investment of at least 1.6 million 
crowns spread over three years (in addition to an initial 
investment of 2.3 million) had to be guaranteed by the 
company; and three quarters of the work force, of at least 
1,500 workers, had to be Hungarian citizens52. The benefits 
were later transferred to the new company which resulted 
from the merger of Hofherr-Schrantz with its closest 
competitor Clayton-Shuttleworth in 191253.
51 The owners of the Viennese firm maintained a controlling 
stake in Budapest company. On the relationship between the 
two firms see MOL, Z 450-112.cs.-759.sz.: Hofherr-Schrantz- 
Clayton-Shuttleworth (Vienna), protocoils of Board of 
Directors' meetings, 1908 to 1913.
52 MOL, Z 451-5.cs.-21.sz.: Hofherr-Schrantz-Clayton- 
Shuttleworth (Kispest), communications with the Hungarian 
Ministry of Trade, 1908-1913.
53 Again, the Austrian and the Hungarian operations of the 
two firms were merged into two formally independent joint- 
stock companies.
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The second example used to illustrate the way in which 
industrial promotion in Hungary attracted interest among 
machine-builders is that of the Austrian "Marchegger 
Maschinenfabrik und EisengieBerei", a producer of
processing machinery for the iron and coal industries and 
cement factories54. In an expose, its owner outlined his
plan of building a new production plant in Hungary rather
than expanding the existing facilities in Austria. Apart 
from an expected further increase in business in Hungary, 
which already accounted for more than half of the firm's 
total turnover, he cited the definite promise of
substantial orders from the Hungarian government as the 
most prominent reason of considering to set up a new plant. 
This plant and the existing factory in Austria would both 
be owned and operated by a new Hungarian joint-stock 
company. In accordance with the principles of the 1907 Law 
on industrial promotion, the prospect of government orders 
was dependent on the creation of a Hungarian company and 
plant. The example of the "Marchegger Maschinenfabrik” may 
thus show that at least to some extent industrial policies 
had a capacity creating effect in Hungarian machine- 
building55. Sufficient quantitative data are not available 
to measure more precisely the impact of industrial policies 
on Hungarian engineering. However, if allowance is made for 
the fact that investment in other industries was also 
financially supported with a view to foster domestic 
industrial production, notably in the textiles industry, it 
seems plausible to assume that part of the additional 
demand for investment goods was channelled to the domestic 
capital goods sector56. The relatively small amounts of 
government benefits spent directly in support of the
54 See MOL, Z 40-9.cs.-238.sz. : Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi 
Bank, 1909.
55 Komlos maintains a sceptical view of the effectiveness of 
industrial promotion in Hungary, see his Customs Union, 
pp.154-159.
56 Ibid. , p. 157.
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machine-building industry were thus complemented by the 
benefits derived indirectly from support of other 
industrial branches.
4. Conclusion
The discussion in the previous pages has shown that the 
structure of Hungarian machine-building output was 
dominated by the production of agricultural machinery. 
Moreover, after the turn of the century this branch 
belonged to the most rapidly growing sections of Hungarian 
machine-building, expanding faster than mechanical 
engineering as a whole. As in the case of Austria, a rising 
share of engineering resources was put to use in the making 
of agricultural machines and implements. It will be 
examined in Chapter V to what extent the increasing 
specialization in machinery for agricultural purposes was 
a response not only to the peculiarities of the Hungarian 
economy but also to its relative position in international 
machinery trade.
The data presented in Table III.10 below suggest that 
variations in productive activity in Hungarian machine- 
building were likely to feed back to the iron and steel 
sector. As in the case of Austria, the machine-building 
industry persistently absorbed more than 50 per cent of the 
country's iron and steel consumption. The volume of metal 
inputs used in mechanical engineering accounted for an even 
higher share of domestic output of iron and steel. The 
large relative weight of engineering demand in total demand 
for iron and steel meant that any changes in output of the 
machine-building industry, which implied a variation in 
material inputs, led to significant changes in the demand 
for iron and steel output. Hence in Hungary, too, expansion 
and contraction in mechanical engineering entailed 
substantial backward linkage effects.
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Table III.10
HUNGARIAN MACHINE-BUILDING DEMAND FOR IRON AND STEEL AS 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
Production Consumption
1870/1874 71.5 52.3
1875/1879 56.7 51.5
1880/1884 60.2 51.6
1885/1889 55.6 51.2
1890/1894 64.1 59.1
1895/1899 62.1 59.3
1900/1904 64.0 66.3
1905/1913 68.4 63.8
Source: Appendix A, Tables A.16 to 
(2) .
A. 18, and A.20, colum:
The relative percentage contributions of individual 
manufacturing branches to total industrial growth are 
reproduced in Table III.11. These data allow us to assess 
the quantitative impact the machine-building industry made 
on output expansion in Hungarian manufacturing as a 
whole57. The evidence suggests that mechanical engineering 
in Hungary was a major force accounting for growth, 
especially during the 1883-96 cycle when the sector 
contributed more than 26 per cent of the increase in total 
manufacturing output. In the years thereafter, however, the 
machine-building industry lost some of its relative 
strength as a growth generating sector. Between 1896 and 
1903, most of the comparatively low rate of manufacturing 
growth was accounted for by the expansion in the consumers 
goods industries, notably cotton and flour production. The 
acceleration in overall manufacturing growth in the post- 
1903 period was to a very large extent dominated by the 
expansion in the iron and steel sector. The machine- 
building industry's percentage contribution to overall
57 The methods used to compute the relative sectoral 
contributions to industrial growth are described in detail 
in Chapter II, section 5.
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growth was in proportion to its share in total 
manufacturing value added.
Table III.11
RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDUSTRIAL GROWTH (PER CENT)
Branch 1871-83 1883-96 1896-1903 1903-13
Machines 11.75 26.33 17.08 19.34
Iron 11.77 33.92 -2.56 47.49
Electricity - - 9.16 9.79
Cotton 15.96 4.32 32.92 5.18
Flour 59.21 21.95 26.98 -1.17
Sugar 3.57 4.27 16.67 11.55
Beer -2.26 7.04 -2.48 7.25
Spirits — 2.17 2.23 0.55
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Growth p.a. 5.17 4.12 1.67 4.06
Sources: Appendix A, Table A.21, column (2); Komlos,
Customs Union, Appendix E, Table E.5.
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IV
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT IN AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN 
ENGINEERING: AN ANALYSIS OF BALANCE-SHEETS
1. The Scope of Analysis
This chapter deals with individual machine-building 
companies. Its aim is to complement the previous discussion 
of sectoral development in Austrian and Hungarian machine- 
building with an analysis of financial and investment 
behaviour at the firm level. Balance-sheet data are used to 
trace company growth, the associated changes in demand for 
capital and, finally, the varying forms of capital 
provision1. The examination of annual statements, however,
1 The process by which the information contained in annual 
statements is generated calls for particular care in the 
use of balance-sheet data as source material. Annual 
statements are primarily addressed to people or 
institutions outside the firm involved (e.g. share-holders, 
creditors, tax authorities and the general public). They 
are often used to convey information compatible with a 
firm's perceived interests but which is not necessarily 
identical to that used in internal communication; cf. Wohe, 
G., Einfiihrung in die Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre 
(Munich, 13th ed. 1978), pp.757-762. The respective legal 
norms generally leave some scope for firms to decide how to 
value their assets and liabilities. But the way fixed 
assets and inventories are evaluated, or equity and 
contingency reserves are endowed, for example, directly 
affects the length of the balance-sheet, the stated annual 
surplus and the ratio of debt to assets. At the time, 
companies had considerable freedom in designing their 
annual statements: no stipulations on the structure of
annual statements or denotations of the balance-sheet 
entries were made in the laws concerning joint-stock 
companies; Mosser, A., Die Industrieaktiengesellschaft in 
Osterreich, 1880-1913: Versuch einer historischen Bilanz- 
und Betriebsanalyse (Vienna, 1980), pp.25-26. However, the 
eight companies examined below used a similar structure and 
system of denotation in their annual statements. Moreover, 
as all balance-sheets are analyzed on a year-to-year basis
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is confined to those of public limited companies only2. No 
records are available for the privately owned firms which 
were under no legal obligation to publish their financial 
results3.
Based on statements of the leading six Austrian and two 
Hungarian machine-building firms, two core sets of annual 
balance-sheet data have been compiled for 1880 to 1912/13 
(Sample I)4. The Austrian companies included are5:
1. Aktien-Gesellschaft der Lokomotivfabrik, vorm. G. Sigl 
in Wiener Neustadt, Vienna (1875): Sigl,
2. Maschinen- und Waggonbau-Fabriks-Aktiengesellschaft in 
Simmering, vorm. H.D. Schmid, Vienna (1869): 
Simmering.
3. Erste Brunner Maschinen-Fabriks-Gesellschaft, Brno 
(1872): Brunner Maschinenfabrik.
using fairly broad standard definitions, abrupt changes in 
asset and liability valuation, for example, are likely to 
show up in the data and can be accounted for.
2 In the following, public limited company and joint-stock 
company are used interchangeably.
3 Austrian law postulated the publicity of companies' 
results. But, strictly speaking, joint-stock companies, 
too, were under no obligation to publish their results in 
the press. Publication was effectively secured only by the 
legal requirement to make the annual statement, the profit 
and loss account and the business report available to 
share-holders who had the right to approve of, or reject, 
the annual balance in the general share-holders' meetings. 
See Mosser, Industrieaktiengesellschaft, pp.16, 25.
4 For definitions of the balance-sheet data and the methods 
employed in their derivation see Appendix B, where all 
indicators referred to in this chapter are presented in 
tabular form. Tables B.la to B.2c provide average data for 
the six Austrian and two Hungarian firms, respectively. The 
balance-sheet indicators for each of the eight companies 
are reproduced separately in Tables B.3a to B.lOd.
5 Companies' names are reproduced as given in Compass. 
Finanzielles Jahrbuch fur Osterreich-Ungarn 1914 (Vienna, 
1913). A company's founding year is given in parentheses, 
its short name used in the following is italicised.
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4. Maschinenbau-Actien-Gesellschaft, vorm. Breitfeld, 
DanSk & Co. (Akciova spolecnost strjlrny drive 
Breitfeld, DanSk ispol.), Prague (1872): Breitfeld.
5. Prvni cesko-moravska tovarna na stroje v Praze (Erste 
bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik in Prag), Prague 
(1871): Bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik.
6. Prager Maschinenbau-Actiengesellschaft, vorm. Ruston 
& Co. (Prazska akciova strjlrma), Prague (1869): 
Ruston6.
Sample I for Hungarian machine-building encompasses the 
balance-sheet data of
1. Ganz & Comp. - Danubius, Maschinen-, Waggon- und
Schif fbau-Actien-Gesellschaft (Ganz es tcirsa
Danubius, gep-, waggon- es hajogy&r reszvenytdrsas&g), 
Budapest (1869): Ganz1, and
2. Schlick-Nicholson Maschinen-, Waggon- und Schiffsbau- 
Aktien-Gesellschaft (Schlick-Nicholson gep-, waggon- 
es hajdgyar reszvenytdrsasag), Budapest (1869): 
Schlick8.
In the 1890s, joint-stock founding activity in engineering 
picked up again after it had come to a virtual standstill 
in the late 1870s and throughout the 1880s. Taking account 
of the rising number of public limited machine-building 
companies, additional data sets have been prepared for
6 The Bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik and Ruston are not 
included in Mosser's study of Austrian joint-stock 
companies. He chose the Wiener Lokomotiv-Fabriks-Aktien- 
gesellschaft and the Aktiengesellschaft fur Maschinenbau, 
vorm. Brand & Lhuillier instead to be represented in his 
sample alongside the other companies named here. For the 
former, however, not all relevant data are available for 
the early 1880s. And the latter was founded as late as 
1895. See Mosser, Industrieaktiengesellschaft, p.76.
7 Danubius was added to Ganz' company name after the merger 
with Danubius Ship- and Machine-Building Company in 1911.
8 Nicholson was added to Schlick's company name after the 
merger with Nicholson Machine-Building Company in 1912.
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selected years (Sample II) . These include nine Austrian 
companies for 1890, 14 Austrian and 12 Hungarian firms for 
1900 and, finally, 30 Austrian and 25 Hungarian joint-stock 
manufacturers for 19129. Sample II serves to evaluate the 
extent to which the main trends of development in the 
chosen balance-sheet indicators of Sample I also apply to 
a wider, more representative group of companies.
How do the number and size of companies included in the 
samples compare with the respective totals of public 
limited companies in the industry? How important were 
joint-stock operations relative to other types of firms? 
Tables IV. 1 and IV. 2 provide a comparison of the sample 
data with those for the industry as a whole. It should be 
emphasized, though, that the reported shares of the samples 
in the totals are minimum values as the available industry­
wide data do not allow the isolation of machine-building 
firms proper. Hence the Austrian totals include companies 
of the metal-working and armaments industries, too10. The 
same problem applies to the Hungarian figures for 1880 to 
1900, in particular11. The samples, therefore, almost 
certainly represent a much larger proportion of mechanical 
engineering in both Austria and Hungary than the shares 
given below would indicate.
9 See Appendix B for a list of the firms included and Tables 
B.11 and B.12 for the average sample data derived from the 
statements of these companies.
10 See Table IV. 1 for sources.
11 The Hungarian industry totals for 1912 refer to machine- 
building, ship-building, boiler-making and the 
manufacturing of "general equipment" only. These data are 
more narrowly defined and thus not to be compared directly 
with the numbers given for 1880, 1890 and 1900 which also 
include the non-engineering metal-working industries. See 
Table IV.2 for sources.
Table IV.1
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AUSTRIAN PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES IN ENGINEERING
Total Sample I % Sample II %
1880
companies 15 6 40 - -
share capital 29.1 13.7 47 — -
total capital 50.8 21.7 43 — —
1890
companies 15 6 40 9 60
share capital 31.1 14.3 46 21.0 67
total capital 69.9 27.3 39 44.1 63
1900
companies 38 6 16 14 37
share capital 124.1 21.9 18 65.8 53
total capital 224.6 54.0 24 134.2 60
1912
companies 80 6 8 30 38
share capital 317.9 45.2 14 146.4 46
total capital 808.9 124.1 15 302.3 37
Note: share capital and total capital in million crowns.
Sources: k .k. Statistische Centra1-Commission,
Statistisches Jahrbuch der osterreichischen Monarchie
1880, VIII, pp. 52-53; Osterreichische Statistisches
Handbuch 1887 , p.204; 1891, p. 224; 1897, p.242 ; 1901,
p.308; 1906, p>. 322; 1911, p. 176; 1913 , p.173 •
With the increasing formation of new joint-stock companies 
in Austria after 1890, the core-sample of six firms 
represents a declining proportion of all companies in terms 
of both their number and capital employed. But, measured by 
their capital endowment, the companies in Sample I 
commanded a higher than average volume of financial 
resources12. Sample II represents a substantially larger 
part of the industry than Sample I. Again the difference 
between the percentage shares of firms represented, on the
12 Cf. Mosser, Industrieaktiengesellschaft, pp.95-98, who 
observes a similar characteristic in his sample of 
engineering and metal-working firms.
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one hand, and capital, on the other, suggests that for most 
years the firms in the sample were above average size. 
Allowing for the very broad definitions of the total 
industry statistics, Austrian joint-stock machine-building 
seems fairly well covered in the samples.
The Hungarian core sample's degree of representation is 
falling over time, too. For 1880 and 1890, the sample seems 
more representative of the industry in terms of number of 
firms than in terms of share capital13. From the turn of 
the century, Ganz and Schlick each commanded larger than 
average share capital14. Sample II provides good per 
centage coverage of Hungary's joint-stock companies in the 
machine-building industry, especially for 1912. However, 
with neither equity reserves or borrowed capital included, 
share capital is a fairly unreliable indicator of a firm's 
command over financial resources and its relative 
importance. Ganz' and Schlick's significance for Hungarian 
machine-building is probably more adequately reflected in 
their share in the industry's total output. During most 
years between 1880 and 1900, the two firms' combined output 
accounted for approximately 30 to 55 per cent15. This is a 
very large share even if allowance is made for those parts 
of their production which do not fall in the mechanical 
engineering category used in the estimates of total
13 The small initial number of joint-stock companies in the 
metal-working and machine-building industries (three in 
1880, five in 1890) implies that the inclusion of only one 
fairly large or fairly small firm will strongly affect the 
counted totals or averages.
14 In 1912, 48 companies had a combined share capital of
78.1 million crowns whereas a smaller number of firms in 
1900 (26) had shares issued worth more than 79 million
crowns. The implied difference in average firm size is 
explained by the inclusion of some large-scale non-machine- 
building operations (e.g.armaments) in the total for 1900.
15 See Appendix A, Table A. 21, column (1); Appendix B, 
Tables B.9c and B.lOc.
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machine-building output16.
Table IV.2
HUNGARIAN PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES IN ENGINEERING
Total Sample I % Sample II %
1880
companies 3 2 67 - -
share capital 7.9 4.7 60 — —
1890
companies 5 2 40 - -
share capital 35.8 6.2 17 — —
1900
companies 26 2 8 12 46
share capital 79.2 8.8 11 36.8 46
1912
companies 48 2 4 25 52
share capital 78.1 16.6 21 60.8 78
Sources: k .k. Handelsministerium, Bureau des
Industrierates , Statistische Materialien tiber die
Besteuerung und Entwicklung der Industrie-
Aktiengesellschaften in Osterreich (Vienna, 1904), Table
83, p.610, Table 85 , pp.612*-613. Magyar Kir. Kozponti
Statisztikai Hivatal,, Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv 1912,
Table 43, p.214.
The data in Table IV. 3 allow a partial answer to the 
question of how significant the public limited company was 
in the Austrian machine-building industry. Regardless of 
whether the manufacturing establishment (factory, workshop) 
or the legal entity (company; enterprise; concern) is 
chosen as the statistical object, in both cases about one 
third of the industry's workforce was employed by public 
limited companies - despite their small number relative to 
the total of companies. But whilst one finds a substantial 
degree of employment concentration in joint-stock
16 Ganz, in particular, ran large departments for electrical 
engineering and railway car production; see section 3 
below.
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companies, remarkably less concentration can be observed at 
the actual production level17: on average 581 persons were 
employed per company or enterprise, yet only 238 persons 
per manufacturing site.
Table IV.3
EMPLOYMENT AND OWNERSHIP IN AUSTRIAN MACHINE-BUILDING
1902
Establishments Owners/Companies
number employees number employees
Total 2,583 61,401 2,334 56,947
PLC 84 20,014 33 19,168
PLC/Total (%) 3.3 32.6 1.4 33.7
PLC: public limited companies. The numbers of establishments and
employees differ slightly from those given in Table II.7, Chapter II, 
where data for plants in operation only are reproduced.
Source: k.k. Statistische Zentralkommission, "Ergebnisse
der gewerblichen Betriebszahlung vom 3. Juni 1902", 
Osterreichische Statistik, vol. 75 (1907), l.Heft, 2.
Abtlg., Table XVII, pp.306-309.
The medium-size production unit was thus a feature 
characteristic not only for machine-building as a whole but 
also for the public limited companies in the industry. 
However, in terms of employment plants operated by joint- 
stock companies were still significantly above the 
industry's average18.
17 Mosser, Industrieaktiengesellschaft, pp.101-103, stresses 
this point with reference to the whole of industrial joint- 
stock companies in Austria.
18 Cf. the discussion in Chapter II, section 4.
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2. The Growth of Machine-Building Companies:
The Demand for Capital
•'Each company needs ... a certain amount of capital the 
size of which depends on the volume of production, the 
method of production, and the velocity of production. The 
need for the provision of capital and its scale are closely 
related to the growth of a company. The latter is reflected 
in the volume of investment, i.e. the conversion of money 
into (other) assets, and in the development of the balance- 
sheet total”19.
Figure IV.1 and Table IV.4 show that the need for capital 
in the machine-building industry rose during the years 
between 1880 and 1912. In each of the three decades, the 
two Budapest firms' average balance-sheet total rose faster 
than that of the Austrian companies'. Whereas the Austrian 
average total grew at an annual rate of 5.58 per cent, 
Ganz' and Schlick's average total increased by nine per 
cent between 1880 and 1912. Both these rates of growth are 
well above the figure calculated for German machine- 
building companies20. But expansion occurred in an uneven 
fashion and affected the companies to a varying extent.
19 Feldenkirchen, W., "Zur Kapitalbeschaffung und
Kapitalverwendung bei Aktiengesellschaften des deutschen 
Maschinenbaus im 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhundert”, 
Vierteljahrschrift fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 69 
(1982) No.1, p.38.
20 Ibid. , p.45.
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Table IV.4
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF BALANCE
(PER CENT)
-SHEET TOTAL
1880
-1890
1890
-1900
1900
-1912
1880
-1912
1. Sigl
2. Simmering
3. Brunner
4. Breitfeld
5. Bohmi sch-mahr.
6. Ruston
-1.87
4.44
7.80
2.42
6.49
0.70
2.88
4.86
10.67
9.14
9.57
3.50
2.90
12.24
6.03
4.18
3.11
14.54
1.38
7.43
8.02
5.14
6.15 
6.59
7. Ganz
8. Schlick
7.90
14.00
12.16
4.07
7.50
9.45
9.06
9.12
Six companies* 
(1.-6.)
2.28 7.17 7.06 5.58
Two companies* 
(7.-8.)
9.38 10.24 7.86 9.07
Eight companies* 
(1.-8.)
4.43 8.44 7.43 6.80
* Growth of average balance-sheet total
Sources: Appendix 
B.6a, B.7a, B.8a,
B, Table B.la, B.2a, 
B.9a and B.lOa.
B. 3a, B.4a, B.5a,
Table IV.5
COMPOUND RATES OF ANNUAL PEAK-TO-PEAK GROWTH:
AVERAGE BALANCE-SHEET TOTALS (PER CENT)
1885 1900 1907 1885
-1900 -1907 -1912b -1912b
Six companies 4.51 5.83 8.81 5.64
Two companies 8.45a -0.41 20.59 8.20
Eight companies 5.82 3.28 13.52 5.04
a: 1884-1900 b: 1912 was not a peak year
Sources: Appendix B, Tables B.la and B . 2a.
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Figure IU.l: Average of Balance-Sheet Totals (1000 Crouns), Seni-Log Scale
53087.7
Hungary
23400.2
3267.8
Austria
3670.2
1880 1888 1836 1304 1312
Source: Appendix B, Tables B.la and B.2a.
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A brief look at peak-to-peak rates rather than growth over 
ten year periods reveals a markedly more accentuated 
temporal pattern of expansion (Table IV.5). Clearly, the 
most rapid rise among both Austrian and Hungarian machine- 
building companies took place in the last half decade prior 
to World War I. As will be shown below, this was a period 
of intense merger and take-over activity. Several companies 
effectively doubled their size and scale of operation. 
During the 1880s Austrian company growth and the related 
rise of capital requirements were limited: the average
balance-sheet total fluctuated around an almost constant 
level up to the mid-1890s (Figure IV.1). Given the 
depressed state of the Austrian machinery market in the 
1880s with slow growth of production and insufficient 
capacity utilization, it is hardly surprising to find that 
company investment in new production equipment remained low 
throughout the decade (Figure IV.2). Due to very low or 
even negative levels of net investment the average value of 
fixed assets and plant equipment shrunk at an average rate 
of 0.90 per cent between 1880 and 189021. It was not until 
the close of the century that Austrian machine-building 
companies substantially expanded their production capacity. 
Negative rates of net investment imply that not even the 
equivalent of depreciation allowances had been fully re­
invested22. Sigl provides an extreme example: this
company's gross investment in plant equipment was at 
constant zero between 1882 and 1894, i.e. not even those 
parts of the funds built up through depreciation allowances 
had been channelled back into investment23. No replacement
21 Appendix B, Table B.lb. See also Tables B.3b to B.8b on 
changes of individual Austrian company's fixed assets.
22 The common practice was to insert the value of fixed 
assets into the statements, corrected by the annual 
depreciation allowances.
23 Gross investment (t) = value of assets (t) minus value of 
assets (t-1) plus depreciation allowance (t) , i.e. gross 
investment equals net investment plus the allowance made 
for lost usefulness.
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Figure IU.Z: Awerage Annual Net Inuestnent as Percentage of Fixed Assets
103.3672
Hungary
61.5632
Austria
13.7533
-22.0447
1881 1883 1837 1305 1312
Source: Appendix B, Tables B.lb and B.Zb.
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investment took place24.
The higher rates of company growth calculated for the 1890s 
and the years up to 1912 do not reflect a process of 
smooth, continuous expansion. They are largely the result 
of discrete upward jumps in the key indicators. Though 
internal expansion also played a role, it was mostly 
external expansion, by means of acquisitions and mergers, 
that determined company growth in the Habsburg Monarchy's 
machine-building industry. The evidence suggests that the 
drive for external expansion as well as the attempts to 
cartelize the industry were, to a considerable extent, 
pursued as a means of achieving economies of specialization 
rather than economies of scale.
For a viable pattern of product specialization among firms 
to develop, machinery producers must be confronted with a 
large demand for their output. Limited market size thus 
imposes a severe stricture25. This is a problem of which 
contemporary observers of Austria's machine-building 
industry were only too aware26. Because of the high degree 
of heterogeneity of output and the importance of custom 
work typical for the capital goods sector, improvements in 
efficiency derive largely from increased division of labour 
among firms. Yet the importance of growth in markets lies 
not in that it facilitates bigness at the firm level but 
rather in the ability of firms to concentrate on a limited
24 See Table IV. 7 below.
25 Rosenberg, N., "Capital Goods, Technology, and Economic 
Growth", N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology 
(Cambridge, 1976), pp.143-144.
26 Cf. Fischer, H., "Die Maschinenindustrie in Osterreich", 
Die GroB-Industrie Osterreichs, vol. I (Vienna, 1908), 
p.98; Handels- und Gewerbekammer Prag, Bericht der Handels- 
und Gewerbekammer in Prag iiber die volkswirtschaftlichen 
Verhaltnisse ihres Bezirkes im Jahre 1906 (Prague, 1907), 
pp.103-104; Pfaff, C., "Die Maschinen-Industrie", 
Entwicklung von Industrie und Gewerbe in Osterreich in den 
Jahren 1848-1888, eds. Commission der Jubilaums-Gewerbe- 
Ausstellung Wien 1888 (Vienna, 1888), pp.268-269.
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range of products possessing specified properties and 
performing specific tasks. Thus machinery producers tend to 
aim primarily at the realization of economies of 
specialization. Producers of intermediate goods, whose 
output is typically fairly homogeneous (e.g. chemicals, 
iron and steel), enjoy, in contrast, economies of scale27. 
"The economies of specialization ... derive not from the 
production of a completely homogeneous product but from the 
concentration upon a relatively narrow (heterogeneous) 
product range which in turn requires a relatively 
homogeneous collection of resources in their production. 
The point is that the typical machine-producing firm 
produces small batches of output drawn up to specifications 
reflecting the unique requirements of the user, but each 
such batch differs only slightly, and all draw upon a 
homogeneous collection of resources - each firm possessing 
plant facilities, designing abilities, and other 
technological 'know-how' which is geared to the effective 
solution of a very limited range of production problems"28.
None of the numerous attempts to operate a cartel in 
Austria's machine-building industry after the turn of the 
century proved successful29. In all instances, though, it 
was the problem of product specialization that motivated 
negotiations. A first comprehensive agreement on common 
interests was signed in 1904 by four leading Bohemian 
firms, Ruston, the Bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik and
27 In illustrating the relationship between the two 
concepts, Rosenberg points out that firms which achieve 
economies of scale are also specialized in their output 
structure, but firms may achieve economies of 
specialization which do not involve significant economies 
of scale; Rosenberg, "Capital Goods", pp.143-144.
28 Ibid., p. 144.
29 For a general discussion of the spread of cartels in late 
nineteenth century Austria see Good, D., The Economic Rise 
of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (Berkeley, Calif., 1984),
pp.218-226.
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the machine-building departments of Ringhoffer and Skoda30. 
The aims of the agreement were to reduce costs through 
increased division of labour, joint project design and 
costing facilities, and joint sales offices31. The 
signatories viewed the limited capacity of the domestic 
market and the tendency of individual firms to produce a 
wide range of output as the main obstacles to increasing 
specialization. Product specialization of individual 
plants, in turn, was seen as a pre-condition for reductions 
in manufacturing costs. Accordingly, in an effort to avoid 
internal competition and thus increase the scope for 
realizing economies of specialization, provisions were made 
so that each of the four participating firms would focus on 
the production of a narrowly defined range of items, even 
if it involved giving up traditional lines of products. 
Machinery orders were to be allocated to a particular plant 
by joint institutions32. However, this ambitious scheme 
which stopped just short of merging the four companies did 
not materialize as one of the participants eventually 
withdrew its support33.
A renewed effort to cartelize the industry was made in 
1907, initially involving 11 of the largest machine- 
building firms in Austria34. In this case, though, the aims 
of association were less far reaching than the 1904/05 
venture of the Bohemian manufacturers. Though general
30 Kartell-Rundschau II (1904), pp.700-703, 739-741. The
plants of the four firms jointly employed about 3,900 
workers.
31 Magyar Orsz&gos Leveltar, Budapest (hereafter MOL), Z-40- 
8.cs.-204.sz.: Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank, Proj. 405/5 
- Az osztrak gyarak kartell-megallapodasa, pp.75-83, 1905.
32 Ibid.
33 Kartell-Rundschau III (1905), pp.16-18.
34 Kartell-Rundschau VI (1908), pp.130-131, 214, 552, 667. 
Another firm and a group of Galician factories joined in 
later.
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reference was made to the task of improving product 
specialization in individual plants, the cartel agreement 
did not define explicitly future areas of specialization 
for its participating firms35. Orders were allocated to 
member firms according to quotas based on the shares these 
firms had in the total output covered within the agreement, 
and in the production of specific types of machinery during 
the preceding years. Prices were not formally fixed but 
offers of cartelized firms were "protected" in so far as 
other cartel members would not supply at lower prices in 
response to the quota system and the compensatory measures 
and penalties introduced to offset variations above and 
below the individual firm's quotas. The arrangements were 
confined to domestic sales of machinery; exports were not 
regulated. A virtually identical cartel agreement drafted 
for the Hungarian machine-building industry in 1908 was 
never implemented36. Operating since November 1907 and 
planned to function for ten years, the Austrian machinery 
cartel soon collapsed in 1911 without having achieved many 
of its aims37. The reasons for this failure were 
manifold38, but the fact that the cartel encompassed only
35 MOL, Z-40-9.cs.-245.sz.: Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank, 
Osztr&k g^pgy&rak kartellegyezmeny tervezete, 1907.
36 MOL, Z-425-3.cs.-25.sz.: Ganz £s Tarsa Villamossagi-,
Gep-, Vagon- ts Hajogy&r Rt., magyar gepgy&rak kozt kotott 
kartellszerii megallapodasok, 1908. See also Kartell- 
Rundschau VI (1908), pp.305, 461, 552; IX (1911), pp.408- 
409; Berend, I.T. and Ranki, G., The Development of the 
Manufacturing Industry in Hungary, 1900-1914. Studia
Historica 19 (Budapest, 1960), pp.33-34.
37 Kartell-Rundschau IX (1911), pp.675-678, 813-814, 903-
906. The hope that quotas for particular products would be 
absorbed by particular firms, thus increasing their share 
in the manufacturing of these products and facilitating 
product specialization at the plant level, did not 
materialize. Quotas were hardly exchanged between firms and 
hence no significant concentration of production was 
achieved.
38 Contemporaries viewed the high degree of heterogeneity of 
the industry's output, frequently based on individual 
designs, and the importance of personal contacts between
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a rather small part of the industry was certainly prominent 
amongst them. With approximately 45 million crowns on 
annual average, cartelized machinery output accounted for 
less than 10 per cent of total output in mechanical 
engineering39.
Almost all mergers and acquisitions were carried out 
between firms on the same stage of production, i.e. 
machine-building companies generally combined with other 
machine-building firms. Very rarely do we find examples of 
vertical integration when companies at either preceding or 
subsequent stages of production were acquired. Thus 
horizontal combinations were the rule. Three main themes 
characterize external expansion among Austro-Hungarian 
machine-building firms. Firstly, companies often combined 
with other firms operating in the same or very closely 
related product fields. These moves were primarily 
motivated by the search for specialization gains: an
increased share in the market for particular types of 
machinery allowed the allocation of a larger proportion of 
plant and design capacity to specialized production rather 
than to general machine-building still dominant in most 
firms at the time. Product specialization implied scope for 
productivity improvements as manufacturing of a more 
restricted range of products could draw on a more 
homogenous set of resources: design expertise, the specific 
labour skills required, the productive apparatus used in
producers and customers as the main obstacles to product 
and sales standardization required for the successful 
operation of a quota based machinery cartel. Cf. Kartell- 
Rundschau IX (1911), pp.904-905; Hammerbacher, Die 
Konjunkturen in der deutschen Eisen- und Maschinen- 
GroBindustrie (Munich/Berlin, 1914), pp.109-110.
39 Bibliothek der Kammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft fur 
Wien, Vienna (hereafter HKB Wien), Sign. IV.6316: 
Handelspolitische Zentralstelle, Gutachten zum autonomen 
Zolltarif: Die Entwicklung der osterreichischen
Maschinenindustrie seit 1905 bis 1913, typescript, no 
place, no year, pp.13-14. Kartell-Rundschau IX (1911), 
pp.988-989. Appendix A, Table A.13, column (1).
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the manufacturing process or material input40. But, 
secondly, mergers and acquisitions were also used to widen 
the existing manufacturing programme and to gain entry to 
new product markets which had not been supplied before. 
Product diversification was seen as a means to shield a 
firm from negative effects of either extremely volatile or 
secularly falling demand for a particular product or type 
of product (risk reduction). Thirdly, the purchase of 
foreign firms served to acquire or maintain access to 
foreign markets threatened by increasing protectionism.
The next section examines the experience of individual 
companies in some more detail.
3. External Expansion in the Machine-Building Industry
In 1900, the Briinner Maschinenfabrik - a producer mainly of 
steam engines and boilers for the cotton textile 
industries, flour mills and electric power generation 
plants - bought the machine-building firm of Friedrich 
Wanniek & Co. (Brno)41. This move immediately translated 
into a doubling of its balance-sheet total, a 58-per cent 
rise in the value of its fixed assets, and a 63-per cent 
increase in turnover during the 12 months from 189942. Two 
factors shaped the decision to carry out what was 
technically a company acquisition, but effectively the
40 Rosenberg stresses that a high degree of specialization 
in machinery production is conducive to an effective 
learning process and to an effective application of what is 
learned; a "highly developed facility in the designing and 
production of specialized machinery is, perhaps, the most 
important single characteristic of a well-organized capital 
goods industry and constitutes an external economy of 
enormous importance to other sectors of the economy”, 
Rosenberg, "Capital Goods", p.144.
41 Die Hundertjahrige Geschichte der Ersten Briinner 
Maschinen-Fabriks-Gesellschaft in Briinn von 1821 bis 1921 
(Leipzig, 1921), pp.111-113, 127, 150-151; for a
description of the Wannieck works see pp.127-149.
42 Appendix B, Tables B.5a and B.5b.
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merger of two firms43. With the termination of the 
partnership in 1900, and neither of the partners in a 
position to run the firm on their own account, Wannieck 
initially contemplated the transformation into a joint- 
stock company, allowing for further expansion44. But both 
Wannieck and the Briinner Maschinenfabrik shared the 
conclusion that such a move would only intensify 
competition between them without much benefit for either45. 
For not only were they the two largest machine-building 
firms in the Brno region, they also had very similar 
product programmes46. Furthermore, it was thought that "the 
integration of the Wannieck factory would be possible 
'without notable increase in central administration' and 
that a more economic utilization of both plants would 
induce a substantial reduction in production costs and, in 
turn, an equivalent rise in total profits”47.
Further steps towards external expansion were taken in 1912 
and 1913. The general shareholders' meeting in 1912 voted 
to increase the company's share capital from 4 to 7.4 
million crowns48. Though part of the additional funds were 
to be used for financing expansion of the Brno plants, the
43 In 1900 the Brunner Maschinenfabrik raised its share 
capital from 2.4 to 3.2 million crowns and acquired 
Wannieck's plant in exchange for 4000 shares at 200 crowns; 
Geschichte der Brunner Maschinenfabrik, p.150.
44 Ibid., pp.149-150. In 1890, the Swiss machine-building 
firm Gebr. Sulzer, Winterthur, had taken a 41 percent 
limited interest in the firm. Friedrich Wannieck, the 
founder, and two executives of his private firm became 
partners in Fr.Wannieck & Company; Geschichte der Brunner 
Maschinenfabrik, pp.141-141.
45 Ibid., p. 150.
46 Steam engines ”of all systems and sizes” and machinery 
for sugar plants and brickworks made up the core of 
Wannieck's output in the 1880s and 1890s; see Geschichte 
der Brunner Maschinenfabrik, pp.139-147.
47 Ibid. , p. 150.
48 Compass 1914, pp.437-438; Geschichte der Brunner 
Maschinenfabrik, p .2 21.
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anticipated takeover of the Wiener Dampfkessel-, Apparate- 
und Maschinenfabriks AG, vorm. Josef Pauker & Sohn (Vienna) 
and the purchase of a majority stake in Rock Istvkn Gepgyar 
ReszvenytarsasAg (Budapest) called for an increase in 
equity49. The possession of Pauker - manufacturers of steam 
boilers, in particular - implied a further widening of the 
Briinner Maschinenfabrik's productive capacity and an 
increase in market share; again, as in the case of 
Wannieck, a producer operating in similar or complementary 
markets had been acquired50. Thus the main objective was, 
apparently, to strengthen the company's absolute and 
relative position in their existing markets it. However, 
the purchase of Rock added a new dimension to the Briinner's 
policy of external expansion51. For here, for the first 
time, a non-Austrian firm was integrated into its group of 
subsidiary companies52. One factor, in particular, 
accounted for this investment decision. In the light of 
Hungarian industrialization policy, the Brunner 
Maschinenfabrik realized that it had to acquire a 
manufacturing base in Hungary if it were to have access to 
this market. Rock provided this access through its 
established links with both customers and public 
administration in Hungary53. Consequently, those products
49 Ibid.. Pauker was affiliated on 1 January 1913, the Rock 
shares were bought on 31 December 1912.
50 For a brief description of Pauker, its output range and 
its company acquisitions (Th.Schultz & L.Goebel, Vienna, 
1911; Rohrenkesselfabrik Modling vorm. Diirr, Gehre & Comp. 
AG, Modling/Vienna, 1911-12) see Geschichte der Brunner 
Maschinenfabrik, pp.173-209.
51 On Rock Istvan machine-building works see Geschichte der 
Brunner Maschinenfabrik, pp.209-220.
52 The participation in Simmering's Bucarest subsidiary 
works in 1909 does not appear to have been of great 
significance to the Brunner Maschinenfabrik. It is neither 
mentioned in the firms centennial publication Geschichte 
der Brunner Maschinenfabrik, nor in the Compass entries 
dealing with the Brunner.
53 Geschichte der Brunner Maschinenfabrik, p.221.
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which were previously a speciality of the parent company in 
Brno were now added to Rock's existing range, namely 
equipment for sugar refineries and brickworks, steam 
turbines and Diesel-engines54.
To a large extent, the rapid growth of Breitfeld in the 
late 1890s and of Ruston and Simmering after the turn of 
the century can also be explained in terms of external 
expansion. Breitfeld acquired the Fiirst Salm'sche 
Eisenwerke (Blansko) in 1897 and, in the following year, 
the machine-building firm of Bolzano, Tedesko & Cie 
(Schlan)55. Again, turnover, balance-sheet total and the 
value of assets rose to considerably higher levels as a 
consequence56. In 1911, Breitfeld concluded a cooperation 
agreement with Nicholson Maschinenfabriks-AG (Budapest) and 
took a minority stake in the firm57.
During the 1880s and 1890s, Ruston grew at a rate well 
below the average of the six Austrian companies. In 1900 it 
ranked last of these firms in terms of its balance-sheet 
total. But by 1912 two major take-overs had completely 
changed the situation. In a first step to expand business 
Ruston bought the machine-building factories of Bromovsky, 
Schulz & Sohr (1910) where production was moved to from the 
original plant. A year later the machine-building 
department of F. Ringhoffer was added58. As a result the 
balance-sheet total rose from its previous maximum of 6.3 
million crowns in 1907 to 14.7 million in 1910 and - with
54 Ibid., p.220; Compass 1914, p.940.
55 Compass 1903, pp.1223-1225. See also Die Industrie 1892- 
1913. Festnummer zum 20-jahrigen Bestand des 
Zentralverbands der Industriellen Osterreichs, Vienna 1913, 
pp.90-92.
56 Appendix B, Tables B.6a and B.6b.
57 Compass 1913, pp.412, 856; Die Industrie, p.90.
58 In the same year Ruston sold all its shares of the 
Maschinen-Fabriks-AG vorm. Tanner, Laetsch & Co (Vienna) to 
Simmering; Compass 1913, pp.426-428.
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the integration of Ringhoffer - 24.6 million crowns in 
191159. These acquisitive activities made Ruston the second 
biggest of the six Austrian firms after Breitfeld. In 1911 
Ruston bought a majority stake of the Ungarische 
Sangerhauser Maschinenfabriks-AG (Budapest) and arranged 
its merger with the firm of Josef Eisele, a steam-boiler 
factory60. Thus some form of participation in the Hungarian 
market was secured. But Ruston's drive for growth was soon 
to be penalized. The downturn in the business cycle, a 
heavy debt and interest burden, and delays in the 
completion of the new plant on the recently acquired 
Ringhoffer site caused a massive loss in 191361. The Skoda 
works played a central role in the reorganisation of Ruston 
the following year. Share capital was reduced to 3.5 
million crowns to cover the loss, to fund extraordinary 
depreciation allowances, and to finance restructuring62. 
New stocks were then issued to raise share capital to 16 
million crowns. Skoda acquired shares with a nominal value 
of 7 million crowns in exchange for machinery, equipment 
and patents of its machine-building factory in 
Pilsen/Plzeft. Thus, as a result of the reorganization, a 
new engineering combine was created as part of the Skoda 
concern63.
59 Appendix B, Table B.8a.
60 Compass 1914, pp.452-454, 945. The company's name was
then changed into Vaterlandische Maschinenbau-AG 
Sangerhausen-Eisele.
61 The 1913 loss amounted to more than 5.8 million crowns 
at a time when share capital was 14 million crowns. The 
annual surplusses in 1911 and 1912 stood at 0.67 and 0.52 
million crowns. See Appendix B, Tables B.8a and B.8b and 
Compass 1916, pp.471-473.
62 Compass 1916, pp.471-473.
63 Consequently, the company's name was changed into 
Vereinigte Maschinenfabriken AG vorm. Skoda, Ruston, 
Bromovsky und Ringhoffer. See also Marz, E.,
Osterreichische Bankpolitik in der Zeit der groBen Wende 
1913-1923 (Vienna, 1981), pp.85-88.
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Sigl and Simmering64 were predominantly active in railway 
related production. Therefore, both firms were subject to 
the extreme fluctuations in demand for locomotives and 
rolling stock. The data on annual turnover clearly reflect 
this problem65. The responses to the challenge, however, 
were quite different. Whilst Sigl continued to rely heavily 
on the production of locomotives and tenders66, Simmering 
made a clear move towards product diversification. In order 
to become less dependent on variations in demand for 
railway cars - hitherto the core field of production - 
Simmering bought the Briinn-Konigsfelder Maschinenfabrik 
Lederer & Porges (near Brno) in 19 0367. With the 
integration of this firm as branch-works, Simmering 
obtained expertise and capacity in new fields of 
engineering, reducing dependence on railway related output. 
Thus machines and apparatus for the petroleum, paraffin and 
chemical industries, as well as cooling technology and 
wood-working machinery were added to Simmering's product 
range68. The production of gas and Diesel engines, in the 
Brno plant, linked the company to the more recent, dynamic
64 A short account of Simmering's history is given in the 
company's centennial publication Hundert Jahre Maschinen- 
und Waggonbau-Fabriks-AG in Simmering, vorm. H.D. Schmid 
(Vienna, 1931). See also Mathis, F., Big Busines in 
Osterreich. Osterreichs Grossunternehmen in 
Kurzdarstellungen, pp.284-287.
65 Appendix B, Tables B.3c and B.4c.
66 Between the early 1890s and 1912/13 the share of these 
products in Sigl's total turnover fluctuated between 60 
percent and 90 percent with other machinery having largely 
a compensatory function. When locomotive production was low 
- as, for example, in 1892/93 - the production of other 
machinery, spare parts and accessories, etc. took a larger 
share. But these never accounted for more than 40 percent 
of overall turnover. Appendix B, Table B.3c; Compass 1905, 
p.259 and 1916, p.467.
67 Compass 1905, pp.263-264; Hundert Jahre Simmering, p.13.
68 Hundert Jahre Simmering, p. 13.
118
sections of the machine-building industry69. The short run 
effect of the integration of Lederer & Porges was an upward 
shift in the scale of operation - both the value of assets 
as well as the balance-sheet total more than doubled from 
1902 to 190370. Certainly more important, however, was the 
fact that Simmering, in contrast to Sigl, was now much 
better placed to benefit from the expansion of the wider 
machinery market. Yet Simmering continued to increase its 
company holdings. Already in 1904 Roumanian subsidiary 
works were opened in Bucarest as a means of circumventing 
tariff barriers. Four years later this firm was transformed 
into an independent joint-stock company, with Simmering 
holding a 50 per cent stake71. The privately owned 
engineering firm of G.Topham & Co. (Vienna) was acquired in 
1909 and henceforth run as a limited company. Topham 
produced largely for the wood-working industries72. A new 
share issue in 1911 provided the funds to take-over all 
shares of Maschinen-Fabriks-AG vorm. Tanner, Laetsch & Co. 
(Vienna). This company, which previously belonged to 
Ruston, employed about 500 workers in the production of 
steam technology, cooling-systems and brewery equipment73. 
There is no indication, however, that any of these three 
firms was as closely tied into the productive structure of 
the parent company as Lederer & Porges. Moreover, they each 
remained companies of legally independent status.
The two Hungarian firms, Ganz and Schlick, participated in
69 Compass 1905, pp.263-264 and 1910, pp.364-365.
70 Appendix B, Tables B.4a and B.4b. It should be noted, 
though, that Simmering's business year 1903/04 had 15 month 
due to a change in accounting practice.
71 Matis, Big Business, p. 285. In 1909, the Brunner 
Maschinenfabrik participated in the Bucarest subsidiary, 
Compass 1911, p.377.
72 Hundert Jahre Simmering, pp. 13-14.
73 Ibid.; Compass 1914, pp.456-458.
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the mergers and acquisitions movement, too. Schlick joined 
in rather belatedly, yet did so with considerable effect. 
Subsequent to a doubling of its share capital, the Budapest 
firm merged its operation with Nicholson Maschinenfabriks- 
AG (Budapest)74. This company had established close ties 
with Breitfeld (Prague) the previous year. As a result of 
the amalgamation, Schlick's balance-sheet total rose by 
almost 120 per cent in 191275. As production of the 
combined companies was to be concentrated in Schlick's 
premises, with the Nicholson factory to be demolished, 
Nicholson's fixed assets were written off completely in its 
final 1911 statement76. Mere one-off capacity expansion 
was, therefore, not the primary goal behind the fusion. The 
concentration of all production into the existing Schlick 
plant and its subsequent reorganization indicate that the 
main aims were rationalization of the manufacturing process 
and improved capacity utilization. As a result, the new 
firm of Schlick-Nicholson implemented a major investment 
programme in 191377. The rise in Schlick's 1912 balance- 
sheet total thus largely originated from the increase in 
share capital, the integration of Nicholson's equity 
reserves and liabilities, credit and stocks - but not a
74 Compass 1913, pp.855-857 and 1914, pp.914-916. At the 
time of the merger, Nicholson employed about 750 to 800 
workers. Its manufacturing programme included agricultural 
machinery, steam engines and locomobiles. Annual turnover 
amounted to approximately 6 million crowns.
75 Schlick's balance-sheet total (net of accumulated
depreciation allowances) amounted to 10.93 million crowns 
in 1911, whereas Nicholson stated a total of 10.04 million. 
The new firm of Schlick-Nicholson had a balance-sheet total 
of 23.83 million crowns in 1912. Appendix B, Table B.lOa; 
Compass 1913, pp.855-859.
76 Technically this was done by endowing accumulated
depreciation allowances up to the level of gross value of 
fixed capital. See Compass 1913, pp.855-857; 1916, p.975.
77 The net value of fixed plant and equipment rose by 58
percent, Appendix B, Table B.lOb.
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consequence of taking-over of its fixed capital78.
The temporal pattern of Ganz' external and internal 
expansion was somewhat unusual among the eight firms79. As 
has been shown above, the increase in company concentration 
via mergers and acquisitions was by and large a feature of 
the post-1900 years. In contrast, Ganz branched out very 
early and pursued external growth already in the 1870s and 
1880s. With little acquisitive activity in the 1890s and 
early 1900s, amalgamation later became a theme again only 
after 1910.
As early as 1869 - the year of its conversion into a joint- 
stock company - Ganz set up branch works in Ratibor 
(Prussia). Proximity to the German, Polish and Russian 
markets as well as ready energy supplies from the Silesian 
coal fields were the main driving forces. A reduction in 
transport and energy cost and the overcoming of tariff- 
barriers were the envisaged benefits of this move80. 
Whereas there is no indication that the Ratibor venture 
implied any significant change in Ganz' manufacturing 
programme, modifications were heralded by the purchase of 
the First Hungarian Waggon Factory81. This company had run 
into financial difficulties in the aftermath of the 1873 
crisis. Ganz bought the firm in 1879/80, thus adding 
modern, valuable capacity just on the eve of an upswing of
78 Compass 1914, pp.914-916; Appendix B, B.lOa.
79 The first fifty years of Ganz & Co. are the subject of 
BerlcLsz, J. , "A Ganz-gyar elso felszazada 1845-1895", 
Tanulmanyok Budapest multjkbol, vol.XII (1957), pp.349-458.
80 Ibid., pp. 380-381.
81 At the time, Ganz mainly produced railway wheels, tramway 
wheels and railway crossings as well as other cast iron 
products for engineering and construction purposes; 
Berl£sz, "Ganz-gyar", p.380.
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the Hungarian economy82. Moreover, the manufacturing of 
railway and tramway cars was fully complementary to Ganz's 
already well-established production of cast iron wheels. 
Thus one may view this acquisition to some extent as one of 
the rare cases of forward integration in the industry.
In the mid-1880s the cellulose and paper-making industries 
of Austria-Hungary with her large and rich woodlands began 
developing. Ganz noticed the opportunities this potential 
market offered and bought the machine-building factory in 
Leobersdorf near Vienna (1887)83. Despite its small size 
and its substantial financial problems, Ganz considered the 
firm as the only important manufacturer of machinery for 
these industries84. The plant was reorganized and fully 
integrated as branch works into the productive structure of 
Ganz85. This acquisition immediately led to a 26 per cent 
increase in the value of Ganz' net fixed assets and an 11 
per cent rise in the balance-sheet total86. Yet probably 
more important in the longer run was that Ganz had now 
significantly widened its product range and expanded into 
markets so far unserved.
During the following 20 years, no further steps were taken 
towards external expansion. The emphasis lay now, clearly, 
on internally generated company growth. A large investment 
programme in 1896-98 completed the structure of 
manufacturing sites which was to be in place for the next
82 Berlasz, "Ganz-gyar”, pp.388-390; Compass 1880, pp.828- 
829, 839 and 1882, pp.697-698. At around the same time Ganz 
became increasingly involved in electro-technical 
engineering and water-turbine technology.
83 Compass 1889, pp.463-464; Berl&sz, "Ganz-gyar”, pp.400- 
401.
84 Ibid..
85 Voltmann, W., "130 Jahre Leobersdorfer Maschinenfabrik" 
(unpublished diploma thesis, Wirtschaftsuniversitat Wien, 
Vienna, 1981), provides only little information on this 
firm for the years between 1870 and 1913. See also Mathis, 
Big Business, p.185.
86 Appendix B, Tables B.9a and B.9b.
122
ten years. The value of Ganz net fixed capital rose from
1.7 million crowns in 1895 to 8.3 million in 189887. A new 
plant was built in Budapest in response to the needs of 
Ganz' fast expanding electro-technical department. The 
premises in Leobersdorf were substantially enlarged to 
include a new department for electrical engineering and a 
new foundry. A blast furnace complex in Petrovagora 
(Carniola), which hitherto had been leased, was now bought 
from the Krainische Industriegesellschaft. Thus Ganz got 
hold of its own supply of special iron qualities essential 
for hard castings88. Only eight years later, in 1906, the 
electro-technical department was separated from the parent 
company and henceforth run as a formally independent joint- 
stock company. Similarly, the Leobersdorf works were sold 
to a newly established joint-stock company in 190789. In 
both cases, though, Ganz maintained a substantial interest 
as shareholder and continued to be involved in the 
management of the now affiliated firms90. The loss of plant
87 Ibid.
88 At around the turn of the century, Ganz operated six 
plants:
1. machine-building factory (original plant), Budapest
2. railway car factory, Budapest
3. electro-technical factory, Budapest
4. subsidiary works, Leobersdorf
5. subsidiary works, Ratibor
6. blast furnace complex, Petrovagora.
A brief list of the major output items of these plants is 
to be found in Compass 1900, pp.1019-1022.
89 Compass 1909, pp. 320-323.
90 MOL, Z-436-l.cs.-l.t.: Ganz-Fele Villamoss&gi Rt.,
Notarielle Bescheinigung (Ubersetzung), 1906; Z-58-51.cs.- 
161.t: Magyar Altalanos Hitelbank, No. 161g, 1907-1913.
Ganz held 45 percent of the share capital (8 million 
crowns) of the new firm Ganz-Fele Villamossagi Rt. . Both 
transactions were carried out in collaboration with the 
Hungarian General Credit Bank (Magyar Altalanos Hitelbank) 
which itself took up large portions of the new companies' 
stock. The changes in Ganz' securities portfolio reflect 
the company's continuing financial interest in the two new 
firms; the total value of securities held by Ganz and 
inserted in its balance-sheet are for
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and equipment to the new companies nevertheless implied a 
significant fall in fixed capital91.
But these changes in the legal and organizational framework 
of the Ganz concern only preceded a re-arrangement of Ganz 
which fundamentally altered its structure, scale and scope. 
For in 1911 Ganz merged its operations with those of 
Danubius Schiffbau- und Maschinenfabriks-AG, Budapest92. 
Though Danubius produced railway cars, too, the firm mainly 
operated shipyards in Budapest and - since 1908 - in Fiume 
(Rijeka). In 1909, it employed about 2,000 workers compared 
with Ganz' 4,000 strong workforce93. A rapid increase in 
orders from the Austro-Hungarian navy induced the new firm 
of Ganz-Danubius to expand its ship-building capacity and 
to attract more labour. Already in 1913, Ganz-Danubius had 
about 10,000 workers on its payroll94. Whereas the Fiume 
shipyards accounted for only 22 per cent of Ganz-Danubius' 
gross fixed capital in 1911, this share had risen to more 
than 50 per cent by 191395. Most of the company's massive 
new investment was now geared towards naval armaments 
production. Its rapid expansion between 1910 and 1913 was 
therefore directly linked to the pre-World War I re­
armament boom96.
1905: 2.7 million crowns,
1906: 6.6 million crowns,
1907: 10.8 million crowns,
1910: 10.0 million crowns;
Compass 1908, p.312; 1910, p.652 and 1913, p.855.
91 The value of Ganz net fixed assets fell by 28 percent in
1906 and 23 in 1907; Appendix B, Table B.9b.
92 Compass 1913, pp.852-855.
93 Compass 1911, pp. 679-680, 683.
94 Compass 1913, pp.852-855.
95 Ibid.; Compass 1914, p. 913 and 1916, p. 972.
96 The value of fixed assets rose by 82 percent in 1912 and
by more than 130 percent in 1913; Appendix B, Table B.9b.
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Three factors, in particular, explain the varying growth of 
machine-building companies and the resulting differences in 
capital requirements:
1. Company growth in the machine-building industry was 
largely a function of external expansion. Most companies 
realizing above average growth rates in the respective 
decades did so by company acquisitions or amalgamations. 
The Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik97 and Schlick, the 
latter in the 1880s, were an exception. A renunciation of 
external growth as opposed to internal growth, for whatever 
reason, generally implied a renunciation of faster growth 
overall.
2. The different development of demand in the various 
branches of machine-building, too, led to differential 
rates of company growth. Growth rates differed because 
firms acted in different markets. The experience of those 
companies operating in railway equipment markets supports 
the argument that the failure to extend production into 
other fields caused penalty in terms of restricted growth. 
This is not to say that railway engineering as such was an 
activity detrimental to company growth since eventually 
almost all companies discussed here produced either rolling 
stock, locomotives or other railway equipment to some 
extent. Yet insufficient product diversification allowed 
little compensation for the effects of temporarily stagnant
97 The substantial rise of both balance-sheet total and 
value of fixed assets in 1899 and 1900 reflects high rates 
of internal growth. New share capital was raised in both 
years in order to finance the construction of a new 
locomotive factory, further building and machinery 
investment and debt repayment. In 1907, the company founded 
- in a joint-venture with F.Ringhoffer - the Prager 
Automobilfabrik Ges.m.b.H.. The following year the 
Bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik purchased Ringhoffer's 
stake, liquidated the car factory and integrated its plant 
as new department for car engineering. Compass 1914, 
pp.432-433.
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or volatile demand for one product or group of products98.
3. The course of the respective domestic economy, 
apparently, played a role as well. For the two Hungarian 
firms - Ganz and Schlick - showed a temporal pattern of 
expansion markedly different from that of most of the
Austrian companies. If the two economies were not in the
same phase of a cycle, this should to some extent have 
affected relative company growth.
4. The Provision of Capital
Fixed capital in Austrian machine-building firms 
continuously declined during the 1880s up to the mid-1890s. 
The industry aimed at reducing excess capacity. It seems 
safe to assume that at least parts of this surplus capacity 
were a left-over from the boom prior to 1873 not reduced to 
a sufficient level in the depression thereafter. The 
recovery of Austria's machine-building industry in the
1880s was a slow, gradual process. Low capacity utilization 
and poor company growth caused demand for fresh capital to 
be weak. Only one of the six Austrian companies - the
Brunner Maschinenfabrik - raised new share capital between 
1880 and 189099. Similarly, equity reserves endowed out of 
profits were built-up slowly. As a result, total equity 
capital grew by only 1.51 per cent on annual average in 
this decade (Table IV.6). Though the use of borrowed funds 
expanded faster, its relatively small volume meant that the
98 These preliminary conclusions summarize results 
strikingly similar to those Feldenkirchen obtained for 
German machine-building companies during the same period; 
see his "Kapitalbeschaffung und Kapitalverwendung”, pp.44- 
45.
99 In 1889, the Brunner Maschinenfabrik increased its joint- 
stock capital from 1.2 million to 1.8 million crowns. 
Appendix B, Table B.5a.
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level of total capital was barely affected100. Low rates of 
company growth generally implied limited increases in the 
capital employed.
100 The fast rise in the Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinen­
fabrik 's credit capital is largely a result of its 
extremely low level at the onset of the 1880s. In 1880, 
borrowed funds accounted for less than 15 percent of the 
balance-sheet total; Appendix B, Table B.7a.
Table IV.6
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AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF EQUITY AND BORROWED CAPITAL (%)
EQC
1880
-1890
BOC EQC
1890
-1900
BOC
1. Sigl
2. Simmering
3. Brunner
4. Breitfeld
5. Bohmisch-mahr
6. Ruston
1.21
0.09
5.94
0.70
1.40
1.51
-10.94
12.13
11.80
5.42
20.68
-0.48
0.58
5.49
8.10
8.68
10.82
0.10
11.54
4.87
12.70
8.74
8.78
9.80
7. Ganz
8. Schlick
5.31
11.24
13.09
18.16
8.89
5.65
18.92
3.27
Six companies* 
(1.-6.)
1.51 3.70 5.46 9.19
Two companies' 
(7.-8)
6.60 14.82 8.09 14.75
EQC
1900
-1912
BOC EQC
1880
-1912
BOC
1. Sigl
2. Simmering
3. Brunner
4. Breitfeld
5. Bohmisch-mahr
6. Ruston
1.46
9.86
3.97
4.53
0.90
15.22
4.50
14.67
8.44
5.18
4.33
14.05
1.11
5.37
5.86
4.57
4.05
5.98
1.45
10.73
10.80
6.02
10.62
8.00
7. Ganz
8. Schlick
3.59
6.16
9.75
12.28
5.76
7.65
13.59
11.14
Six companies* 
(1.-6.)
6.25 8.10 4.50 7.04
Two companies' 
(7.-8.)
4.21 10.14 6.16 13.02
Growth of average equity and borrowed capital
Key: EQC: equity capital
BOC: borrowed capital
Sources: Appendix B, Tables B.la, B.2a, B.3a, B.4a, B.5a, 
B.6a, B.7a, B.8a, B.9a, B.lOa.
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Figure IU.3: Auerage Capital Structure, Austria (1000 Crowns), Semi-Log Scale
20684.8
Total Capital /
8097.4
3170.0 Equity Capital
Borrowed Capital
1241.0
1880 1888 1896 1904 1912
Source: Appendix B, Table B.la.
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Figure IU.4: Auerage Capital Structure, Hungary (1000 Crouns), Seni-Log Scale
63716.0
Total Capital
14861.1
3466.5 Equity Capital
Borrowed Capital
808.6
1880 1889 1898 1907 1913
Source: Appendix B, Table B.2a.
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In response to faster expansion, the two Hungarian firms 
increased both their equity and their borrowed capital at 
clearly higher rates than most of the Austrian companies. 
Schlick repeatedly raised new share capital to finance its 
rapid growth in the 1880s. New shares were issued in 1881, 
1882 and 1884. Given the substantial increase in borrowed 
funds and the still very low level of reserves in the 
1880s, further equity had to be raised if a deterioration 
of Schlick's debt ratio was to be avoided101. Ganz, in 
contrast, did not increase its equity by recourse to 
external sources. The company systematically built up its 
reserves as a substantially larger than average part of 
annual profits was not distributed but kept at the disposal 
of the firm. As a result, the share of reserves in Ganz' 
equity capital increased from 8 per cent in 1880 to almost 
45 per cent only ten years later102.
In the 1880s, Austrian engineering companies were capable 
of financing most of their restricted investment projects 
by recourse to depreciation equivalents only. Provisions 
made for the replacement of capital-stock were not fully 
used for this purpose. This, again, is a clear indicator of 
sluggish company growth and associated low levels of demand 
for capital. The persistent feature of negative rates of 
net investment in the 1880s (Figure IV.2) suggests that 
some companies were in a position to finance at least part 
of their working capital out of accumulated depreciation 
allowances. This, surprisingly, applied even to Ganz and 
Schlick - despite their faster than average expansion in 
this decade (Tables IV.4 and IV.6). The example of Sigl and 
Breitfeld, in particular, shows that the funds involved 
were quite significant. An exception, again, was the 
Brunner Maschinenfabrik. In contrast to Ganz and Schlick - 
where company growth was not directly associated with an
101 Appendix B, Table B.lOa.
102 Ibid., Table B.9a.
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increase in fixed capital103 - the Brunner Maschinenfabrik 
maintained high levels of positive net investment 
throughout the 1880s. Its fixed capital thus expanded at a 
rate well above the average of all eight companies104. 
Accordingly, capacity growth had to be supported by 
increasing utilization of both equity and borrowed capital.
Table IV.7
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES AND ACTUAL RE-INVESTMENT
(1000 CROWNS)
Sigl Simmering Breitfeld
A B A B A B
1881 84.5 84.5 27.9 27.9 — —
1882 0 0 32.1 32.1 123.9 0.9
1883 176.0 0 33.2 33.2 124.2 21.4
1884 332.3 0 33.9 33.9 125.0 125.0
1885 297.6 0 34.4 34.4 131.9 26.4
1886 133.0 0 33.9 22.0 125.3 17.9
1887 126.0 0 35.1 35.1 28.5 28.5
1888 119.4 0 34.2 10.8 155.3 11.3
1889 113.1 0 34.1 27.3 19.8 19.8
1890 107.2 0 33.8 19.3 36.5 36.5
Total 1363.1 84.5 332.6 276.0 870.4 287.7
Key: A : depreciation allowances
B: actual re-investment
Note: Since actual re-investment not necessarily equals the allowance 
made for this purpose the smaller one of the two values for 
depreciation and gross investment represents re-investment.
Sources: Appendix B, Tables B.3b, B.4b and B.6b.
The upswing of Austrian machine-building production in the 
1890s induced a change in investment behaviour which 
eventually had to be accommodated by different forms of 
finance. Capital requirements could not be met any more by 
sole use of funds reserved for equipment replacements.
103 See Appendix B, Tables B.9a, B.9.b, B.lO.a and B.lOb.
104 Ibid., Tables B.lb, B.2b and B.5b.
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External expansion - which gathered pace at around the turn 
of the century - called for additional means of finance. As 
a result, both equity capital as well as outside capital 
grew at much higher rates than in the previous decade 
(Table IV.6).
The general recovery of the industry and stable and at 
times improving returns on equity - notably in the late 
1890s and during 1907 to 1912 - contributed to an
environment in which raising further equity on the capital 
market posed no serious problems. Most of the Austrian 
companies increased their stock capital in the late 1890s 
and early 1900s in several consecutive steps. A second wave 
followed in the years 1910 to 1913105. With share prices 
above the nominal value of shares, companies could often 
realize substantial issuing premiums which, in most 
instances, were allocated to equity reserves106. Yet in the 
long run share capital nevertheless lost much of its 
significance relative to other forms of financial capital. 
Whereas the average balance-sheet total of the eight 
companies rose by 720 per cent between 1880 and 1912, 
average share capital increased by only 235 per cent. In 
both Austria and Hungary, the average ratio of equity 
capital to statement total also fell over time. This holds 
even though the favourable development of profits during 
the 1890s and after the stagnation 1901-04 facilitated more
105 Breitfeld, for example, carried out seven increases of 
its joint-stock between 1897 and 1913: as a consequence, 
its share capital rose from 3.0 million crowns in 1896 to 
11 million in 1912 (13.2 million crowns in 1913). The case 
of Ruston is even more striking. The rapid expansion in its 
scale of operation achieved by company u caused a sharp 
increase in demand for long term capital. This demand was 
satisfied by both a rise in borrowing and a widening of its 
basis of equity capital. Ruston's joint-stock rose from 2.4 
million crowns in 1901 to 14 million crowns in 1912. See 
Appendix B, Tables B.6a and B.8a.
106 Breitfeld cashed in an issuing premium of 832.000 crowns 
in 1900, 640.000 in 1901, and 717.900 crowns in 1906; with 
its 1911 share issue, Ruston realized a premium of 1.3 
million crowns. Cf. Compass 1909, pp.274-276; 1914, p.453.
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extensive endowment of equity reserves107. Unless share 
capital was increased, the rate of growth of equity was 
determined by the change in equity reserves. The latter, in 
turn, was a function of company growth, the level of 
profits and their distribution. Consequently, equity ratios 
varied between firms and over time (Table IV.8).
Ganz pursued a markedly different approach to self- 
financing out of un-distributed profits than the other 
companies. Before the turn of the century, in particular, 
Ganz maintained persistently lower rates of distribution of 
annual surplus108 and the company's share capital was 
increased only twice109. As a result, reserves dominated 
the equity structure to a much larger extent than in any of 
the other firms examined here. It is difficult to assess 
the reasons for this policy. Yet it seems plausible to link 
Ganz' extensive self-financing to the relationship between 
company growth on the one hand, and the debt ratio on the 
other. For if a company grows rapidly it requires funds to 
finance expansion. If then, for whatever reason, it does 
not wish to or is not able to raise further equity on the 
capital market, it is confined to either increasing its 
borrowing or using withheld profits110. Continuous
107 See Appendix B, Tables B.la to B.lc. The continuous rise 
in the ratio of equity to share capital (Ratio2) up to the 
mid-1890s resulted from building up reserves while share 
capital remained more or less constant. When stock capital 
was increased from around the turn of the century onwards 
reserves continued to grow as well. From then on the two 
parts of equity funds were kept in a fairly stable ratio.
108 See Appendix B, Ratio7 in Tables B.3d, B.4d, B.5d, B.6d, 
B.7c, B.8c, B.9d and B.lOd.
109 Share capital was increased from 3.84 million crowns to
4.8 million in 1896 and, eventually, to 8.64 million crowns 
in 1911; Appendix B, Table B.9a.
110 In the event of new share issues, a change in the 
ownership structure of a firm occurs unless all current 
share-holders participate in full and in proportion to 
their current holdings of stock. But owners and management 
may want to prevent outsiders from gaining influence over 
the company and thus abstain from issuing new equity.
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increases in credit finance may, however, negatively affect 
a company's debt position and its ability to obtain credit 
at more favourable conditions.
Table IV.8
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF EQUITY RATIOS: 1880 TO 1912
maximum minimum mean coeff.
1. Sigl 92.6 28.1 62.5 .321
2. Simmering 76.5 30.9 55.5 .222
3. Brunner 75.8 36.8 60.3 .131
4. Breitfeld 72.5 42.5 53.2 .136
5. Bohm.-mahr. 81.4 37.8 55.9 .235
6. Ruston 77.9 44.4 66.2 .142
7. Ganz 74.8 26.4 51.9 .185
8. Schlick 88.6 39.0 58.2 .211
Sources: Calculations based on equity ratios (Ratiol) given 
in Appendix B, Tables B.3c to B.lOc.
With generally declining equity ratios, borrowed funds 
became increasingly important over time among all eight 
companies discussed here (Table IV. 6)111. The most rapid
111 Sigl was the firm experiencing the most pronounced 
fluctuations in its share of equity capital. These were 
largely a reflection of severe jumps of turnover and 
variations in stocks; see Appendix B, Tables B.3b and B.3c. 
A decreasing volume of production translated into a drop of 
absolute annual surplus which - in turn - reduced the 
balance-sheet total. Since the volume of equity capital was 
rarely subject to substantial short-run reductions the 
equity share rose sharply. In 1892, for example, Sigl's 
equity ratio peaked at more than 92 percent. At the same 
time the annual surplus more than halved as a consequence 
of another fall in output. The same "mechanism" was at work 
again in 1902 and 1903 - though the rise in equity share 
was induced by a massive reduction in material stocks in 
1901 which offset the effects of a rising surplus in this 
year. The steep fall of Sigl's ratio of equity capital in 
1906 - despite a high level of production - resulted mainly 
from the heavy losses in this year. These losses in 
combination with an unprecedented rise in net investment 
boosted the balance-sheet total while equity capital 
remained more or less unchanged. As a consequence, reserves 
were dissolved, the value of share capital halved, and new
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rise in the use of credit capital can be observed for years 
characterized by high levels of investment and company 
growth. This holds, in particular, for the Austrian 
companies. Peaks in investment coincided closely with peaks 
in credit finance (Figures IV.2 and IV.3).
The available balance-sheet data rarely allow 
differentiating between short-term and long-term credit 
capital. Thus it proves difficult to assess the term 
structure of borrowed funds. The only type of long-term 
borrowed capital which occasionally has been referred to in 
some of the Austrian companies' statements was mortgage 
credit, notably from the 1890s onwards. Yet even these data 
are rather patchy and cannot be integrated into a coherent 
series. There are two likely explanations for the apparent 
lack of more detailed information. Either long-term credit 
did in fact not play any important part or was "hidden” in 
the total debt positions.
The results Feldenkirchen derived for German joint-stock 
engineering companies may provide some rough indication 
about the relative significance of short and long-term 
borrowing112. According to his findings, many firms did not 
employ any long-term borrowed capital during long spans of 
time or even the whole period between 1880 and 1913. Other 
companies, in contrast, made extensive use of loan or 
debenture capital. The average share of long-term credit in 
the balance-sheet total, though, was fairly constant over 
time at approximately 10 to 11 per cent. But the values 
varied considerably between companies113. With falling
shares issued increasing share capital to 5 million crowns 
in 1907. The losses were explained with badly calculated 
export orders, delayed completion of the current investment 
programme, and penalty payments for incompleted orders; 
Compass 1909, pp.284-285 and 1911, pp.358-360.
112 Feldenkirchen, "Kapitalbeschaf fung und Kapitalver- 
wendung”, p .48.
113 For 1913, for example, a minimum of 0 percent and a 
maximum of 34.6 percent was recorded for the share of long­
term credit in the total among engineering companies
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equity ratios and a more or less constant share of long­
term credit, short-term borrowing became an increasingly 
important form of finance in German machine-building114. 
Feldenkirchen finds an explanation in the willingness of 
banks to offer increasing overdrafts. Continuous 
prolongation made these credit funds permanently available. 
The companies were thus put into a position to finance 
essential investment projects by use of bank credit and to 
delay recourse to the capital market until more favourable 
conditions prevailed (i.e. higher issuing premiums or 
better loan conditions)115.
Similar circumstances seem to have characterized the 
Austrian situation. Little evidence can be found suggesting 
extensive long-term borrowing in the form of loans or 
debentures among Austrian engineering firms. Ganz was the 
only company among the eight which issued a long-term loan. 
In 1898, six million crowns were raised by means of 
debenture bonds with a 20-year amortization period. No 
other form of long-term credit had been explicitly stated 
in the company's balance-sheet116. Yet bank records 
indicate that rolling overdrafts were effectively providing 
a form of longer term credit finance to the industry. 
Occasionally, further bank credit was secured against 
mortgage117. The share-holdings of the Credit-Anstalt
registered at the Berlin stock-exchange; Feldenkirchen, 
"Kapitalbeschaffung und Kapitalverwendung", p.48.
114 Ibid., pp.48-49.
115 Ibid.
116 The subsequent pay-off and ongoing company growth caused 
the loan's share in the total to fall rapidly over time. In 
the year it was issued, this loan on debentures accounted 
for 41 percent of Ganz' balance-sheet total. By 1912 this 
share had dropped to less than four percent; Compass 1900, 
p.913 and 1914, p.913.
117 Archiv der Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Vienna (hereafter 
CAA) : Verwaltungsratsprotokolle, a) for Breitfeld: no.7
(23.3.1897), no.27 (22.12.1900), no.l (8.1.1902), no.18
(22.8.1905), no.14 (18.6.1907), no.17 (30.7.1907), no.15
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implied substantial interests of the bank in the Austrian 
machine-building industry118. This, in fact, may explain 
the bank's preparedness to accommodate the financial needs 
of the industry by supplying bank credit on a longer term 
basis.
For most of the period discussed here the ratio of equity 
capital to fixed assets and stocks was above 100 per 
cent119. This shows that long-term investment in machinery 
and equipment was generally covered by long-term finance. 
Even stocks as part of the working capital were completely 
covered. This ratio, too, fluctuated over time and varied 
between firms, largely in response to short-run variations 
in stocks held and changes in investment behaviour. With 
another sharp rise in the scale of operations just prior to 
World War I and the associated expansion of both assets and 
material stocks more outside funds had to be used to 
finance - at least partly - the holding of material stocks. 
As a result, the average ratios for both the six Austrian 
firms and the two Hungarian companies fell120. But with the
(19.7.1910), no.8 (22.4.1913); b) for Ruston: no.25
(13.12.1898), no.27 (22.12.1900), no.26 (15.12.1908); c)
for Sigl: no.28 (4.12.1888), no.9 (3.5.1898), no.26
(11.12.1900) .
The argument about the increasing significance of bank 
credit and its prolongation for company finance is further 
strengthened when other firms are taken into account. The 
Credit-Anstalt's records on firms like Stabilimento 
Tecnico, Ringhoffer, Tanner-Laetsch & Co., Heid, Ruesch- 
Ganahl, Kaiser's Sohne and Zieleniewski - which are 
included in Sample II for Austria - provide ample evidence 
in support of the hypothesis that rolling overdrafts were 
effectively employed as a form of long-term credit.
118 CAA: Verwaltungsratsprotokolle, no.27 (27.11.1906), no.11
(24.5.1910), no.16 (12.8.1913). See also Marz, Bankpolitik, 
pp.85-88.
119 See Appendix B, Ratio4 in Tables B.lc, B.2c, B.3d to 
B.6d, B.7c to B.8c, B.9d to B.lOd.
120 Ibid., Ratio4 in Tables B.lc and B.2c. The sharp fall in 
the average ratio for the two Hungarian companies (1911 to 
1913) results from the re-organization of Ganz. The merger
138
exception of Simmering (1907 to 1910) and Ganz (1913), all 
firms maintained a level of equity capital which covered 
their long-term investment in fixed capital. The endowment 
with equity - relative to the value of plant and equipment 
- probably accounted to some extent for the limited use of 
long-term credit capital in Austrian machine-building. If 
growth of fixed capital was moderate, the demand for long­
term finance, too, grew only moderately. While the fixed 
capital bound long-term in the company could be financed 
completely by own funds, there was no pressing need to 
raise long-term credit.
Finally, the problem of how successful machine-building 
firms were in economizing their capital requirements should 
be discussed briefly. How did the ratio of turnover to 
balance-sheet total change? Here only a tentative answer is 
possible as turnover data are available for only six of the 
eight companies and only for limited periods of time. 
However, the results obtained are interesting for several 
reasons. Firstly, before the turn of the century the ratios 
of all firms were generally much higher than after121. 
Though substantial differences existed between the 
companies as to the actual level of their respective 
ratios, the trend indicates a long-run decline from the 
peaks in the 1880s and 1890s. Except for improvements as a
with the Danubius shipyards implied not only a 370 percent 
increase in fixed assets, but stocks of materials, semi­
finished and finished products rose more than tenfold 
between 1910 and 1913. Whereas stocks made up less than 20 
percent of Ganz' balance-sheet total in 1900, they 
accounted for more than 36 percent in 1913. For German 
engineering, Feldenkirchen observed that "the share of non­
monetary components in working capital was particularly 
high among shipyards"; Feldenkirchen "Kapitalbeschaffung 
und Kapitalverwendung", p.46. Large projects spread over 
longer periods of time - like large-scale ship-building - 
required maintenance of larger stocks. The move of Ganz 
into this section of engineering thus went along with a 
rise in its stock holding.
121 See Appendix B, Ratio5 in Tables B.3d to B.6d and B.9d to 
B.lOd.
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consequence of short-run increases in annual turnover, none 
of the companies managed to increase the productivity of 
the capital it employed. In most cases, it actually fell 
over time.
Another point of interest is that the causes of high or low 
ratios varied between firms. Sigl, for example, responded 
to slow company growth by continuous net desinvestment. The 
firm reduced its capital stock in an attempt to downwardly 
adjust its plant and equipment to fluctuating and declining 
levels of railway related output. The ratio of turnover to 
balance-sheet total rapidly improved from its low level in 
the mid-1880s and stayed above the 100 per cent mark up to 
1901122. The Brunner Maschinenfabrik, in contrast, achieved 
markedly lower ratios123. This, however, was not a 
consequence of sluggish growth but rather one of fast 
expansion of both turnover and capital employed. Much of 
the Brunner's growth was capacity driven. Permanent 
positive net investment caused the ratio of turnover to 
total capital to fluctuate around a level of 81 per cent - 
despite rapidly rising output.
Ganz, finally, reached exceptionally high turnover/total 
ratios in the mid-1880s which gradually declined, while 
remaining above 100 per cent, towards the end of the 
century and, eventually, fell strongly in the years after 
1898124. Though fluctuating, turnover rose rapidly up to 
the late 1890s; but at the same time fixed capital was not 
increased.
122 Appendix B, Ratios in Table B.3d. The substantially lower 
levels of the ratio after the turn of the century can be 
explained by the collapse of turnover (1902 to 1905), the 
massive loss in 1906 and the effects of the subsequent re­
organization of Sigl.
123 See Appendix B, Ratio5 in Table B.5d.
124 See Appendix B, Ratio5 in Table B.9d.
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Table IV.9
SUMMARY STATISTICS: TURNOVER / BS-TOTAL, 1885-1903 (%)
maximum minimum mean coeff.var.
1. Sigl 144.6 30.3 92.0 .328
2. Simmering 153.7 34.5 108.3 .296
3. Brunner 95.6 56.7 80.5 .124
4. Breitfeld 107.3 64.8 84.7 .149
5. Ganz 201.2 62.8 120.9 .325
6. Schlick 112.4 69.9 88.9 .151
Key: BS-Total: balance-sheet total
Note: The period 1885 to 1903 delimits the years for which turnover 
data of all six companies are available.
Sources: Calculations based on Appendix B, Ratio5 in Tables 
B.3d to B.6d, B.9d to B.lOd.
The subsequent modernization and expansion of Ganz' 
operation in 1896 to 1900 preceded the downturn in the 
Hungarian economy when output dropped dramatically. 
Similarly, Schlick's turnover collapsed, too. As a result, 
both firms experienced historically low ratios of turnover 
to capital employed. Here, the temporal coincidence of 
large capital investment with a downswing in the business 
cycle may provide an explanation. Yet as no turnover data 
are available for the years after 1905 and 1903, 
respectively, we cannot observe whether or not the two 
companies' ratios improved again in the upswing.
5. Conclusion
The growth of machine-building companies in Austria- 
Hungary, the pattern of their investment, the volume and 
forms of finance varied significantly between different 
firms and over time. The diverging development of demand in 
the various machine-building branches, the impact of the 
business cycles in Austria and Hungary, and companies' 
preparedness to pursue external growth, were the main 
factors accounting for differential rates of company
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growth.
In most instances, faster than average company growth was 
achieved by mergers and acquisitions within the industry. 
Moves towards external expansion seem to have been 
motivated by three basic considerations. Some firms 
acquired other manufacturers as a means of diversifying 
their output and thus reducing the impact of stagnant or 
volatile demand for their existing product range. Other 
companies, in contrast, focused on producers operating in 
the same or fairly similar markets; in these cases, it has 
been shown, the primary aim was to facilitate improvements 
in product and plant specialization. A third type of 
external company growth was that involving the purchase of 
machine-building firms abroad in an effort to secure access 
to foreign machinery markets.
As in German machine-building, the relative importance of 
credit capital increased during the decades from 1880 to 
1912 - a result confirmed when more than the original eight 
companies are taken into account125. Hungarian engineering 
firms, in particular, seem to have operated on a 
comparatively low equity level. Though the decline in 
equity ratios was somewhat more pronounced in Austrian and 
Hungarian companies than in German firms126, on average all 
firms in Samples I and II maintained levels of equity 
capital sufficient to finance their fixed assets bound 
long-term.
125 See Appendix B, Tables B.ll and B.12; Feldenkirchen, 
"Kapitalbeschaffung und Kapitalverwendung", Table 3, p.56.
126 Cf. Feldenkirchen, “Kapitalbeschaf fung und Kapital- 
verwendung", Table 3, p .56.
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V
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN COMPETITION: INTERNAL 
AND EXTERNAL TRADE OF MACHINERY IN AUSTRIA-
HUNGARY
1. Trade and Production
Despite the rapid advances in domestic machinery 
production, especially from the 1890s, the Habsburg 
Monarchy remained heavily dependent on imports of foreign 
capital goods throughout the late nineteenth century. 
Though the size of the gap varied, the balance of trade in 
machinery was in deficit for each year between 1870 and 
1913 (Figure V.l). Moreover, the value of imports exceeded 
that of exports in almost all categories of machinery 
during these years. Isolating Austrian trade flows yields 
results which indicate that this dependency was not 
confined to the economically less developed Eastern half of 
the Empire1. With the exception of her trade with Hungary, 
Austria herself also suffered a negative balance of 
machinery trade, too, from the 1880s up to 1913.
Between 1872 and 1912, the Empire's imports of machinery 
from abroad grew in line with Austrian output (in current 
prices) by 3.7 per cent on annual average - a rate below 
the average of Hungarian machine-building growth. Exports
1 Though for most of the period under consideration here no 
official data on Austrian machinery trade are available, 
the major trends and changes can be traced by making use of 
the Hungarian trade statistics. Austria's trade flows were 
derived by subtracting Hungary's imports and exports 
related to the rest of the world from the overall figures 
for Austria-Hungary. The Hungarian material allows, 
moreover, to take account of the internal trade in 
machinery between the two halves of the Empire. See the 
discussion in Appendix D.
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Figure U.l: Balances of Machinery Trade (1000 Crowns)
64646
Austria's Internal Trade with Hungary
S737.7
Austria's External 
\ Trade
Austria-Hungary's 
External Trade-45170.7
-100073.0
1303 13131870 1881 1832
Source: Appendix D, Tables D.l, D.2 and D.3.
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expanded by about 3 per cent over the whole period2. The 
considerable difference between the respective growth rates 
for selected periods suggests that domestic production and 
imports did not respond proportionally to changing market 
conditions (Table V.l). While output of machines rose 
fairly rapidly from the mid-1880s to 1900, imports 
increased at a significantly lower pace. But after the turn 
of the century, the growth in machinery imports outstripped 
that of both Austrian and Hungarian production3.
Table V.l
COMPOUND RATES OF GROWTH 
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF MACHINERY (PER CENT)
Habsburg Empire Austria Hungary
Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp.
1872-1912 3.7 3.0 — — — —
1883-1912 5.5 4.3 4.7 4.3 6.4 5.4
1872-1883 -0.3 -1.1 — — — —
1883-1900 2.5 4.1 2.6 3.6 0.5 5.9
1900-1912 9.6 4.5 7.7 5.1 15.3 4.6
Peak-to-peak measurement. Since the peaks in Austria may not correspond 
precisely to the peaks in Hungary (or the Habsburg Empire as a whole), 
the periods compared are not identical. The figures for Austria and 
Hungary do not include growth in internal trade.
Source: Appendix D, Tables D.l and D.2.
However, from the late 1880s imports of capital goods from 
abroad showed a temporary decline relative to Austrian and 
Hungarian production. The degree of import penetration in 
Austria was falling as domestic producers provided a rising
2 Since trade data are available only in current prices, 
comparisons with domestic production are based on Austrian 
and Hungarian machine-building output in current rather 
than in constant prices.
3 See Appendix A, Tables A.13, column (1), and A.21, column 
(1).
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proportion of machines and equipment for use in the 
Austrian economy (Figure V.2)4. For Hungary, though, no 
such effect can be observed, largely because of the 
structure of her machinery imports. By far the largest part 
of Hungarian imports of capital goods came from Austria, 
i.e. from within the customs area. The relative decline in 
the Habsburg Empire's total machinery imports during the 
1890s thus primarily affected Austria, which absorbed about 
80 per cent of all foreign imports at the time5.
The slow growth of total imports relative to domestic 
production seems less an outcome of increased tariff 
protection but rather one of changing economic 
circumstances in those countries which exported machinery 
to the Habsburg Monarchy. As growth in the German economy, 
for example, accelerated again in the second half of the 
1880s, some of the external pressure on Austrian producers 
was reduced6. For much of the "surplus" output, previously 
sold as exports to the Monarchy, was now supplied to an 
expanding market where demand for capital goods was 
beginning to rise again. Moreover, it has been shown in the 
previous chapter that up to the mid-1890s Austrian machine- 
building was still operating on under-utilized capacity. 
When domestic demand for machinery eventually recovered 
again in response to an acceleration in Austrian industrial 
growth, it was readily accommodated by an increase in 
output. Consequently, a relatively small share of this 
demand was diverted to imported items. The industrial boom 
which unfolded in Germany during the final years of the 
century induced a rise in German product prices and so
4 Import penetration: machinery imports/(domestic production 
+ machinery imports - machinery exports). Internal trade 
between Austria and Hungary is included in the trade 
figures used.
5 Appendix D, Tables D.l, D.2, and D.3.
6 Cf. Hoffmann, W.G., Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft 
seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1965), Table 
76, pp.390-395.
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Figure U.2: Inport Penetration of Machinery Markets (Per Cent)
47.0395
Hungary
35.6335
24.2274
Austria
12.8214
1883 1891 1907 19131899
Sources: App. A, Tables A.13, col.(l), A.21, col.(l); App. D, Tables D.2, D.3.
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further improved the competitive position of Austrian 
manufacturers in their home market7. But to the extent that 
Austrian machinery producers benefitted from the upswing in 
the German economy, they suffered afterwards when a 
downturn followed in 1901. The effects of contracting 
Austrian machinery demand were aggravated by increasing 
German competition both at home and in export markets. 
Because of rapidly falling domestic sales German machine- 
building firms turned abroad in search of foreign 
customers8.
With a few exceptions, Austria - as the larger of the two 
economies - persistently absorbed more than 80 per cent of 
the Monarchy's imports of machines until the turn of the 
century. Thereafter, this share quickly fell in response to 
Hungary's more rapid industrial expansion and the 
associated re-direction of demand for imported plant and 
equipment. At the same time, Austrian manufacturers were 
apparently not in a position to exploit to the full extent 
the opportunities provided in the Hungarian market. For the 
trade statistics show that their position of relative 
strength in the Hungarian economy was gradually eroded by 
rising foreign competition. Whereas Hungary used to procure 
about 70 to 80 per cent of her imported machinery from the 
Western half of the Monarchy, this share had fallen to 60 
per cent in 19139.
7 Rudolph, Banking and Industrialization, pp.31-32.
8 Cf. "Waggon- und Maschinenfabrikation”, Die Storungen im 
deutschen Wirtschaftsleben in ihren Rilckwirkungen auf die 
industriellen, Effekten- und Geldmarktverhaltnisse 
Osterreichs. Schriften des Vereins fur Socialpolitik 112, 
eds. Verein fur Socialpolitik (Leipzig, 1903), pp.55-57, 
and, in the same volume, "Die Maschinenindustrie”, pp.67- 
69.
9 Appendix D, Tables D.2 and D.3.
Table V.2
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AUSTRIAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF MACHINERY AS 
OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION
PERCENTAGE
Period Imports from Exports to Exports
Abroad Hungary Elsewhere
1883/1885 21.1 11.4 7.3
1886/1890 20.8 9.3 5.8
1891/1895 16.4 12.2 3.7
1896/1900 12.7 9.4 4.4
1901/1905 12.2 10.6 5.9
1906/1910 15.3 10.3 6.2
1911/1913 15.7 11.0 6.8
Sources: 
Tables D.
Appendix A, Table 
2 and D.3.
A.13, column (1); Appendix D,
The strong regional orientation of Austrian machine- 
building is clearly reflected in the volume and direction 
of its exports. Machinery sales to Hungary alone always 
accounted for a larger share of Austrian production than 
those to the rest of the world (Table V.2). Hence Austrian 
engineering was to some extent dependent on the expansion 
of machinery demand in Hungary. Contemporaries viewed the 
increasing success of Hungarian and foreign firms in the 
Hungarian market as a severe problem for the manufacturers 
in Bohemia, Moravia, and Lower Austria10. For the growth of 
exports to other countries was not fast enough as to fully 
offset the effects of declining shares in Hungarian imports 
of capital goods after the turn of the century. Despite 
advantages such as geographical proximity and operation 
within one customs area, Austrian exports of capital goods 
to Hungary rose by less than 7 per cent on annual average 
between 1900 and 1912, whereas imports of foreign
10 Bibliothek der Kammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft fiir 
Wien, Vienna (hereafter HKB Wien), Sign. IV.6316:
Handelspolitische Zentralstelle, Gutachten zum autonomen 
Zolltarif: Die Entwicklung der osterreichischen
Maschinenindustrie seit 1905 bis 1913, typescript, no 
place, no year, pp.9-10.
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engineering products to Hungary grew by 15 per cent during 
the same period11. Although Austrian exports of machinery 
to the rest of the world increased by about 5 per cent, 
too, these could not compensate for the lost opportunities 
because the volume of Austria's export trade with other 
countries was well below that with Hungary12. However, much 
of the contemporary Austrian manufacturers' complaints 
about being virtually excluded from the Hungarian machinery 
market were greatly exaggerated13. Austria remained 
Hungary's main source of imported capital goods throughout 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Figure 
V . 3)14.
11 Appendix D, Tables D.2 and D.3.
12 Ibid.
13 Cf. "Die Maschinenindustrie", p.69; Handels- und 
Gewerbekammer Prag, Bericht der Handels- und Gewerbekammer 
Prag iiber die volkswirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse ihres 
Bezirkes im Jahre 1896 (Prague, 1897), pp.99-100.
14 ROW = rest of the world.
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Figure U.3: Hungarian Inports of Machinery C1000 Crowns)
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Source: Appendix D, Tables D.2 and D.3.
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2. The Composition of Austria-Hungary's Machinery Trade
The analysis of Austria-Hungary's trade in machinery is 
somewhat hampered by frequent changes within the foreign 
trade statistics. In general, the goods classification 
scheme was modified when tariff variations were carried 
out15. From 1891 onwards the trade data are fairly detailed 
and largely compatible with those after the tariff change 
in 1906. The following discussion will therefore focus on 
the period 1891 to 1913. With a few exceptions16, any 
statement about the composition of trade flows in earlier 
years would be virtually meaningless as the share of 
"other, unclassified machinery" in both total imports and 
exports was extremely high in the 1870s and 1880s; at times 
it accounted for more than 90 per cent. A second problem 
should also be kept in mind: average import and export unit 
prices were rather volatile throughout the four decades17. 
Significant jumps, drops, peaks, or troughs can be observed 
for years near to or within those of tariff changes and re­
classification18. These upward or downward movements 
reflect to some extent changes in the composition of 
machinery trade; i.e. the share of high or low unit price 
products fluctuated in both imports and exports. But re- 
evaluations by the trade authorities seem to have played a
15 Import tariffs were changed in 1878, 1882, 1887, 1892, 
and 1906; k.k. Handelsministerium, Statistische Materialien 
iiber den osterreichisch-ungarischen AuBenhandel nebst 
Vergleich der Zollsatze seit 1878, Tarifklasse XL: 
Maschinen, Apparate und Bestandteile derselben (Vienna, 
1913).
16 Imports and exports of locomotives and locomobiles are 
reported in the trade statistics throughout the period 
discussed here.
17 Unit price = crowns per 100 kilograms of machinery. The 
official trade statistics report both the value and the 
weight of traded goods.
18 This holds especially for import prices in 1882, 1887, 
and 1892. See Appendix D, Figure D.l.
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role as well19. They do not, however, indicate the direct 
impact of tariff changes on unit prices, since the value of 
any imports is given as commercial value at the customs 
borders, i.e. exclusive of domestic freight and tariff 
levied upon them20.
Figure V.4 depicts the percentage shares in total imports 
of the three largest groups of machinery - textile 
machines, agricultural machines, and metalworking 
machines21. It shows that textile machines accounted for 
most Austro-Hungarian machinery imports between the early 
1890s and 1912. This seems hardly surprising given the 
relative weight of cotton and woollen textiles manufacture 
in the industrial economy. According to Fellner, the 
production of textiles and clothes in 1911 made up 25 per 
cent of total industrial output in Austria22. Domestic 
producers were apparently at no time in a position to 
satisfy the machinery demand of this industry. The balance 
of trade in textile machines was negative throughout the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century23. The small 
initial size of specialized textile machine-building, in 
particular, contributed to the persistence of import 
dependency. On the eve of World War I, for example, there 
was only one company in Austria producing spinning machines
19 The reported import or export unit prices were estimated 
and established by the Austro-Hungarian ”k.k. Permanenz- 
Commission fur die Handelswerte" (= permanent commission 
for the establishment of trade values). See the 
introductory sections of k.k. Handelsministerium, 
Statistisches Departement, Statistik des auswartigen 
Handels des osterreichisch-ungarischen Zollgebiets (Vienna, 
1893-1916).
20 Ibid.
21 Textile machines inclusive of sewing and knitting 
machines; see Appendix D, Tables D.5.
22 Fellner, F. v., " Das Volkseinkommen Osterreichs und 
Ungarns”, Statistische Monatsschrift XLII (1916), pp.570- 
571.
23 Appendix D, Table D.5.
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Figure U.4: Shares in Austro-Hungarian Machinery Inports (Per Cent)
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Source: Appendix D, Tables D.l, D.4, D.5 and D.6.
154
with an estimated annual output of 1.5 million crowns24. In 
contrast, the Monarchy imported spinning machines worth 
more than 6.5 million crowns on annual average between 1907 
and 191325. Given the relatively low share of Hungary in 
total imports of textile machinery26, it is fair to assume 
that the bulk of these spinning machines was shipped to 
Austria: domestic production was then nowhere near to
playing a significant role. Similarly, the width of the gap 
in trade of sewing and knitting machines and its long-run 
persistence indicate that the Monarchy's clothing 
industries had to turn to suppliers abroad27. The use of 
machinery of foreign origin spread as these industries 
increasingly mechanized their manufacturing processes28. In 
1913, domestic producers of sewing machines still provided 
only manually or foot-driven devices: "All other sewing
machines (were) procured from abroad"29. The only area in 
textile machinery production where Austrian factories 
seemed able to expand somewhat was in the production of 
looms30. According to estimates based on the data of the 
workers' insurance association, annual output averaged 
approximately 5.7 million crowns between 1907 and 191131. 
Even if the lower contemporary output estimate of 4 million
24 HKB Wien, Sign. IV. 6316: Gutachten, p. 131.
25 Handelsministerium, Statistik des auswartigen Handels 
1907 (III), pp.176-177; 1912 (IV), p.168; 1915 (IV), p.85.
26 Magyar Kir. Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, "A Magyar 
Szent Korona Orszagainak 1882-1913. £vi Kiilkereskedelmi 
Forgalma", Magyar Statisztikai Kozlemenyek 63 (Budapest, 
1923), p.313; Appendix D, Table D.5.
27 Appendix D, Table D.5.
28 HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, pp.136-137.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. , p. 128.
31 See Appendix A, Table A. 12b, for sources.
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crowns is used32, the ratio between domestic production and 
imports from abroad is clearly more favourable than in the 
case of spinning and sewing machines33. The value of 
Austria-Hungary's imports of looms was about 2.4 million 
crowns on annual average between 1907 and 19ll34. However, 
even in this branch of textile machinery production, the 
Monarchy maintained a substantial trade deficit from the 
1880s up to 191335.
After the turn of the century, imports of machine tools 
grew particularly fast36. Their value share in the 
Monarchy's total machinery imports rose from an average 3.1 
per cent in 1889/99 to 6.0 per cent in 1900/1037. The
32 This estimate refers explicitly to Austrian production of 
looms only, see HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, p.128. 
The former estimates (5.7 million crowns) are based on data 
from loom manufacturing establishments and thus, 
presumably, also cover production of other auxiliary 
machines.
33 See Appendix A, Table A.lid, and Appendix D, Table D.5, 
for data on production and trade of sewing and knitting 
machines.
34 Handelsministerium, Statistik des auswartigen Handels 
1915 (IV), p.85; 1912 (IV), p.168; 1907 (III), p.177.
35 See Appendix D, note 1, for sources on import and export 
data.
36 The available trade data do not allow differentiation 
between machine tools and the larger class of power-driven 
metal-working machinery: "The basic distinction is that 
machine tools shape metal through the use of a cutting-tool 
and the progressive cutting away of chips, whereas other 
metalworking machinery shapes metal without the use of a 
cutting-tool - by pressing (forming, stamping, punching), 
forging, bending, shearing, etc.", Rosenberg, N., 
"Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry, 1840- 
1910", Essays in American Economic History, eds. A.W. Coats 
and R.M. Robertson (London, 1969), p.167.
37 Appendix D, Tables D.l and D.6. There is some indication 
that actual unit prices of imported machine-tools were much 
higher than reported in the foreign trade statistics. The 
overall value of these imports and hence their share in 
total machinery imports were probably substantially above 
those stated here. Estimates based on records of purchase
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fairly sudden upsurge in deliveries of metal-working 
equipment from abroad is quite in accordance with the 
development of Austrian engineering as outlined in the 
previous chapters. This was a period of massive investment 
in new plant equipment. Though much of the rapid rise in 
average annual net investment was induced by acquisitions 
and mergers within the machine-building industry, low or 
even negative levels of net investment in the 1880s and 
early 1890s had left a small and outdated capital stock now 
to be replaced and expanded. The demand for the machine 
tool industry's output is largely determined by the 
requirements of primary machine makers and the demand 
situation they face. Ceteris paribus, rising demand for 
sewing machines, for example, will lead to a rise in the 
demand for machine tools necessary to make them. The growth 
of engineering in terms of output and employment caused an 
increase in demand for machine tools once the industry came 
close to full capacity utilization. A further motive was 
rationalization of the production processes. Labour-saving 
machinery was imported in order to reduce the share of 
labour in production costs, i.e. to increase labour 
productivity in the machine-building industry. "After 
labour-saving methods originated and developed abroad ... 
it is obvious that one turned there for the appropriate 
working machinery and neglected domestic production"38. To 
some extent, machine tools were also supplied by domestic 
manufacturers, but limited market size impeded product 
specialization at the factory level39. The most important
negotiations of the k.k. Osterreichische Staatseisenbahnen 
(Austrian state railways) suggest prices which imply 
imports of machine-tools (in 1912) worth more than 21 
million crowns rather than the officially registered 13.6 
million; HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, pp.119-123.
38 HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, p.116.
39 Cf. Rosenberg, N., "Capital Goods, Technology, and 
Economic Growth", N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology 
(Cambridge, 1976), pp.143-146. The following discussion 
relies on Carden, G.L., Machine-Tool Trade in Austria-
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machine tool firm in Austria-Hungary were the Vulkan works 
which, in 1909, employed approximately 500 workers in
Vienna and about 400 to 600 men in their Budapest plant.
Catering primarily to the machinery requirements of iron 
works and locomotive shops, the firm turned out more than 
200 different types and sizes of machine tools and 
accessories, often made according to a multitude of
patterns40. Similarly, the Ernst Dania works in Vienna, one 
of the leading machine tool firms in the Habsburg Monarchy, 
were also not able to fully specialize output and 
standardize production. Though first steps towards series 
production were made by turning out lathes, drills,
planers, and shapers in lots of either six or twelve, the 
firm was still prepared "to build to order any of nearly 
200 varieties of tools"41.
An American observer of the machine tool trade in Europe 
concluded that Austria-Hungary's machine tool industry did 
not offer sufficient quantities of high-grade medium-sized 
tools, in particular42. Contemporary estimates put Austrian 
production of metal-working machinery at 6,000 tons in 
1913/1443, this contrasts with an import volume of 17,499
Hungary, Denmark, Russia, and Netherlands with
Supplementary Reports on Italy and France. U.S. Department 
of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Manufactures, Special 
Agents Series-No.34 (Washington, 1910), pp.11-19.
40 Output of Vulkan included lathes; planers, shapers, and 
slotters; drilling and boring machines; horizontal and 
vertical milling machines; screw-cutting, tapping, sawing, 
and grinding machines; punching, shearing, bending, and 
straightening machines; eccentric and friction presses; 
steam and pneumatic hammers; hydraulic presses, and wood­
working machinery.
41 Carden, Machine-Tool Trade, p. 16.
42 Ibid., p. 11.
43 HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, p. 123.
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tons in 1912 and almost 15,000 tons in 191344. Austrian 
engineering was thus to a large extent dependent on the 
supply of machine tools from abroad where a larger market 
had allowed a higher degree of standardization and 
specialization45.
The examination of the Monarchy's trade in agricultural 
machinery reveals a pattern of development significantly 
different from that of overall machinery trade and, in 
particular, that in equipment for the textiles industries. 
Machines for use in agriculture almost always accounted for 
a substantial part of Austria-Hungary's capital goods 
exports. But their share rose even further after the turn 
of the century. By 1910, more than 40 per cent of the 
Monarchy's machinery exports were equipment for 
agriculture46. The balance of trade in threshing machines, 
ploughs, sowing and reaping equipment, and other
44 About 70 percent of the Monarchy's imports of metal- and 
wood-working machinery in these years went to Austria; 
Handelsministerium, Statistik des auswartigen Handels 1915 
(IV), p.86; Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal,
"Kiilkereskedelmi Forgalma", p.307. The Hungarian statistics 
do not distinguish between metal- and wood-working 
machinery. In the total of Austro-Hungarian imports, 
however, wood-working machines accounted for only a minor 
share; see Appendix D, Table D.6.
45 It may be noted in this context that even in Germany with 
her larger industrial economy, insufficient market size was 
an obstacle to more rapid specialization and 
standardization within the machine-building industry and 
its machine tool branch, especially in comparison with 
American engineering. Though Germany was the Habsburg 
Monarchy's main source of imported metal-working machinery 
(see Table V.5), she herself relied on supplies from the 
generally more advanced American machine tool firms. Even 
after the turn of the century, Germany continued to depend 
on imports of American precision machinery, especially 
turret lathes and automatic lathes. See Milward, A.S, and 
Saul, S.B., The Development of the Economies of Continental 
Europe 1850-1914 (London, 1977), pp.38-41; for a more 
detailed discussion see Barth, E., Entwicklungslinien der 
deutschen Maschinenbauindustrie von 1870 bis 1914 (Berlin, 
1973), pp.47-58.
46 Appendix D, Tables D.l and D.4.
159
agricultural implements improved to such an extent that a 
surplus was generated in most years between 1901 and 1910. 
However, the significance of trade for the Austrian 
producers of agricultural machinery is more evidently 
reflected in the reconstructed trade data which refer to 
Austria alone. If internal trade with Hungary is taken into 
account as well, Austria maintained a substantial surplus 
in agricultural machinery trade from the 1880s onwards. 
This holds despite the sharp increase in domestic demand, 
especially after the turn of the century, when Austria's 
imports of agricultural machines rose by 16 per cent on 
annual average47. The ratio of total exports to Austrian 
output of agricultural machinery fluctuated between a 
minimum of 38 per cent (1901) and a maximum of 49 per cent 
(1906) during the period 1897 to 191148. Countries other 
than Hungary increasingly became markets for the products 
of Austrian agricultural machine manufacturers; hence the 
relative weight of shipments to foreign lands rose rapidly 
after the turn of the century (Table V.3).
Table V.3
OUTLETS FOR AUSTRIAN AGRICULTURAL
(PER CENT)
MACHINERY PRODUCTS
Domestic Market Hungary Rest of the World
1897 59.7 37.6 2.7
1901 61.9 30.0 8.1
1906 51.4 31.2 17.4
1911 58.3 22.0 19.7
Sources: Appendix A, Table A .12c; Appendix D, Table D.10.
It has been shown in Chapter II that the manufacture of
47 Appendix D, Table D.10.
48 See the estimate for Austrian production of agricultural 
machinery given in Appendix A, Table A.12c, and the data on 
Austrian trade in Appendix D, Table D.10.
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agricultural machines and implements was one of the largest 
and most rapidly growing branches of Austrian machine- 
building49. Both the development of output as well as that 
of exports indicate that Austria's machine-building 
industry increasingly specialized in the production of 
agricultural machinery. Though temporary export surpluses 
were generated by trade in steam engines and locomotives50, 
too, no other machine-building branch of important size was 
as persistently orientated towards export business. The 
evidence suggests that relative market size and relative 
input material costs were the two main factors which 
accounted for the emergence of this pattern of 
specialization at the meso-level.
As a first step in dealing with these problems, the next 
section briefly examines the regional direction of Austria- 
Hungary's machinery trade. Where did imports come from? 
Where were exports sent to? And how did these flows relate 
to the process of specialization as outlined above?
3. The Geographical Pattern of Machinery Trade
The regional orientation of Austria-Hungary's international 
trade in machines was fairly simple: machines were imported 
from the West and exported mainly to Eastern and South 
Eastern Europe. Table V.4 shows that this pattern remained 
remarkably stable throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Structural shifts within this basic 
pattern, however, took place.
49 See Chapter II, section 3.
50 See Appendix D, Tables D.8 and D.9.
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Table V.4
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S PARTNERS IN MACHINERY TRADE 
(1000 CROWNS, CURRENT PRICES)
(1) Imports
Year Total Germany Britain USA SwitzerId.
1913 122,970 89,197 14,708 12,330 1,903
1912 151,959 110,535 20,162 13,968 3,197
1910 106,719 76,856 17,117 7,203 2,427
1905 62,275 40,290 14,990 3,622 1,434
1900 50,710 29,525 14,342 2,872 2,515
1895 44,632 25,812 14,776 942 2,036
1891 34,794 19,282 11,972 456 1,492
(2) Exports
Year Total Russia Romania Germany Italy
1913 54,063 15,957 6,453 10,117 3,457
1912 51,880 12,383 10,807 7,311 5,334
1910 38,801 12,125 7,874 6,221 3,101
1905 31,184 6,129 7,522 5,528 3,610
1900 30,575 6,909 9,815 5,867 7,650
1895 9,386 3,274 2, 688 1,826 625
1891 9,812 1,780 1,030 1,978 640
Sources: Appendix D, Table D. 1; Handelsministerium,
Statistik des auswartigen Handels 1915 (III), pp.223-226,
278-281, 450-453, 604-606, 780-782, 845-848, 925-927, 1545-
1547 ; 1910 (III), pp.201->204, 255-258, 426-429, 582-584,
745-748, 812-815, 884-886, 1469-1471; 1905 (12), pp.127-
128, 149-150, 168-169, 215-216, 335-336, 395-396, 421, 630, 
723, 726, 744-745, 749, 752, 776, 782, 784-785; 1896 (II), 
pp.424, 426, 430, 432, 439, 454, 467-468, 475-476; 1896
(12), pp.36-37, 58-59, 103-104, 179-180, 285-286, 207-208, 
389-390, 511.
In the early 1890s, Britain supplied about one third of the 
Monarchy's imports of machinery. The share continuously 
fell in the following two decades - by 1913 it accounted 
for only 12 per cent. During the same span of time, 
Germany's share rose from 55 to more than 70 per cent. 
Machinery imports from the United States amounted to only 
one per cent of the total in 1891, but stood at 10 per cent 
by 1913 (Table V.4).
The relative decline of imports from Britain was largely a
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result of changes in the material composition of foreign 
supplies: import demand for textile machines grew more
slowly than that for other types of machinery and, 
consequently, their share in total machinery imports 
continuously fell from the late 1880s (Figure V.4). But 
textile machines, notably cotton spinning-machines, 
constituted the bulk of imports from Britain, the world's 
premier textile machinery maker51. Thus it was not by 
chance that the 1908 peak in Austro-Hungarian textile 
machinery imports coincided with the peak in British 
machinery exports to the Habsburg Empire52. The increasing 
presence of German machine-builders in the Monarchy's 
import markets was less closely associated with a 
particular group of products. However, machine tools and 
metal-working machines were of special significance53. 
German firms developed dominant stakes in a market 
characterized by a lack of strong domestic competition and 
a rapid rise of import demand54. Though imports in this
51 Handelsministerium, Statistik des auswartigen Handels 
1915 (III), pp.451-452; 1910 (III), p.428; 1905 (12),
p.335; 1896 (12), p.104. Cf. Saul, S.B., "The Market and 
the Development of the Mechanical Engineering Industries in 
Britain, 1860-1914", EHR 2nd ser. XX (1967), p.112-113; the 
foreign trade of Austria-Hungary suggest, contra Saul, that 
the Habsburg Empire belonged to the large group of 
countries whose cotton spindles had been mostly bought in 
Britain.
52 In 1908, Austria-Hungary imported textile machinery worth 
32.5 million crowns; Appendix D, Table D.5. At the same 
time Britain shipped machinery for more than 29 million 
crowns to the Monarchy, about 70 percent of which accounted 
for textile machines; see Handelsministerium, Statistik des 
auswartigen Handels 1910 (III), pp.426-428.
53 For an account of machine tool building in late 
nineteenth century Germany and the impact of British and 
American technology see Buxbaum, B., "Der deutsche 
Werkzeugmaschinen- und Werkzeugbau im 19. Jahrhundert", 
Beitrage zur Geschichte der Technik und Industrie, vol.9 
(Berlin, 1919), pp.97-129.
54 Given that Germany herself relied to some degree on 
imported machine tools from America, it may seem surprising 
that she was able to command such a large share in Austro-
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field were not as voluminous as those of textile or 
agricultural machinery, they grew particularly fast.
Table V.5
IMPORTS FROM GERMANY IN PER CENT OF TOTAL
Agric. Ma. Text. Ma. Sewing Ma. Machine Tools
1912 41.8 51.7 62.8 81.7
1910 31.2 52.0 63.3 87.5
1905 26.2 40.6 45.4 74.9
1900 24.3 34.1 52.1 61.3
1895 32.3 27.8 62.8 86.5
1891 32.3 39.7 69.6 87.2
Sources
D.6.
: See Table V.4 and Appendix D, Tables D.4, D.5 and
After the turn of the century, the United States emerged as 
a major supplier to the Austrian machinery market. American 
agricultural machines - reapers and mowing machines, in 
particular - quickly gained a rising share in the 
Monarchy's expanding imports. Whereas in 1900 only 17 per 
cent of imported farm implements came from the United 
States, this share rose to 25 per cent in 1905, and, 
eventually, 38 per cent in 191255.
Hungarian imports of machine tools and metal-working 
machinery; cf. Milward and Saul, Development, pp.38-41, and 
Barth, Entwicklungslininen, pp.47-58. But German exporters 
probably benefited from their proximity to the Habsburg 
Monarchy's markets. Moreover, they were aided by the lower 
(negotiated) tariff imposed on their products, whereas 
imports from the United States were subjected to the higher 
(autonomous) tariffs. Finally, it seems possible that the 
structure of Austria-Hungary's import demand favoured 
especially the inflow of those types of machinery in whose 
production German firms had become fully competitive in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, the 
available foreign trade statistics are not sufficiently 
detailed to examine this problem in more detail.
55 See Appendix D, Table D.4, and Handelsministerium, 
Statistik des auswartigen Handels 1915 (III), p.1546; 1910 
(III), p.1470; 1905 (12), p.630.
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Austro-Hungarian exports of machinery were predominantly 
directed towards Russia and Romania. They increasingly 
consisted of agricultural machines and implements and thus 
reflected the changing output structure of Austrian 
machine-building. Other export items were locomobiles, 
largely for agricultural applications as well, and steam 
engines56. However, locomobiles and steam engines played 
only a comparatively minor role.
Table V.6
SHARE OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINES 
MACHINERY EXPORTS
IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY'S 
(PER CENT)
Russia Romania
1912 59.3 42.0
1910 52.7 57.6
1905 47.0 39.8
1900 39.2 31.1
1895 34.5 30.1
1891 30.4 36.5
Sources: See Table V.4 and Appendix D, Table D.4.
The pattern of output specialization and the associated 
change in the product composition of Austria's trade of 
machinery, outlined in the previous section, was thus 
complemented by a parallel regional specialization. 
Machinery for largely industrial purposes was imported from 
the North-West of the industrial world, whereas exports of 
mostly agricultural machines were shipped to the 
predominantly agricultural economies of Eastern Europe. An 
increasing share of the Austrian machine-building 
industry's output was geared towards catering for these 
markets (Table V.3).
56 See Appendix D, Tables D.8 and D.9.
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4. Input Prices and the Effects of the Austro-Hungarian 
Tariff on Iron and Steel
Throughout the late nineteenth century, machine-building in 
the Habsburg Monarchy had to rely to a substantial degree 
on foreign supplies of input materials. Cast iron, in 
particular, was a major import item57. The volume of 
domestic production was insufficient to satisfy the demands 
of the engineering industry. Though the share of imports in 
Austrian consumption of cast iron declined in the long run, 
it was subject to pronounced fluctuations in response to 
changes in the industry's business cycle. An upswing almost 
immediately translated into an over-proportional rise of 
imports. Almost 80 per cent of cast iron consumption in 
1871 was imported. And still in 1912, more than a third of 
all the cast iron consumed came from abroad (Figure V.5). 
This dependency on imported inputs provides the background 
against which the contemporary debate between producers and 
consumers of iron should be seen. Prices of iron and the 
level of tariffs were at the centre of continuous disputes 
between these groups, which also involved the Ministry of 
Trade58. The significance of iron and steel prices, in 
turn, was a direct consequence of their central role in the 
cost calculations of consumers, i.e. the machine-building 
industry. Material input costs accounted for almost 40 per
57 Cf. Appendix A, Tables A. 8 and A. 17.
58 In 1881, a group of prominent machine-building and metal­
working companies approached the Ministry of Trade, 
intervening against the proposed increase in tariffs on 
crude iron; Osterreichisches Staatsarchiv - Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsarchiv (hereafter AVwA): Akten des
Handelsministeriums, H. 27547-1881 and H. ad34514-1881.
The period after the turn of the century is covered in 
"Materialien zur Kartellenquete 1912, VIII. 
Eisenindustrie", Die Kartellfrage in Osterreich (Vienna, 
1897-1912), (hereafter "Eisenkartellenquete"), Abschnitt 
II: Darstellung des Kartellwesens in der Eisenindustrie,
pp.1-21.
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Figure U.5: Share of Imports in Austrian Cast Iron Consumption (Per Cent)
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11.3458
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Source: Appendix A, Tables A.7 and A.8.
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cent of the industry's gross value of production59. Even 
minor variations in the relevant prices were thus 
exercising a strong influence on gross output or value 
added.
Table V.7
TARIFF PER TON OF IMPORTED CAST IRON (CROWNS)
Autonomous Tariff Negotiated Tariff
post 1906 19.0 15.0
1892-1906 19.0 15.5
1882-1892 19.0
1878-1882 11.9
pre 1878 16.8 10.0
Sources: k.k. Handelsministerium, Statistische Materialien 
iiber den osterreichisch-ungarischen AuBenhandel nebst 
Vergleich der Zollsatze seit 1878, Tarifklasse XXXVIII: 
Eisen und Eisenwaren (Vienna, 1912), p.3; 
Handelsministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt IV: 
Statistische Materialien, Table 16, pp.36-37.
With a few exceptions from 1899 to 1901, unit prices of 
domestically produced cast iron were always well above the 
commercial value of imported materials. Figure V.6 
nevertheless indicates a long-run decline in the price 
differential between Austrian and foreign cast iron prices. 
The excess of domestic prices over import prices reached a 
maximum in 1878 with 114 per cent. Only during the brief 
period 1899 to 1901 were Austrian unit prices lower than 
import prices. The prices of imported cast iron, however, 
were so-called commercial values, i.e. they did not include 
the quantity tariffs levied upon imports of iron and steel. 
These were substantial and often accounted for more than 30 
per cent of the value of imported cast iron (Table V.7; 
Figure V.7). The mark-up provided by tariffs ensured that, 
from the mid-1890s onwards, actual import prices of cast 
iron (as opposed to prices exclusive of tariffs) were
59 Fellner, "Volkseinkommen”, pp.570-571.
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Figure U.6: Unit Prices of Cast Iron (Crowns/Ton)
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Source: Appendix C, Table C.l.
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Figure U.7: Tariffs as Percentage of Unit Prices of Imported Cast Iron
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Source: See Appendix C, Table C.l.
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clearly above domestic prices. Iron consumers were thus not 
in a position to benefit from the alternative of lower cost 
materials provided by imports. Moreover, the quantity- 
tariff system implied that - in contrast to an ad-valorem 
regime - the degree of relative protection rose in times of 
falling import prices because then the value share of a 
tariff in the total import price increased. This was 
clearly the case from the mid-1870s to the mid-1890s. It 
should be noted, however, that total import prices (i.e. 
inclusive of tariffs) were still below the prices of 
domestically produced cast iron during this period. But due 
to the quantity tariff, machine-builders in Austria were 
not able to proportionally reduce their material costs. 
This probably contributed to the agony in Austrian machine- 
building in the 1870s and 1880s by implicitly facilitating 
the inflow of lower price machinery imports from abroad.
The argument put forward here, namely, that the machine- 
building industry in Austria-Hungary faced serious supply 
side constraints (costs of raw material inputs) which were 
aggravated by the prevailing tariff policy, is likely to 
meet some reservations. Three points of criticism seem 
obvious.
Firstly, cast iron was not the only relevant input of the 
machine-building industry. An input-costs argument based on 
cast iron prices alone is, therefore, necessarily biased. 
Secondly, average unit prices of domestically produced cast 
iron at the place of production are unrepresentative. They 
are not market prices but average values computed by public 
authorities on the basis of data provided by the various 
producers. These average prices are too high as they - 
probably - cover not only regular, standard qualities of 
iron but also specialist qualities of substantially higher 
value60. And, finally, alternative data suggest that for 
1898 to 1911 cast iron prices in Berlin, for example, were
60 Handelsministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt IV: 
Statistische Materialien, p.14 and Table 6, p.19.
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actually higher than those in Vienna, rather than the other 
way round61. Domestic iron consumers were thus not put at 
a comparative disadvantage by higher input costs. There is 
sufficient evidence to refute these three objections which 
will be addressed in turn.
The discussion of price differentials in this section and 
in section 6 further below relies on the compilation of 
Austrian and German iron prices presented in tabular form 
in Appendix C. In addition to a set of cast iron prices, 
the data include wholesale prices for Austrian and German 
support iron, heavy sheet metal, and bar iron in Vienna and 
Berlin, respectively. For these products, so-called 
parities of the respective German price in Vienna are given 
as well. These parity prices are composed of the German 
wholesale price, the charge for freight from the German 
mill to Vienna and the Austrian tariff levied on iron 
imports from Germany.
Cast iron was certainly not the only important input 
material. However, if other iron and steel qualities are 
also taken into account, the argument developed here is 
strengthened even further. Average wholesale prices for bar 
iron, iron profiles, and sheet metal in Vienna were almost 
always well above the respective levels in Berlin between 
1890 and 1911 (with some exceptions between 1899 and 
1902)62. But quantity tariffs and, to some extent, freight 
rates caused the parity of the German prices in Vienna to 
be pushed above the level of Austrian prices63. In brief,
61 Ibid., Abschnitt III: Tabellen und graphische Darstel- 
lungen, Table XXIV, p.33.
62 This holds regardless of whether or not the longer 
distance between Berlin and the Ruhr area (as the main iron 
and steel producing region in Germany) relative to the 
distance between Vienna and the major Austrian iron 
producing regions introduces an upward bias in the German 
prices. The sources do not mention the place of production 
of the iron delivered to Berlin and Vienna. Cf. the 
discussion below, p.171.
63 Appendix C, Tables C.2 to C.4.
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Austrian consumers of iron faced higher input prices than 
their German competitors. The tariffs imposed effectively 
ruled out the substitution of cheaper foreign supplies for 
domestic products64. Table V.ll in section 6 below shows 
that, ceteris paribus, the opportunity to import iron and 
steel from Germany free of tariff would have closed most of 
the large gap between input prices in Austria and those in 
Germany.
The possibility that the inclusion of certain special 
qualities of cast iron drives up the average unit price 
cannot be rejected out of hand. But exactly the same 
objection could be raised against the use of the average 
unit price (commercial value) of cast iron imports for 
comparative purposes. However, there is no indication that 
domestic production included a higher share of those 
special qualities than did imports. Only if the composition 
were substantially different would the observed price 
differential between domestically produced cast iron and 
imported cast iron lose its significance. But there is no 
evidence to support this view.
The direct comparison of the given Berlin and Vienna cast 
iron prices in "Eisenkartellenquete” is misleading for a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, the Berlin price quoted refers 
to German cast iron of category I - the product with the 
highest unit price among those listed. Unit prices in 
Germany of German cast iron III and, in particular, 
Luxembourg cast iron III were substantially lower 
throughout the period than the prices cited65. Thus it 
seems likely that the quoted German prices are upwardly 
biased and not as representative as they appear to be. This 
holds even more so, as it is not clear to what category or
64 Market protection arrangements between Austrian and 
German iron and steel works meant, moreover, that Austrian 
consumers could not obtain offers from cheaper German 
producers for the delivery of T- and U-profiles; HKB Wien, 
Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, p.144.
65 Appendix C, Table C.l.
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quality of cast iron the Austrian price relates to. 
Secondly, almost all of the difference between cast iron 
prices in Berlin and those in Vienna turns out to result 
from different transport costs. Though the place of 
production of German cast iron is not given in 
"Eisenkartellenquete”, the freight rate charged for 
transport from iron mills to Berlin, which is reproduced 
separately, implies a distance of approximately 450 to 500 
kilometres66. The Ruhr area is the major iron producing 
region in that distance to Berlin. The Austrian cast iron 
price relates to the Witkowitz iron works in Moravia; the 
charge for transport, included in the Vienna price, is not 
reproduced in the sources. But it can be approximated on 
the basis of railway freight rates and the distance between 
Witkowitz and Vienna, which is roughly half of that between 
the Ruhr area and Berlin. Although German freight rates 
were somewhat lower than Austrian rates, the charge for 
transport of the same amount of iron from the Ruhr to 
Berlin was almost 50 per cent higher than the charge for 
delivery from Witkowitz to Vienna67. The quoted German 
price for cast iron simply includes a larger transport cost 
component than the Austrian price68. Thirdly, whereas the 
Berlin price is based on average trade prices for the given
66 Handelsministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt Ills 
Tabellen und graphische Darstellungen, Table XXIV, p.33, 
and Table XXXII, p.38. Statistische und tarifarische Daten 
insbesondere iiber die im Betriebe der k.k. Staatseisenbahn- 
verwaltung stehenden Eisenbahnen (Vienna, 1904), pp.154- 
155.
67 Ibid.
68 For comparative purposes, the assumption of relatively 
longer transport distances and thus higher transport costs 
in Germany seems justified only if there is reason to 
believe that they reflect the relative locational situation 
of iron producers and iron consumers in Austria and Germany 
more accurately than, for example, the simpler assumption 
of, in general, similar distances between iron producers 
and consumers in the two countries.
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quality of iron plus freight, the Austrian quotation is 
given as the final price of cast iron from the Witkowitz 
mill for Viennese wholesalers or major consumers. It seems 
highly unlikely that this Austrian price has an equivalent 
upward bias as the German price, for the report in which 
these data are produced was prepared by the chief executive 
of the Witkowitz iron and steel works69. He certainly had 
no professional interest to quote higher prices which could 
justify complaints from domestic iron and steel consumers, 
i.e. his customers70.
The quantitative basis of the argument that iron prices in 
Austria were both absolutely and relatively lower than 
maintained here appears rather weak. The evidence suggests 
that Austrian consumers of iron and steel, like the 
machine-building industry, had to face higher prices for 
essential material inputs than their foreign competitors. 
Though by around the turn of the century, effectively all 
domestic sales of Austrian iron production were subject to 
cartelized marketing and price policies71 we will not 
further investigate to what extent the observed price 
differentials were a more or less direct result of the
69 The section of the "Materialien zur Kartellenquete 1912" 
dealing with the iron and steel industry (here: 
"Eisenkartellenquete") was prepared as a memorandum by 
Friedrich Schuster (chief executive of Witkowitz) on behalf 
of the Austrian iron and steel industry's association and 
upon request by the Austrian Ministry of Trade. It was also 
separately published as Materialien zur Eisenkartell- 
Enquete. Denkschrift des Vereins der Montan-, Eisen- und 
Maschinen-Industriellen Osterreichs (Vienna, 1912).
70 It is interesting to note, though, that the other 
comparative price data supporting the argument put forward 
here were provided in the same source; cf. Appendix C, 
Tables C.l to C.4.
71 Cf. Handelsministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt 
II: Darstellung des Kartellwesens in der Eisenindustrie, 
pp.7-8. See also Mejzlik, H., Probleme der alpenlandischen 
Eisenindustrie (Vienna, 1971), pp.208-224.
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cartel72. Here it suffices to establish that there was a 
substantial price and thus material cost differential to 
foreign competitors.
The following section takes a closer look at the effects of 
input prices on the cost competitiveness of an individual 
engineering firm. Though only a "snapshot", it illustrates 
that raw material price differentials observed at industry 
level trickled down so as to cause relative disadvantages 
at the company level.
5. The Relative Cost Position of Austrian Machine- 
Building: The Example of Voith
The German machine-building firm of J.M. Voith (Heidenheim) 
decided in 1903 to set up a new plant in St. Polten, Lower 
Austria73. This move was designed to circumvent the likely 
effects of the forthcoming trade treaty negotiations: 
Austria-Hungary was the company's main foreign market to 
which access seemed to be threatened by the anticipated 
rise of import tariffs74. Both the parent company and its 
Austrian subsidiary works specialized in the production of 
water turbines, paper-making machines, and auxiliary and 
preparatory machinery for the paper-making industry75. 
Employment in the St. Polten operation rose from 230
72 The production and sale of bar iron, iron profiles, and 
heavy sheet metal and plate was cartelized as early as 
1886; crude iron - including cast iron - was included in 
further cartel arrangements in 1902. Handelsministerium, 
"Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt II: Darstellung des
Kartellwesens in der Eisenindustrie, pp.2-4, 13.
73 Werksarchiv, Voith GmbH, Heidenheim/Germany (hereafter 
VWA), Nr.2 / 3.4: paper of Director Gottschick, 1. January 
1917.
74 Ibid. and Nr. 1 / 2.7: memorandum of Director Gottschick 
1904, quoted in May 1923 report.
75 VWA, Nr. 1 / 2.7: report on the development of J.M. 
Voith, Heidenheim a/Brenz, 23 May 1907.
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workers in 1904 to 682 in 191376.
The similarity in the manufacturing programme allows for a 
direct comparison of cost in the two plants. Data on wage 
cost, material cost and “Regie"-expenses77 are available 
for the production of identical Francis-turbine wheels, 
paper-making machines, and a number of auxiliary 
machines78. The results of such a comparison are striking. 
Total cost of production of a paper-making machine were 
more than 20 per cent higher in the Austrian plant. None of 
the 13 major elements of the machine was built at lower 
cost in St. Polten than in Heidenheim79. Though in this 
case, cost cannot be split up into its main components, the 
data relating to other types of machinery suggest that 
input material price differentials played the decisive 
role.
The percentage difference in total cost of production and 
its components between the German and the Austrian plant is 
given in Tables V.8 and V. 980. The numbers in parentheses 
indicate the relative percentage contribution of each cost 
component to the percentage difference in total cost81. 
Given the cost structure in both plants and all production 
processes, differences in wage cost or "Regie" were, 
apparently, of only minor importance. Material cost 
accounted by far for the largest share in total cost with
76 VWA, Nr. 1 / 2.7: report, May 1923.
77 Cf. Mosser, A., Die Industrieaktiengesellschaft in 
Osterreich 1880-1913: Versuch einer historischen Bilanz- 
und Betriebsanalyse (Vienna, 1980), pp.53, 54, 67, on the 
varying use of "Regie" or "general expenses" as a poorly 
defined cost component.
78 HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, pp. 142-147.
79 Ibid., p. 146.
80 Percentage difference: ((CAut - C^)/Cq^) *100, where CAut and 
C^ ,. denote costs in the Austrian and German plant, 
respectively.
81 Each percentage difference was multiplied by the 
component's share in total German costs.
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their share varying between a minimum of 54 per cent and a 
maximum of 75 per cent82. The price for input materials was 
therefore the variable with the most pronounced influence 
on total cost. Turbine wheels, for example, were largely 
made of cast iron83. On average, more than 80 per cent of 
the difference in production cost of turbine wheels and 
auxiliary and preparatory machinery are attributable to the 
substantially higher cost of material inputs in the 
Austrian plant. Wage expenses were, in general, slightly 
lower but could not compensate for the gap.
Table V.8
COST DIFFERENTIALS - TURBINE WHEELS (PER CENT)
Total Materials Wages "Regie"
I. 28.6 41.4 (22.5) 1.9 (0.3) 20.9 (5.8)
II. 23.9 30.3 (17.4) 3.4 (0.6) 22.8 (5.9)
III. 24.5 35.1 (20.7) -2.7 (-0.4) 16.6 (4.2)
IV. 15.8 20.4 (12.7) 1.1 (0.2) 12.6 (2.9)
V. 23.6 28.3 (19.7) 2.7 (0.3) 19.0 (3.6)
VI. 17.3 24.3 (17.0) -8.9 (-1.0) 6.8 (1.3)
Aver. 22.2 30.0 (18.6) -2.5 (-0.3) 16.5 (3.8)
Numbers I to VI indicate turbines of different weight in kilograms
(KG): I = 1,350 KG? II = 1,650 KG? III = 3,500 KG ? IV = 9,300 KG? V =
10,900 KG? VI = 15,400 KG.
Source>: HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, p.143.
82 HKB Wien, Sign. IV. 6316: Gutachten, pp. 143, 147.
83 Ibid. , p. 142.
Table V.9
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COST DIFFERENTIALS - AUXILIARY MACHINES (PER CENT)
Total Materials Wages "Regie"
I. 9.8 18.3 (11.1) -10.6 (-1.1) -0.4 (-0.1)
II. 25.2 36.7 (18.2) 2.9 (0.4) 17.9 (6.5)
III. 13.2 17.3 (12.5) -5.8 (-0.5) 5.8 (1.1)
IV. 13.1 11.7 (7.7) -0.7 (-0.1) 21.9 (5.5)
V. 14.5 16.8 (12.1) -5.6 (-0.4) 14.2 (2.8)
VI. 24.3 30.2 (15.9) 3.8 (0.5) 23.0 (7.9)
Aver. 16.7 21.8 (13.6) -2.7 (-0.3) 13.7 (3.7)
Numbers I to VI indicate different types of machinery:
I = hydraulic power grinder II = stone sharpener for grinder
III = hollander IV = graining machine
V = (stone) refiner VI = rolling machine.
Source: HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, p.147.
Although this section looked at only one producer with a 
limited output range, the case of Voith nevertheless 
demonstrates the effects of iron and steel prices on cost 
differentials and, ultimately, cost competitiveness in 
Austrian machine-building.
6. The Effectiveness of Import Tariffs on Machinery
Austrian iron producers rejected the claim that protective 
tariffs were an essential source for the iron consumer's 
difficulties by pointing out that tariffs on imported 
machinery outweighed by far the additional expenses 
incurred by tariffs on raw materials84. The argument ran as 
follows: assuming it takes 57 kilograms (kg) of pig iron to 
produce 50 kg of cast iron, and 32 kg of smelted iron and 
38 kg of ingots to make 50 kg of wrought iron, then the 
tariff expense on all imported materials for a hypothetical 
machine of 100 kg of weight (1/2 of which cast iron, 1/2
84 Handelsministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt II: 
Darstellung des Kartellwesens in der Eisenindustrie, p.16.
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wrought iron) amounts to
0.57 * 1.50 K = 0.86 K
+ 0.38 * 3.40 K = 1.29 K
+ 0.32 * 4.50 K = 1.44 K
Total 3.59 K85.
This total was compared to an average tariff of 20 K per 
100 kg of imported machines and it was concluded that the 
iron tariff could not have posed a major obstacle for the 
finishing industries86.
The argument, however, is misleading. For the problem was 
not the actual absolute difference between the respective 
quantity tariffs on iron and steel on the one hand, and 
those on imported machines on the other. As has been shown 
in the previous sections, the iron tariff operated in a way 
which lifted input prices in Austria substantially above 
those which competing industries faced abroad87. The 
question with respect to the domestic market was then, in 
the first place, whether the degree of protection offered 
to the domestic machine-building industry via the tariff on 
imports of machines fully offset the negative effects of 
import tariffs on inputs. On export markets, of course, no 
such protection was offered and Austrian producers were 
confronted with the same tariff barriers as their foreign 
competitors who may or may not have had access to more 
favourably priced iron and steel inputs.
The virtually complete lack of disaggregate price data 
other than import values, however, is a major obstacle to 
a thorough analysis. We cannot directly compare the cost 
and price of a certain type of machine produced in Austria
85 Ibid.. These are the lower, negotiated tariff rates for 
the post 1906 period. The corresponding higher autonomous 
(general) tariff rates were 1.90 K, 3.80 K, and 4.80 K, 
respectively, per 100 kg; Handelsministerium, Statistische 
Materialien: Eisen und Eisenwaren, pp.5, 12, 14.
86 Handelsministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt II: 
Darstellung des Kartellwesens in der Eisenindustrie, pp.16- 
17.
87 Cf. Appendix C, Tables C.l to C.4.
180
with a similar machine made elsewhere, study what the 
effects of the specific tariffs applicable were on relative 
cost and relative market prices, and establish significant 
changes over time. However, some broad generalizations do 
seem possible.
The micro data for Voith suggest material cost 
differentials between Austria and Germany ranging from 12 
to 41 per cent (Tables V.8 and V.9). These data refer only 
to one firm, a limited range of products and, presumably, 
only one particular year or short period of time. Table 
V.10 therefore provides longer run information on the 
percentage difference between Austrian and German iron 
prices, assuming again these were relevant for the larger 
part of machine-building.
Table V.10
PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE OF AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN IRON PRICES*
Cast Iron Support Iron Bar Iron Sheet Metal
1909/1911 24.0 35.8 28.9 51.6
1906/1908 3.1 30.6 24.2 45.2
1903/1905 11.1 31.4 31.3 40.0
1900/1902 0.4 6.0 4.0 -7.3
1897/1899 7.9 34.0 19.1 25.4
1894/1896 14.9 52.2 57.5° 57.4
1891/1893 16.9 38. lb - 28. 4b
1888/1890 13.9 — — —
Mean 11.5 32.6 27.5 34.4
a Percentage difference: absolute difference between Austrian and
German price in per cent of German price 
b 1890/1893
c 1893/1896
Source: Appendix C, Tables C.l to C.4.
In order to avoid an undue upward bias of the respective 
Austrian price, the lower price of either the domestic 
product or the imported product (inclusive of tariff) has
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been chosen in each year88. For it is plausible to assume 
that Austrian machine-builders would have turned to foreign 
supplies if these were cheaper. The figures reproduced in 
Table V.10 reflect a large gap between input prices in 
Austria and those in Germany. They show, moreover, that 
this was not a temporary problem but a continuous one. Most 
important, though, is to establish that it was the Austrian 
tariff which accounted for most of the price differential. 
1903 is a suitable year to illustrate this problem in that 
it is typical insofar as the percentage differences in that 
particular year were fairly close to their long-run 
averages89. Subtracting the respective tariff from the 
parity of German iron prices in Vienna yields results as 
given in Table V.ll90. These data suggest that, ceteris 
paribus, the availability of tariff-free iron imports would 
have narrowed dramatically the gap between Austrian and 
German prices. Input material costs of Austrian machine- 
builders would have been 14 to 16 per cent lower than they 
actually were. Similarly, the percentage price difference 
to Germany would have dropped to levels between 11 and 13 
per cent, respectively, with the remaining gap resulting
88 The German cast iron price used is an arithmetic average 
of prices GCI1, GCI3, and LCI3 in Appendix C, Table C.l. 
The Austrian cast iron price applied is either ACI or 
ICITa, depending on which one is lower. For support iron, 
bar iron and sheet metal Austrian wholesale prices (ASI, 
ASM, ABI) have been compared with German wholesale prices 
(GSI, GSM, GBI). Parities of German prices in Vienna were 
used instead of the Austrian prices if the latter were 
higher. That, however, was only once the case (1892, 
support iron). See Appendix C, Tables C.2 to C.4.
89 Percentage price difference in 1903: cast iron - 14.1 
percent; support iron - 29.4 percent; bar iron - 30.8 
percent sheet metal - 33.7 percent. See Table V.10 for 
sources.
90 Negotiated (lower) tariffs for 1892 to 1906 in crowns per 
metric ton: 59.5 crowns (support iron); 71.4 crowns (bar 
iron) and 90 crowns (approximate average for various 
gualities of sheet metal); Handelsministerium, Statistische 
Materialien: Eisen und Eisenwaren, pp.17-18, 25-34.
from transport costs (Table V.ll).
Table V.ll
COMPARATIVE IRON PRICES, 1903 (CROWNS/TON)
support iron: ASI GSI PSI PSI-tariff
198 153 229 170
bar iron: ABI GBI PBI PBI-tariff
191 146 235 164
sheet metal: ASM GSM PSM PSM-tariff
230 172 282 192
ASI, ABI, ASM: Austrian wholesale prices (Vienna)
GSI, GPI, PSM: German wholesale prices (Berlin)
PSI, PBI, PSM: parities of German wholesale prices inclusive of
tariff and freight in Vienna
Source: (1) prices: Appendix C, Tables C.2 to C.4. (2)
tariffs: Handelsministerium, Statistlsche Materlalien:
Eisen und Eisenwaren, pp.17-18, 25-34.
In a further step towards analyzing the simultaneous 
effects of import tariffs on iron and steel and on 
machinery, the nominal quantity tariffs are transformed 
into ad-valorem rates; the negotiated (lower) tariff per 
unit of imports is expressed in per cent of the import 
price per unit (Table V.12)91.
91 An average negotiated tariff of 20 crowns per 100 
kilograms of imported machinery, as used in Handels­
ministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt II: 
Darstellung des Kartellwesens in der Eisenindustrie, pp.16- 
17, and as assumed in the discussion below (see Tables V.12 
and V.14), seems a fairly reasonable approximation. For 
1906 to 1913, the following unweighted average negotiated 
tariff rates applied to the four most important groups of 
Austro-Hungarian machinery imports (the number of different 
tariff rates applied in each group is given in 
parentheses):
(1) agricultural machines 16 crowns (4)
(2) metal-working machines 21 crowns (6)
(3) textile machines 9 crowns (7)
(4) sewing machines 51 crowns (7).
Combining these unweighted average tariff rates by use of 
the share of each of the four groups of machinery imports
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Table V.12
NOMINAL PERCENTAGE TARIFFS ON IMPORTS
Machinery* Cast Bar Sheet Support
Iron Iron Metal Iron
1890/94 17.9 25.0 46.9C 39.8 35.1
1895/99 19.5 22.1 39.2 44.5 35.8
1900/04 19.6 19.4 39.1 40.2 33.3
1905/09 18.3 19.8 39.8 48.9 33.6
1910/11 18.9b 19. 8b 42.8 50.7 34.7
Mean 18.8 21.3 40.5 44.0 34.5
* Average negotiated tariff of 20 crowns per 100 kg of imported
machinery in per cent of average import unit price of machinery 
b 1910/1913 
c 1893/94
Note: The nominal percentage tariff is defined as the ratio of the 
negotiated tariff to the respective import unit price exclusive of the 
tariff.
Sources: (1) iron prices: Appendix C, Table C.l: ICI; Table
C.2: PSI (minus tariff); Table C.3: PSM (minus tariff); 
Table C.4: PBI (minus tariff). (2) iron tariffs:
Handelsministerium, Statistische Materialien Eisen, pp.3, 
17-18, 25-34. (3) machinery prices: see Appendix D, Figure
D.l. (4) machinery tariff: Handelsministerium,
"Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt II: Darstellung des
Kartellwesens in der Eisenindustrie, p.16.
in their combined total, yields a rough approximation of 
the average negotiated tariff imposed on machinery imports 
in 1890, 1900, and 1910:
1910 17 crowns
1900 17 crowns
1890 14 crowns.
During 1887 to 1905, tariff rates were generally slightly 
lower than in 1906 to 1913. These results would suggest 
that the assumption of a tariff of 20 crowns overestimates 
rather than underestimates the actual level of nominal
tariff protection accorded to machine-building. Imports of 
machinery in these four groups accounted for about 50 per 
cent of total Austro-Hungarian machinery imports between 
1890 and 1910. These findings should thus be fairly 
representative. See Handelsministerium, Statistische 
Materialien: Maschinen, pp.64-127, 132-140, and Appendix D, 
Tables D.l, and D.4 to D.6.
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The tariff rates imposed on imports of iron and steel were 
on average substantially above those levied on imports of 
machinery92. We can now ask what the effective or implicit 
rate of protection was in contrast to the nominal tariff, 
in order to measure the degree of protection offered to 
domestic machine-building.
According to the concept of effective rates of protection, 
the nominal tariff on a good may differ from the rate of 
protection given to the value added in the production of 
the good when material inputs (intermediate goods) are 
taken into account93. The proponents of this concept argue 
that the purpose of a tariff is to protect the factors of 
production which create value added; hence the effective 
rate of protection accorded to value added is more 
meaningful a measure than the nominal tariff94. This 
concept can be adapted so as to allow a rough and static 
approximation of the benefits and disadvantages Austrian 
machinery producers derived from the existing tariff 
structure. In terms of an input-output system, value added 
(Vj) can be defined as
(1) Vj =  1 - Eajj
where Vj denotes value added in industry j and a^  is the 
value of inputs delivered from the ith industry to the jth 
industry, all at world market prices. If tariffs are in 
operation, domestic prices will differ from world market 
prices and the equation for domestic value added (Vj*) can 
be re-written as
(2) vj* = 1 + tj - Eas (1 + tj)
where tj and tj denote the nominal tariffs in the jth and ith 
industries, respectively. The effective rate of protection
92 The nominal percentage tariffs on imports of bar iron, 
sheet metal, and support iron would be even higher if they 
were computed on the basis of import prices exclusive of 
freight.
93 Cf. Sodersten, B., International Economics (London, 2nd 
ed., reprint 1983), p.207.
94 Ibid.
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(Tj) is then
(3) Tj = (Vj* - Vj)/Vj
=  (tj -  Eaytj)
= tj + ((tj - tj') /Vj
where tj' = Ea^/Ea^ is the weighted average tariff rate on 
material inputs into the jth industry95.
According to Fellner, value added in Austrian machine- 
building amounted to about 53 per cent of gross output96; 
machinery imports into the Monarchy were subject to an 
average 18.8 per cent duty on the official value as 
recorded in the trade statistics (Table V.12), and, 
finally, the weighted average tariff rate on material 
inputs was approximately 25.3 per cent97. The effective 
rate of protection of Austria's machine-building industry 
would thus be
T = 18.8 + ((18.8 - 25.3)47)/53 
= 13.0.
Though the effective tariff is lower than the nominal 
tariff on machinery imports, it is still positive. Hence 
this result would suggest that the machine-builders' claims 
of being put at a disadvantage through the tariff system 
were out of place. However, all the evidence available 
indicates that the data on import prices of machinery
95 Ibid., pp.212-213.
96 Fellner, F., "Das Volkseinkommen Osterreichs und
Ungarns", Statistische Monatsschrift XLII (1916), pp.570- 
571.
97 The weighted average (1890/1911) tariff rate on material 
inputs (iron and steel) was computed by combining the
nominal tariff rates given in Table V.12 with weights 
derived from those used in the input price index:
tj' = . 80* (. 45*21.3 +.35*40.5 + .10*44.0 + .10*34.5)
= 25.29.
The weights of cast iron and bar iron have been reduced to 
45 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively, to allow for the 
inclusion of tariffs on sheet metal and support iron, two 
iron qualities which are not covered in the input price 
index. Iron and steel accounted for 80 per cent of material 
inputs and fuels, which we disregard here for the sake of 
simplicity, for 20 per cent. See Appendix A, Table A.5.
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produced in the official trade statistics and used for the 
above computation are substantially underestimated. The 
examination of sales price data for various types of 
machinery yields results which show a massive gap between 
actual market prices and the official trade values (Table 
V.13) .
Table V.13
MACHINERY PRICE DIFFERENTIALS IN PER CENT
number average
of prices differential
(1) metal-working machinery 6 31.8
(2) steam boilers & distilling 
apparatus
7 64.8
(3) agricultural locomobiles 1 -10.5
(4) steam engines 5 39.9
(5) internal combustion engines 3 120.0
(6) steam turbines 5 246.1
(7) water turbines & parts 9 61.5
(8) mechanical transmissions 3 42.2
(9) transport & elevation equipment 5 74.1
(10) presses 3 87.8
(11) milling machinery 5 41.2
(12) centrifuges 2 87.5
(13) wood-working machinery 1 85.6
(14) pumps & compressors 6 73.4
(15) drying apparatus 1 53.8
(16) textile machinery 2 1.8
Mean 64 72.4
Source: HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, pp.18-29.
64 market prices in 16 groups of machinery were compared 
with the prices used in the trade statistics98 (Table
98 If the tariffs imposed work, domestic sales prices differ 
from world market prices by the amount of the tariff. In 
order to ensure comparability between domestic sales prices 
(SP) and the official import prices (IP), the tariff levied 
on a particular machine was subtracted from its sales price 
before comparing the sales price with the official import 
price, which does not include the tariff. The formula used 
to compute the machinery price differentials is as follows: 
((SP - t) - IP)/IP, where t denotes the negotiated tariff 
in crowns.
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V.13). Multiplying the average import unit price of 
machinery by a factor of 1.72, as a means of roughly 
correcting for the underestimation of machinery prices, 
yields two series of revised machinery import prices and 
adjusted machinery import tariff rates (Table V.14)99. 
According to these data, the actual percentage tariff 
imposed on imports of machinery was substantially lower 
than the official foreign trade prices would imply.
Table V.14
REVISED IMPORT PRICES OF MACHINERY AND TARIFF RATES
import price tariff rate*
(crowns/10 0kg) (per cent)
1890/94 191.9 10.42
1895/99 176.3 11.34
1900/04 175.3 11.41
1905/09 187.5 10.66
1910/13 182.4 10.96
Mean 182.7 10.95
Average negotiated tariff of 20 crowns per 100 kg of imported 
machinery in per cent of average import unit price of machinery
Sources: See Tables V.12 and V.13
Using the revised mean nominal tariff rate of 10.9 per cent 
instead of the initial 18.8 per cent, the re-calculation of 
the effective rate of protection produces this result:
T = 10.9 + ((10.9 - 25.3)47)/53 
= -1.9.
A negative rate of effective protection means that the
99 In a strict sense, the revised prices apply only to the 
years after the turn of the century because they are based 
on price differentials observed in the 1905-1913 period; 
see sources given in Table V.14. By using the factor of 
1.72 also for the earlier years, we assume implicitly that 
machinery import prices in the earlier years were as much 
underestimated as in the immediate pre-World War I years.
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tariff protection accorded to value added is eliminated by 
the tariff levied on inputs. This finding suggests that the 
Austrian tariff structure did indeed discriminate against 
the users of iron and steel, namely the machine-building 
industry, and put them at a systematic competitive 
disadvantage100.
However, the result of a negative implicit tariff needs to 
be qualified. As an average measure, it does not imply that 
all machinery producers in the Habsburg Monarchy were faced 
with negative rates of protection. Clearly, not all 
manufacturers operated with a similar or even more iron 
intensive input-mix than the one assumed in the 
computation. Sales prices of some types of machines were 
most certainly significantly below the revised industry 
average, as others were above it, and specific machinery 
tariffs varied strongly around the average of 20 crowns per 
100 kilograms. Hence some machinery producers enjoyed high 
effective rates of protection, whereas others had to cope 
with negative implicit tariffs.
However, the point is that, at least after the turn of the 
century101 a sizeable part of Austria-Hungary's machine- 
building industry, especially its iron and steel input­
intensive branches, was most probably squeezed between high 
material input costs and fierce foreign competition. 
Generally rising demand contributed to the growth of 
machinery imports. The absolute and relative size of 
product markets shaped the pattern of output 
specialization. But Austria-Hungary's tariff structure, 
too, appears as a major causal factor in the explanation of 
both the rapid rise in Austro-Hungarian machinery imports 
after 1900102, and the increasing specialization in the
100 Toniolo observed a similar constellation in the Italian 
tariff structure; Toniolo, G., "Effective Protection and 
Industrial Growth: The Case of Italian Engineering”, JEEH 
(1977) NO.3, pp.659-673.
101 Cf. note 99 above.
102 See above, Table V.l.
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production of agricultural machinery. Growing domestic 
demand was directed to relatively cheaper imports of 
machinery as domestic suppliers were hampered by higher 
material input costs. Furthermore, the tariff structure 
intensified a shift into product areas with a relatively 
low iron and steel content per unit of output, like 
agricultural machines and implements103. This branch of 
machine-building was thus less exposed to the competitive 
pressures emanating from high domestic iron and steel 
prices.
103 HKB Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, p. 11.
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VI
CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF THE MACHINE-BUILDING 
INDUSTRY IN THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION
The economic development of Austria-Hungary's machine- 
building industry was, to a large extent, a reflection of 
the course which the Habsburg economy took in the late 
nineteenth century. Periods of expansion and phases of 
contraction in mechanical engineering generally coincided 
with growth variations of the same direction in the 
industrial sector at large. But just as overall industrial 
growth rates in Austria and Hungary were out of phase with 
one another between 1870 and 1913, so were the rates of 
expansion in the machine-building industry. While Hungary's 
industrial sector as a whole grew at a more rapid pace than 
Austria's, Hungarian machinery output, too, increased at a 
faster rate than in the Western half of the Empire. In both 
countries, however, the rates of growth of engineering 
output over individual business cycles as well as over the 
full period under review differed markedly from those 
observed in other branches and the industrial economy at 
large. Though machine-building was an industry particularly 
exposed to the impact of variations in the business cycle, 
it was one of the most dynamically growing branches of 
manufacturing.
However, the new output estimates derived here indicate 
that Austria's machine-building industry took a course 
distinctly different from that implied in earlier research
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by Richard Rudolph1. Between 1870 and 1913, production 
expanded at a substantially lower rate. The temporal 
pattern of output growth shows, contrary to the view held 
recently, that the capital goods sector in the Western half 
of the Habsburg Monarchy was subject to a severe downturn 
and prolonged depression after the stock-market crash of 
18732. Austrian machinery output fluctuated at levels below 
its long-run trend until the early 1890s. Only towards the 
very end of the 1880s was there any sustained advance above 
pre-crash levels of production. This finding amounts to 
fresh evidence in support of the controversial notion of a 
"Great Depression" which has featured so prominently in 
recent Austrian historiography.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, Eduard Marz and Herbert Matis 
formulated what is now generally regarded as the 
traditional view of Austria's economic development in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century3. Proceeding from a 
largely non-quantitative approach, both authors argue that 
economic growth in Austria conformed "to the long-wave 
pattern that Kondratieff and others sketched out for the 
late nineteenth century"4. According to their hypothesis, 
the years 1873 and 1896 mark trend breaks. A long upswing
1 Rudolph, R., "The Pattern of Austrian Industrial Growth 
from the Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century", 
Austrian History Yearbook, Table 2; and Banking and 
Industrialization in Austria-Hungary. The Role of Banks in 
the Industrialization of the Czech Crownlands, 1873-1914 
(Cambridge, 1976), Table A.3, p.207.
2 Cf. Rudolph, Banking and Industrialization, pp.28-29; and 
Good, D.F., The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750- 
1914 (Berkeley, Calif., 1984), p.165.
3 Marz, E., "Zur Genesis der Schumpeterschen Theorie der 
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung", On Political Economy and 
Econometrics, Essays in Honour of Oskar Lange (Warsaw, 
1965), pp.370-380, and Osterreichische Industrie- und 
Bankpolitik in der Zeit Franz Josephs I. (Vienna, 1968); 
Matis, H . , Osterreichs Wirtschaft 1848-1913: Konjunkturelle 
Dynamik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel im Zeitalter Franz 
Josephs I. (Berlin, 1972).
4 Good, Economic Rise, p.163.
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from 1848 to 1873 was dominated by the rapid construction 
of railways. The 1873 crash rang in a downswing, the Great 
Depression, which was characterized by price deflation and 
low rates of growth of real output. A new upswing began in 
1896 and lasted until the outbreak of the First World War; 
its main driving forces were the rise of new industries and 
the increase in demand associated with Austria-Hungary's 
re-armament programme5. This periodization of Austrian 
economic development and especially the view that the 
period between 1873 and 1896 is adequately understood as 
one of great depression was first challenged in 1974 by 
David Good6. He estimated rates of growth of financial 
intermediary assets in Austria and translated them into GNP 
growth rates by using a finance-income ratio originally 
calculated for several other countries. Good concludes that 
real per capita output in Austria grew at approximately the 
same rate between 1873 and 1896 as between 1896 and 1913, 
and so rules out a break in secular trend in 1873. In terms 
of the behaviour of real output, he maintains, the Great 
Depression in Austria, as in Britain, is essentially a 
myth7. Using the same data but employing different 
estimating methods, John Komlos challenged Good's results 
and argues that output growth did indeed accelerate after 
the mid-1890s, following sluggish expansion during the 
preceding two decades8. The debate was resumed again in
5 Cf. Marz, E., "Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der
Donaumonarchie im 19. Jahrhundert", Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft (1985), p.368; Matis, Osterreichs Wirtschaft, 
p.19.
6 Good, D.F., "Stagnation and 'Take-Off' in Austria, 1873- 
1913", EHR 2nd ser. XXVII (1974) No.l, pp.72-87.
7 Ibid.. Cf. Saul, S.B. The Myth of the Great Depression
1873-1896 (Basingstoke, 2nd ed., reprint, 1989).
8 Komlos, J., "Is the Depression in Austria after 1873 a
'Myth'?", EHR 2nd ser. XXXI (1978) No.2, pp.287-289. For
Good's response to the criticism see "The Great Depression 
and Austrian Growth after 1873" in the same issue of EHR, 
pp.290-294.
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Good's 1984 synthesis of Habsburg economic history9. Good 
acknowledges that the mid-1890s mark the dividing line 
between secular deflation and secular inflation; but he 
points out that most of the downward movement of prices had 
occurred before this date and that prices were basically 
flat for two decades from the mid-1880s10. In support of 
his thesis that the performance of Austria's economy 
between the early 1870s and the mid-1890s did not differ 
significantly from its performance in the subsequent 
periods, Good draws on the estimates of industrial output 
prepared by Nachum Gross and Richard Rudolph11. Komlos 
argues, in contrast, that this evidence is heavily biased 
and that Good's smoothing of his (Komlos') production 
series, which yields results broadly in support of the 
revisionist view, implies a loss of "important information 
on what was going on in the economy at crucial cyclical 
turning points"12. However, though Good rejects the 
traditional interpretation, he recently provided quite 
telling evidence in its favour, when he presented new 
estimates of real per capita regional product in the 
Habsburg Empire. Between 1890 and 1910, Austrian per capita 
output grew by more than double the rate than during the 
preceding twenty-year interval13. These estimates imply a
9 Good, Economic Rise, pp.162-185.
10 Ibid., p.171.
11 Ibid., p.172. Cf. Gross, N.T., "Industrialization in 
Austria in the Nineteenth Century" (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1966), pp.61- 
66, and Rudolph, Banking and Industrialization, pp.12-13.
12 Komlos, J., Review of D.F. Good, The Economic Rise of the 
Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914. JEEH 18 (1989) No.2, pp.453- 
455, and The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union. Economic 
Development in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century 
(Princeton, 1983), Appendix C, pp.238-254.
13 Good, D.F., "Austria-Hungary", Patterns of European 
Industrialization. The Nineteenth Century, eds. R.Sylla and 
G. Toniolo (London, 1991), Table 11.3, p.230. It should be 
emphasized that the increase in per capita output growth 
was achieved in a period characterized by an acceleration
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temporal pattern of per capita income increases that 
corresponds to the major phases of contraction and 
expansion in Austrian machinery output.
Due to a lack of adequate data, the output estimates 
presented here do not stretch further back than 1870 and, 
consequently, do not permit any inference about the early 
1870s as a break in the secular trend of Austrian machinery 
production. Similarly, the financial data of the companies 
examined here start only in 1880. Thus no conclusions can 
be drawn on the validity of the long-wave concept as such, 
since we have no measure of the extent to which the trends 
discernible in the period from the early 1870s to the mid- 
1890s are different from those in the preceding period. But 
it has been shown in this thesis that the experience of 
Austria's machine-building industry in the 1870s and 1880s 
clearly diverged from its course in the following two 
decades, when output growth was markedly faster. This 
result has implications for the understanding of the timing 
and pace of Austrian economic development.
The link that justifies using a section series like 
machinery production for making main economic inferences is 
the nature of the machine-building industry's output, which 
constitutes replacements or additions to the capital stock 
of an economy14. If the domestic machine-building industry 
produces primarily for the domestic market and if it holds 
a dominant share in this market, both conditions apply in 
the Habsburg case, then changes in the rate of growth of 
machinery production are likely to reflect changes in 
investment demand for plant and equipment effective in the
in the rate of Austrian population growth; see Fischer, W., 
"Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Europas 1850-1914", Handbuch 
der europaischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, vol. 5: 
Europaische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte von der Mitte 
des 19, Jahrhunderts bis zum ersten Weltkrieg, ed. W. 
Fischer (Stuttgart, 1985), Table 3, p.14.
14 Rosenberg, N., "Capital Goods, Technology, and Economic 
Growth", N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology 
(Cambridge, 1976), p.143.
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economy. The revisionist thesis, which postulates steady 
and uninterrupted growth in the Austrian economy from the 
1870 to 1913, implies that no significant differences in 
the rate of machinery investment existed between the 
subperiods in question15. When aggregate demand for 
industrial goods first contracted and then slowly recovered 
in the 1870s and early 1880s, it was confronted with an 
enlarged capital stock built up in the preceding boom 
years. Machinery purchases were thus largely confined to 
replacements only. Sluggish manufacturing growth led to low 
levels of net investment in capital goods and a further 
fall in levels of demand for machinery, which were already 
depressed due to the collapse in railway construction. This 
state of the Austrian machinery market in the 1880s is well 
reflected in the experience of individual machine-building 
firms. The growth of engineering companies and the related 
rise of capital requirements were restricted. In response 
to slow growth of output and insufficient capacity 
utilization, investment in new production equipment 
remained low throughout the decade. As a result of very low 
or even negative rates of net investment the average value 
of fixed assets and plant equipment actually fell between 
1880 and 1890. It was not until the close of the century 
that Austrian machine-building companies substantially 
expanded their production capacity to meet the rising 
demand for their output. All available evidence, whether it 
be the growth of domestic machinery production, the 
investment behaviour of machine-building firms, or the 
changes in machinery imports, points to low levels of 
demand for machinery during most of the 1870s and 1880s. It 
was in the last two decades before the First World War 
that, in response to renewed investment demand, output 
growth in Austrian engineering accelerated and surpassed
15 This holds to the extent that similar rates of growth of 
an economy's output require roughly similar rates of 
investment, i.e. no abrupt changes in the structure of the 
economy take place which alter the output-investment ratio.
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that in most other sectors of the industrial economy.
Austria's machine-building industry, clearly, displayed a 
pattern of development that is not compatible with the
revisionist view.
The consumer goods industries continued to hold a dominant 
share of total manufacturing output throughout the period 
under review16. As late as 1911, the textiles, clothing, 
and foodstuffs branches accounted for almost 50 per cent of 
value added in Austria's manufacturing industry17. In 
Hungary, this share was only slightly lower18. But it was, 
to a large extent, the producer goods sector, including
mechanical engineering, that carried industrial expansion
forward in the late nineteenth century.
The most striking finding of this thesis is the strength of 
the machine-building industry's contribution to industrial 
growth in the Habsburg Monarchy. One might have expected to 
find faster than average long-run rates of growth in this 
sector, as both agriculture and industry shifted to 
increasingly complex and capital-intensive production 
processes which translated into an acceleration in the 
growth of demand for capital goods. But expansion of 
industrial machine-building in fact gained such a momentum 
that, despite an initially small share in manufacturing 
value added, this sector became one of the two main sources 
of growth in industry. This holds especially for Austria 
after full recovery from the Great Depression had been 
achieved. Measured over the whole period 1870 to 1913, 
machinery output grew faster in Hungary than in Austria. 
But since Hungarian industry as a whole, too, expanded at 
a higher rate, the impact of engineering growth on total
16 Gross, "Industrialization in Austria”, Table 15, p.70.
17 Ibid.
18 Fellner, F. v., "Das Volkseinkommen Osterreichs und 
Ungarns", Statistische Monatsschrift XLII (1916), pp.548- 
556.
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manufacturing growth was nevertheless somewhat smaller in 
Hungary than in the Western half of the Empire during most 
cycles.
The performance of the capital goods sector appears even 
more impressive when allowance is made for the severe 
obstacles placed in its course. Mechanical engineering in 
Austria-Hungary was struggling with substantial input cost 
disadvantages vis-a-vis its foreign competitors, which were 
aggravated by the prevailing tariff structure. The fact 
that, after the turn of the century, the growth of 
machinery imports outstripped that of domestic production 
may serve as an indication of the continuous increase in 
machinery demand from industry and agriculture. Yet an 
inept tariff policy which protected the iron and steel 
industry at the expense of the machine-building sector 
meant that domestic machinery producers were not able to 
exploit this increase to the full. Growth in mechanical 
engineering, remarkable though it was, was thus hampered as 
the tariff structure effectively re-directed domestic 
demand for its output to cheaper foreign supplies. In sum, 
output growth in Austria-Hungary's machine-building 
industry could have been even faster if the sector had not 
been subjected to detrimental tariff rates.
Nachum Gross concluded in his thesis that "long-run 
industrial growth in nineteenth century Austria was not 
sufficiently rapid to make her economy relatively less 
backward at the end of the period than it had been in the 
middle of the century"19. Though drawing only on growth 
rates and thus ignoring the qualitative changes in the 
composition of total industrial output, this statement 
refers to some of the core elements of the debate about the 
path of the Habsburg Monarchy's industrialization. The data 
that are available show that modern economic growth began 
during the mid-1820s in the Western regions of the Empire,
19 Gross, "Industrialization", p.96.
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yet without displaying any signs of a Gerschenkronian great 
spurt or Rostovian take-off20. But up to the early 1870s, 
output growth was not as fast as to keep pace with the more 
advanced nations of Western Europe. The degree of Austria- 
Hungary's relative economic backwardness probably increased 
between 1820 and 187021. Recent comparative research has 
produced results which suggest that, in relative terms, 
economic growth in the Habsburg Monarchy accelerated during 
the four decades under review. Between 1870 and 1910, 
Austria-Hungary's real per capita product grew faster than 
in most Western European countries. As a result, the wide 
gap in per capita output levels to Great Britain, France, 
Belgium, and, to a lesser extent, Germany, narrowed. "By 
1914", David Good remarks, "the Empire's position relative 
to Western Europe was no better and may have been somewhat 
worse than a century before, and it had lost out to Germany 
for political dominance of Central Europe. But in its final 
four decades the Empire began to 'catch-up'"22. Most of 
this 'catching-up', it should be stressed, took place in 
the last two decades before World War I, i.e. during the 
period which the traditionalists in Austrian historiography 
view as marked by a renewed long-run upswing after the end 
of the Great Depression. Real per capita output in Austria 
rose by only 0.9 per cent on annual average between 1870 
and 1890, but by more than 2 per cent between 1890 and 
1910; similar rates of growth are calculated for Hungary23. 
This acceleration in per capita output matches with the 
changes in engineering growth and the rising contribution 
of the machine-building sector to total industrial
20 Good, "Austria-Hungary", pp.221-225; Komlos, Customs 
Union, pp.90-111.
21 Good, "Austria-Hungary", pp. 225-228.
22 Ibid. , p. 229.
23 Ibid., Table 11.3, p.23 0.
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production observed in this thesis24. There is evidence 
suggesting that the improvements in macro-economic 
productivity measured by Good may have been causally linked 
to changes in machinery investment, which are reflected in 
the output series for the machine-building industry.
In a study covering six major industrial countries during 
the past century, Bradford De Long detected a strong 
association of machinery investment and per capita income 
growth25. Moreover, his regression results indicate that 
machinery investment was more strongly associated with GDP 
per capita growth than investment in general (including 
non-residential construction investment). Even if allowance 
is made for political stability and investment in 
education, two factors often regarded as a key to growth, 
the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on 
machinery investment is not reduced. The problem is, of 
course, whether causation runs from machinery investment to 
economic growth or from growth to machinery investment. If 
faster growth causes higher investment because of rising 
profit expectations, then investment should respond equally 
to increases in output resulting from improved productivity 
(higher per capita incomes) and to those caused by 
population growth. "It should not matter whether larger 
demand comes from having more consumers or richer 
consumers"26. Testing for causation, De Long regressed 
machinery investment on output per capita growth and 
population growth. His results show a strong association
24 The periods containing the largest increase in the rate 
of per capita income growth compared to the previous decade 
were 1890-1900 for Austria and 1880-1890 for Hungary. For 
Austria, 1890-1900 marks also the period with the most 
rapid growth in per capita income, whereas in Hungary per 
capita income expanded at its fastest rate between 1890 and 
1900; Good, "Austria-Hungary", Table 11.3, p.230.
25 De Long, J.B., "Productivity Growth and Machinery 
Investment: A Long-Run Look, 1870-1980", JEH 32 (1992)
No.2, pp.307-324.
26 Ibid. , p. 317.
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between output per capita growth and machinery investment 
and a weaker and imprecisely estimated association between 
population growth and machinery investment. De Long thus 
argues that "intensive growth that raises productivity and 
income levels is especially strongly associated with 
machinery investment”27. He estimates that each additional 
percentage point of total output allocated to machinery 
investment raises output per worker by more than half a 
percentage point per annum. This is a high estimate and it 
may result from the fact that the nations included in the 
sample are today wealthy and succesfully industrialized 
countries; the high coefficient may, to some extent, 
reflect the good luck that these economies had in the past. 
Yet, irrespectively, those economies that have grown most 
rapidly in the past have been those that have invested 
heavily in machinery28. Given the temporal coincidence of 
changes in per capita output and those in machinery 
production, it seems at least plausible to view the rise in 
productivity in the Habsburg Monarchy as related to 
increased machinery investment.
However, the conclusion that mechanical engineering was at 
the core of industrial expansion in late nineteenth century 
Austria-Hungary does not amount to a corroboration of 
Alexander Gerschenkron's hypothesis that the capital goods 
sector was likely to dominate over the consumer goods 
industries in the process of industrialization of follower 
countries, like the Habsburg Empire29. Industrialization in 
Austria started much earlier in the nineteenth century and 
rested to a large degree on advances in the textile
27 Ibid. . De Long supports this finding with further 
evidence drawn from the national growth experience of 
Argentina and post-World War II Germany, see 
"Productivity", pp.318-320.
28 Ibid. , p. 323 .
29 Gerschenkron, A., Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).
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industries. In Hungary, the first widespread wave of 
industrialization in the 1870s and 1880s was dominated by 
the rise of the flour milling industry. What has been 
observed here is that the machine-building industry, as 
part of the capital goods sector, became an increasingly 
important source of economic growth in a period after 
initial industrialization. This finding could be 
interpreted as evidence in support of Walter Hoffmann's 
hypothesis that over the process of industrialization the 
consumer goods industries lose their dominant position in 
favour of the capital goods sector, including iron and 
steel, metals and engineering30. However, what has been 
shown in this thesis is that among those manufacturing 
branches for which comparable output estimates are 
available, the machine-building industry belonged to the 
most rapidly advancing sectors in both Austria and Hungary. 
It should be kept in mind, though, that these branches do 
not represent the full range of manufacturing output31. Any 
inference about trend shifts from the consumer goods sector 
to the capital goods sector would require a more complete 
coverage of industrial sectors and an analysis of the 
input-output relationships necessary to allocate outputs 
between them32. For Austria-Hungary, however, the essential 
data are not available.
30 Hoffmann, W.G., The Growth of Industrial Economies 
(Manchester, 1958), pp.31-41, 145-159. The empirical basis 
of Hoffmann's concept has been criticized as weak because 
of insufficient sectoral coverage and arbitrary definitions 
of consumer goods and capital goods industries; Cf. 
O'Brien, P.K., "Do We Have a Typology for the Study of 
European Industrialization in the XlXth Century?", JEEH 15 
(1986) No.2, pp.310-311.
31 Komlos' estimates of manufacturing output, which have 
been used here for comparative purposes and the measurement 
of the machine-building industry's contribution to 
industrial growth, are based on eight sub-series (beer, 
iron, distilled spirits, sugar, cotton textiles, woollen 
textiles, flour, electricity); Komlos, Customs Union, 
Appendix E, Tables E.5 and E.6.
32 O'Brien, "Typology", pp. 310-311.
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The domestic machine-building industry was able to make a 
major contribution to economic growth in the Habsburg 
Empire in the face of difficult circumstances. The findings 
presented in this thesis suggest interpreting the
industry's performance largely in terms of its response to 
the prevailing market conditions. Nathan Rosenberg has 
shown that the efficient operation of a capital goods 
sector is critically dependent on a sufficiently high level 
of demand for capital goods permitting output 
specialization33. Though Rosenberg refers to specialization 
at the firm level, the concept can also be used to explain 
the composition of output at industry level. The growth in 
machinery output, and its variation over time, was
associated with changes in the structure of the machine- 
building industry's output. These changes were determined 
by changes in the absolute and relative size of product 
markets. Austria-Hungary's machinery producers focused on 
the manufacturing of those machines for which the domestic 
economy provided sufficiently large markets. The available 
data for Hungary indicate an engineering sector which, by 
the turn of the century, was capable of providing
increasingly diverse and complex outputs. But steam 
technology, agricultural machinery and implements, and 
plant and equipment for the food processing industries 
accounted for particularly high shares in total machinery 
output. In the early 1870s, at a time of rising demand 
associated with rapid railway construction, locomotive 
engineering was probably the most important single branch 
of Austria's machine-building industry. However, as later 
in Hungary, its relative importance declined over time as 
the fall in the rate of new railway building brought with 
it a decline in demand for railway related output. 
Operating in a country with a large agricultural sector, 
both in absolute terms and relative to industry, the
33 Rosenberg, N., "Capital Goods, Technology, and Economic 
Growth", N. Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology 
(Cambridge, 1976), p.143.
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machine-building industry was increasingly geared to the 
provision of agricultural machinery, demand for which was 
secularly rising as a result of mechanization and the 
spread of more capital intensive farming techniques. Power 
machines like steam engines and, at a later stage, internal 
combustion engines were used in virtually all branches of 
industry. The market for these machines was thus 
substantially larger than that for highly specialized 
machinery like machine-tools or spinning machines which 
found use only in a limited number of industries. Moreover, 
proximity to the predominantly agricultural economies of 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe helped widening the market 
for machinery producers in the Habsburg Empire. Exports 
accounted for a substantial share of domestic production of 
agricultural machinery. Though the argument does not 
account for the increasing specialization in steam 
technology, it appears that Austria-Hungary's tariff 
structure, too, had some bearing on the pattern of output 
specialization. At least part of the shift towards the 
production of agricultural equipment, with a relatively low 
iron and steel content per unit of output, can be explained 
as a response to high tariffs on iron and steel inputs.
The absolute and relative rise of the machine-building 
industry under at times adverse conditions bears witness to 
the underlying dynamism and increasing complexity of the 
Habsburg economy in the late nineteenth century. Rising 
macro-economic productivity was, to a considerable extent, 
facilitated by investment in domestically produced 
machinery. The results of this thesis thus fit in well with 
what now seems to emerge as consensus among Habsburg 
scholars, namely, that the long-held view of Austria- 
Hungary's economic development as essentially one of 
failure can no longer be accepted34.
34 Cf. Good, Economic Rise, pp. 237-255, and "Austria- 
Hungary", pp.225-229; Komlos, Review of Good, p.452. The 
most recent exposition of the failure hypothesis is 
Alexander Gerschenkron's An Economic Spurt that Failed 
(Princeton, 1977).
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APPENDIX A
An Estimate of Output in Austro-Hungarian Machine-Building,
1870 to 1913
I. Austrian Machine-Building Production
1. Earlier Attempts to Approximate Output
Only few contemporary spot estimates of Austrian machine- 
building output are available. They do not allow the 
identification of significant changes in either the short 
or the long run1. And the one recent estimate produced by 
Rudolph is somewhat misleading for several reasons2.
His index of engineering production - designed as a 
component of a wider industrial production index - is based 
solely on iron and steel consumption in this sector. It is 
an input series composed of Austrian iron and steel 
production and imports, corrected by rail production.
1 k.k. Handelsministerium, "Statistik der osterreichischen 
Industrie 1870, 1880, 1885", Nachrichten tiber Industrie,
Handel und Verkehr (hereafter NHIV), vols. 3 (1874) No.2, 
p.145; 28 (1884), pp.94-97; 38 (1888/89), pp.106-109.
Bibliothek der Kammer der gewerblichen Wirtschaft fiir Wien, 
Vienna (hereafter HKB Wien), Sign. IV.6316: 
Handelspolitische Zentralstelle, Gutachten zum autonomen 
Zolltarif: Die Entwicklung der osterreichischen
Maschinenindustrie seit 1905 bis 1913, typescript, no 
place, no year, pp.6-8.
2 Rudolph, R.L., Banking and Industrialization in Austria- 
Hungary. The Role of Banks in the Industrialization of the 
Czech Crownlands, 1873-1914 (Cambridge, 1976), pp.12, 206- 
207, and "The Pattern of Austrian Industrial Growth from 
the Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century", Austrian 
History Yearbook 11 (1975), Table 2. For a critique of 
Rudolph's figures see also Komlos, J., The Habsburg 
Monarchy as a Customs Union. Economic Development in 
Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 
1983), p.242.
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Constant iron and steel prices were applied to convert the 
sub-series into value data. Three shortcomings, in 
particular, impair the quality of this index:
1. Trade flows. The Monarchy's foreign trade statistics 
refer to Austria-Hungary as a whole, i.e. they do not 
differentiate between Austria on the one hand, and Hungary 
on the other. Rather than looking at the Hungarian 
material, which, at least partly and for certain periods of 
time, allows us to distinguish the respective flows, 
Rudolph utilizes the overall trade data and applies 
constant ratios to determine Austrian imports and exports. 
His figures do not account for the internal trade in iron 
and steel between Austria and Hungary which is important 
for approximating the total of Austrian net imports.
2. Content of index. Despite its importance and large share 
in total iron and steel output, wrought iron is not 
included in the series for 1870 to 1899. The neglect of 
wrought iron output, though, leads to a substantial under­
estimation of the level of iron and steel inputs for the 
1870s and 1880s, in particular. This holds even more so as 
at the time rails were still made predominantly of wrought 
iron rather than steel3. No effort has been made to account 
for Austrian imports of cast iron. But these were, again, 
particularly important in the 1870s and 1880s, both in 
absolute terms as well as relative to other inputs4. 
Rudolph's input series is thus heavily biased. The growth 
of engineering inputs appears faster than it actually was.
3. Input/output ratios. Rudolph assumes a constant 
input/output ratio for 1870 to 1913. This seems reasonable 
enough unless one has reason to believe that, for example,
3 Schubert, H.R., "The Steel Industry", A History of 
Technology, vol. 5: The Late Nineteenth Century, c. 1850 to 
c. 1900, eds. C. Singer, E.J. Holymard, A.R. Hall, T.I. 
Williams (Oxford, 1958), p.61. In 1870, Austria produced 
more than 105,000 metric tons of rails, but only 25,000 
tons of steel. Wrought iron output in that year amounted to 
approximately 203,000 tons; see Tables A.8 and A.11.
4 See Tables A.8 to A.11.
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the ratio declined over time as a consequence of improved 
production technology that saves on input material or 
better inventory management that reduces stocks relative to 
the level of production. If that applies, actual output 
grows faster than the rise of inputs would suggest. On the 
other hand, the ratio of inputs to outputs may increase in 
response to shifts towards more iron-and-steel-intensive 
outputs or the factor substitution of iron and steel for 
other inputs, e.g. wood. Output growth would then be slower 
than the growth of iron and steel inputs. However, applying 
a constant ratio to an input series which is heavily biased 
leads by necessity to a distorted view of the development 
of machinery output.
2. The New Output Estimate 
a. Iron and Steel Inputs
As a first step in estimating output, a series for iron and 
steel consumption in Austrian machine-building (in 1000 
metric tons) was compiled. This series is composed of ten 
subseries:
Austrian iron and steel production:
1. cast iron production
2. steel production
3. wrought iron
Austrian net imports of iron and steel:
4. net imports of cast iron
5. net imports of bar iron and steel
6. net imports of sheet metal and plate
7. net imports of smelted iron and ingots
Austrian non-engineering iron and steel consumption:
8. rail production
9. production of railway related materials 
10. production of non-engineering iron goods.
207
Iron and steel production (series 1 to 3)5 
Data on Austrian production of cast iron and steel are 
available for the whole period 1870 to 19136. Austria's 
output of wrought iron, though, had to be estimated for 
most years between 1870 and 1899. An initial attempt to 
approximate wrought iron output as a residual proved 
unsuccessful7. Instead, the production of wrought iron was 
approximated on the basis of the share of steel in total
5 For sources see Table A.8.
6 For 1885, the arithmetic mean of the 1884 and 1886 values 
of cast iron output has been used as the figure given in 
the statistical yearbooks shows an inexplicably sharp rise 
for 1885 (from 63,189 tons in 1884 to 91,348 tons), only to 
fall again in 1886 (to 57,415 tons) - possibly the result 
of a misprint. Neither the data for steel production, nor 
those for imports suggest that there was a general increase 
in demand for iron and steel in 1885. The level of Austrian 
pig iron output actually fell in this year. See Table A.8 
for sources.
7 Total Austro-Hungarian pig iron consumption (including net 
imports of scrap) was converted into wrought iron and steel 
terms using a ratio of .70 for 1870 to 1879 and .75 for 
1880 to 1900; see Kestner, F. , Die deutschen Eisenzolle 
1879 bis 1900 (Leipzig, 1902), Table IX, p.132 and Burn,
D.L., The Economic History of Steelmaking 1867-1939 
(Cambridge, 1940), note 2, p.82. Subtracting Austrian and 
Hungarian steel production from the series obtained in such 
fashion yielded estimates of wrought iron output. The 
estimated values are fairly low for the early 1890's and 
turn negative for all years after 1895, i.e. the estimates 
of wrought iron output are incompatible with the data on 
steel production. (Despite using a higher conversion ratio 
of .80, the results were negative, too, for 1900 to 1913). 
Alhough the values computed for the 1870s and 1880s are not 
that obviously implausible, they may nevertheless be 
flawed. It appears that the method of calculating wrought 
iron output suffers from two defects: firstly, variations 
in pig iron stocks are not taken into account; secondly, 
the use of scrap iron - apart from imports - is not allowed 
for. Data for Britain suggest that pig iron stocks were 
both important and extremely volatile. Between 1880 and 
1886, the ratio of stocks to pig iron production varied 
between a minimum of .193 and a maximum of .355; Carr, 
J.C., Taplin, W., History of the British Steel Industry 
(Oxford, 1962), Table XII, p.106. For Austria and Hungary, 
however, no data on inventories are available. Similarly, 
no figures exist on scrap of domestic origin used in the 
manufacture of wrought iron and steel.
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wrought iron and steel production in those years for which 
output data are available:
Table A.l
PERCENTAGE SHARES 
OUTPUT
OF STEEL IN AUSTRIA- 
OF WROUGHT IRON AND
-HUNGARY'S
STEEL
TOTAL
1870 11.1 1882 48.8 1892 72.8
1873 23.6 1883 54.3 1893 75.1
1879 41.7 1890 72.5 1900 82.9
1880 38.8 1891 71.8
Sources: See Table A.7.
Shares for the years with missing production data were 
obtained by interpolation, using annual average rates of 
change. These shares were then applied to the annual data 
for Austrian steel production, yielding estimates of total 
wrought iron and steel output for 1871 to 1872, 1874 to
1878, 1881, 1884 to 1889 and 1894 to 1899. Subtracting the 
volume of steel produced estimates of Austrian wrought iron 
output. Iron and steel production is given in Table A.8.
Net imports of iron and steel (series 4 to 7)8 
In general, Austrian net imports of iron and steel for 1883 
to 1913 have been computed directly as all the relevant 
flows are reported in the trade statistics of the customs 
union and those of Hungary9:
8 For sources see Tables A.9 and A.10.
9 From 1879 on Bosnia-Herzegovina was integrated in the 
customs union, see Komlos, Customs Union, p.4. Hence her 
foreign trade data are included in the foreign trade 
statistics of the Monarchy. Since these trade flows are 
indistinguishable the figures derived for Austria include 
also those for Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this problem see also 
k.k. Handelsministerium, Handelsstatistischer Dienst, 
AuBenhandel und Zwischenverkehr der im Reichsrathe 
vertretenen Konigreiche und Lander und der Lander der 
heiligen ungarischen Krone 1909 (Vienna, 1911), p.7.
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impA = impAH - impHR0W + impAH 
expA = expAH - expHROW + expAH 
net imports = impA - expA
Key:
impA, expA total Austrian imports and exports
impAH, expAH imports and exports of Austria-Hungary
impHROW, expHROW Hungarian foreign trade with countries
outside the customs union of Austria- 
Hungary
impAH, expAH Austrian imports from and exports to
Hungary (internal trade).
Trade between the two halves of the Habsburg Monarchy is 
covered in the Hungarian trade statistics and, for 1900 to 
1912, in the Austrian "Statistik des Zwischen-verkehrs". 
The import and export figures produced in these two sources 
show only minor differences and are fully compatible for 
the years in which they overlap10. Use of the Hungarian 
data ensured consistency over time11; the Austrian source
10 The maximum divergence - observed in a single year - of 
the Austrian figures from the Hungarian data (in percentage 
of the latter) between 1900 and 1912 is for
imports of bar iron and steel -0.9
exports of bar iron and steel -2.0
imports of sheet metal and plate 8.8
exports of sheet metal and plate -3.4.
Larger data discrepancies show up in total internal trade 
in raw iron (which included a variety of iron qualities): 
imports diverged by a maximum of only 2.5 percent, but 
exports by a maximum of -3 6 percent. These totals, however, 
have not been put to use here. See k.k. Handelsministerium, 
Zwischenverkehrsstatistisches Amt, Statistik des 
Zwischenverkehrs zwischen den im Reichsrathe vertretenen 
Konigreichen und Landern und den Landern der ungarischen 
Krone (Vienna, 1902-1913), 1901, pp.48-49; 1903, pp.56-57; 
1905, pp.56-57; 1906, pp.53-54; 1908, pp.100-103; 1910,
pp.100-103; 1912, pp.100-103. Magyar Kir. Kozponti
Statisztikai Hivatal, ”A Magyar Szent Korona Orszagainak 
1883-1913. £vi Kiilkereskedelmi Forgalma", Magyar 
Statisztikai Kozlemenyek 63 (Budapest, 1923), pp.270, 272, 
274.
11 According to Handelsministerium, AuBenhandel and 
Zwischenverkehr,pp.5-1, no independent records on Austria's 
share in the customs union's foreign trade are available. 
The figures on Austria's foreign trade (exclusive of her 
trade with Hungary) produced in this publication have, 
therefore, been calculated as residuals using the more
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was only utilized for isolating internal trade in cast iron 
(for 1906 to 1912) as this is not reported in the Hungarian 
material.
The lack of complementary trade data for the period prior 
to 188312 requires a rule for separating the Austrian 
portion from the overall external trade figures. Austria's 
5 year-average share in each category of the Monarchy's 
iron and steel imports and exports (1883-87) was applied to 
the data for 1870 to 1882.
Annual exports to Hungary of bar iron and steel (series 5) 
and sheet metal and plate (series 6) for 1870 to 1882 were 
approximated by applying the respective average 1883/87 
ratios of exports to Austrian steel production to annual 
steel output. Imports from Hungary were estimated by using 
the two average 1883/87 shares of Austrian imports (or 
Hungarian exports) in Hungarian steel production13. Net 
imports of bar iron and steel are given in Table A.9, those 
of sheet metal and plate in Table A.10.
Insufficient data called for some modification in the 
procedure of calculating imports of cast iron and smelted 
iron and ingots.
Austrian net imports of cast iron (series 4) had to be 
estimated since the available trade statistics do not allow 
us to isolate them directly. For the Austro-Hungarian 
customs union, import and export data for cast iron exist 
for 1888 to 1913. The respective figures for the previous
comprehensive Hungarian data - a further reason to turn to 
the Hungarian statistics.
12 Though official Hungarian data are available for 1882, 
these are not used here as contemporaries regarded them as 
unreliable, see Bokor, G., Geschichte und Organisation der 
amtlichen Statistik in Ungarn (Budapest, 1896), p.188.
13 As has been shown above, wrought iron output had to be 
estimated for most years between 1870 and 1899. In order to 
confine cumulative estimating and the potential for errors 
associated with it, the 1870 to 1882 estimates for internal 
trade in bar iron and steel and sheet metal and plate were 
based on steel production only rather than total wrought 
iron and steel output.
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years were approximated by applying the 5 year-average 
share (1888-92) of cast iron in total crude iron imports 
and exports to the crude iron data available for 1870 to 
1887. Thus a complete series of Austro-Hungarian cast iron 
net imports was obtained. In a second step, the portion of 
Austria had to be determined. It was assumed that Austria's 
share in the Monarchy's foreign trade in cast iron in each 
year was the same as the one she had in total crude iron 
imports and exports for each year 1883 to 1913. The latter 
was calculated on the basis of both Hungarian and overall 
trade statistics. Austria's net imports from Hungary were 
taken into account as well. Data on internal trade in cast 
iron are available for 1906 to 191214. For 1883 to 1905, it 
was assumed that the structure of Austrian iron exports 
reflected that of Austrian iron production. The relative 
share of cast iron in total Austrian cast iron and pig iron 
production in each year was applied to the figures for 
Austrian exports of crude iron to Hungary15. Imports from 
Hungary were estimated in identical fashion, using the 
share of cast iron in Hungarian iron production to 
determine Hungary's exports to Austria. For 1870 to 1882, 
the average 1883/87 ratio of (estimated) exports to cast 
iron production was used to approximate Austrian cast iron 
exports to Hungary as a constant fraction of Austrian cast 
iron output. Similarly, imports from Hungary were computed 
employing Hungarian output data. The series of Austrian 
cast iron imports is given in Table A.9.
As the available trade data refer only to Austria-Hungary 
as a whole, Austrian net imports of smelted iron and ingots 
(series 7) had to be estimated, too. We assumed that 
Austria's share of imports and exports of smelted iron and
14 For 1913, internal trade in cast iron was estimated using 
the average 1906/12 share of exports in Austrian cast iron 
production. Imports from Hungary were approximated on the 
basis of their share in Hungarian cast iron output.
15 The Hungarian trade statistics do not differentiate 
between cast iron and pig iron and, therefore, reproduce 
only total crude iron imports and exports.
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ingots was equivalent to the share she had in the 
Monarchy's foreign trade in bar iron and steel 
(disregarding internal trade flows). The ratios computed 
for each year were then applied to the totals of imports 
and exports of smelted iron and ingots to derive Austria's 
net imports. Internal trade for 1900 to 1913 was not taken 
into account as the available Austrian data are not 
sufficiently disaggregate and, consequently, no attempt has 
been made to estimate internal trade for earlier years. 
Austrian net imports of smelted iron and ingots are 
reproduced in Table A.10.
Non-engineering iron and steel consumption (series 8 to 
10)16
In a first step to set apart iron and steel consumption in 
machine-building from that in other branches of the 
economy, rail production was substracted from the tonnage- 
sum of the first seven series for each year. Estimates were 
needed for the years with missing production figures: 1871 
to 1879, 1881 to 1882, 1884 and 1886 to 1889. It was
assumed that the volume of Austrian rail production was a 
function of the growth in Austria-Hungary's railway network 
and the Monarchy's imports of rails17. With substantially
16 For sources see Tables A. 11 and A. 12.
17 This procedure requires some further explanation:
(1) Certainly, it would be preferable to take account of 
Hungarian output of rails, too. Yet no data other than 
estimates of Hungary's rail production are available for 
1870 to 1889 (see below, section II, on Hungarian machine- 
building production). The use of these rather tentative 
approximations seems unlikely to improve the accuracy of 
the estimates for Austria. However, to some extent the 
effects of a probable increase in Hungarian rail production 
over time are implicitly allowed for: assuming no 
technological change, a given overall rail- 
consumption/kilometre-of-track ratio and no change in net 
imports of rails, a rise in Hungarian rail output will 
adversely effect the volume of Austrian rail production. 
The ratio of Austrian rail output and Austro-Hungarian rail 
imports to new track laid will fall in response.
(2) Austria-Hungary's total net imports of rails have been 
used - rather than Austria's alone - as Austrian rail
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smaller iron and steel production capacity than Austria, 
yet similarly large additions to the domestic railway 
network, Hungary's import demand for Austrian rails was 
most certainly important.
Five rail-consumption/kilometre-of-track ratios were 
computed on the basis of Austrian rail production and 
Austro-Hungarian rail import figures for 1870, 1880, 1883, 
1885 and 1890 (Table A.2)18. Interpolation - using 
arithmetic averages - yielded ratios for the years with 
missing production data. These ratios were related to new 
track opened each year, providing estimates of rail 
consumption. The estimates were then "smoothed” by 
computing three-year moving averages. This was done to 
allow for the possibility of repair work and changes in 
stocks of rails which both seem likely to have dampened to
production is related to new track laid throughout the 
Monarchy. This was done because the lack of production and 
trade data did not permit a computation of rail consumption 
for each of the two countries separately. (An approximation 
of Austria's and Hungary's individual trade in rails is 
bound to fail. The pronounced and most volatile 
fluctuations in both external and internal trade during the 
1880s would not permit the derivation of meaningful 
constant shares and coefficients with which to attempt a 
backward extrapolation; see the section on series 4 to 7 
above).
(3) For some years the trade statistics suggest that 
Hungarian imports and exports alone exceeded the respective 
totals for the Monarchy. It is not clear whether this 
incompatibility results from an error in the Hungarian data 
or the overall trade figures. Hence Austro-Hungarian 
exports (1885, 1887) and imports (1889) have been
calculated as arithmetic averages of the respective 1884- 
86, 1887-88 and 1888-90 data. See k.k. Statistische
Central-Commission "Statistik des auswartigen Handels der 
osterreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie 1885, 1887, 1889",
Osterreichische Statistik (hereafter OStat), vol.14 
(1886/87), II, p.42, III, p.26; vol.20 (1888/89), II,
p.32c, III, p.24c; vol.26 (1890/91), II, p.58, III, p.34; 
and Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, "Kiilkereskedelmi 
Forgalma", p.278.
18 The difference between the time of rail production and 
the time of opening of new track was taken into 
consideration by shifting two thirds of the figures for new 
track opened in each year into the previous year.
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some extent the effects of variations in railway 
construction on rail consumption. Finally, net imports of 
rails were subtracted to obtain values for rail production. 
Austrian rail production is given in Table A.11.
Table A.2
RAIL-CONSUMPTION / KILOMETRE-OF-TRACK RATIOS
RP NIR NT Ratio
1870 105.27 116.75 1,968.7 .1128
1880 61.03 -24.58 302.3 .1206
1883 165.00 5.12 1,143.7 .1488
1885 83.13 0.08 583.3 .1427
1890 84.97 1.13 862.0 .0999
Key:
RP
NIR
NT
Ratio =
Austrian rail production (1000 tons) 
Austro-Hungarian net imports of rails (1000 
new railway track opened, 2/3 shifted back 
(RP+NIR)/NT
tons) 
one year (km)
Sources : See Table A. 10.
The production of miscellaneous railway related materials 
was important and constituted a considerable fraction of 
rail production19. It was assumed that iron and steel 
consumption in this branch expanded in line with Austrian 
output of rails (Table A.10).
Iron and steel were inputs for industries other than 
machine-building and railway related production. 
Consequently, as a further step to isolate the engineering 
input, at least part of the iron and steel used in metal­
working was substracted from the total (Table A.11, column
19 The production of iron sleepers and various (small) 
railway materials (exclusive of locomotives, wheels and 
axles) counted for 17,690 tons in 1890 when rail produc­
tion was at 84,970 tons, Handelsministerium, "Statistik der 
osterreichischen Industrie 1890", NIHV, vol.54 (1894),
pp.98-99. Unfortunately, this source provides no further 
details of what "small railway materials" actually were.
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(l))20.
The residual volume series is assumed to reflect roughly 
the development of material inputs in the Austrian 
engineering industry (Table A.12, column (2)).
b. The Estimation of Gross Output in Machine-Building
Fellner estimated output of Austrian engineering for 
1911/13 within the framework of his national income 
calculations21. He approximated the "raw value of
production" by applying a wage-sum/gross output ratio 
derived from Hungarian data to Austrian figures on wage- 
sums in industrial engineering. This concept has been
utilized here as well. Wage-sum data are given in the
Austrian workers' insurance statistics - though only for
1889 to 191122.
20 In 1890, Austrian production of tools, wire, rivets, iron 
furniture, eating utensils and locksmith's items was at 
128,332 tons, Handelsministerium, "Statistik der 
osterreichischen Industrie 1890", NIHV, vol.54 (1894), 
pp.98-99. This figure almost certainly represents a minimum 
since products like sickles, scythes, knifes, weaponry, and 
fireproof safes are not even included - due to a lack of 
tonnage data. It was used to calculate estimates for all 
other years. We assumed that Austrian metal-working 
expanded in line with Austrian consumption of iron and 
steel net of rails and railway related materials. However, 
as a constant proportion of iron and steel consumption the 
resulting series has only notional significance as its 
inclusion or exclusion does not effect the pattern of 
change in machine-building inputs and thus the final 
estimate of output.
21 Fellner, F.v., "Das Volkseinkommen Osterreichs und 
Ungarns", Statistische Monatsschrift XLII (1916), pp.558- 
572.
22 k.k. Minister ium des Innern, Die Gebarung und die 
Ergebnisse der Unfallstatistik der Arbeiter-Unfall- 
Versicherungsanstalten (henceforth cited Unfallstatistik) 
1889 (Vienna, 1891), pp. 36-37; 1890 (Vienna, 1892), pp. 
66-67; 1892 (Vienna, 1893), pp. 78-79, 127; 1893 (Vienna, 
1894), pp. 82-83, 131; 1894 (Vienna, 1895), pp.80-81, 129; 
1895 (Vienna, 1896) pp.88-89, 137; 1896 (Vienna, 1897), pp. 
98-99, 162; 1896 (Vienna, 1898), pp. 94-95, 160; and
Table A.3
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1911 PERCENTAGES OF WAGES IN GROSS OUTPUT
1. boiler making, machine repair shops: 17.5
2. general machine-building: 20.5
3. agricultural machine-building: 25.0
4. production of sewing machines: 33.8
5. production of soda-water apparatus: 17.6
6. other branches of machine-building: 22.1
Source: Fellner, "Volkseinkommen", Table VI, p.621.
Table A. 3 provides the (1911) percentage shares of wages in 
gross output of individual machine-building branches which 
have been used to derive the value of gross production in 
these branches 1897 to 1911 (Tables A. 12a to A.12e)23. For 
1889 to 1896, the statistics provide only the total wage­
bill in machine-building. In these cases, the 1897 weighted 
average ratio of 20.89 per cent was applied (Table A.12e). 
Thus a complete series of gross production in Austrian 
machine-building was obtained for 1889 to 1911 (Table A. 13, 
column (1)).
The assumption of a constant wage-bill/turnover ratio for 
either the industry as a whole or its individual branches 
is a simplification necessitated by the lack of more 
detailed data. Certainly, the ratio varied not only between 
different branches of machine-building, but within these 
between different companies and over the business cycle,
Ergebnisse der Unfallstatistik der funfjahrigen 
Beobachtungsperiode 1897 -1901 (Vienna, 1904), pp. 252-285; 
1902 - 1906 (Vienna, 1909), pp. 261-297; 1907 - 1911
(Vienna, 1914), pp. 283-323. Included are Gruppe VI, Titel 
166 to 184 (machinery, tools, apparatus) of the 
Unfallstatistik which correspond to the definitions used in 
HKB Wien, Gutachten. Transportmeans (shipbuilding, railway 
cars, automobiles, etc.) as well electrical engineering are 
not incorporated in the data used.
23 The production of soda-water apparatus and siphons has 
been included in Table A.12e, Gross Production: Other
Machine-Building.
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too24. But there is evidence which indicates that the 
overall ratio, at least, was not subject to any significant 
upward or downward trend over time which would seriously 
affect the new estimates. Deriving an index of production 
in German metal-working, Hoffmann used labour incomes in 
the industry as a proxy for output25. His evidence shows 
that the shares of wages, depreciation and profits in 
output remained fairly constant over the long run.
Dividing the previously derived iron and steel consumption 
in machine-building (in 1000 metric tons; Table A. 11, 
column (2)) by the value of gross production of machines 
(in million current crowns; Table A.13, column (1)) yielded 
a series of annual input/output ratios for 1889 to 191126. 
This series shows pronounced annual fluctuations and, if 
anything, a slight upward movement over time (Table A.4)27.
24 In the branch of general machine-building, for example, 
the share of wagesum in turnover fluctuated between 14.7 
and 36 per cent in 1905 according to the individual 
company. Six years later the minimum ratio was recorded at 
13.8 per cent, the maximum at 3 3 per cent. For the whole of 
engineering average ratios of 25 per cent in 1905 and 22 
per cent in 1911 were considered representative. See HKB 
Wien, Sign. IV.6316: Gutachten, pp.3-8.
25 Hoffmann, W.G., Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft 
seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1965), pp.357- 
359.
26 In general, input/output ratios are defined with both 
inputs and outputs measured in the same units, i.e. either 
in value or in quantity terms. Here, though, output data 
are available only in value terms whereas inputs had to be 
measured in physical quantities since adequate price data, 
notably for rails, railway materials and non-engineering 
iron and steel goods are lacking.
27 The behaviour of the input/output ratio underlines the 
importance of wrought iron inputs. An alternative 
computation was prepared to test for the effects of 
excluding this component for the pre-1900 years, as in 
Rudolph's estimates. Using otherwise identical data and 
methods, but accounting for the change in estimated non­
engineering iron and steel consumption (which is affected 
by the exclusion of wrought iron) , a new series of 
input/output ratios was calculated. This procedure reveals
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Therefore, the 1889-1894 mean of 2.2912 was used to compute 
estimates of machinery output for 1870 to 1888 on the basis 
of the iron and steel input series; the 1907-1911 mean was 
applied to obtain estimates for 1912 to 1913 (Table A.13,
a fluctuating, but persistently rising ratio. With the data 
entered in reverse chronological order to allow for a 
backward extrapolation, this input/output ratio (z) was 
regressed on a time trend (time), producing the following 
equation based on 23 observations for 1889 to 1911 (t-
statistics in parentheses):
z = 1.4686 + .046175*time + .4347*e(-l)
(21.0586) (7.6217) (2.1916)
R2 = .9054 R2 = .8955 F(2, 19) = 90.9279 DW = 1.9112
The time variable has been chosen to equal 0 in the base 
year (1889), to increase by 1 during each successive year 
and to decrease by 1 during each preceeding year. All test 
statistics indicate significance of the respective 
coefficients at either the 1 or 5 percent level. An 
autoregressive error term was inserted in the equation to 
correct for the presence of serial correlation in the 
initial OLS estimation. A plausible explanation for the 
existence of serially correlated errors may be found in 
cyclical fluctuations of the ratio for which no explicit 
allowance has been made. In an upswing, prices are likely 
to rise and the value of nominal output is likely to rise, 
too. The actual input/output ratio will then be lower than 
its longer run trend value; a negative residual results. 
Similarly, at or near the bottom of a downswing, relatively 
lower input prices may encourage manufacturers to build-up 
input stocks in advance, despite the likely presence of 
relatively low output prices, as they may anticipate an 
upswing. The volume of inputs increases while the value of 
output still stagnates: the actual input/output ratio will 
then be higher than predicted by the trend line (positive 
residuals). Using the regression equation for a backward 
extrapolation produced estimates of input/output ratios for 
1870 to 1888 which rise as time progresses. For 1870, we 
obtain a ratio of 0.5913 which, when applied to the volume 
of inputs modified as described above, yields an estimate 
of output in current prices of 90.31 million crowns. This 
result is very close to both contemporary estimates and the 
new estimates of output presented in this appendix (see 
Table A.6). However, if we were to apply a constant ratio 
instead, for example the average 1889/1911 ratio of 1.9634 
(based on the modified input series), estimated output for 
1870 would amount to less than 30 million crowns. The point 
is to show that use of a heavily biased input series, in 
this case a series which does not include wrought iron, is 
bound to lead to very substantial estimation errors if a 
constant ratio is used.
column (1)).
219
Table A.4
INPUT / OUTPUT RATIO
mean maximum minimum var. coeff.
1889-1894 2.2912 2.4238 2.1596 .0485
1895-1900 2.5943 2.7659 2.3342 .0616
1901-1906 2.5036 2.6866 2.3416 .0461
1907-1911 2.6018 2.7425 2.4526 .0429
1889-1911 2.4932 2.7659 2.1596 .0701
input = iron and steel consumption in engineering (1000 tons)
output = value of gross production (million current crowns)
Sources: Calculations based on data given in Tables A. 11 
and A.13.
Finally, an input price index was constructed (Table A.14) 
and used to calculate gross production in constant (1913) 
prices (Table A.13, column (2)).
c. The Input Price Index
The construction of a price index of machinery is hampered 
by both methodological as well as practical obstacles. 
Because of a generally high rate of technological progress, 
notably over longer periods of time, it is difficult to 
compare engineering products qualitatively. Structural 
shifts within the machine-building industry add to the 
problem of adequate weighting of individual price 
subseries. Moreover, price data for machines are rare and 
most often discontinuous28.
The almost complete lack of suitable machinery price data 
for both Austria and Hungary necessitates to base a price
28 Hoffmann, Wachstum, p.571.
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index on input rather than output prices29. Information on 
the most important input prices and weights is available 
from contemporary sources.
A Laspeyres index was constructed as a weighted arithmetic 
average of price relatives for material and labour inputs. 
The base year is 1913. Six series of price relatives are 
included30:
ACIt average price per ton of Austrian cast iron at
place of production in year t (1913=100);
HCIt average price per ton of Hungarian cast iron at
place of production in year t (1913=100);
ICIt price per ton of imported cast iron inclusive of
tariff in year t (1913=100)31;
ABIt wholesale price of bar iron in Vienna in year t
29 Tinbergen, Cairncross and Feinstein faced similar 
difficulties in their attempts to construct price indices 
for British engineering. As part of his computation of a 
price index of investment goods, Tinbergen approximated 
machine prices on the basis of trade data and pig iron 
prices; Tinbergen, J., "Business Cycles in the United 
Kingdom”, Verhandelingen der koninklijke Akademie van 
Wetenschappen, n.s. LII (1951), no.4, pp.12-15, Table I A. 
Cairncross' calculation of the average value of machinery 
per ton is based on iron and steel prices; Cairncross, 
A.K., Home and Foreign Investment, 1870-1913, (reprint, Nr 
Brighton, 1975), pp.158-167. Feinstein designed a price 
index for engineering by combining indices of iron and 
steel prices and of wages in engineering and shipbuilding; 
Feinstein, C.H., National Income, Expenditure and Output of 
the United Kingdom, 1855-1965 (Cambridge, 1972), p.188,
Table 63.
30 The lack of adequate price data does not permit the 
construction of a separate price index for Hungarian 
engineering; bar iron prices, for example, are available 
only for Austria. The same holds for wage data in 
mechanical engineering. The input price index is, 
therefore, used for deflating estimated machine-building 
output in both Austria and Hungary. Hence Hungarian cast 
iron prices have been included as well. Import prices for 
cast iron apply to both countries alike because of their 
common customs border.
31 The tariff rate applied is an arithmetic average of the 
(lower) negotiated tariff and the (higher) autonomous 
tariff on cast iron imports.
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(1911/12/13=100; the 1911 price was used also for 
1912 and 1913 as no prices are available or both 
these years);
ACOt average price per ton of Austrian coal at place
of production in year t (1913=100);
WPAj average wage per annum in Austrian machine-
building in year t (1913=100)32.
Material input prices - represented by the first five price 
relatives listed above - and the series for wages are 
combined with equal weights33. According to a study by the 
Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten (German Machine- 
Builders' Association), approximately half of production 
costs in machine-building accrued to expenses on material 
inputs. Raw materials, largely iron, accounted for 80 per 
cent and fuels for 20 per cent of material expenditure. On 
average, cast iron and bar iron - by far the two most 
important engineering material inputs - had a share of 40 
to 50 per cent and 30 to 35 per cent, respectively, in the
32 In a first step, the average annual wage per worker in 
Austrian mechanical engineering was computed on the basis 
of wagesums paid in the industry and the number of workers 
for 1889 to 1911 and converted into index form. The data 
are given in the Austrian workers' insurance statistics. 
The series correlates highly with time. A trend line was 
fitted (OLS) after transformation of the wage data into 
logarithmic form. Forward and backward extrapolation of the 
trend yielded estimates of the trend values of wages. These 
were then used as proxies for actual wages in machine- 
building as the latter are not available. A major 
shortcoming of this procedure is, of course, that cyclical 
variations in wage rates are not taken into account. 
Similar German data - which may be of some significance 
here given the high degree of exchange between the two 
economies - suggest that these variations were particularly 
pronounced in the early 1870s. Yet a comparison with the 
German figures for 1870 to 1913 shows, too, that the 
assumption of a secular increase in wages is likely to be 
adequate. For a series of average annual labour incomes in 
German metal-working see Hoffmann, Wachstum, pp.468-471.
33 Cf. Feinstein, National Income, p. 188.
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total volume of iron used in machines34. These percentages 
have been used to compute weights with which to combine the 
five material input price series (Table A.5). As no 
continuous price data for other raw materials and semi­
finished inputs are available, the weight share of cast 
iron has been raised to 55 per cent, that of bar iron to 45 
per cent35. The three prices for cast iron have been 
weighted according to the average 1870 to 1913 shares of 
Austrian cast iron, Hungarian cast iron and imported cast 
iron, respectively, in total Austro-Hungarian cast iron 
consumption. The price relative of coal is used to 
represent changes in fuel prices.
Table A.5
WEIGHTS USED IN INPUT PRICE INDEX
price relative weight in price index
ACIt 0.50*0.80*0.55*0.505 = 0.111
HCIt 0.50*0.80*0.55*0.079 = 0.017
ICIt 0.50*0.80*0.55*0.416 = 0.092
ABIt 0.50*0.80*0.45 0.180
ACOt 0.50*0.20 0.100
WPAj 0.50 0.500
1.000
Source: See text.
34 Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-Anstalten, Denkschrift iiber 
die Maschinenindustrie der Welt. Bestimmt fur das Kommitte 
B des vorbereitenden Ausschusses der internationalen 
Wirtschaftskonferenz des Volkerbundes (Berlin, 1926), p.39.
35 Prices for support iron (profiles) and sheet metal, for 
example, are available only for the post-1889 period; see 
Appendix C, Tables C.2 and C.3. They have not been included 
in the price index in order to ensure its consistency over 
time.
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d. An Evaluation of the New Output Estimates
As a consequence of changes in the data collection 
procedures, the three Austrian industrial surveys of 1870, 
1880 and 1885 do not present fully compatible sets of 
information36. Nachum Gross has pointed out that "they 
cannot be utilized for determining short-run trends of 
development"37. But the results of these surveys 
nevertheless prove useful in evaluating the new estimates 
derived here. If the quality of the survey data suffers 
mainly from incomplete coverage of the various industries, 
it seems quite likely that the reported output levels in 
each industry represent minima38. The contemporary spot 
estimates of production in Austrian machine-building can 
thus be seen as lower limits against which to measure the 
new output estimates (Table A.6).
36 Gross, N.T., "Industrialization in Austria in the 
Nineteenth Century" (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1966), pp.167-185, and 
"Austrian Industrial Statistics 1880/85 and 1911/13", 
Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 124 (1968), 
pp.39-48.
37 Gross, "Industrialization in Austria", p.173.
38 In general, a firm had to pay more than 42 florins 
business tax for inclusion in the 1880 industrial survey. 
In the 1885 survey, the limit was lowered to 21 florins in 
Vienna and 10.5 florins anywhere else. Both surveys stress 
that the reported output figures are minimum values. 
Similarly, the value of output reported in the 1870 survey 
is largely that of "factory establishments" only, though 
some small-scale manufacturers had been included in the 
survey, too. See Handelsministerium, "Statistik der 
osterreichischen Industrie 1870, 1880, 1885", NIHV, vols. 
3, (1874) No.2, p.173; 28 (1884), pp. VIII-X, 94-97; 38
(1888/89), pp. VII-VIII, 106-109. Cf. Gross, 
"Industrialization", p. 170.
Table A.6
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A COMPARISON OF OUTPUT LEVELS (MILLION CURRENT CROWNS)
(1) Contemporary Estimates (2) New Estimates
Sources: (1) Handelsministerium, "Statistik der osterrei-
chischen Industrie 1870, 1880, 1885", NIHV, vols. 3 (1874) 
No.2, p.145; 28 (1884), pp.94-97; 38 (1888/89), pp.106-
109). (2) Table A.13, column (1).
Estimated output is very close to the probable minimum 
level for 1870. The value of production is, clearly, not 
over-estimated and one may thus assume that no downward 
bias has been introduced into computed long run growth of 
output. For 1880 and 1885 the new estimates are well above 
the benchmarks. Though the divergence may to some extent be 
explained by cyclical variations in the actual input/output 
ratio, it seems more likely that the contemporary 
approximations are indeed reflecting only a part of total 
output in the industry39.
Due to changes in the input structure which are not allowed 
for in the estimates, output probably rose somewhat slower 
during the 1870's and 1880's than implied in the new 
figures. Mosser points out that, at the time, wood was
39 This holds especially for 1880. An inexplicably high 
input/output ratio of 3.50 would result from dividing the
machine-building inputs derived here by the contemporary 
output estimate of 59.83 million crowns. This ratio is far 
above the maximum observed for 1889 to 1911 (see Table 
A.4). In any case, assuming the difference between the 
output estimates were to originate from an over-estimation 
of input (and thus output) levels for 1880 and 1885, the 
argument put forward in this thesis, namely that the rate 
of expansion during this period was considerably slower
than assumed so far, would be strengthened further. For the 
survey data imply a fall in nominal output between 1870 and 
1885.
1870
1880
1885
89.78
59.83
86.09
92.38
91.28
107.98
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still an important input of the machine-building 
industry40. He emphasizes that failure to account for this 
- as implied in a constant ratio of iron and steel inputs 
to value of output - must necessarily lead to an over­
estimation of output growth. For the volume of material 
inputs in the early years is under-estimated relative to 
the volume of inputs in later years when wood had 
eventually been substituted by iron and steel. 
Unfortunately, no sufficiently detailed and continuous 
records on the machine-building industry's material inputs 
are available. But data on Austro-Hungarian foreign trade 
indicate that wood was indeed a significant input material 
at the time. In 1870, for example, machines and equipment 
largely made of wood accounted for more than 17 per cent of 
Austro-Hungarian machinery exports in terms of both weight 
and value. Ten years later, more than 9 per cent of exports 
still consisted of wooden machinery41. The respective 
shares were substantially higher for imports and exports of 
agricultural machines42. Thus a gradually rising
40 Mosser, A., Die Industrieaktiengesellschaft in Oster- 
reich: Versuch einer historischen Bilanz- und Betriebs- 
analyse (Vienna, 1980), p.173.
41 Machinery made of wood in percent of Austro-Hungarian 
foreign trade in machinery:
imports exports
1870
weight
5.7
value
4.7
weight
17.9
value
17.4
1875 8.9 9.5 3.7 3.7
1880 8.8 8.4 9.1 10.4
1885 6.6 4.6 7.3 5.0
See K.k. Statistische Central-Commission, Ausweise fiber den 
auswartigen Handel Osterreichs 1870, pp. 56-57, 98-99;
1875, pp. 58-59, 100-101; 1880, II, pp. 64-67, III, pp.42- 
43 (Vienna, 1873-1881) and "Statistik des auswartigen 
Handels 1885”, OStat, vol.14 (1886/87), II, pp. 48-51; III, 
pp.30-31.
42 Agricultural machinery made of wood in percent of total 
Austro-Hungarian imports and exports of agricultural 
implements:
imports exports
weight value weight value
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input/output ratio for the 1870s and early 1880s -
accounting for shifts in the composition of inputs towards 
a larger share of iron and steel - would probably allow for 
a more accurate approximation of output than the constant 
ratio used here. For the later decades, however, this 
argument cannot hold. According to the foreign trade 
statistics, wood had probably lost its significance as an 
engineering material by 1890. One would, therefore, rather 
expect a longer run decline of the input/output ratio as a 
result of technological progress. Hoffmann has shown that 
in the capital goods industries, in particular, the metal 
weight per unit of output of machines declined during the 
late nineteenth century43. But here, it seems, the ratio of 
material inputs to the value of output remained more or 
less constant or even rose somewhat in the longer term. To 
some extent, the volume of iron and steel inputs associated 
with mechanical engineering is probably still over­
estimated. At least some of the growth in iron and steel 
consumption of other expanding industries like 
construction, ship-building and armaments has been 
attributed to machine-building. For apart from rails, 
railway related materials and a minimum portion of iron and 
steel used in metal-working, no further allowances for iron 
and steel use in other branches of industry have been made 
due to a lack of data44. It seems indeed implausible that - 
throughout the late nineteenth century - Austrian
1880 36.5 40.8 29.9 34.9
1885 52.6 47.2 22.7 18.1
See Statistische Central-Commission, Ausweise tiber den 
auswartigen Handel 1880, II, pp.64-67; III, pp. 42-43 and 
"Statistik des auswartigen Handels 1885”, OStat, vol.14 
(1886/87), II, pp. 48-51; III, pp.30-31.
43 Hoffmann, Wachstum, p.64.
44 Cf. Sandgruber, R., Die Anfange der Konsumgesellschaft: 
Kosumgilterverbrauch, Lebensstandard und Alltagskultur in 
Osterreich im 18, und 19, Jahrhundert (Munich, 1982) p. 
103, who points to the importance of iron and steel inputs 
in construction and metal-working with reference to 
Rudolph's engineering consumption series.
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engineering should have made no progress with respect to 
production techniques or inventory management and that - in 
contrast to the experience in other countries - there was 
an increase rather than decrease in the average metal 
weight per value unit of machinery output. With an upwardly 
biased input series, however, productivity improvements are 
not necessarily expressed in terms of an absolute fall in 
the input/output ratio, but in a constant ratio.
Table A.7
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AUSTRIAN IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION
(1000 TONS)
cast iron steel wrought
1913 273.43 1,781.36 59.07
1912 286.66 1,888.75 64.46
1911 266.25 1,600.87 75.79
1910 264.16 1,504.32 79.63
1909 250.54 1,325.90 79.37
1908 199.19 1,392.89 120.63
1907 191.25 1,249.60 117.98
1906 177.82 1,143.45 114.22
1905 172.58 1,041.49 109.98
1904 168.31 913.84 102.46
1903 162.20 833.59 108.48
1902 160.28 837.72 115.31
1901 145.36 787.75 150.79
1900 121.07 808.82 158.51
1899 124.03 784.39 175.80
1898 120.07 722.69 174.50
1897 125.26 626.25 162.20
1896 123.78 582.71 161.30
1895 117.96 497.64 146.70
1894 122.31 453.48 142.00
1893 108.28 380.45 126.20
1892 100.74 352.29 131.60
1891 99.16 334.07 131.30
1890 91.56 342.88 130.38
1889 61.50 308.99 135.40
1888 69.30 292.19 145.70
1887 66.26 233.94 131.40
1886 57.42 202.92 129.00
1885 60.31 206.13 143.50
1884 63.19 197.85 151.80
1883 47.65 233.48 196.50
1882 43.31 198.68 208.45
1881 41.80 150.01 196.40
1880 33.98 113.34 186.60
1879 29.89 99.55 139.50
1878 29.45 108.92 178.60
1877 34.36 91.97 174.90
1876 40.17 90.77 198.80
1875 41.19 84.50 211.90
1874 41.49 77.86 222.40
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cont. Table A.7
cast iron steel wrought iron
1873 50.45 71.22 230.70
1872 61.95 66.03 293.80
1871 41.20 40.84 245.20
1870 37.26 25.36 203.00
Sources: (1) cast iron: annual issues of k.k. Statistische 
Central-Commission, Statistisches Jahrbuch der 
osterreichischen Monarchie (Vienna, 1870-1882), and 
Osterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch fur die im 
Reichsrathe vertretenen Konigreiche und Lander (Vienna, 
1883-1915). (2) steel and wrought iron (1900-1913):
Kupelwieser, F., "Die Erzeugung von Flusseisen und Stahl im 
XIX. Jahrhundert in Oesterreich-Ungarn", Osterreichische 
Zeitschrift fur Berg- und Hiittenwesen (hereafter OZBH) XLIX 
(1900), pp.656-657. Schuster, F. , "Die Stahlproduktion 
Osterreich-Ungarns", OZBH LVII (1910), pp.378-379. OZBH LIX 
(1911), p.227, LX (1912), p.292; LXI (1913), p.196; LXII 
(1914),p.95. (3) wrought iron (1870-1899): estimates based 
on data given in Beck, L., Die Geschichte des Eisens in 
technischer und kulturgeschichtlicher Beziehung, 5. 
Abteilung: Das XIX. Jahrhundert (Braunschweig, 1903),
pp.1143-1144, 1376.
Table A.8
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AUSTRIAN NET IMPORTS OF CAST IRON AND BAR IRON
(1000 TONS)
cast iron bar iron
1913 134.90 -52.00
1912 172.96 -10.79
1911 47.72 “50.80
1910 78.21 -47.40
1909 98.98 “9.80
1908 141.49 26.91
1907 127.60 -34.46
1906 60.98 -41.70
1905 43.07 -18.38
1904 21.54 -22.46
1903 33.70 -20.40
1902 27.32 -21.10
1901 56.70 -10.71
1900 65.15 -19.59
1899 99.34 -18.08
1898 121.01 0.47
1897 124.89 -6.24
1896 98.33 1.82
1895 97.23 -1.15
1894 73.39 -0.86
1893 48.39 -5.40
1892 35.31 -5.01
1891 33.51 -2.14
1890 45.24 -10.32
1889 72.53 -11.72
1888 55.54 -8.64
1887 37.45 -10.41
1886 42.89 -9.83
1885 37.35 -8.27
1884 71.68 -7.32
1883 105.35 -7.39
1882 84.40 -10.91
1881 63.40 -13.28
1880 39.28 -11.99
1879 36.71 -10.58
1878 31.77 -9.79
1877 30.36 -9.86
1876 29.53 -8.22
1875 43.68 -5.73
1874 38.13 -3.43
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cast iron bar iron
1873 147.51 13.65
1872 182.19 29.85
1871 161.26 23.74
1870 134.36 13.06
Sources: (a) k.k. Statistische Central-Commission, Ausweise 
iiber den auswartigen Handel Osterreichs (Vienna, 1871- 
1882), 1870, pp.28, 86; 1871, pp.28, 86; 1872, pp.28, 86; 
1873, pp.30, 88; 1874, pp.LXVIII-LXIX, 30, 88; 1875, pp.30, 
88; 1876, pp.30, 88; 1877, pp.30, 88; 1878, II, p.40, III, 
p.30; 1879, II, pp.56-58, III, p.38; 1880, II, pp.56-58, 
III, p.38; 1881, II, pp.56-58, III, p.38.
(b) Statistische Central-Commission, "Statistik des 
auswartigen Handels", OStat, vol. 4 (1883/84), II, p.186, 
III, p. 62; vol. 7 (1884), II, p.42, III, p. 27; vol. 10
(1885/86), II, p.42, III, p.26; vol. 14 (1886/87), II,
p.42, III, p.26; vol. 17 (1887/88), II, p.42, III, p.26;
vol. 20 (1888/89), II, p.32c, III, p.24c; vol. 23
(1889/90), II, pp.56, 58, III, p. 34; vol. 26 (1890/91), II,
p.58, III, p.34; vol. 29 (1891/92), II, p.58, III, p.34.
(c) k.k. Handelsministerium, Statistisches Departement, 
Statistik des auswartigen Handels des osterreichisch- 
ungarischen Zollgebiets (Vienna, 1893-1916), 1896 (II), 
pp.498-499, 527; 1901 (12), pp.22, 51-52; 1905 (12), pp.22, 
51-52; 1911 (IV), pp.152-153, 209-210; 1915 (IV), pp.71-72, 
130.
(d) k.k. Handelsministerium, Statistische Materialien iiber 
den osterreichisch-ungarischen AuBenhandel nebst Vergleich 
der Zollsatze seit 1878, Tarifklasse XXXVIII: Eisen und 
Eisenwaren (Vienna, 1912), pp.3, 16.
(e) Handelsministerium, Statistik des Zwischenverkehrs 
1906, p.53; 1908, pp.100-101; 1910, pp.100-101; 1912,
pp.100-101.
(f) Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, "Kiilkereskedelmi 
Forgalma", pp.270, 272.
(g) For sources on iron and steel production data used to 
approximate internal trade for 1870 to 1882 (bar iron) and 
1870 to 1905 and 1913 (cast iron) see Tables A.7 and A.16.
Table A.9
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AUSTRIAN NET IMPORTS OF SHEET METAL AND INGOTS
(1000 TONS)
sheet metal and plate smelted iron and ingots
1913 -34.50 27.98
1912 -19.72 14.21
1911 -11.40 6.61
1910 -6.10 6.05
1909 12.80 3.15
1908 9.95 46.09
1907 -4.79 18.96
1906 -7.62 8.54
1905 -1.62 2.23
1904 10.32 -3.60
1903 8.18 -3.99
1902 5.81 0.94
1901 6.57 1.35
1900 12.60 -10.35
1899 3.59 -4.94
1898 5.93 6.56
1897 2.32 3.89
1896 2.62 8.88
1895 3.89 1.76
1894 7.24 1.90
1893 6.05 0.57
1892 4.49 1.72
1891 3.27 2.94
1890 1.13 0.95
1889 0.51 1.56
1888 -3.76 1.25
1887 -4.37 2.30
1886 -5.57 1.89
1885 -5.96 0.40
1884 -5.66 2.10
1883 -8.81 3.18
1882 -5.12 3.45
1881 -4.51 0.25
1880 -5.14 -0.82
1879 -4.92 -0.26
1878 -4.71 -2.84
1877 -4.40 -2.53
1876 -4.16 -2.19
1875 -3.94 -2.57
1874 -3.63 -2.96
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sheet metal and plate smelted iron and ingots
1873 0.93 -1.92
1872 1.69 -1.80
1871 2.60 -1.75
1870 1.03 -1.98
Sources: (a) Statistische Central-Commission, Ausweise iiber 
den auswartigen Handel 1870, pp.28, 86; 1871, pp.28, 86; 
1872, pp.28, 86; 1873, pp.30, 88; 1874, pp.LXVIII-LXIX, 30, 
88; 1875, pp.30, 88; 1876, pp.30, 88; 1877, pp.30, 88;
1878, II, p.40, III, p.30; 1879, II, pp.56, 58, III, p.38;
1880, II, pp.56, 58, III, p.38; 1881, II, pp.56, 58, III,
p.38.
(b) Statistische Central-Commission, "Statistik des 
auswartigen Handels", OStat, vol. 4 (1883/84), II, pp.40, 
120, 186, III, pp.20, 62; vol. 7 (1884), II, p.42, III,
p.27; vol. 10 (1885/86), II, p.42, III, p.26; vol. 14
(1886/87), II, p.42, III, p.26; vol. 17 (1887/88), II,
p.42, III, p.26; vol. 20 (1888/89), II, p.32c, III, p.24c; 
vol. 23 (1889/90), II, p.58, III, pp.34, 36; vol. 26
(1890/91), II, pp.58, 60, III, pp.34, 36; vol. 29
(1891/92), II, pp.58, 60, III, pp.34, 36.
(c) Handelsministerium, Statistik des auswartigen Handels 
1896 (II), pp.498-499, 528; 1901 (12), pp.22-23, 52; 1905 
(12), pp.22-23, 52; 1911 (IV), pp.152-153, 210-211; 1915
(IV), pp.71-72, 130-131.
(d) Handelsministerium, Statistische Materialien Eisen, 
pp.10-15, 22.
(e) Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, "Kulkereskedelmi 
Forgalma", p.274.
(f) See sources given in Table A.8 for bar iron import data 
used for approximating Austria's share in the Monarchy's 
net imports of smelted iron and ingots.
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Table A.10
AUSTRIAN PRODUCTION OF RAILS AND RAILWAY MATERIALS
(1000 TONS)
rails railway mater
1913 114.23 23.78
1912 103.77 21.60
1911 113.77 23.66
1910 93.46 19.46
1909 113.95 23.72
1908 149.20 31.06
1907 108.83 22.66
1906 85.68 17.84
1905 87.13 18.14
1904 81.11 16.89
1903 94.24 19.62
1902 87.78 18.28
1901 85.36 17.77
1900 83.07 17.30
1899 98.14 20.43
1898 116.39 24.23
1897 91.28 19.00
1896 82.96 17.27
1895 75.36 15.69
1894 64.41 13.41
1893 64.60 13.45
1892 48.89 10.18
1891 66.98 13.95
1890 84.97 17.69
1889 87.23 18.16
1888 100.51 20.93
1887 119.64 24.91
1886 113.67 23.67
1885 83.13 17.31
1884 119.75 24.93
1883 165.00 34.35
1882 121.03 25.20
1881 79.87 16.63
1880 61.03 12.71
1879 28.70 5.98
1878 29.87 6.23
1877 55.44 11.54
1876 64.72 13.47
1875 81.77 17.02
1874 82.76 17.23
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rails railway materials
1873 79.37 16.52
1872 125.91 26.21
1871 128.62 26.78
1870 105.27 21.92
Sources: (1) rails: (a) production 1870, 1880, 1885:
Handelsministerium, "Statistik der osterreichischen 
Industrie 1870, 1880, 1885”, NIHV, vols. 3 (1874) No.l,
pp.35-38; 28 (1884), pp.76-77; 38 (1888/89), pp.88-89. (b) 
production 1883: Stahl und Eisen 4 (1884) No.l, p. 64
(quoted in Rudolph, Banking and Industrialization, p.223);
(c) production 1890-1913: Stahl und Eisen 32 (1912) No.38, 
p.1587; 34 (1914) No.9, p.383. (d) rail imports:
Statistische Central-Commission, Ausweise iiber den 
auswartigen Handel 1870, pp.28, 86; 1871, pp.28, 86, 1872, 
28, 86; 1873, pp.30, 88; 1874, pp.LXVIII-LXIX, 30, 88;
1875, pp.30, 88; 1876, pp.30, 88; 1877, pp.30, 88; 1878, 
II, p.40, III, p.30; 1879, II, p.56, III, p.38; 1880, II, 
p.56, III, p.38; 1881, II, p.56, III, p.38; and "Statistik 
des auswartigen Handels", OStat, vol. 4 (1883/84), II,
pp.40, 120, 186, III, p.62; vol. 7 (1884), II, p.42, III, 
p.27; vol. 10 (1885/86), II, p.42, III, p.26; vol. 14
(1886/87), II, p.42, III, p.26; vol. 17 (1887/88), II,
p.42, III, p.26; vol. 20 (1888/89), II, p.32c, III, p.24c; 
vol. 23 (1889/90), II, p.58, III, p.34; vol. 26 (1890/91), 
II, p.58, III, p.34; vol. 29 (1891/92), II, p.58, III,
p. 34.
(e) new track opened: Statistische Central-Commission,
Statistisches Jahrbuch 1873, IV, pp.4-5, 13; 1874, IV,
pp.2-3, 8-9; and Statistisches Handbuch im 1882, p.192;
1914, p.191. Magyar Kir. Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, 
Magyar Statisztikai fivkonyv 1912, p.245.
(2) railway materials: Handelsministerium, "Statistik der 
osterreichischen Industrie 1890", NIHV, vol.54 (1894),
pp.98-99, and the data for rail production given in this 
table.
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Table A.11
AUSTRIAN CONSUMPTION OF IRON AND STEEL
(1000 TONS)
(1) in metal-working (2) in machine-building
1913 527.63 1,524.60
1912 583.91 1,687.20
1911 462.20 1,335.60
1910 454.03 1,311.90
1909 417.35 1,206.00
1908 451.69 1,305.20
1907 397.02 1,147.20
1906 347.64 1,004.50
1905 319.86 924.23
1904 280.85 811.53
1903 259.13 748.77
1902 262.30 757.92
1901 266.02 768.66
1900 266.32 769.53
1899 268.81 776.74
1898 259.83 750.78
1897 238.66 689.62
1896 226.04 653.16
1895 198.73 574.25
1894 185.53 536.11
1893 150.79 435.70
1892 144.51 417.56
1891 134.00 387.19
1890 128.33 370.83
1889 119.13 344.24
1888 110.59 319.55
1887 80.22 231.80
1886 72.34 209.02
1885 85.62 247.40
1884 84.58 244.39
1883 95.28 275.32
1882 96.68 279.36
1881 86.79 250.78
1880 72.38 209.14
1879 65.61 189.60
1878 75.93 219.39
1877 63.71 184.10
1876 68.52 197.99
1875 69.48 200.76
1874 69.38 200.49
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(1) in metal-working (2) in machine-building
1873
1872
1871
1870
107.12
123.82
91.96
73.25
309.53
357.77
265.73
211.65
Sources: (1) metal-working: Handelsministerium, "Statistik 
der osterreichischen Industrie 1890", NIHV, vol.54 (1894), 
pp.98-99, and Tables A.7 to A.10. (2) machine-building:
Tables A.7 to A.11, column (1).
Table A.12a
GROSS PRODUCTION: BOILER-MAKING AND 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
MACHINE-SHOPS
1911 122,702.3 1903 70,864.0
1910 114,141.7 1902 69,838.9
1909 108,468.6 1901 60,488.0
1908 108,755.4 1900 59,973.1
1907 94,099.4 1899 41,941.1
1906 86,590.9 1898 38,554.9
1905 80,296.6 1897 34,047.4
1904 74,676.0
Sources: (1) wage-sum data: Ministerium des Innern,
Unfallstatistlk 1897-1901, 1902-1906, 1907-1911, Gruppe
Via, Titel 166, 170, 170a, 170a & 170, 170a & 147, 170a & 
205 & 210, 176 and 177. (2) wage-sum/production ratio: 
Table A.3. Ratio used here: 17.5 per cent.
Table A.12b
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GROSS PRODUCTION: LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERING AND 
GENERAL MACHINE-BUILDING 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
1911 264,260.5 1903 173,007.8
1910 255,341.5 1902 175,404.9
1909 286,441.5 1901 211,721.5
1908 294,290.2 1900 213,218.0
1907 272,166.3 1899 208,889.3
1906 231,624.4 1898 190,761.5
1905 194,922.0 1897 171,286.8
1904 178,004.4
Sources: (1) wage-sum data: Ministerium des Innern,
Unfallstatistik 1897-1901, 1902-1906, 1907-1911,
Gruppe Via, Titel 174, 175, 175 & 170a, 175 & 170 & 170a,
175 & 170a & 190 & 170 and 183 . (2) wage-sum/production
ratio: Table A.3. Ratio used here: 20.5 per cent.
Table A.12c
GROSS PRODUCTION: AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
1911 62,271.6 1903 32,629.2
1910 58,788.4 1902 28,922.0
1909 51,489.2 1901 25,187.6
1908 48,463.2 1900 26,852.0
1907 45,905.2 1899 26,139.6
1906 41,500.0 1898 23,214.0
1905 35,956.4 1897 20,085.2
1904 35,369.2
Sources: (1) wage-sum data: Ministerium des Innern,
Unfallstatistik 1897-1901, 1902-1906, 1907-•1911, Gruppe
Via, Titel 173. (2) wage'-sum/production ratio: Table A.3.
Ratio used here : 25 per cent.
Table A.12d
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GROSS PRODUCTION: SEWING- 
(1000 CURRENT
AND KNITTING 
CROWNS)
MACHINES
1911 7,671.6 1903 5,265.7
1910 7,277 .5 1902 4,763.9
1909 5,909.5 1901 4,755.0
1908 6,763.0 1900 3,784.9
1907 6,126.6 1899 5,716.9
1906 6,057.1 1898 6,200.0
1905 5,320.4 1897 6,050.3
1904 6,059.8
Sources: (1) wage-sum data: Ministerium des Innern,
Unfallstatistik 1897-1901, 1902-1906, 1907-1911
Gruppe Via, Titel 180. (2) wage-sum/production ratio: Table
A.3. Ratio used here: 33.8 per cent.
Table A.12e
GROSS PRODUCTION: OTHER MACHINE-BUILDING 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
1911 47,289.2 1899 25,236.9
1910 42,812.8 1898 23,643.9
1909 39,404.8 1897 20,789.3
1908 37,764.0 1896 236,152.1
1907 34,478.4 1895 225,152.1
1906 29,729.5 1894 221,187.5
1905 27,522.0 1893 201,748.7
1904 26,829.9 1892 186,831.1
1903 25,779.8 1891 176,224.1
1902 25,404.6 1890 159,580.9
1901 26,110.1 1889 142,949.5
1900 25,843.6
Note: The figures given for 1889 to 1896 represent the
total of Austrian machine-building production
Sources: (1) wage-sum data: Ministerium des Innern,
Unfallstatistik 1889, Gruppe IVa, pp.36-37; 1890, Gruppe 
Via, pp.66-67; 1893, Gruppe Via, pp.80-81; 1896, Gruppe
Via, pp.94-95; 1897-1901, 1902-1906, 1907-1911, Gruppe Via, 
Titel 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 178, 179, 181, 182 and 184.
(2) wage-sum/production ratios: Table A. 3. Ratios used
here: 22.1 per cent (1897-1911); 17.6 per cent for Titel 
181 only (1897-1911); 20.89 per cent for total (1889-1896).
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Table A.13
GROSS OUTPUT OF AUSTRIAN MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY
(1000 CROWNS)
(1) in current prices (2) in constant (1913) prices
1913 585 978.8 585 978.8
1912 648 489.9 656 921.6
1911 504 195.2 517 811.4
1910 478 361.9 496 150.9
1909 491 713.5 510 933.7
1908 496 035.9 506 489.0
1907 452 776.1 465 195.4
1906 395 501.9 421 915.0
1905 344 017.3 386 730.0
1904 320 939.2 363 715.7
1903 307 546.5 349 523.2
1902 304 334.2 346 871.8
1901 328 262.3 363 375.2
1900 329 671.7 349 779.8
1899 307 923.8 335 797.2
1898 282 374.1 318 385.3
1897 252 259.1 286 979.9
1896 236 152.1 271 775.6
1895 225 152.1 266 916.4
1894 221 187.5 258 543.7
1893 201 748.7 237 080.8
1892 186 831.1 221 675.2
1891 176 224.1 203 314.9
1890 159 580.9 183 736.2
1889 142 949.5 168 954.8
1888 139 468.4 167 130.1
1887 101 168.0 122 508.0
1886 91 225.6 111 352.8
1885 107 979.4 129 542.2
1884 106 663.3 125 711.2
1883 120 165.8 137 018.9
1882 121 925.2 139 742.8
1881 109 453.4 128 530.9
1880 91 278.1 106 561.3
1879 82 749.5 94 559.0
1878 95 752.8 109 173.5
1877 80 350.7 88 416.8
1876 86 411.9 95 220.3
1875 87 623.1 91/ 220.6
1874 87 504.4 86, 288.9
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(1) in current prices (2) in constant (1913) prices
1873
1872
1871
1870
135.094.4 
156,150.6
115.979.5 
92,377.0
123,126.0
139,957.7
108,243.3
88,594.8
Sources: Estimates based on Tables A.7 to A.12e. See Table 
A.14 for price index used.
Table A.14
INPUT PRICE INDEX (1913=100)
1913 100.00 1891 86.68
1912 98.72 1890 86.85
1911 97.37 1889 84.61
1910 96.41 1888 83.45
1909 96.24 1887 82.58
1908 97.94 1886 81.92
1907 97.33 1885 83.35
1906 93.74 1884 84.85
1905 88.96 1883 87.70
1904 88.24 1882 87.25
1903 87.99 1881 85.16
1902 87.74 1880 85.66
1901 90.34 1879 87.51
1900 94.25 1878 87.71
1899 91.70 1877 90.88
1898 88.69 1876 90.75
1897 87.90 1875 96.06
1896 86.89 1874 101.41
1895 84.35 1873 109.72
1894 85.55 1872 111.57
1893 85.10 1871 107.15
1892 84.28 1870 104.27
Sources: (1) prices of Austrian cast iron, bar iron and
imported cast iron: Appendix C, Tables C.l and C.3. (2)
prices of Hungarian cast iron: Kozponti Statisztikai
Hivatal, Magyar Statisztikai fivkonyv 1879, IV, p.26; 1889, 
IV, p.26; 1893, pp.120-121: 1895, p.151; 1897, p.131; 1898, 
p.97; 1903, p.145; 1911, p.153; 1913, p.117. (3) coal
prices: Statistische Central-Commission, Statistisches
Jahrbuch 1870, pp.68-69; 1871, pp.72-73; 1872, II, pp.38- 
39; 1873, II, pp.38-39; 1874, II, pp.38-39; 1875, II,
pp.34-35; 1876, II, pp.34-35; 1877, II, pp.34-35; 1878, II, 
pp.34-35; and Statistisches Handbuch 1885, pp.120-121; 
1895, pp.152-153; 1900, p.162; 1904, p.150; 1909, p.221; 
1913, p.110. (4) wages: see sources given in Tables A.12a
to A.12e. (5) weights: Table A.5.
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II. Hungarian Machine-Building Production
1. Contemporary Output Data
As a consequence of lacking data, the estimation of output 
in Hungary's machine-building industry had to rely on a 
considerably thinner statistical basis than that for 
Austrian production. Though fairly comprehensive spot 
estimates of output are available for 1898 and 1906, wage­
bill data - which could be used for further approximations 
of output - do exist only for 1909 to 1912. A summary is 
given below (Table A.15).
2. The New Output Estimate
a. Iron and Steel Inputs
Starting point for the estimation of output was, again, a 
series of iron and steel inputs based on ten subseries. 
These were derived as a means to obtain the consumption of 
iron and steel in Hungarian machine-building as a residual 
(Table A.20, column (2)).
Data for Hungarian cast iron and steel production are 
available from contemporary sources for the whole period 
discussed here. No estimates or adjustments were necessary. 
As for Austria, production of wrought iron had to be 
estimated for most years between 1870 and 1899. An estimate 
was prepared in identical fashion, using the shares of 
steel in total Hungarian wrought iron and steel production 
in those years for which data are available as a means to 
derive wrought iron output (see Table A.l). Hungarian iron 
and steel production is reproduced in Table A.16.
Hungarian net imports of iron and steel have been computed 
in exact correspondence to the respective trade flows for 
Austria, using the same sources and methods (Table A.17 to 
A.18).
243
Hungary's output of rails had to be estimated for 1870 to 
1889 as rail production figures are available only for 1890 
to 1913. The iron works of the Austro-Hungarian State 
Railway Company in Anina and Resicza introduced the 
production of iron rails in Hungary in 1866. Manufacturing 
of steel rails began during the early 1870s45. At the iron 
and steel works in Diosgy6r, explicitly set up by the 
government to cater for railway needs, rail production 
commenced in 187146. In brief, Hungarian production of 
rails was in its initial stages at the time and output 
seems likely to have been low relative to Austrian levels. 
For 1870 to 1889, Hungarian output of rails was estimated 
as a function of iron and steel consumption. In 1890, the 
volume of rail production accounted for 26 per cent of 
Hungary's consumption of iron and steel (exclusive of net 
imports of sheet metal). This share was used to compute 
estimates of rail production for the earlier years47. Rail 
production is given in Table A.19.
In a further step to isolate machine-building iron and 
steel inputs, both the production of railway related
45 Matlekovits, A. v., Das Konigreich Ungarn, vol. II 
(Leipzig, 1900), pp.178-197.
46 The Diosgy6r works introduced the Siemens-Martin process 
in 1878/79 and phased out the production of iron rails. By 
1882, almost all rails were made of steel; Matlekovits, 
Konigreich Ungarn, pp.179-181, 330-331. As the very low
production levels for 1880, 1881 and 1882 indicate, the
transformation of the plant took time and effected output.
47 Though based on the simplifying assumption of a constant 
ratio, the results obtained look plausible. In the early 
1890s, the Diosgy6r plant's output of rails accounted on 
average for approximately 60 percent of Hungary's total 
output of rails. However, the share fluctuated from year to 
year between 35 and 90 percent. (It is because of this 
volatility that the output data for Diosgy6r - available 
from 1880 - have not been put to use in the approximation 
of total rail output.) Comparisons with estimated rail 
output for 1883 to 1889 indicate an average share of 59 
percent of Diosgy6r in total rail output with variations 
between 39 and 73 percent. See Matlekovits, Konigreich 
Ungarn, vol. II, pp.180-181, and Table A.18.
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materials and the use of iron and steel in other metal­
working industries had to be estimated. It was assumed that 
output of railway materials grew in proportion to Hungarian 
rail production. The use of iron and steel in metal-working 
was approximated as a constant share of overall iron and 
steel consumption (net of rails and railway materials). The 
two calculations had to be based on Austrian 1890 ratios 
since, again, no adequate Hungarian figures are available 
(Tables A. 19 and A.20, column (l))48.
Subtracting the volume of rails and railway materials and 
the iron and steel used in metal-working from the 
previously derived series for production and imports of 
iron and steel (Tables A. 16 to A.18) yielded a residual 
volume series of iron and steel used in Hungarian machine- 
building (Table A.20, column(2)). This was taken to roughly 
represent material inputs in Hungarian machine-building.
b. The Approximation of Gross Production
The very small number of observations for the value of 
Hungarian engineering production does not permit the 
compilation of a meaningful series of input/output ratios. 
The Austrian input/output ratios were, therefore, used as 
a proxy to estimate Hungary's machine-building output for 
1870 to 190849. For 1909 to 1912, production was estimated 
on the basis of wage-sum data given in the Hungarian 
workers' accident insurance statistics (see Table A.15). 
The output figures so derived allowed the computation of an 
average 1909-1912 input/output ratio which was then used to
48 Cf. this Appendix, notes 19 and 20.
49 As in the estimate for Austria, the average 1889 to 1894 
ratio was used to approximate output for the 1870s and 
1880s. For 1890 to 1908, a three-year moving average of the 
Austrian ratio was used (rather than the unmodified ratio) 
to reduce at least part of the impact of cyclical and 
random fluctuations on the estimate for Hungarian machine- 
building.
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approximate the value of machinery production for 1913. In 
this way, we obtained a complete series of gross output in 
Hungarian mechanical engineering for 1870 to 1913 (Table 
A.21, column (1)). Finally, output in constant (1913) 
prices was computed, using the input price index given in 
Table A.14 (Table A.21, column (2)).
c. An Evaluation of the New Output Estimate
As a result of both lacking output figures and incomplete 
information on inputs, the estimates for Hungarian machine- 
building rely heavily on Austrian data. Possibly 
significant differences in the output development of the 
two countries' engineering sectors are thus not fully taken 
into account. Alternative output estimates for the early 
years, which would permit an evaluation of the new 
estimates' accuracy, do not exist. However, a comparison is 
possible with the contemporary accounts of production for 
1898 and 1906.
Though in the right order of magnitude, estimated output 
levels (98.14 and 132.12 million crowns, respectively) seem 
somewhat off the mark when compared with the contemporary 
approximations of production in mechanical engineering (see 
Tables A.15 and A.21, column (1)). Possible errors in the 
input series and short run fluctuations in the actual 
(Hungarian) input/output ratio may account for part of the 
divergence. But to a large extent, the difference can be 
explained with the techniques of data gathering and 
processing employed in the industrial surveys of 1898 and 
1906. In 1898, only establishments employing more than 20 
people were surveyed50. Eight years later, an even more 
restrictive definition of factory establishment was used51.
50 Kereskedelmugyi Miniszter, ”Gep-gyartas 1898”, pp.4-5.
51 Though no further details about the criteria applied are 
provided, some smaller establishments included in the 1898 
survey were omitted from the 1906 survey as a result of a 
more narrow definition; Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal,
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Thus, a presumably significant number of smaller producers 
were not included in the surveys and, as a result, their 
output was not recorded. The activity of railway repair 
shops - which employed about one-third of the total 
workforce in engineering - was considered, too. As the 
surveys emphasize, many of these did not only carry out
repair work but were engaged in the production of
completely new machinery52. Their output, though, is not
included in the total for mechanical engineering but
recorded separately (see Table A.15). Both factors - the 
restricted scope of the two surveys and the exclusion of 
machinery production in railway repair shops - suggest a 
downward bias in the contemporary output estimates. Viewed 
in this light, the new output estimates presented here seem 
quite plausible.
Gyaripar 1906, p.546.
52 Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Gyaripar 1906, p.546.
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Table A.15
GROSS PRODUCTION: HUNGARIAN MACHINE-BUILDING 
(MILLION CURRENT CROWNS)
1912
1911
179.76
159.60
1910
1909
170.53
167.93
1906 89.00* 
3 6 . 3 5b
1898 61.67* 
29. 63b
125.35 91.30
mechanical engineering exclusive of ship-building, arms 
production and manufacturing of transport means 
railway repair shops
Sources: (1) 1898: Kereskedelmiigyi Magyar Kir. Miniszter,
"Gep-gydrt&s es Kozlekedesi Eszkozok Gyartasa", A Magyar 
Korona Orszagainal Gykripara az 1898. £vben, V. part, ed. 
J. Sztereny (Budapest, 1901), pp.93-96. (2) 1906: Magyar
Kir. Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, A Magyar Korona 
Orszagainak Gyaripara az 1906. £vben, II. vol, II. part, 
ed. A. Edvi lies (Budapest, 1911), pp.716-717. (3) 1909-
1912: (a) wage-sum data: Magyar Kir. Allami Munkas-
biztositasi Hivatal, A magyar kiralyi allami 
munkasbiztositasi hivatalnak az 1907. evi XIX. torv&nyezikk 
177. §-a alapjcin a kereskedelmiigyi magyar kir&lyi minister 
el& terjesztett jelentes6 az orszkgos munkasbetegsegelyzo 
es baleset-biztoslto penztar miikodeserol 1909-1912 (Szeged, 
1912, 1914; Arad, 1913; Budapest, 1917), VIII., tetelszama 
199- 214, 219, 254-255. (b) wage-sum-production ratios:
Table A.3. Before conversion into gross output, the wage 
data of the various branches of machine-building were 
grouped in exactly the same way as the respective Austrian 
figures, see Tables A.12a to A.12e.
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Table A.16
HUNGARIAN IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION (1000 TONS)
cast iron steel wrought ir
1913 13.99 796.29 12.25
1912 11.18 780.75 12.56
1911 15.99 711.92 11.67
1910 14.64 635.95 17.72
1909 15.58 608.30 22.60
1908 17.41 592.08 45.28
1907 17.10 451.27 64.48
1906 17.16 434.69 71.01
1905 17.56 389.17 74.77
1904 17.20 319.52 81.73
1903 18.87 310.97 61.93
1902 18.57 312.53 81.47
1901 20.64 297.70 76.10
1900 22.74 346.12 80.54
1899 19.63 332.64 74.60
1898 20.78 331.55 80.10
1897 17.97 303.31 78.60
1896 17.12 294.69 81.60
1895 21.46 246.91 72.80
1894 17.84 206.95 64.80
1893 16.64 189.23 62.80
1892 14.48 158.86 59.40
1891 14.10 151.97 59.70
1890 14.00 156.72 59.60
1889 12.86 107.52 47.10
1888 10.02 100.62 50.20
1887 10.66 65.25 36.70
1886 9.17 57.05 36.30
1885 11.51 72.65 50.60
1884 13.08 61.07 46.90
1883 11.36 56.34 47.45
1882 14.85 41.09 43.15
1881 15.03 38.34 50.20
1880 11.11 20.88 34.40
1879 8.66 25.35 35.50
1878 10.37 20.50 33.60
1877 8.05 24.25 46.10
1876 10.33 24.01 52.60
1875 8.59 12.20 30.60
1874 10.20 9.30 26.60
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cont. Table A.16
cast iron steel wrought iron
1873 10.01 9.04 29.30
1872 10.28 7.09 31.50
1871 10.59 6.86 41.20
1870 11.82 3.63 29.00
Sources: (1) cast iron: Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal,
Magyar Statisztikai fivkonyv 1879, IV, p.26; 1889, IV, p.26; 
1893, pp.120-121,;1895, p.151; 1897, p.131; 1898, p.97;
1903, p.145; 1911; p.153; 1913, p.117. (2) steel and
wrought iron: see Table A.7.
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Table A.17
HUNGARIAN NET IMPORTS OF CAST IRON AND BAR IRON
(1000 TONS)
cast iron bar iron
1913 43.40 21.45
1912 64.26 47.01
1911 41.73 29.72
1910 36.01 16.25
1909 28.77 10.07
1908 53.62 26.23
1907 27.66 12.66
1906 5.17 -0.79
1905 2.34 -8.19
1904 2.56 -8.71
1903 2.56 -8.11
1902 2.48 -0.38
1901 6.11 -2.92
1900 1.07 -16.78
1899 3.19 -10.73
1898 4.84 3.02
1897 8.22 10.03
1896 12.84 13.91
1895 25.20 14.29
1894 25.93 12.66
1893 5.61 15.48
1892 5.16 8.64
1891 2.13 5.54
1890 3.06 5.83
1889 2.18 6.93
1888 0.71 5.95
1887 1.06 3.82
1886 3.09 6.51
1885 3.76 5.26
1884 10.27 7.32
1883 11.88 4.43
1882 6.64 7.31
1881 5.12 2.94
1880 3.33 2.87
1879 3.08 1.42
1878 2.63 3.19
1877 2.70 1.34
1876 2.68 1.65
1875 3.84 2.98
1874 3.36 3.25
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cont. Table A.17
cast iron
1873
1872
1871
1870
11.76
14.59
12.59 
10.44
bar iron
4.53
5.51
3.33
2.43
Sources: See Table A.8.
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Table A.18
HUNGARIAN NET IMPORTS OF SHEET METAL AND INGOTS
(1000 TONS)
sheet metal and plate smelted iron and ingots
1913 1.90 2.50
1912 14.61 1.21
1911 4.18 0.45
1910 -7.34 0.49
1909 -7.39 -0.15
1908 3.31 4.59
1907 6.15 1.95
1906 -5.76 0.65
1905 -8.33 0.19
1904 -12.41 -1.40
1903 -9.86 -1.18
1902 -5.60 -0.97
1901 -5.24 -0.21
1900 -10.49 -2.68
1899 -5.03 -1.30
1898 -0.50 -0.16
1897 2.00 -0.23
1896 4.76 0.24
1895 7.70 0.13
1894 3.88 0.36
1893 7.07 0.17
1892 2.03 0.02
1891 1.42 0.18
1890 0.94 0.09
1889 -0.03 0.21
1888 4.68 0.06
1887 3.58 -0.06
1886 3.62 0.02
1885 3.45 -0.09
1884 5.16 0.15
1883 6.31 0.23
1882 5.26 0.14
1881 3.77 -0.07
1880 2.95 -0.31
1879 2.44 -0.18
1878 3.13 -0.94
1877 2.07 -0.83
1876 2.00 -0.77
1875 2.31 -0.87
1874 2.25 -0.89
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cont. Table A.18
sheet metal and plate smelted iron and ingots
1873 5.63 -0.66
1872 6.39 -0.71
1871 5.37 -0.71
1870 3.29 -0.70
Sources: See Table A.9.
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Table A.19
HUNGARIAN PRODUCTION OF RAILS AND RAILWAY MATERIALS
(1000 TONS)
rails railway mate
1913 141.47 29.45
1912 114.64 23.89
1911 92.03 19.16
1910 62.38 12.99
1909 93.31 19.43
1908 110.67 23.04
1907 54.22 11.29
1906 51.41 10.70
1905 44.00 9.16
1904 29.27 6.09
1903 30.67 6.39
1902 32.90 6.85
1901 35.33 7.36
1900 50.37 10.49
1899 44.40 9.25
1898 75.39 15.70
1897 73.16 15.23
1896 86.89 18.09
1895 69.90 14.55
1894 45.62 9.50
1893 25.86 5.38
1892 28.96 6.03
1891 56.96 11.86
1890 62.88 13.09
1889 46.46 9.67
1888 44.03 9.17
1887 30.86 6.43
1886 29.47 6.14
1885 37.76 7.86
1884 36.47 7.59
1883 34.61 7.21
1882 29.74 6.19
1881 29.32 6.10
1880 18.99 3.95
1879 19.40 4.04
1878 18.23 3.79
1877 21.45 4.47
1876 23.78 4.95
1875 15.07 3.14
1874 13.62 2.84
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cont. Table A.19
rails railway materials
1873 16.81 3.50
1872 17.94 3.73
1871 19.41 4.04
1870 14.88 3.10
Sources: (1) rails: (a) 1870-1889: estimates based on
Hungarian iron and steel consumption (Tables A.16 to A.18). 
(b) 1890-1913: Stahl und Eisen 32 (1912) No.38, p.1587; 34 
(1914) No.9, p.383. (2) railway materials: estimates based 
on Austrian 1890 railway materials/rail production ratio 
(Table A.10) and the data for Hungarian rail production 
given in this table, column (1).
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Table A.20
HUNGARIAN CONSUMPTION OF IRON AND STEEL
(1000 TONS)
(1) in metal-working (2) in machine-building
1913 185.33 535.52
1912 203.90 589.17
1911 181.12 523.35
1910 164.12 474.23
1909 145.27 419.77
1908 156.52 452.28
1907 132.60 383.16
1906 118.27 341.75
1905 106.53 307.82
1904 93.36 269.77
1903 86.93 251.19
1902 94.70 273.65
1901 89.86 259.64
1900 92.47 267.19
1899 92.38 266.93
1898 89.61 258.93
1897 85.23 246.28
1896 82.32 237.86
1895 78.17 225.87
1894 71.29 206.00
1893 68.33 197.43
1892 54.92 158.68
1891 42.74 123.49
1890 42.23 122.04
1889 31.01 89.62
1888 30.60 88.43
1887 21.53 62.20
1886 20.61 59.55
1885 26.10 75.42
1884 25.68 74.20
1883 24.73 71.46
1882 21.21 61.29
1881 20.54 59.36
1880 13.44 38.84
1879 13.58 39.25
1878 12.97 37.49
1877 14.85 42.92
1876 16.39 47.37
1875 10.66 30.79
1874 9.67 27.95
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cont. Table A.20
(1) in metal-working (2) in machine-building
1873 12.67 36.62
1872 13.62 39.36
1871 14.34 41.44
1870 10.78 31.15
Sources: (1) metal-working: estimates based on Austrian
1890 share of metal-working in iron and steel consumption 
(net of rails and railway materials) and the data given in 
Tables A. 16 to A.19. (2) machine-building: Tables A.16 to
A.20, column (1).
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Table A.21
GROSS OUTPUT OF HUNGARIAN MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY
(1000 CROWNS)
(1) in current prices (2) in constant (1913) prices
1913 180 963.0 180 963.0
1912 179 755.0 182 092.2
1911 159 602.9 163 913.2
1910 170 529.2 176 870.5
1909 167 930.0 174 494.1
1908 178 122.9 181 876.5
1907 149 189.1 153 281.3
1906 132 115.0 140 938.2
1905 119 078.0 133 862.5
1904 105 792.7 119 893.3
1903 101 101.2 114 900.4
1902 112 973.2 128 763.8
1901 108 692.2 120 318.6
1900 111 356.0 118 148.1
1899 106 550.7 116 195.7
1898 98 141.2 110 657.1
1897 90 560.2 103 024.8
1896 88 642.5 102 014.2
1895 87 544.9 103 783.9
1894 86 628.9 101 259.6
1893 86 866.8 102 079.8
1892 72 219.4 85 688.3
1891 54 834.9 63 264.6
1890 52 836.4 60 834.2
1889 39 114.2 46 229.8
1888 38 596.7 46 251.8
1887 27 146.8 32 873.1
1886 25 989.1 31 723.2
1885 32 915.7 39 488.8
1884 32 385.8 38 169.3
1883 31 187.6 35 561.6
1882 26 751.0 30 660.3
1881 25 909.4 30 425.4
1880 16 951.3 19 789.6
1879 17 128.9 19 573.5
1878 16 361.3 18 654.5
1877 18 730.6 20 610.9
1876 20 675.2 22 782.7
1875 13 437.7 13 989.4
1874 12 196.8 12 027.3
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cont. Table A.21
(1) in current prices (2) in constant (1913) prices
15.983.6 14,567.5
17.177.1 15,395.8
18.085.6 16,879.2
13.596.2 13,039.5
1873
1872
1871
1870
Sources: (1) 1909-1912: Table A.15. (2) All other years:
estimates based on Tables A.16 to A.20. See Table A.14 for 
price index used.
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APPENDIX B
Balance-Sheets of Austro-Hungarian Machine-Building 
Companies, 1880 to 1913
1. Annual Statements of Eight Engineering Firms
The following tables present annual balance-sheet data of
six Austrian and two Hungarian machine-building firms for
1880 to 1912/13 (Sample I). The companies included are1:
1. Aktien-Gesellschaft der Lokomotivfabrik, vorm. G.Sigl 
in Wiener Neustadt, Vienna (1875);
2. Maschinen- und Waggonbau-Fabriks-Aktiengesellschaft in 
Simmering, vorm. H.D.Schmid, Vienna (1869);
3. Erste Brunner Maschinen-Fabriks-Gesellschaft, Brno 
(1872) ;
4. Maschinenbau-Actien-Gesellschaft, vorm. Breitfeld, 
DanSk & Co. (Akciov& spoleCnost strojirny dfive 
Breitfeld, DanSk i spol.), Prague (1872);
5. Prvni Cesko-moravska tov&rna na stroje v Praze (Erste 
bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik in Prag), Prague 
(1871);
6. Prager Maschinenbau-Actiengesellschaft, vorm. Ruston, 
Bromovsky und Ringhoffer (Prazska akciova strjirma), 
Prague (1869);
7. Ganz & Comp. - Danubius, Maschinen-, Waggon- und
Schiffbau-Actien-Gesellschaft (Ganz es tarsa
1 Unless otherwise stated, all numerical data and results 
presented in the following are either taken directly or 
derived from the respective annual accounts published in 
Compass. Finanzielles Jahrbuch fur Osterreich-Ungarn 
(Vienna, 1870-1916) and Jahrbuch der osterreichischen Berg- 
und Hiittenwerke, Maschinen- und Met allwar enfabriken
(Vienna, 1905-1912). Companies' names are reproduced as 
given in Compass 1914.
261
Danubius, gep-, waggon- es hajogyar reszveny- 
t&rsascig) , Budapest (1869);
8. Schlick-Nicholson Maschinen-, Waggon- und Schiffsbau - 
Aktien-Gesellschaft (Schlick-Nicholson gep-, waggon- 
es hajogyar reszvenytarsas&g), Budapest (1869).
Tables B.l and B.2 provide average data for the six 
Austrian and two Hungarian firms, respectively. The 
balance-sheet indicators for each of the eight companies 
are reproduced separately in Tables B.3a to B.lOd. The 
following indicators have been taken or derived from the 
companies' annual statements (short notation in 
parentheses):
balance-sheet total (BST) share capital (SHC)
equity capital (EQC)2 equity reserves (RES)3
borrowed capital (BOC) contingent reserves (CRS)4
fixed assets (FXA)5 netinvestment (INV)6
material stocks (STO)7 depreciation (DEP)8
2 EQC = SHC + RES. Equity capital (EQC) has been adjusted, 
i.e. profits forwarded from the previous years are included 
whilst losses forwarded are subtracted from equity reserves 
(RES).
3 Equity reserves have been adjusted for profits or losses 
forwarded.
4 Contingent reserves are part of borrowed capital as they 
generally constitute a liability.
5 This category refers to the value of machinery, tools, 
buildings and other real estate.
6 Netinvestment represents the absolute change in the value 
of fixed assets (plant and equipment).
7 Under this heading, the value of stocks of raw materials, 
semi-finished products and finished goods is summed up.
8 Depreciation allowances include only the annual allowances 
made for lost usefulness of fixed capital.
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annual surplus (SPL)9 annual dividend (DIV)10 
turnover (TOV)12return on equity (RET)11 
RATIOl = (EQC/BST)*100 
RATI03 = (FXA/BST)*100 
RATI05 = (TOV/BST)*100
RATI02 = (EQC/SHC)*100 
RATI04 = (EQC/FXA+STO)*100 
RATI06 = (STO/TOV)*100
RATI07 = (annual, absolute dividend/SPL)*100.
All absolute figures are reproduced in 1000 current crowns, 
while annual dividends, return on equity and all ratios are 
given as percentages. The ratios produced in Tables B.l and
B.2 are based on absolute average data. They are not the 
mean of the individual companies' ratios.
In order to ensure a consistent classification of the 
balance-sheet data, some general principles of definition 
and standardization had to be applied13. As a rule, though, 
all adjustments of the original data were kept to a 
minimum.
Own funds are composed of share capital, reserves, and 
balance-sheet profit. They constitute that amount of the 
value of all assets which exceeds the value of borrowed 
funds. In this study, however, only those parts of the 
annual surplus which were assigned to the reserves or which 
were carried forward from the previous year are added to 
equity capital. For only these non-distributed parts of the 
surplus remain in the company and at its disposal. In turn, 
losses forwarded imply a reduction in equity capital. 
Nevertheless, the appropriate partition of some of the
9 Annual surplus has been adjusted to account for profits 
and losses forwarded from the previous year.
10 Dividend paid on share capital in percent.
11 Annual return on equity capital in percent:
RET = (SPL/EQC)*100.
12 Data on turnover are not available for Ruston and the 
Bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik. Schlick's 1881 to 1883 
figures of turnover are taken from Matlekovitz, A. v., Das 
Konigreich Ungarn, vol. II (Leipzig, 1900), p.336.
13 Cf. Mosser, Industrieaktiengesellschaft, pp.25-74.
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reserves posed a problem. Difficulties arise from the fact 
that - in some cases - even those reserves nominally 
intended to cover contingent liabilities were endowed out 
of undistributed profits rather than treated as expenses. 
Thus their function can be viewed as that of equity rather 
than outside capital, at least partly. As Mosser shows, 
this practice was quite in accordance with contemporary law 
and habit14. Since the actual size of the funds in question 
is hardly of particular importance15 this problem has been 
approached in a simple and pragmatic fashion. Only those 
funds which were clearly assigned to equity reserves16 were 
included in total equity capital. These exceeded by far all 
those classified here as contingent reserves. So-called 
tax-reserves, pension funds, other welfare provisions, and 
allowances made for insecure payments have been allocated 
to borrowed (credit) capital regardless of the way they 
were endowed. Only if subsequent inclusion in equity 
capital took place, were funds originally allocated to 
contingent reserves classified as equity.
Due to the quality of the source material short term and 
long term credit capital have not been distinguished here. 
Some companies temporarily stated the volume of long term 
loans, others did not so at all. In general, all credit 
capital was lumped together. Hence a consistent series for 
either short term or long term finance could not be 
compiled17.
14 Ibid. , p.36.
15 See the data under heading CRS (contingent reserves) in 
the following tables. For the Brunner Maschinenfabrik these 
parts of borrowed capital have not been reproduced 
separately since the contingent reserves inserted in its 
statements (for 1882 to 1897 only) never amounted to more 
than 1700 crowns.
16 This group encompasses the reserves required by law, 
those established for special purposes (eg. "Baufonds"), 
and general reserves built up at the companies' own 
discretion.
17 Cf. Mosser, Industrieaktiengesellschaft, pp.40-41.
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Some companies' business year differed from the calendar 
year. Here, all statements dated within the first half of 
a given year have been allocated to the previous year, 
those dated on a month in the second to the given year. 
Each of the eight companies had a twelve month business 
year18.
Contrary to the general practice in Austria, Ganz and 
Schlick - like most of the Hungarian firms included in 
Sample II - inserted accumulated depreciation allowances in 
their annual statements. Accordingly, the gross value of 
fixed assets and equipment was reported on the opposite 
side of the balance-sheet. To ensure compatibility with the 
Austrian data, these accumulated depreciation allowances 
were subtracted from the value of assets (in order to 
obtain their net value) and, of course, from the balance- 
sheet totals.
Further adjustments of some of the original balance-sheet 
figures were necessary only in the case of Ganz and the 
Bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik. The Ratibor (Silesia) 
and Leobersdorf (Austria) branches of Ganz were, generally, 
covered with a summary value in Ganz' balance-sheet. For 
1883 to 1900 (Ratibor) and 1887 to 1900 (Leobersdorf) 
additional data allow us to isolate the two branches' value 
of fixed assets and their annual depreciation allowances. 
Estimates were then prepared for 1880 to 1882 and 1901 to 
1910 (Ratibor)19, and for 1901 to 1906 (Leobersdorf)20.
18 The only one exception was Simmering which shifted its 
statement deadline from end of December to end of March in 
1903; the firm thus had a fifteen month business year in 
1903/04.
19 The rate of change of the value of net fixed assets 
between 1883 and 1884 was used to calculate net fixed 
assets for 1880 to 1882. The 1884 rate of depreciation was 
applied to compute annual depreciation allowances for 1880 
to 1883. Both the value of net fixed assets and annual 
depreciation allowances for 1901 to 1910 were approximated 
by using the respective average annual rates of change 
between 1900 and 1911. The 1911 depreciation allowance, in 
turn, was estimated by using Ratibor's share in Ganz'total 
value of fixed assets in 1911 and applying this ratio to
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From 1911 the assets of Ratibor are given again in Ganz' 
statements. The two branches' reconstructed values of fixed 
assets and their depreciation allowances were added to the 
respective totals of Ganz for those years in which they 
were not recorded as such in the statements. Thus a 
complete and coherent series for Ganz' fixed assets was 
obtained for 1880 to 1913.
For almost all years, equity capital funds and annual 
surplus of the Bohmisch-mahrische Maschinenfabrik had to be 
re-calculated. Only a fraction of the actual balance was 
inserted as such in the statements. For whatever reason, 
parts of annual surplus were booked directly into capital 
reserves and split up into board shares of profit and 
dividends before the residual was listed as "profit". The 
practice of surplus allocation changed from year to year. 
To correct for this, annual surplus was recon-structed in 
accordance with the usual practice employed by the other 
firms examined here: it was computed as a gross total, i.e. 
as the balance out of which dividends, equity reserves, 
directors' bonuses etc. were funded.
the company's total depreciation allowances in 1911. The 
gross value of fixed assets at Ratibor is given in Ganz' 
1911 statement.
20 The Leobersdorf plant of Ganz was transformed into a 
joint-stock company in 1907. The balance-sheet for this 
year reports both the annual depreciation allowance and the 
value of net fixed assets. Again, average annual rates of 
change were calculated for 1900 to 1907 and used to compute 
the value of Leobersdorf's fixed assets and its 
depreciation allowances.
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Table B.la
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIX AUSTRIAN FIRMS
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 3 826.2 2 286.9 2 379.9 93.0 1 241.0
1881 4 272.1 2 286.9 2 411.6 124.7 1 678.3
1882 4 495.1 2 286.9 2 513.8 226.9 1 772.9
1883 4 700.3 2 286.9 2 403.8 116.8 1 952.1
1884 4 917.0 2 286.9 2 558.1 271.2 2 069.3
1885 4 943.8 2 286.9 2 618.7 331.7 2 103.9
1886 4 484.9 2 286.9 2 645.9 359.0 1 683.4
1887 4 443.3 2 286.9 2 629.6 342.7 1 686.8
1888 4 717.0 2 286.9 2 588.7 301.7 1 911.4
1889 4 569.7 2 386.9 2 728.7 341.7 1 566.3
1890 4 793.6 2 386.9 2 764.9 378.0 1 784.0
1891 4 697.7 2 386.9 2 780.7 393.8 1 657.9
1892 4 571.5 2 386.9 2 825.8 438.9 1 537.2
1893 4 321.8 2 386.9 2 826.8 439.9 1 249.3
1894 4 430.8 2 386.9 2 843.9 457.0 1 342.2
1895 4 460.4 2 386.9 2 851.8 464.9 1 351.8
1896 4 921.6 2 486.9 3 015.3 528.3 1 620.7
1897 5 754.5 2 703.6 3 358.2 654.6 2 085.3
1898 6 260.3 2 870.3 3 528.7 658.4 2 292.4
1899 7 271.4 3 213.6 4 091.9 878.3 2 580.9
1900 9 578.4 3 646.6 4 702.9 1,056.3 4 296.4
1901 8 862.1 3 913.3 5 082.9 1,169.7 3 278.0
1902 7 950.2 4 045.9 5 176.4 1,130.5 2 477.2
1903 8 492.4 4 295.9 5 414.8 1,118.9 2 770.0
1904 8 888.0 4 295.9 5 429.8 1,133.9 2 973.8
1905 10 255.7 4 546.6 5 724.3 1,177.7 4 082.9
1906 12 574.0 4 959.7 6 103.2 1,143.6 5 936.8
1907 14 241.5 4 959.7 6 180.6 1,221.0 7 222.5
1908 13 938.4 5 226.3 6 663.7 1,437.3 6 418.7
1909 13 494.9 5 226.3 6 754.5 1,528.2 5 788.6
1910 14 237.3 5 693.0 7 305.3 1,612.3 6 008.0
1911 17 468.9 6 693.0 8 821.8 2,128.8 7 657.6
1912 21 720.7 7 526.3 9 738.9 2,212.6 10 945.9
Table B.lb
267
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIX AUSTRIAN FIRMS
CRS FXA INV STO SPL
1880 10.5 1 614.1 _ 909.4 205
1881 20.6 1 629.5 15.4 1, 198.2 171
1882 25.2 1 628.6 -0.9 1/184.9 83
1883 26.5 1 602.3 -26.3 1,065.6 344
1884 38.9 1 553.1 -49.2 859.4 289
1885 52.9 1 482.6 -70.5 639.7 221
1886 42.5 1 450.7 -31.9 719.5 155
1887 35.5 1 443.4 -7.3 910.2 106
1888 55.3 1 406.1 -37.3 1,066.6 191
1889 54.9 1 423.8 17.7 1,130.7 274
1890 57.5 1 474.1 50.3 1, 196.0 244
1891 68.4 1 526.0 51.9 1, 066.6 259
1892 73.8 1 541.1 15.0 1, 084.8 208
1893 81.6 1 515.1 -26.0 997.3 245
1894 100.6 1 483.1 -32.0 920.3 244
1895 118.4 1 501.5 18.4 1, 068.1 256
1896 95.6 1 520.8 19.3 1, 137.1 285
1897 106.3 1 686.8 166.0 1, 350.5 311
1898 119.0 1 704.6 17.8 1, 619.4 439
1899 198.5 1 964.1 259.5 1,883.7 598
1900 197.2 2 670.4 706.3 2, 644.6 579
1901 215.9 2 917.7 247.3 2, 007.8 501
1902 227.9 2 796.8 -120.9 1,745.4 296
1903 229.0 3 133.1 336.3 1,920.5 307
1904 139.3 3 138.6 5.5 2, 083.7 484
1905 138.5 3 217.5 78.9 2,906.2 448
1906 143.2 3 743.6 526.1 3, 319.5 86
1907 143.1 4 444.2 700.6 4, 135.5 838
1908 167.2 4 542.1 97.9 3, 122.8 856
1909 184.2 4 547.8 5.7 2, 486.8 951
1910 212.5 4 984.6 436.8 2, 897.3 924
1911 226.4 5 547.5 562.9 3,529.8 989
1912 239.8 6 690.0 1,142.5 5, 189.0 1,035
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Table B.lc
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIX AUSTRIAN FIRMS
RET RATIOl
1880 8.6 62.2
1881 7.7 56.4
1882 3.3 55.9
1883 14.3 51.1
1884 11.3 52.0
1885 8.4 53.0
1886 5.9 59.0
1887 4.0 59.2
1888 7.4 54.9
1889 10.1 59.7
1890 8.8 57.7
1891 9.3 59.2
1892 7.4 61.8
1893 8.7 65.4
1894 8.6 64.2
1895 9.0 63.9
1896 9.5 61.3
1897 9.3 58.4
1898 12.4 56.4
1899 14.6 56.3
1900 12.3 49.1
1901 9.9 57.4
1902 5.7 65.1
1903 5.7 63.8
1904 8.9 61.1
1905 7.8 55.8
1906 1.4 48.5
1907 13.6 43 .4
1908 12.8 47.8
1909 14.1 50.1
1910 12.6 51.3
1911 11.2 50.5
1912 10.6 44.8
RATI02 RATI03 RATI04
104.1 42.2 94.3
105.5 38.1 85.3
109.9 36.2 89.3
105.1 34.1 90.1
111.9 31.6 106.0
114.5 30.0 123.4
115.7 32.3 121.9
115.0 32.5 111.7
113.2 29.8 104.7
114.3 31.2 106.8
115.8 30.8 103.6
116.5 32.5 107.3
118.4 33.7 107.6
118.4 35.1 112.5
119.1 33.5 118.3
119.5 33.7 111.0
121.2 30.9 113.4
124.2 29.3 110.6
122.9 27.2 106.2
127.3 27.0 106.3
129.0 27.9 88.5
129.9 32.9 103.2
127.9 35.2 114.0
126.0 36.9 107.1
126.4 35.3 104.0
125.9 31.4 93.5
123.1 29.8 86.4
124.6 31.2 72.0
127.5 32.6 86.9
129.2 33.7 96.0
128.3 35.0 92.7
131.8 31.8 97.2
129.4 30.8 82.0
269
Table B.2a
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: TWO HUNGARIAN FIRMS
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 3 670.2 2 370.0 2 529.7 159.7 808
1881 4 370.3 2 520.0 2 805.8 285.8 1 187
1882 5 476.0 2 920.0 3 320.8 400.8 1 699
1883 6 240.9 2 920.0 3 439.8 519.8 2 176
1884 6 509.1 3 120.0 3 852.6 732.6 2 006
1885 5 986.7 3 120.0 4 014.0 894.0 1 440
1886 5 814.9 3 120.0 4 136.3 1 016.3 1 252
1887 6 310.2 3 120.0 4 223.9 1 103.9 1 629
1888 7 122.5 3 120.0 4 333.4 1 213.4 2 140
1889 7 993.4 3 120.0 4 541.8 1 421.8 2 656
1890 8 992.6 3 120.0 4 795.2 1 675.2 3 219
1891 10 850.3 3 120.0 5 241.1 2 121.1 4 587
1892 11 842.2 3 120.0 5 705.9 2 585.9 5 222
1893 13 793.6 3 520.0 6 386.2 2 866.2 6 451
1894 14 175.7 3 520.0 6 627.4 3 107.4 6 632
1895 15 003.0 3 920.0 7 393.2 3 473.2 6 741
1896 17 145.8 4 400. 0 9 925.3 5 525.3 6 220
1897 19 200.2 4 400.0 10 043.2 5 643.2 8 269
1898 20 691.6 4 400.0 10 126.4 5 726.4 9 548
1899 22 175.8 4 400.0 10 325.5 5 925.5 10 919
1900 23 841.5 4 400.0 10 440.7 6 040.7 12 747
1901 20 800.5 4 400.0 10 372.0 5 972.0 10 036
1902 20 114.0 4 400.0 10 336.3 5 936.3 9 298
1903 21 173.9 4 400.0 10 381.9 5 981.9 10 099
1904 20 037.8 4 400.0 10 489.1 6 089.1 9 004
1905 21 115.4 4 400.0 10 305.8 5 905.8 10 342
1906 21 334.9 4 400.0 10 077.9 5 677.9 10 551
1907 23 173.1 4 400.0 10 165.0 5 765.0 12 134
1908 21 875.5 4 400.0 10 299.1 5 899.1 10 484
1909 20 161.3 4 400.0 10 576.8 6 176.8 8 512
1910 19 842.5 4 400.0 10 965.0 6 565.0 7 776
1911 32 789.4 6 320.0 14 731.9 8 411.9 16 422
1912 59 087.7 8 320.0 17 124.4 8 804.4 40 615
1913 64 768.9 8 320.0 16 968.6 8 648.6 46 747
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: TWO HUNGARIAN FIRMS
CRS FXA INV STO SPL
1880 36.0 1 233.8 — 631.2 331.9
1881 90.0 1 200.1 -33.8 1, 030.3 381.7
1882 118.0 1 252.8 52.7 1, 079.0 455.8
1883 163.0 1 414.8 162.0 1, 394.8 624.1
1884 201.5 1 361.7 -53.1 1, 342.0 650.6
1885 253.7 1 285.0 -76.7 965.1 494.4
1886 282.6 1 245.8 -39.2 943.1 426.2
1887 300.3 1 379.4 133.6 1, 122.3 456.8
1888 339.5 1 501.7 122.3 1, 039.4 648.7
1889 383.7 1 311.7 -190.0 1, 362.2 795.3
1890 509.6 1 361.7 50.0 1, 149.7 977.9
1891 586.4 1 495.8 134.1 1, 172.8 1, 021.6
1892 645.8 1 443.0 -52.8 3,117.9 914.3
1893 805.3 1 560.7 117.7 2, 202.8 956.0
1894 896.9 1 703.8 143.1 2, 838.3 915.3
1895 995.4 2 078.2 374.4 3, 687.7 868.1
1896 1,117.2 3 702.7 1,624.5 2, 961.5 999.9
1897 1,238.1 5 183.6 1,480.9 4, 234.1 887.9
1898 1,355.1 5 379.8 196.2 3,727.1 1, 015.6
1899 1,336.3 5 190.9 -188.9 4, 396.8 815.4
1900 1,374.3 5 643.5 452.6 4, 513.3 491.3
1901 1,298.5 5 503.4 -140.1 3, 518.0 392.2
1902 1,334.6 5 310.6 -192.8 4, 319.9 475.6
1903 1,341.9 5 128.6 -182.0 3, 649.4 692.9
1904 1,325.5 4 950.3 -178.3 3, 205.8 544.0
1905 1,412.5 5 473.6 523.3 3, 364.4 467.0
1906 1,094.3 4 267.0 -1,206.6 1,976.6 705.1
1907 1,070.7 3 698.6 -568.4 2, 910.1 873.6
1908 1,136.0 4 228.3 529.7 3, 295.5 1, 091.5
1909 1,200.3 4 131.0 -97.3 2,847.9 1, 072.3
1910 1,151.6 4 366.8 235.8 2, 433.9 1, 101.0
1911 4,576.7 6 691.0 2,324.2 7, 296.7 1, 653.2
1912 8,799.4 13 607.3 6,916.3 16, 530.0 1, 348.1
1913 17,389.3 15 817.7 2,210.4 21, 755.8 848.9
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Table B.2c
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: TWO HUNGARIAN FIRMS
RET RATIOl RATI02 RATI03 RATI04
1880 13.1 68.9 106.7 33.6 135.6
1881 13.6 64.2 111.3 27.5 125.8
1882 13.7 60.6 113.7 22.9 142.4
1883 18.1 55.1 117.8 22.7 122.4
1884 16.9 59.2 123.5 20.9 142.5
1885 12.3 67.0 128.7 21.5 178.4
1886 10.3 71.1 132.6 21.4 189.0
1887 10.8 66.9 135.4 21.9 168.8
1888 15.0 60.8 138.9 21.1 170.5
1889 17.5 56.8 145.6 16.4 169.9
1890 20.4 53.3 153.7 15.1 190.9
1891 19.5 48.3 168.0 13.8 196.4
1892 16.0 48.2 182.9 12.2 125.1
1893 15.0 46.3 181.4 11.3 169.7
1894 13.8 46.8 188.3 12.0 145.9
1895 11.7 49.3 188.6 13.9 128.2
1896 10.1 57.9 225.6 21.6 148.9
1897 8.8 52.3 228.3 27.0 106.6
1898 10.0 48.9 230.1 26.0 111.2
1899 7.9 46.6 234.7 23.4 107.7
1900 4.7 43.8 237.3 23.7 102.8
1901 3.8 49.9 235.7 26.5 115.0
1902 4.6 51.4 234.9 26.4 107.3
1903 6.7 49.0 236.0 24.2 118.3
1904 5.2 52.3 238.4 24.7 128.6
1905 4.5 48.8 234.2 25.9 116.6
1906 7.0 47.2 229.0 20.0 161.4
1907 8.6 43.9 231.0 16.0 153.8
1908 10.6 47.1 234.1 19.3 136.9
1909 10.1 52.5 240.4 20.5 151.6
1910 10.0 55.3 249.2 22.0 161.2
1911 11.1 44.9 233.1 20.4 105.3
1912 7.9 29.0 205.8 23.0 56.8
1913 5.0 26.2 203.9 24.4 45.2
Table B.3a
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIGL
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 6 631.0 3 921.6 3 921.6 0.0 2,694
1881 8 412.1 3 921.6 3 921.6 0.0 4,490
1882 9 607.0 3 921.6 3 859.7 -61.9 5,746
1883 10 019.8 3 921.6 3 109.1 -812.5 6,089
1884 11 687.6 3 921.6 3 930.7 9.1 6,980
1885 13 045.2 3 921.6 4 255.7 334.1 8,207
1886 10 685.3 3 921.6 4 406.9 485.3 6,085
1887 9 111.9 3 921.6 4 365.0 443.4 4,589
1888 8 061.4 3 921.6 4 287.4 365.8 3,282
1889 5 522.0 3 921.6 4 356.9 435.3 679
1890 5 487.6 3 921.6 4 421.0 499.4 845
1891 4 850.5 3 921.6 4 365.0 443.4 152
1892 4 762.2 3 921.6 4 409.4 487.8 197
1893 5 096.3 3 921.6 4 368.9 447.3 436
1894 5 077.6 3 921.6 4 395.8 474.2 322
1895 5 189.5 3 921.6 4 425.3 503.7 346
1896 5 395.3 3 921.6 4 467.6 546.0 504
1897 6 572.8 3 921.6 4 515.3 593.7 1,612
1898 7 359.1 3 921.6 4 543.6 622.0 2,249
1899 6 664.1 3 921.6 4 660.9 739.3 1,552
1900 7 286.5 3 921.6 4 685.8 764.2 2,521
1901 5 592.6 3 921.6 4 608.1 686.5 715
1902 5 501.0 3 921.6 4 634.3 712.7 724
1903 5 414.0 3 921.6 4 619.2 697.6 610
1904 6 345.2 3 921.6 4 639.7 718.1 1,355
1905 9 348.0 3 921.6 4 663.4 741.8 4,509
1906 16 602.1 5 000.0 4 671.8 -328.2 11,930
1907 13 976.0 5 000.0 5 025.1 25.1 8,583
1908 12 800.7 5 000.0 5 134.5 134.5 7,156
1909 9 372.3 5.000.0 5 273.6 273.6 3,556
1910 7 660.0 5,000.0 5 366.7 366.7 1,879
1911 7 733.2 5,000.0 5 468.7 468.7 1,841
1912 10 273.7 5,000.0 5 576.6 576.6 4,276
1913 8 157.7 5,000.0 5 680.3 680.3 2,053
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIGL
CRS FXA INV DEP STO
1880 10.0 3 517.2 _ 15.2 2, 154.
1881 8.0 3 562.3 45.1 84.5 3 /013.
1882 8.0 3 562.3 0.0 0.0 2,722.
1883 40.0 3 386.3 -176.0 176.0 1,884.
1884 68.0 3 053.0 -333.3 332.3 1,114.
1885 120.0 2 755.4 -297.6 297.6 622.
1886 92.0 2 622.4 -133.0 133.0 615.
1887 40.0 2 496.4 -126.0 126.0 745.
1888 90.0 2 377.0 -119.4 119.4 1,280.
1889 40.0 2 263.8 -113.2 113.1 1, 138.
1890 36.0 2 156.6 -107.2 107.2 1,224.
1891 40.0 2 098.0 -58.6 101.7 811.
1892 24.0 2 000.3 -97.7 97.7 1, 117.
1893 22.0 1 907.6 -92.7 92.7 1,498.
1894 32.0 1 819.7 -87.9 87.9 1, 096.
1895 40.0 1 779.3 -40.4 83.5 1, 163.
1896 34.0 1 794.7 15.4 80.5 1,249.
1897 64.0 1 812.5 17.8 82.2 1,543.
1898 84.0 1 728.4 -84.1 84.1 1,694.
1899 90.0 1 738.7 10.3 84.8 2,609.
1900 68.0 1 752.2 13.5 86.5 2,998.
1901 68.0 1 670.3 -81.9 81.9 1,301.
1902 68.0 1 668.0 -2.3 82.5 1,231.
1903 68.0 1 589.5 -78.5 78.3 1, Oil.
1904 75.0 1 515.5 -74.0 74.3 1,433.
1905 90.0 1 547.3 31.8 76.9 4, 017.
1906 100.0 3 289.2 1,741.9 97.7 3,089.
1907 100.0 4 229.1 939.9 141.6 3,451.
1908 100.0 4 700.1 471.0 216.4 3, 166.
1909 100.0 4 507.6 -192.5 263.9 1, 387.
1910 150.0 4 264.7 -242.9 266.1 1,018.
1911 150.0 4 418.1 153.4 302.1 1, 165.
1912 150.0 5 579.6 1,161.5 369.9 1,353.
1913 0.0 5 388.5 -191.1 447.2 1,225.
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS : SIGL
SPL TOV DIV RET RATIO1
1880 15.2 — 0.0 3.9 59.1
1881 -61.9 - 0.0 -1.6 46.6
1882 -750.6 - 0.0 -19.5 40.2
1883 821.6 9 427.2 0.0 26.4 31.0
1884 776.0 7 452.3 10.0 19.7 33.6
1885 581.7 6 059.6 10.0 13.7 32.6
1886 193.4 3 234.8 6.0 4.4 41.2
1887 157.7 3 596.3 6.0 3.6 47.9
1888 491.1 5 774.7 10.0 11.5 53.2
1889 485.2 5 661.9 10.0 11.1 78.9
1890 220.8 5 560.9 7.0 5.0 80.6
1891 332.6 5 036.2 7.0 7.6 90.0
1892 155.6 3 597.9 5.0 3.5 92.6
1893 291.3 5 365.9 6.5 6.7 85.7
1894 359.5 5 702.7 8.0 8.2 86.6
1895 417.3 5 598.2 9.0 9.4 85.3
1896 423.4 6 511.9 9.0 9.5 82.8
1897 445.4 6 906.8 10.0 9.9 68.7
1898 566.5 8 369.5 10.0 12.5 61.7
1899 450.5 7 657.9 10.0 9.7 69.9
1900 79.2 7 925.2 4.0 1.7 64.3
1901 268.7 8 088.0 6.0 5.8 82.4
1902 141.8 3 936.3 4.0 3.1 84.2
1903 184.4 3 886.5 4.0 4.0 85.3
1904 350.2 3 552.1 5.0 7.5 73.1
1905 175.3 4 260.1 4.0 3.8 49.9
1906 -2,685.9 11 082.3 0.0 -57.5 28.1
1907 367.5 10 926.8 5.0 7.3 36.0
1908 510.0 11 521.1 7.0 9.9 40.1
1909 541.9 9 044.1 7.5 10.3 56.3
1910 414.3 5 928.4 6.0 7.7 70.1
1911 422.7 6 413.4 6.0 7.7 70.7
1912 420.7 7 029.9 6.0 7.5 54.3
1913 423.5 7 404.7 6.0 7.5 69.6
Table B.3d
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIGL
RATI02 RATI03 RATI04 RATI05 RATI06 RATI07
1880 100.0 53.0 69.2 — — 0.0
1881 100.0 42.4 59.6 - - 0.0
1882 98.4 37.1 61.4 - - 0.0
1883 79.3 33.8 59.0 94.1 20.0 0.0
1884 100.2 26.1 94.3 63.8 15.0 50.5
1885 108.5 21.1 126.0 46.5 10.3 67.4
1886 112.4 24.5 136.1 30.3 19.0 121.7
1887 111.3 27.4 134.7 39.5 20.7 149.2
1888 109.3 29.5 117.2 71.6 22.2 79.8
1889 111.1 41.0 128.1 102.5 20.1 80.8
1890 112.7 39.3 130.7 101.3 22.0 124.3
1891 111.3 43.3 150.0 103.8 16.1 82.5
1892 112.4 42.0 141.4 75.6 31.1 126.0
1893 111.4 37.4 128.3 105.3 27.9 87.5
1894 112.1 35.8 150.8 112.3 19.2 87.3
1895 112.8 34.3 150.4 107.9 20.8 84.6
1896 113.9 33.3 146.7 120.7 19.2 83.4
1897 115.1 27.6 134.5 105.1 22.4 88.0
1898 115.9 23.5 132.8 113.7 20.2 69.2
1899 118.9 26.1 107.2 114.9 34.1 87.1
1900 119.5 24.1 98.6 108.8 37.8 198.0
1901 117.5 29.9 155.1 144.6 16.1 87.6
1902 118.2 30.3 159.8 71.6 31.3 110.6
1903 117.8 29.4 177.6 71.8 26.0 85.1
1904 118.3 23.9 157.4 56.0 40.4 56.0
1905 118.9 16.6 83.8 45.6 94.3 89.5
1906 93.4 19.8 73.2 66.8 27.9 0.0
1907 100.5 30.3 65.4 78.2 31.6 68.0
1908 102.7 36.7 65.3 90.0 27.5 68.6
1909 105.5 48.1 89.5 96.5 15.3 69.2
1910 107.4 55.7 101.6 77.4 17.2 72.4
1911 109.4 57.1 97.9 82.9 18.2 71.0
1912 111.5 54.3 80.4 68.4 19.3 71.3
1913 113.6 66.1 85.9 90.8 16.5 70.8
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Table B4.a
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIMMERING
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 2 616.0 2 000.0 2 000.6 0.6 534.9
1881 3 196.4 2 000.0 2 001.1 1.1 1,048.5
1882 3 167.3 2 000.0 2 007.0 7.0 1, 059.9
1883 3 219.2 2 000.0 2 008.3 8.3 1, 035.7
1884 3 134.3 2 000.0 2 020.8 20.8 894.3
1885 3 093.6 2 000.0 2 032.8 32.8 840.8
1886 3 086.3 2 000.0 2 045.6 45.6 818.5
1887 3 617.6 2 000.0 2 060.5 60.5 1 680.8
1888 3 891.0 2 000.0 1 936.8 -63.2 2 043.5
1889 3 808.3 2 000.0 1 847.5 -152.5 1 669.1
1890 4 037.5 2 000.0 2 019.2 19.2 1 680.8
1891 4 066.2 2 000.0 2 137.7 137.7 1 609.9
1892 3 979.9 2 000.0 2 239.2 239.2 1 539.9
1893 3 439.4 2 000.0 2 234.8 234.8 1 029.7
1894 3 030.4 2 000.0 2 237.9 237.9 725.8
1895 3 428.7 2 000.0 2 204.5 204.5 1 166.6
1896 3 905.0 2 000.0 2 202.1 202.1 1 556.2
1897 4 407.4 2 000.0 2 208.7 208.7 2 029.3
1898 5 262.9 3 000.0 3 413.2 413.2 1 548.5
1899 5 188.2 3 000.0 3 429.2 429.2 1 422.9
1900 6 488.6 3 000.0 3 446.7 446.7 2 705.0
1901 4 585.9 3 000.0 3 464.9 464.9 861.8
1902 4 622.5 3 000.0 3 488.1 488.1 1 202.7
1903 10 215.6 4 500.0 4 919.8 419.8 5 102.9
1904 11 567.8 4 500.0 4 932.7 432.7 6 410.5
1905 13 985.4 6 000.0 6 568.5 568.5 7 376.7
1906 16 205.0 6 000.0 6 608.7 608.7 9 412.5
1907 21 405.1 6 000.0 6 612.5 612.5 13 429.5
1908 18 406.1 6 000.0 6 775.8 775.8 10 112.3
1909 18 005.2 6 000.0 6 926.9 926.9 9 504.4
1910 18 303.2 6 000.0 7 078.4 1,078.4 9 870.3
1911 22 300.7 8 000.0 10 552.3 2,552.3 10 530.7
1912 25 931.3 8 000.0 10 653.1 2,653.1 13 974.8
Table B.4b
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIMMERING
CRS FXA INV DEP STO
1880 — 1 130.2 — 68.4 842.3
1881 - 1 180.6 50.4 27.9 923.6
1882 - 1 246.2 65.7 32.1 1,270.1
1883 - 1 268.9 22.7 33.2 1,015.4
1884 — 1 283.3 14.4 33.9 924.5
1885 — 1 293.2 9.9 34.4 710.2
1886 - 1 281.4 -11.8 33.9 870.9
1887 - 1 322.2 40.8 35.1 1,471.4
1888 - 1 298.8 -23.4 34.2 1,697.2
1889 — 1 292.0 -6.8 34.1 1,349.4
1890 — 1 277.5 -14.4 33.8 1,251.3
1891 - 1 271.1 -6.4 33.4 892.9
1892 - 1 549.5 278.4 37.6 1,402.6
1893 - 1 571.6 22.1 36.0 666.1
1894 — 1 510.2 -61.4 68.9 855.7
1895 — 1 466.0 -44.2 38.1 1,333.4
1896 - 1 439.5 -26.5 37.1 1,635.9
1897 - 1 566.9 127.4 66.2 1,613.5
1898 - 1 634.4 67.5 44.1 1,393.1
1899 60.0 1 604.7 -29.7 42.7 1,746.3
1900 60.0 1 637.6 32.9 43.7 2,092.8
1901 60.0 1 663.6 26.0 44.9 1,567.4
1902 60.0 1 628.8 -34.9 43.5 1,653.8
1903 80.0 3 766.8 2,138.0 200.8 3,515.0
1904 80.0 4 104.4 337.6 200.0 3,847.4
1905 60.0 4 983.3 878.8 179.4 5,223.8
1906 60.0 5 910.9 927.6 363.6 6,587.3
1907 60.0 7 500.1 1,589.2 738.5 8,638.1
1908 200.0 6 725.6 -774.5 738.9 3,319.3
1909 300.0 6 874.8 149.2 750.0 2,655.6
1910 300.0 6 690.0 -184.8 509.3 4,284.2
1911 300.0 7 031.3 341.3 528.0 5,458.8
1912 300.0 8 242.3 1,211.0 613.7 5,988.7
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Table B.4c
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIMMERING
SPL TOV DIV RET RATIOl
1880 80.5 1 917.0 4.0 4.0 76.5
1881 146.8 2 965.1 7.0 7.3 62.6
1882 100.4 2 973.8 5.0 5.0 63.4
1883 175.2 4 017.9 8.0 8.7 62.4
1884 219.2 3 265.8 10.0 10.8 64.5
1885 220.0 4 440.8 10.0 10.8 65.7
1886 222.3 2 095.5 10.0 10.9 66.3
1887 -123.6 2 423.5 0.0 -6.0 57.0
1888 -89.3 3 654.6 0.0 -4.6 49.8
1889 291.7 5 427.5 6.0 15.8 48.5
1890 337.5 5 523.2 10.0 16.7 50.0
1891 318.5 6 250.3 10.0 14.9 52.6
1892 200.9 5 170.3 10.0 9.0 56.3
1893 175.0 4 757.0 10.0 7.8 65.0
1894 66.7 2 931.2 5.0 3.0 73.8
1895 57.6 2 505.6 3.0 2.6 64.3
1896 146.6 4 352.9 7.0 6.7 56.4
1897 169.3 5 695.8 8.0 7.7 50.1
1898 301.1 6 485.1 9.0 8.8 64.9
1899 336.1 6 315.6 10.0 9.8 66.1
1900 336.8 6 515.6 10.0 9.8 53.1
1901 259.1 5 027.9 7.5 7.5 75.6
1902 -68.3 3 920.8 0.0 -2.0 75.5
1903 192.9 3 526.0 4.0 3.9 48.2
1904 224.6 — 5.0 4.6 42.6
1905 40.2 — 0.0 0.6 47.0
1906 183.8 - 3.0 2.8 40.8
1907 1,363.1 - 5.0 20.6 30.9
1908 1,518.0 - 8.0 22.4 36.8
1909 1,573.8 — 9.0 22.7 38.5
1910 1,354.5 — 9.0 19.1 38.7
1911 1,217.7 - 7.0 11.5 47.3
1912 1,303.4 - 7.0 12.2 41.1
Table B.4d
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SIMMERING
RATI02 RATI03 RATI04 RATI05 RATI06 RATI07
1880 100.0 43.2 101.4 73.3 43.9 99.4
1881 100.1 36.9 95.1 92.8 31.1 95.4
1882 100.4 39.3 79.8 93.9 42.7 99.5
1883 100.4 39.4 87.9 124.8 25.3 91.3
1884 101.0 40.9 91.5 104.2 28.3 91.3
1885 101.6 41.8 101.5 143.5 16.0 90.9
1886 102.3 41.5 95.0 67.9 41.6 90.0
1887 103.0 36.5 73.8 67.0 60.7 0.0
1888 96.8 33.4 64.6 93.9 46.4 0.0
1889 92.4 33.9 69.9 142.5 24.9 41.1
1890 101.0 31.6 79.8 136.8 22.7 59.3
1891 106.9 31.3 98.8 153.7 14.3 62.8
1892 112.0 38.9 75.8 129.9 27.1 99.6
1893 111.7 45.7 99.9 138.3 14.0 114.3
1894 111.9 49.8 94.6 96.7 29.2 150.0
1895 110.2 42.8 78.7 73.1 53.2 104.2
1896 110.1 36.9 71.6 111.5 37.6 95.5
1897 110.4 35.6 69.4 129.2 28.3 94.5
1898 113.8 31.1 112.7 123.2 21.5 89.7
1899 114.3 30.9 102.3 121.7 27.7 89.3
1900 114.9 25.2 92.4 100.4 32.1 89.1
1901 115.5 36.3 107.2 109.6 31.2 86.8
1902 116.3 35.2 106.3 84.8 42.2 0.0
1903 109.3 36.9 67.6 34.5 99.7 93.3
1904 109.6 35.5 62.0 — — 100.2
1905 109.5 35.6 64.4 — — 0.0
1906 110.1 36.5 52.9 - - 97.9
1907 110.2 35.0 41.0 - - 22.0
1908 112.9 36.5 67.5 - - 31.6
1909 115.4 38.2 72.7 — — 34.3
1910 118.0 36.6 64.5 — — 39.9
1911 131.9 31.5 84.5 - - 46.0
1912 133.2 31.8 74.9 — — 43.0
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Table B.5a
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BRUNNER MASCHINENFABRIK
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 1 777.3 1 200.0 1 246.6 46.6 453.5
1881 2 081.8 1 200.0 1 249.2 49.2 750.2
1882 2 486.9 1 200.0 1 297.1 97.1 966.9
1883 2 656.3 1 200.0 1 343.4 43.4 1,058.6
1884 2 509.9 1 200.0 1 390.8 190.8 984.3
1885 2 201.7 1 200.0 1 390.6 190.6 686.0
1886 2 352.3 1 200.0 1 394.7 194.7 845.2
1887 2 606.8 1 200.0 1 400.6 200.6 1 024.4
1888 2 920.8 1 200.0 1 438.0 238.0 1 303.7
1889 3 790.6 1 800.0 2 268.7 468.7 1 374.0
1890 3 767.9 1 800.0 2 219.0 419.0 1 383.9
1891 3 668.7 1 800.0 2 225.8 425.8 1 264.9
1892 3 749.4 1 800.0 2 242.2 442.2 1 354.5
1893 3 411.5 1 800.0 2 247.4 447.4 927.4
1894 3 502.3 1 800.0 2 274.8 474.8 1 059.3
1895 3 929.7 1 800.0 2 283.4 483.4 1 254.8
1896 4 226.9 2 400.0 3 203.8 803.8 585.0
1897 4 555.9 2 400.0 3 282.3 882.3 823.7
1898 4 945.6 2 400.0 3 368.3 968.3 1 025.2
1899 5 131.8 2 400.0 3 497.9 1,097.9 1 042.0
1900 10 381.5 3 200.0 4 835.5 1,635.5 4 572.8
1901 10 924.2 4 000.0 6 400.6 2,400.6 3 541.2
1902 9 805.4 4 000.0 6 562.4 2,562.4 2 637.2
1903 9 594.4 4 000.0 6 623.1 2,623.1 2 511.4
1904 9 624.3 4 000.0 6 655.1 2,655.1 2 372.9
1905 10 511.6 4 000.0 6 714.5 2,714.5 3 106.7
1906 11 685.6 4 000.0 6 786.8 2,786.8 4 025.1
1907 12 135.8 4 000.0 6 903.4 2,903.4 4 168.0
1908 11 645.5 4 000.0 7 066.9 3,066.9 3 821.3
1909 11 677.8 4 000.0 7 205.2 3,205.2 3 502.6
1910 12 211.4 4 000.0 7 357.2 3,357.2 3 817.2
1911 13 224.9 4 000.0 7 521.2 3,521.2 4 568.8
1912 20 970.6 4 000.0 7 717.1 3,717.1 12 087.0
Table B.5b
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BRUNNER MASCHINENFABRIK
FXA INV STO TOV SPL
1880 713.5 — 583.5 — 77.2
1881 713.5 0.4 698.7 - 164.8
1882 800.1 86.6 885.1 - 222.9
1883 850.7 50.6 965.5 - 254.3
1884 868.2 17.5 849.9 — 134.8
1885 880.7 12.5 727.8 1 679.9 125.0
1886 878.0 -2.8 816.4 1 591.6 112.0
1887 920.5 42.6 750.5 2 047.2 181.8
1888 981.9 61.4 987.5 2 181.9 179.1
1889 1,120.8 138.9 1,321.4 2 148.0 147.9
1890 1 310.1 189.3 1,189.7 2 985.3 165.0
1891 1 352.4 42.3 1,205.2 3 124.9 177.9
1892 1 333.7 -18.7 1,090.9 2 760.2 152.7
1893 1 334.8 1.0 1,035.3 3 123.9 236.7
1894 1 372.6 37.8 1,112.3 3 206.1 168.3
1895 1 608.5 235.9 898.0 3 725.9 391.6
1896 1 795.6 187.1 847.7 3 513.5 438.1
1897 1 906.9 111.3 891.3 3 698.0 450.0
1898 2 061.2 154.3 1,075.7 4 588.3 552.1
1899 2 125.2 63.9 1,100.3 4 907.3 591.9
1900 3 372.4 1,247.3 3,498.0 8 018.5 973.2
1901 3 439.2 66.8 3,723.3 8 872.5 982.3
1902 3 352.0 -87.2 2,544.4 7 666.1 605.8
1903 3 551.1 199.2 2,238.7 6 777.5 460.0
1904 3 475.0 -76.1 2,506.2 6 887.6 596.3
1905 3 365.2 -109.8 2,591.2 7, 900.0 690.3
1906 3 533.1 167.8 3,407.5 - 873.7
1907 3 508.4 -24.7 2,906.6 - 1,064.5
1908 3 406.4 -102.0 2,601.0 - 757.3
1909 3 348.1 -58.3 2,281.1 — 970.0
1910 3 241.7 -106.4 2,549.8 — 1,037.0
1911 3 089.9 -151.8 3,313.1 - 1,134.9
1912 3 899.4 809.5 6,614.3 — 1,166.6
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Table B.5c
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BRUNNER MASCHINENFABRIK
DIV RET RATIOl RATI02 RATI03
1880 6.0 6.2 70.1 103.9 40.1
1881 8.0 13.2 60.0 104.1 34.3
1882 12.0 17.2 52.2 108.1 32.2
1883 14.0 18.9 50.6 111.9 32.0
1884 10.0 9.7 55.4 115.9 34.6
1885 9.0 9.0 63.2 115.9 40.0
1886 8.0 8.1 59.3 116.2 37.3
1887 10.0 13.0 53.7 116.7 35.3
1888 10.0 12.5 49.2 119.8 33.6
1889 10.0 6.5 59.9 126.0 29.6
1890 8.0 7.4 58.9 123.3 34.8
1891 8.0 8.0 60.7 123.7 36.9
1892 7.5 6.8 59.8 124.6 35.6
1893 10.0 10.5 65.9 124.9 39.1
1894 8.0 7.4 65.0 126.4 39.2
1895 12.0 17.1 58.1 126.9 40.9
1896 12.0 13.7 75.8 133.5 42.5
1897 12.0 13.7 72.0 136.8 41.9
1898 14.0 16.4 68.1 140.4 41.7
1899 15.0 16.9 68.2 145.7 41.4
1900 16.0 20.1 46.6 151.1 32.5
1901 16.0 15.3 58.6 160.0 31.5
1902 11.0 9.2 66.9 i64.1 34.2
1903 9.0 6.9 69.0 165.6 37.0
1904 11.0 9.0 69.1 166.4 36.1
1905 12.5 10.3 63.9 167.9 32.0
1906 15.0 12.9 58.1 169.7 30.2
1907 16.0 15.4 56.9 172.6 28.9
1908 12.0 10.7 60.7 176.7 29.3
1909 16.0 13.5 61.7 180.1 28.7
1910 17.0 14.1 60.2 183.9 26.5
1911 18.0 15.1 56.9 188.0 23.4
1912 18.0 15.1 36.8 192.9 18.6
Table B.5d
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BRUNNER MASCHINENFABRIK
RATI04 RATI05 RATI06 RATI07
1880 96.1 — — 93.2
1881 88.5 - - 116.5
1882 77.0 - - 64.6
1883 74.0 - - 66.1
1884 80.9 — — 89.0
1885 86.5 76.3 43.3 86.4
1886 82.3 67.7 51.3 85.4
1887 83.8 78.5 36.7 66.0
1888 73.0 74.7 45.3 67.0
1889 92.9 56.7 61.5 121.7
1890 88.8 79.2 39.9 87.3
1891 87.0 85.2 38.6 80.9
1892 92.5 73.6 39.5 88.4
1893 94.8 91.6 33.1 76.0
1894 91.5 91.5 34.7 85.6
1895 91.1 94.8 24.1 55.2
1896 121.2 83.1 24.1 65.7
1897 117.3 81.2 24.1 64.0
1898 107.4 92.8 23.4 60.9
1899 108.4 95.6 22.4 60.8
1900 70.4 77.2 43.6 52.6
1901 89.4 81.2 42.0 65.2
1902 111.3 78.2 33.2 72.6
1903 114.4 70.6 33 . 0 78.3
1904 111.3 71.6 36.4 73.8
1905 112.7 75.2 32.8 72.4
1906 97.8 - - 68.7
1907 107.6 - - 60.1
1908 117.6 - - 63.4
1909 128.0 — — 66.0
1910 127.0 — — 65.6
1911 117.5 - - 63.4
1912 73.4 - - 61.7
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Table B.6a
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BREITFELD-DANEk
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 6 277.8 3 000.0 3 358.5 358.5 2 357.2
1881 5 801.8 3 000.0 3 391.2 391.2 1 846.0
1882 5 777.4 3 000.0 3 431.9 431.9 1 787.1
1883 6 035.7 3 000.0 3 467.9 467.9 1 976.3
1884 5 628.9 3 000.0 3 524.6 524.6 1 761.3
1885 5 532.5 3 000.0 3 529.6 529.6 1 829.5
1886 4 878.7 3 000.0 3 535.7 535.7 1 194.8
1887 5 260.5 3 000.0 3 535.0 535.0 1 526.4
1888 6 056.3 3 000.0 3 540.9 540.9 2 198.5
1889 6 593.6 3 000.0 3 572.5 572.5 2 604.8
1890 7 975.3 3 000.0 3 588.7 588.7 3 995.9
1891 8 486.0 3 000.0 3 602.6 602.6 4 473.5
1892 7 649.8 3 000.0 3 696.8 696.8 3 528.4
1893 7 567.4 3 000.0 3 725.7 725.7 3 445.1
1894 7 713.7 3 000.0 3 754.7 754.7 3 472.9
1895 7 276.3 3 000.0 3 779.8 779.8 3 111.4
1896 8 136.5 3 000.0 3 798.5 798.5 3 932.5
1897 11 444.7 4 300.0 5 713.3 1,413.3 5 233.7
1898 10 937.6 4 300.0 5 410.7 1,110.7 4 670.1
1899 15 404.5 5 160.0 6 921.6 1,761.6 6 771.2
1900 19 123.1 6 200.0 8 250.6 2,050.6 9 240.4
1901 18 248.1 7 000.0 9 006.5 2,006.5 8 205.4
1902 15 496.8 7 000.0 8 487.5 1,487.4 6 234.9
1903 14 519.5 7 000.0 8 500.8 1,500.8 5 394.7
1904 14 868.5 7 000.0 8 503 .8 1,503.8 5 233.0
1905 16 323.1 7 000.0 8 509.5 1,509.5 6 662.6
1906 19 091.4 8 400.0 10 625.9 2,225.9 7 056.4
1907 24 251.0 8 400.0 10 624.3 2,224.3 12 205.2
1908 26 304.9 10 000.0 13 004.3 3,004.3 11 968.9
1909 26 067.1 10 000.0 12 991.3 2,991.3 11 547.6
1910 21 413.6 10 000.0 13 022.8 3,022.8 6 848.0
1911 25 365.4 10 000.0 13 029.2 3,029.2 10 747.0
1912 31 242.0 11 000.0 14 034.4 3,034.4 15 312.0
Table B.6b
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BREITFELD-DANEk
CRS FXA INV DEP STO
1880 38.9 2 050.1 — — 899.7
1881 94.5 2 020.6 -29.5 - 1 061.6
1882 118.2 1 897.6 -123.0 124.0 1 161.0
1883 96.5 1 794.8 -102.7 124.2 1 267.4
1884 118.0 1 813.8 18.9 125.0 1 364.8
1885 140.9 1 708.2 -105.6 131.9 1 037.3
1886 99.2 1 600.8 -107.4 125.2 1 174.9
1887 97.3 1 623.3 22.5 28.5 1 251.9
1888 165.3 1 479.3 -144.0 155.3 1 130.9
1889 186.5 1 483.4 4.1 19.8 1 496.6
1890 199.7 1 976.7 493.4 36.5 2 110.8
1891 227.2 2 313.2 336.4 45.3 1 804.1
1892 247.5 2 291.8 -21.4 44.7 1 458.0
1893 268.0 2 256.0 -35.8 43.4 1 694.7
1894 288.3 2 226.0 -30.0 41.7 1 283.5
1895 309.7 2 235.6 9.6 40.7 1 622.3
1896 333.9 2 193.6 -42.0 41.5 1 443.7
1897 355.3 2 947.8 754.2 59.5 2 339.3
1898 375.9 2 894.9 -52.9 60.3 3 280.8
1899 405.9 3 828.2 933.2 79.9 4 066.3
1900 487.1 4 086.9 258.7 76.8 4 311.7
1901 569.3 5 245.5 1,158.6 90.5 3 278.8
1902 632.2 4 714.8 -530.6 100.1 3 167.3
1903 584.0 4 704.5 -10.3 107.5 3 229.9
1904 581.8 4 712.9 8.4 108.0 3 482.1
1905 582.7 4 722.8 9.9 103.7 4 273.5
1906 578.9 5 402.4 679.6 112.7 4 734.7
1907 575.4 7 493.4 2,091.0 126.7 6 255.9
1908 573.0 8 834.4 1,341.0 205.0 6 047.3
1909 571.7 9 017.0 182.6 250.0 5 804.3
1910 571.5 8 912.0 -104.9 266.2 5 043.5
1911 571.5 8 989.8 77.8 273.5 5 831.0
1912 571.5 9 821.3 831.5 285.9 8 515.6
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Table B.6c
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BREITFELD-DANiK
SPL TOV DIV RET RATIOl
1880 562.1 6 794.9 14.0 16.7 53.5
1881 564.6 3 968.9 15.0 16.7 58.5
1882 558.4 5 304.8 15.0 16.3 59.4
1883 591.5 6 601.2 15.0 17.1 57.5
1884 343.0 5 887.4 8.0 9.7 62.6
1885 173.5 3 683.7 5.5 4.9 63.8
1886 148.2 3 159.0 5.0 4.2 72.5
1887 199.1 3 536.5 6.0 5.6 67.2
1888 316.9 6 158.9 8.0 8.9 58.5
1889 416.3 5 887.3 10.0 11.7 54.2
1890 390.7 6 367.6 10.0 10.9 45.0
1891 409.9 7 304.9 io.o 11.4 42.5
1892 424.6 6 350.4 10.0 11.5 48.3
1893 396.5 5 440.4 10.0 10.6 49.2
1894 486.1 7 182.0 11.0 12.9 48.7
1895 385.1 6 523.5 10.0 10.2 51.9
1896 405.6 6 473.5 10.0 10.7 46.7
1897 497.7 9 308.9 10.0 8.7 49.9
1898 856.8 10 684.0 11.0 15.8 49.5
1899 1,711.7 16 536.0 15.0 24.7 44.9
1900 1,632.1 20 009.0 15.0 19.8 43.1
1901 1,036.1 16 209.0 10.0 11.5 49.4
1902 774.5 11 441.0 8.0 9.1 54.8
1903 624.0 12 008.0 7.0 7.3 58.5
1904 1,131.7 12 845.0 10.0 13.3 57.2
1905 1,151.0 15 312.0 12.0 13.5 52.1
1906 1,409.1 17 868.0 13.0 13.3 55.7
1907 1,421.5 19 435.0 13.0 13.4 43.8
1908 1,331.7 23 279.0 11.0 10.2 49.4
1909 1,528.3 21 831.0 12.0 11.8 49.8
1910 1,542.8 19 359.0 12.0 11.8 60.8
1911 1,589.2 20 450.0 12.0 12.2 51.4
1912 1,895.6 26 017.0 12.0 13.5 44.9
Table B.6d
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BREITFELD-DANEk
RATI02 RATI03 RATI04 RATI05 RATI06 RATI07
1880 112.0 32.7 113.9 108.2 13.2 74.7
1881 113.0 34.8 110.0 68.4 26.7 79.7
1882 114.4 32.8 112.2 91.8 21.9 80.6
1883 115.6 29.7 113.2 109.4 19.2 76.1
1884 117.5 32.2 110.9 104.6 23.2 70.0
1885 117.7 30.9 128.6 66.6 28.2 95.1
1886 117.9 32.8 127.4 64.8 37.2 101.2
1887 117.8 30.9 122.9 67.2 35.4 90.4
1888 118.0 24.4 135.7 101.7 18.4 75.7
1889 119.1 22.5 119.9 89.3 25.4 72.1
1890 119.6 24.8 87.8 79.8 33.1 76.8
1891 120.1 27.3 87.5 86.1 24.7 73.2
1892 123.2 30.0 98.6 83.0 23.0 70.7
1893 124.2 29.8 94.3 71.9 31.1 75.7
1894 125.2 28.9 107.0 93.1 17.9 67.9
1895 126.0 30.7 98.0 89.7 24.9 77.9
1896 126.6 27.0 104.4 79.6 22.3 74.0
1897 132.9 25.8 108.2 81.3 25.1 86.4
1898 125.8 26.5 87.6 97.7 30.7 55.2
1899 134.1 24.9 87.7 107.3 24.6 45.2
1900 133.1 21.4 98.2 104.6 21.5 57.0
1901 128.7 28.7 105.7 88.8 20.2 67.6
1902 121.2 30.4 107.7 73.8 27.7 72.3
1903 121.4 32.4 107.1 82.7 26.9 78.5
1904 121.5 31.7 103.8 86.4 27.1 61.9
1905 121.6 28.9 94.6 93.8 27.9 73.0
1906 126.5 28.3 104.8 93.6 26.5 77.5
1907 126.5 30.9 77.3 80.1 32.2 76.8
1908 130.0 33.6 87.4 88.5 26.0 82.6
1909 129.9 34.6 87.7 83.7 26.6 78.5
1910 130.2 41.6 93.3 90.4 26.1 77.8
1911 130.3 35.4 87.9 80.6 28.5 75.5
1912 127.6 31.4 76.5 83.3 32.7 69.6
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Table B.7a
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BOHMISCH-MAHRISCHE MASCH.FABRIK
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 1 781.6 1 200.0 1 273.9 73.9 260.3
1881 1 687.8 1 200.0 1 374.0 174.0 195.5
1882 1 842.3 1 200.0 1 387.1 187.1 325.4
1883 1 939.3 1 200.0 1 407.2 207.2 393.7
1884 2 062.1 1 200.0 1 429.0 229.0 529.2
1885 1 788.1 1 200.0 1 441.7 241.7 276.4
1886 1 896.0 1 200.0 1 428.6 228.6 377.5
1887 2 146.9 1 200.0 1 435.0 235.0 621.5
1888 3 068.8 1 200.0 1 441.8 241.8 1 482.8
1889 3 190.0 1 200.0 1 457.3 257.3 1 587.2
1890 3 340.1 1 200.0 1 463.5 263.5 1 705.9
1891 2 910.7 1 200.0 1 462.1 262.1 1 302.0
1892 3 106.7 1 200.0 1 473.9 273.9 1 482.0
1893 2 407.1 1 200.0 1 489.4 289.4 723.2
1894 3 364.9 1 200.0 1 503.7 303.7 1 667.5
1895 2 974.8 1 200.0 1 517.2 317.2 1 341.5
1896 3 503.5 1 200.0 1 523.0 323.0 1 860.8
1897 3 252.6 1 200.0 1 529.6 329.6 1 582.0
1898 4 049.5 1 200.0 1 537.7 337.7 2 366.0
1899 6 093.3 2 400.0 3 137.8 737.8 2 653.5
1900 8 334.4 3 158.0 4 091.6 933.6 3 958.7
1901 8 163.9 3 158.0 4 111.5 953.5 3 752.1
1902 7 519.5 3 158.0 4 183.3 1,025.3 3 187.9
1903 6 412.3 3 158.0 4 120.2 962.2 1 993.3
1904 6 042.5 3 158.0 4 141.1 983.1 1 477.5
1905 6 365.2 3 158.0 4 178.8 1,020.8 1 694.4
1906 6 744.3 3 158.0 4 215.9 1,057.9 1 970.4
1907 7 356.4 3 158.0 4 206.1 1,048.1 2 564.5
1908 8 872.4 3 158.0 4 283.8 1,125.8 3 782.9
1909 10 076.1 3 158.0 4 412.6 1,254.6 4 760.2
1910 11 154.3 3 158.0 4 473.2 1,315.2 5 879.1
1911 11 629.9 3 158.0 4 494.5 1,336.5 6 230.4
1912 12 033.7 3 158.0 4 543.5 1,385.5 6 580.7
Table B.7b
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BOHMISCH-MAHRISCHE MASCH.FABRIK
CRS FXA INV STO SPL DIV
1880 9.8 750.4 — 161.5 247.4 10.0
1881 12.6 729.5 -20.9 199.6 118.4 7.5
1882 15.2 699.4 -30.1 315.4 129.8 7.5
1883 4.1 683.7 -15.7 127.4 138.4 7.5
1884 27.8 669.3 -14.4 82.9 103.9 6.0
1885 23.6 637.3 -32.0 70.3 70.0 6.0
1886 26.9 738.7 101.4 191.8 89.9 6.0
1887 29.4 717.8 -20.9 445.8 90.4 6.0
1888 27.2 715.9 -1.9 350.1 144.2 7.5
1889 50.7 852.9 137.0 473.2 145.5 7.5
1890 49.5 853.6 0.7 487.8 170.7 8.0
1891 76.0 851.6 -2.0 469.2 146.7 8.0
1892 96.0 801.2 -50.4 341.6 150.8 8.0
1893 116.0 750.8 -50.4 302.4 194.6 8.0
1894 184.6 700.3 -50.5 353.4 193.7 8.0
1895 251.1 649.9 -50.4 350.2 116.1 7.5
1896 84.0 631.5 -18.4 304.0 119.7 7.5
1897 84.0 613.7 -17.8 328.3 141.0 7.5
1898 108.0 642.7 29.0 478.6 145.7 7.5
1899 460.8 1,207.1 564.4 521.6 302.1 10.0
1900 568.4 3,826.2 2,619.1 1,511.1 284.1 10.0
1901 598.4 4,005.5 179.3 766.1 300.3 8.0
1902 607.3 3,869.7 -135.8 794.6 148.2 6.0
1903 642.3 3,596.9 -272.8 494.7 298.8 7.0
1904 98.9 3,451.0 -145.9 136.2 423.9 10.0
1905 98.6 3,007.7 -443.3 245.2 492.0 12.0
1906 120.6 2,646.1 -361.6 740.8 558.1 13.0
1907 123.5 2,216.2 -429.9 1,620.9 585.8 13.0
1908 130.0 1,872.0 -344.2 2,248.4 805.8 15.0
1909 133.8 1,831.5 -40.5 1,535.2 903.3 16.0
1910 253.5 1,476.1 -355.4 1,219.0 802.1 16.0
1911 336.8 1,119.1 -357.0 610.6 905.0 18.0
1912 417.3 1,113.0 -6.1 950.9 909.5 19.0
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Table B.7c
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: BOHMISCH-MAHRISCHE MASCH.FABRIK
RET RATIOl RATI02 RATI03 RATI04 RATI07
1880 19.4 71.5 106.2 42.1 139.7 48.5
1881 8.6 81.4 114.5 43.2 147.9 76.0
1882 9.4 75.3 115.6 38.0 136.7 69.3
1883 9.8 72.6 117.3 35.3 173.5 65.0
1884 7.3 69.3 119.1 32.5 190.0 69.3
1885 4.9 80.6 120.1 35.6 203.8 102.8
1886 6.3 75.3 119.0 39.0 153.5 80.1
1887 6.3 66.8 119.6 33.4 123.3 79.7
1888 10.0 47.0 120.2 23.3 135.3 62.4
1889 10.0 45.7 121.4 26.7 109.9 61.9
1890 11.7 43.8 122.0 25.6 109.1 56.2
1891 10.0 50.2 121.8 29.3 110.7 65.5
1892 10.2 47.4 122.8 25.8 129.0 63.7
1893 13.1 61.9 124.1 31.2 141.4 49.3
1894 12.9 44.7 125.3 20.8 142.7 49.6
1895 7.7 51.0 126.4 21.8 151.7 77.5
1896 7.9 43.5 126.9 18.0 162.8 75.2
1897 9.2 47.0 127.5 18.9 162.4 63.8
1898 9.5 38.0 128.1 15.9 137.1 61.8
1899 9.6 51.5 130.7 19.8 181.5 79.5
1900 6.9 49.1 129.6 45.9 76.7 111.2
1901 7.3 50.4 130.2 49.1 86.2 84.1
1902 3.5 55.6 132.5 51.5 89.7 127.8
1903 7.3 64.3 130.5 56.1 100.7 74.0
1904 10.2 68.5 131.1 57.1 115.4 74.5
1905 11.8 65.7 132.3 47.3 128.5 77.0
1906 13.2 62.5 133 .5 39.2 124.5 73.6
1907 13.9 57.2 133.2 30.1 109.6 70.1
1908 18.8 48.3 135.6 21.1 104.0 58.8
1909 20.5 43.8 139.7 18.2 131.1 55.9
1910 17.9 40.1 141.6 13.2 166.0 63.0
1911 20.1 38.6 142.3 9.6 259.8 62.8
1912 20.1 37.8 143.9 9.2 220.1 66.0
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Table B.8a
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: RUSTON
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 3 873.5 2 400.0 2 478.2 78.2 1,145.8
1881 4 452.8 2 400.0 2 532.8 132.8 1,739.1
1882 4 089.6 2 400.0 3 100.2 700.2 751.3
1883 4 331.7 2 400.0 3 086.7 686.7 1,159.1
1884 4 479.4 2 400.0 3 052.7 652.7 1,265.8
1885 4 001.8 2 400.0 3 061.6 661.6 782.8
1886 4 010.6 2 400.0 3 064.1 664.1 779.5
1887 3 915.8 2 400.0 2 981.6 581.6 802.1
1888 4 303.8 2 400.0 2 887.0 487.0 1,309.4
1889 4 513.7 2 400.0 2 869.1 469.1 1,482.7
1890 4 153.0 2 400.0 2 878.0 478.0 1,091.7
1891 4 204.4 2 400.0 2 891.2 491.2 1,144.2
1892 4 181.0 2 400.0 2 893.3 493.3 1,121.0
1893 4 009.3 2 400.0 2 894.6 494.6 934.6
1894 3 895.9 2 400.0 2 896.7 496.7 805.3
1895 3 963.2 2 400.0 2 900.9 500.9 889.9
1896 4 362.4 2 400.0 2 896.7 496.7 1,285.5
1897 4 293.7 2 400.0 2 899.9 499.9 1,231.0
1898 5 007.1 2 400.0 2 898.6 498.6 1,895.8
1899 5 146.1 2 400.0 2 904.1 504.1 2,043.3
1900 5 856.6 2 400.0 2 906.9 506.9 2,780.1
1901 5 658.1 2 400.0 2 906.0 506.0 2,591.6
1902 4 755.9 3 196.0 3 703.0 507.1 875.4
1903 4 798.5 3 196.0 3 705.9 509.9 1,007.1
1904 4 879.7 3 196.0 3 706.7 510.7 993.7
1905 5 001.0 3 200.0 3 711.1 511.1 1,147.5
1906 5 115.8 3 200.0 3 710.4 510.4 1,226.4
1907 6 324.3 3 200.0 3 712.5 512.5 2,384.1
1908 5 600.9 3 200.0 3 716.8 516.8 1,670.6
1909 5 771.0 3 200.0 3 717.7 517.7 1,860.2
1910 14 681.1 6 000.0 6 533.2 533.2 7,754.1
1911 24 559.1 10 000.0 11 864.8 1,864.8 12,026.7
1912 29 872.9 14 000.0 15 909.0 1,909.0 13,444.4
Note: The sharp rise of equity reserves in 1882 resulted 
from a one-off endowment of reserve funds. The board of 
directors bought shares of the firm on own account and, by 
their allocation to the reserves, put them at the company's 
disposal. See Compass 1882, pp.684-685.
Table B.8b
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: RUSTON
CRS FXA INV STO SPL DIV
1880 4.1 1 523.6 — 815.2 249.4 8.3
1881 8.5 1 570.7 47.1 1,291.8 181.0 7.5
1882 9.0 1 565.9 -4.8 755.9 238.1 7.5
1883 17.9 1 629.2 63.3 1,133.0 85.9 5.0
1884 18.9 1 630.9 1.7 819.8 161.0 5.0
1885 28.4 1 621.0 -9.9 670.4 157.3 5.0
1886 36.3 1 583.0 -38.0 648.0 167.0 5.0
1887 45.2 1 580.0 -3.0 796.2 132.1 5.5
1888 48.4 1 583.5 3.5 953.8 107.4 5.0
1889 51.4 1 529.7 -53.9 1,005.3 162.0 5.5
1890 58.5 1 270.0 -259.7 911.5 183.4 6.0
1891 66.3 1 270.0 0.0 1,216.1 169.0 6.0
1892 74.2 1 270.0 0.0 1 098.4 166.6 6.0
1893 82.5 1 270.0 0.0 787.2 180.0 6.0
1894 97.0 1 270.0 0.0 820.9 193.9 6.5
1895 108.3 1 270.0 0.0 1,040.8 172.5 6.5
1896 120.4 1 270.0 0.0 1,341.6 180.2 6.5
1897 132.8 1 273.2 3.2 1,386.9 162.8 6.0
1898 146.1 1 265.9 -7.3 1,793.9 212.8 6.5
1899 174.1 1 281.0 15.1 1,257.8 198.7 7.5
1900 — 1 347.1 66.1 1,455.8 169.5 6.5
1901 - 1 481.8 134.7 1,409.6 160.5 6.0
1902 - 1 547.9 66.1 1,080.6 177.6 5.0
1903 - 1 590.0 42.1 1,032.7 85.6 2.5
1904 — 1 572.9 -17.1 1,096.9 179.3 5.0
1905 — 1 678.6 105.7 1,085.3 142.4 4.0
1906 - 1 680.1 1.5 1,357.4 179.1 5.0
1907 - 1 717.8 37.7 1,940.5 227.7 6.0
1908 - 1 713.9 -3.9 1,354.3 213.5 6.0
1909 — 1 707.5 -6.4 1,256.6 193.2 5.0
1910 — 5 323.1 3,615.6 3,268.6 393.8 6.0
1911 - 8 636.7 3,313.6 4,799.8 667.6 6.0
1912 — 11 484.1 2,847.4 7,710.7 519.5 5.0
Table B.8c
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: RUSTON
RET RATIOl RATI02 RATI03 RATI04 RATI07
1880 10.1 64.0 103.3 39.3 106.0 80.2
1881 7.1 56.9 105.5 35.3 88.5 99.5
1882 7.7 75.8 129.2 38.3 133.5 75.6
1883 2.8 71.3 128.6 37.6 111.7 139.7
1884 5.3 68.1 127.2 36.4 124.6 74.5
1885 5.1 76.5 127.6 40.5 133.6 76.3
1886 5.5 76.4 127.7 39.5 137.3 71.9
1887 4.4 76.1 124.2 40.4 125.5 99.9
1888 3.7 67.1 120.3 36.8 113.8 111.7
1889 5.6 63.6 119.5 33.9 113.2 81.5
1890 6.4 69.3 119.9 30.6 131.9 78.5
1891 5.8 68.8 120.5 30.2 116.3 85.2
1892 5.8 69.2 120.6 30.4 122.2 86.4
1893 6.2 72.2 120.6 31.7 140.7 80.0
1894 6.7 74.4 120.7 32.6 138.5 80.5
1895 5.9 73.2 120.9 32.0 125.5 90.4
1896 6.2 66.4 120.7 29.1 110.9 86.6
1897 5.6 67.5 120.8 29.7 109.0 88.5
1898 7.3 57.9 120.8 25.3 94.7 73.3
1899 6.8 56.4 121.0 24.9 114.4 90.6
1900 5.8 49.6 121.1 23.0 103.7 92.0
1901 5.5 51.4 121.1 26.2 100.5 89.7
1902 4.8 77.9 115.9 32.5 140.9 90.0
1903 2.3 77.2 116.0 33.1 141.3 93.4
1904 4.8 76.0 116.0 32.2 138.8 89.1
1905 3.8 74.2 116.0 33.6 134.3 89.9
1906 4.8 72.5 115.9 32.8 122.2 89.3
1907 6.1 58.7 116.0 27.2 101.5 84.3
1908 5.7 66.4 116.1 30.6 121.1 89.9
1909 5.2 64.4 116.2 29.6 125.4 82.8
1910 6.0 44.5 108.9 36.3 76.0 91.4
1911 5.6 48.3 118.6 35.2 88.3 89.9
1912 3.3 53.3 113.6 38.4 82.9 134.8
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Table B.9a
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: GANZ
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 5 880.5 3 840.0 4 156.6 316.6 1 135.7
1881 7 171.0 3 840.0 4 408.1 568.1 2 117.7
1882 8 678.6 3 840.0 4 627.0 787.0 3 288.7
1883 9 569.0 3 840.0 4 847.1 1 007.1 3 701.6
1884 9 400.5 3 840.0 5 210.0 1 370.0 3 136.4
1885 8 319.5 3 840.0 5 516.5 1 676.5 1 738.3
1886 7 792.9 3 840.0 5 832.1 1 992.1 1 273.9
1887 8 674.3 3 840.0 5 916.0 2 076.0 1 909.1
1888 9 946.1 3 840.0 6 129.4 2 289.4 2 660.0
1889 11 712.0 3 840.0 6 529.8 2 689.8 3 820.2
1890 12 575.0 3 840.0 6 970.9 3 130.9 3 886.2
1891 16 951.9 3 840.0 7 818.4 3 978.4 7 294.4
1892 18 421.7 3 840.0 8 729.2 4 889.2 8 072.8
1893 20 677.5 3 840.0 9 358.1 5 418.1 9 775.0
1894 19 304.4 3 840.0 9 711.7 5 871.7 8 016.1
1895 21 085.7 3 840.0 10 253.6 6 413.6 9 431.7
1896 24 941.3 4 800.0 15 241.8 10 441.8 8 010.8
1897 28 836.0 4 800.0 15 431.5 10 631.5 11 929.7
1898 31 895.1 4 800.0 15 548.9 10 748.9 14 605.3
1899 35 756.9 4 800.0 15 905.7 11 105.7 17 989.9
1900 39 622.0 4 800.0 16 340.7 11 540.7 21 974.3
1901 35 252.4 4 800.0 16 517.5 11 717.5 17 952.6
1902 33 431.9 4 800.0 16 432.5 11 632.5 16 247.4
1903 36 058.4 4 800.0 16 461.1 11 661.1 18 412.0
1904 34 558.5 4 800.0 16 647.8 11 847.8 17 001.5
1905 36 836.3 4 800.0 16 262.2 11 462.2 19 801.6
1906 34 709.7 4 800.0 15 798.5 10 998.5 17 728.2
1907 35 600.8 4 800.0 15 909.1 11 109.1 18 217.1
1908 34 478.0 4 800.0 16 146.2 11 346.2 16 541.2
1909 31 164.2 4 800.0 16 595.6 11 795.6 12 821.5
1910 30 291.9 4 800.0 17 266.4 12 466.4 11 226.9
1911 54 645.8 8 640.0 24 684.0 16 044.0 27 096.2
1912 94 345.8 8 640.0 24 949.3 16 309.3 67 097.4
1913 106 366.9 8 640.0 24 877.9 16 237.9 79 572.4
Table B.9b
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: GANZ
CRS FXA INV DEP STO
1880 0.0 1 737.0 0.0 53.5 970.5
1881 176.0 1 648.0 -89.0 52.1 1,738.3
1882 236.0 1 481.3 -166.7 150.1 1,821.7
1883 326.0 1 357.4 -123.9 158.4 2, 105.7
1884 396.0 1 246.4 -111.0 157.3 1, 657.0
1885 507.3 1 106.0 -140.4 157.9 873.3
1886 550.2 1 083.9 -22.1 160.2 834.1
1887 600.5 1 375.7 291.8 67.2 1, 091.9
1888 678.9 1 533.1 157.4 87.7 1, 117.6
1889 767.3 1 571.7 38.6 82.9 1, 614.5
1890 967.7 1 605.4 33.7 167.6 1,290.2
1891 1 077.3 1 781.4 176.0 231.0 1, 144.7
1892 1 204.3 1 658.0 -123.4 159.4 4, 939.4
1893 1 510.0 1 516.5 -141.5 157.8 2, 674.7
1894 1 736.8 1 512.4 -4.1 156.4 3 ,322.8
1895 1 970.7 1 727.8 215.4 146.7 5, 178.1
1896 2 214.4 4 881.3 3,153.5 141.0 4, 017.3
1897 2 446.2 7 865.9 2,984.6 332.9 7, 102.5
1898 2 680.2 8 261.5 395.6 343.5 5,791.3
1899 2 642.7 7 933.8 -327.7 352.7 6,989.6
1900 2 604.7 8 831.4 897.6 373.8 7, 633.0
1901 2 567.1 8 597.7 -233.7 375.3 5, 932.1
1902 2 639.2 8 292.1 -305.6 371.0 6,879.3
1903 2 653.8 8 028.2 -263.9 369.8 6, 178.6
1904 2 621.1 7 735.3 -292.9 367.1 5, 510.1
1905 2 794.9 8 882.0 1,146.7 418.7 5,838.6
1906 2 158.7 6 338.5 -2,543.5 291.0 1,895.9
1907 2 141.3 4 859.6 -1,478.9 259.5 3, 386.4
1908 2 272.0 5 561.6 702.0 293.2 4,441.5
1909 2 400.5 5 554.7 -6.9 304.8 3, 579.3
1910 2 303.2 5 715.6 160.9 340.0 3, 021.0
1911 9 153.4 10 409.1 4,693.5 527.5 12, 153.0
1912 16 844.4 24 100.7 13,691.6 100.0 26, 749.0
1913 34 145.9 26 710.4 2,609.7 148.7 38, 826.3
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Table B.9c
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: GANZ
SPL TOV DIV RET RATIOl
1880 588.2 6,870.9 8.75 14.2 70.7
1881 655.2 8, 389.9 10.00 14.9 61.5
1882 762.9 12, 511.1 12.50 16.5 53.3
1883 1,018.4 17, 207.4 15.00 21.0 50.7
1884 1,054.1 20, 261.8 16.25 20.2 55.4
1885 1,065.3 16, 737.6 16.25 19.3 66.3
1886 686.9 9,219.1 13.75 11.8 74.8
1887 849.1 10, 635.2 13.75 14.4 68.2
1888 1,156.8 14, 483.4 16.25 18.9 61.6
1889 1,362.0 19, 510.6 17.50 20.9 55.8
1890 1,717.9 23, 858.4 18.75 24.6 55.4
1891 1,839.2 26, 866.9 20.00 23.5 46.1
1892 1,619.7 23, 064.2 20.00 18.6 47.4
1893 1,644.3 25, 790.3 21.25 17.8 44.8
1894 1,575.4 25, 852.8 21.25 16.2 50.3
1895 1,400.1 26, 131.8 25.00 13.7 48.6
1896 1,688.7 30, 000. 0 27.50 11.1 61.1
1897 1,474.9 24, 258.0 25.00 9.6 53.5
1898 1,740.9 34, 000.0 25.00 11.2 48.8
1899 1,861.2 26, 000.0 25.00 11.7 44.5
1900 1,307.5 34, 500.0 20.00 8.0 41.2
1901 782.2 28, 500.0 12.50 4.7 46.9
1902 744.0 21, 000.0 12.50 4.5 49.2
1903 1,185.3 26, 114.7 17.50 7.2 45.7
1904 909.1 26, 411.8 16.25 5.5 48.2
1905 772.5 23, 700.0 13.75 4.8 44.1
1906 1,183.0 17.50 7.5 45.5
1907 1,474.6 20.00 9.3 44.7
1908 1,790.5 22.50 11.1 46.8
1909 1,747.1 22.50 10.5 53.3
1910 1,798.7 22.50 10.4 57.0
1911 2,865.5 22.50 11.6 45.2
1912 2,299.1 22.50 9.2 26.4
1913 1,916.5 18.75 7.7 23.4
Table B.9d
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: GANZ
RATI02 RATI03 RATI04 RATI05 RATI06 RATI07
1880 108.2 29.5 153.5 116.8 14.1 57.1
1881 114.8 23.0 130.2 117.0 20.7 58.6
1882 120.5 17.1 140.1 144.2 14.6 62.9
1883 126.2 14.2 140.0 179.8 12.2 56.6
1884 135.7 13.3 179.4 215.5 8.2 59.2
1885 143.7 13.3 278.7 201.2 5.2 58.6
1886 151.9 13.9 304.1 118.3 9.1 76.9
1887 154.1 15.9 239.8 122.6 10.3 62.2
1888 159.6 15.4 231.2 145.6 7.7 53.9
1889 170.1 13.4 204.9 166.6 8.3 49.3
1890 181.5 12.8 240.7 189.7 5.4 41.9
1891 203.6 10.5 267.2 158.5 4.3 41.8
1892 227.3 9.0 132.3 125.2 21.4 47.4
1893 241.1 7.3 220.9 124.7 10.4 49.6
1894 252.9 7.8 200.9 133.9 12.9 51.8
1895 267.0 8.2 148.5 123.9 19.8 68.6
1896 317.5 19.6 171.3 120.3 13.4 78.2
1897 321.5 27.3 103.1 84.1 29.3 81.4
1898 323.9 25.9 110.6 106.6 17.0 68.9
1899 331.4 22.2 106.6 72.7 26.9 64.5
1900 340.4 22.3 99.3 87.1 22.1 73.4
1901 344.1 24.4 113.7 80.9 20.8 76.7
1902 342.3 24.8 108.3 62.8 32.8 80.6
1903 342.9 22.3 115.9 72.4 23.7 70.9
1904 346.8 22.4 125.7 76.4 20.9 85.8
1905 338.8 24.1 110.5 64.4 24.6 85.5
1906 329.1 18.3 191.9 - - 71.0
1907 331.4 13.7 192.9 - - 65.1
1908 336.4 16.1 161.4 - - 60.3
1909 345.7 17.8 181.7 — — 61.8
1910 359.7 18.9 197.6 — — 60.0
1911 285.7 19.1 109.4 - - 67.8
1912 288.8 25.5 49.1 - - 84.6
1913 287.9 25.1 38.0 — - 84.5
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Table B.lOa
BALANCE -SHEET INDICATORS: SCHLICK
BST SHC EQC RES BOC
1880 1 459.8 900.0 902.8 2.8 481.4
1881 1 569.6 1 200.0 1 203.4 3.4 257.9
1882 2 273.4 2 000.0 2 014.6 14.6 110.0
1883 2 912.9 2 000.0 2 032.4 32.4 650.9
1884 3 617.6 2 400.0 2 495.1 95.1 875.5
1885 3 653.9 2 400.0 2 511.5 111.5 1, 142.4
1886 3 837.0 2 400.0 2 440.4 40.4 1,231.3
1887 3 946.1 2 400.0 2 531.9 131.9 1, 349.7
1888 4 298.9 2 400.0 2 537.4 137.4 1, 620.9
1889 4 274.8 2 400.0 2 553.7 153.7 1, 492.6
1890 5 410.2 2 400.0 2 619.5 219.5 2, 552.9
1891 4 748.6 2 400.0 2 663.8 263.8 1,880.7
1892 5 262.7 2 400.0 2 682.6 282.6 2, 371.4
1893 6 909.8 3 200.0 3 514.3 314.3 3, 127.8
1894 9 046.9 3 200.0 3 543.1 343.1 5, 248.7
1895 8 920.3 4 000.0 4 532.8 532.8 4, 051.3
1896 9 350.3 4 000.0 4 608.8 608.8 4, 430.6
1897 9 564.4 4 000.0 4 654.9 654.9 4, 608.6
1898 9 488.1 4 000.0 4 703.8 703.8 4,492.4
1899 8 594.7 4 000.0 4 745.2 745.2 3, 849.5
1900 8 061.1 4 000.0 4 540.6 540.6 3, 520.5
1901 6 348.6 4 000.0 4 226.6 226.6 2, 119.8
1902 6 796.0 4 000.0 4 240.1 240.1 2, 348.9
1903 6 289.3 4 000.0 4 302.7 302.7 1,786.1
1904 5 517.0 4 000.0 4 330.5 330.5 1, 007.7
1905 5 394.4 4 000.0 4 349.4 349.1 883.6
1906 7 960.1 4 000.0 4 357.3 357.3 3, 375.6
1907 10 745.3 4 000.0 4 421.0 421.0 6, 051.7
1908 9 273.1 4 000.0 4 452.0 452.0 4,428.6
1909 9 158.3 4 000.0 4 558.1 558.1 4, 202.6
1910 9 393.0 4 000.0 4 663.5 663.5 4 ,326.2
1911 10 933.0 4 000.0 4 779.7 779.7 5,748.4
1912 23 829.6 8 000.0 9 299.5 1,299.5 14, 132.8
1913 23 171.0 8 000.0 9 059.2 1,059.2 13, 922.6
Table B.lOb
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SCHLICK
CRS FXA INV DEP STO
1880 72.0 730.7 — 9.6 291.9
1881 4.0 752.2 21.5 32.0 322.2
1882 0.0 1 024.3 272.1 24.4 336.3
1883 0.0 1 472.3 448.0 34.4 683.8
1884 7.0 1 476.9 4.6 61.3 1,027.0
1885 0.0 1 464.1 -12.8 30.0 1,056.8
1886 15.0 1 407.7 -56.4 50.0 1,052.1
1887 0.0 1 383.1 -24.6 48.4 1,152.8
1888 0.0 1 470.2 87.1 50.0 961.3
1889 0.0 1 051.6 -418.6 81.0 1,109.9
1890 51.5 1 118.0 66.4 84.0 1,009.2
1891 95.4 1 210.1 92.1 70.0 1,201.0
1892 87.2 1 228.0 17.9 60.0 1,296.4
1893 100.5 1 604.9 376.9 60.0 1,731.0
1894 57.0 1 895.3 290.4 60.0 2,353.8
1895 20.0 2 428.6 533.3 80.0 2,197.2
1896 20.0 2 524.0 95.4 80.0 1,905.7
1897 30.0 2 501.4 -22.6 100. 0 1,365.8
1898 30.0 2 498.1 -3.3 100.0 1,662.9
1899 30.0 2 448.1 -50.0 50.0 1,804.0
1900 144.0 2 455.7 7.6 50.0 1,393.6
1901 30.0 2 409.0 -46.7 40.0 1,103.9
1902 30.0 2 329.0 -80.0 80.0 1,760.4
1903 30.0 2 229.0 -100.0 100.0 1,120.1
1904 30.0 2 165.3 -63.7 100.0 901.4
1905 30.0 2 065.3 -100.0 100.0 890.1
1906 30.0 2 195.5 130.2 100.0 2,057.3
1907 0.0 2 537.5 342.0 100.0 2,433.7
1908 0.0 2 895.0 357.5 100.0 2,149.5
1909 0.0 2 707.3 -187.7 150.0 2,116.4
1910 0.0 3 018.0 310.7 150.0 1,846.9
1911 0.0 2 972.9 -45.1 150.0 2,440.4
1912 754.4 3 113.9 141.0 120.0 6,311.1
1913 632.6 4 925.0 1,811.1 0.0 4,685.2
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Table B.lOc
BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SCHLICK
SPL TOV DIV RET RATIO1
1880 75.5 1,234.0 7.0 8.4 61.8
1881 108.2 1,657.1 8.0 9.0 76.7
1882 148.7 2,345.5 6.0 7.4 88.6
1883 229.7 2,870.7 10.0 11.3 69.8
1884 247.1 3,718.0 9.0 9.9 69.0
1885 -76.5 2,561.5 0.0 -3.0 68.7
1886 165.4 3,408.7 3.0 6.8 63.6
1887 64.5 4,000.7 2.5 2.6 64.2
1888 140.6 3,880.7 5.0 5.5 59.0
1889 228.5 4,205.2 6.0 9.0 59.7
1890 237.9 4,920.9 7.0 9.1 48.4
1891 204.1 4,465.7 7.0 7.7 56.1
1892 208.8 4,882.9 7.0 7.8 51.0
1893 267.7 5,648.5 6.2 7.6 50.9
1894 255.1 7,010.6 7.0 7.2 39.2
1895 336.1 9,806.6 6.5 7.4 50.8
1896 311.0 9,682.8 6.5 6.8 49.3
1897 300.8 10,752.1 6.5 6.5 48.7
1898 290.2 9,608.4 6.5 6.2 49.6
1899 -230.5 6,011.1 0.0 -4.9 55.2
1900 -324.9 5,688.0 0.0 -7.2 56.3
1901 2.1 4,793.0 0.0 5.0 66.6
1902 207.1 5,295.0 3.5 4.9 62.4
1903 200.5 5,126.0 4.0 4.7 68.4
1904 178.8 — 4.0 4.1 78.5
1905 161.4 — 4.0 3.7 80.6
1906 227.1 - 5.0 5.2 54.7
1907 272.6 - 6.0 6.2 41.1
1908 392.4 - 7.0 8.8 48.0
1909 397.6 — 7.0 8.7 49.8
1910 403.3 — 7.0 8.7 49.7
1911 404.9 - 7.0 8.5 43.7
1912 397.2 - 5.0 4.3 39.0
1913 -218.8 - 0.0 -2.4 39.1
Table B.lOd
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BALANCE-SHEET INDICATORS: SCHLICK
RATI02 RATI03 RATI04 RATI05 RATI06 RATI07
1880 100.3 50.1 88.3 84.5 23.7 83.4
1881 100.3 47.9 112.0 105.6 19.4 89.7
1882 100.7 45.1 148.1 103.2 14.3 80.7
1883 101.6 50.5 94.3 98.6 23.8 87.1
1884 104.0 40.8 99.7 102.8 27.6 87.4
1885 104.7 40.1 99.6 70.1 41.3 0.0
1886 101.7 36.7 99.2 88.8 30.9 43.5
1887 105.5 35.1 99.8 101.4 28.8 93.0
1888 105.7 34.2 104.4 90.3 24.8 85.4
1889 106.4 24.6 118.1 98.4 26.4 63.0
1890 109.2 20.7 123.1 91.0 20.5 70.6
1891 111.0 25.5 110.5 94.0 26.9 82.3
1892 111.8 23.3 106.3 92.8 26.6 80.5
1893 109.8 23.2 105.4 81.8 30.6 73.5
1894 110.7 21.0 83.4 77.5 33.6 87.8
1895 113.3 27.2 98.0 109.9 22.4 77.4
1896 115.2 27.0 104.0 103.6 19.7 83.6
1897 116.4 26.2 120.4 112.4 12.7 86.4
1898 117.6 26.3 113.0 101.3 17.3 89.6
1899 118.6 28.5 111.6 69.9 30.0 0.0
1900 113.5 30.5 118.0 70.6 24.5 0.0
1901 105.7 38.0 120.3 75.5 23.0 0.0
1902 106.0 34.3 103.7 77.9 33.3 67.6
1903 107.6 35.4 128.5 81.5 21.9 79.8
1904 108.3 39.3 141.2 — — 89.5
1905 108.7 38.3 147.2 — — 99.1
1906 108.9 27.6 102.5 - - 88.1
1907 110.5 23.6 88.9 - - 88.0
1908 111.3 31.2 88.3 - - 71.4
1909 114.0 29.6 94.5 — — 70.4
1910 116.6 32.1 95.9 — — 69.4
1911 119.5 27.2 88.3 - - 69.2
1912 116.2 13.1 98.7 - - 100.7
1913 113.2 21.3 94.3 - - 0.0
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2. The Machine-Building Companies in Sample II
Tables B.ll and B.12 below present summary balance-sheet 
data of the machine-building firms included in Sample II. 
All definitions and methods used in the derivation of 
balance-sheet indicators are identical to those described 
in the previous section. In addition to the original six 
companies of Sample I, Sample II of Austrian engineering 
companies encompasses the following firms:
a. 1890/91, 1900/01, 1912/13
1. Stabilimento Tecnico Triestino, Trieste (1857) ;
2. Wiener Locomotiv-Fabriks-AG, Vienna (1869);
3. Pilsener Maschinen- und Waggonbau-AG, Pilsen/Plzefi 
(1872) ;
b. 1900/01, 1912/13
4. Grazer Waggon- und Maschinen-Fabriks-AG, vorm. Joh. 
Weitzer, Vienna (1895) ;
5. Aktiengesellschaft fur Maschinenbau, vorm. Brand & 
Lhuillier, Brno (1895);
6. Nesselsdorfer Wagenbau-Fabriks-Gesellschaft, Vienna 
(1891);
7. Maschinenfabrik Andritz AG, Vienna (1900) ;
8. Skodawerke AG, Pilsen/Plzeft (1899);
c. 1912/13
9. Maschinenfabriks-AG N. Heid, Stockerau (1901);
10. Osterreichische Maschinenbau-AG "Korting", Vienna 
(1903) ;
11. Staudinger Waggonfabrik, Stauding (1900);
12. Erste Galizische Waggon- und Maschinenbau-AG in Sanok, 
Lemberg/Lwow (1895);
13. Gaswerksbau und Maschinen-Fabriks-AG Franz Manoschek, 
Vienna (1907);
14. Maschinenfabrik L. Zieleniewski, Cracow (1906);
15. Hofherr-Schrantz-Clayton-Shuttleworth, Landwirt- 
schaftliche Maschinen-Fabrik AG, Vienna (1908) ;
16. Leobersdorfer Maschinenfabriks-AG, Vienna (1906);
17. Profinitzer Maschinen- und Motorenfabrik AG F.& 
J.Kovcirik, ProBnitz/ProstSjov (1910) ;
18. Actiengesellschaft Alfa Separator, Vienna (1898);
19. Wiener Dampfkessel-, Apparate- und Maschinenfabriks- 
AG, vorm. Jos. Pauker & Sohn, Vienna (1911);
20. Filter- und brautechnische Maschinen-Fabrik AG, vorm. 
B.H. Hellmann, Prague (1912);
21. Fr. Melichar Samaschinen-Fabriks-AG, Prague (1911);
22. Novak & Jahn, Maschinenfabrik-AG, Prague (1911);
23. Landwirtschaftliche Aktien-Maschinenfabrik, Eisen-
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giesserei und Kesselschmiede Ed. Kokora & Comp., 
Prerau/Pferov (1912);
24. Webstuhl- und Weberei-Maschinen-Fabriks-AG,
Troppau/Opava (1905).
Besides Ganz and Schlick, Sample II for Hungary includes:
a. 1900, 1912
1. Budapester Pumpen- und Maschinen-AG# Budapest (1893);
2. "Nicholson” Maschinenfabriks-AG, Budapest (1895)21;
3. Vulkan Maschinenfabriks-AG, Budapest (1893);
4. "Danubius" Schiffbau- und Maschinenfabriks-AG, 
Budapest (1890)22;
5. Erste ungarische Landwirtschafts-Maschinenfabriks-AG, 
Budapest (1889);
6. C. Teudloff & Th. Dittrich Maschinenfabriks-AG, 
Budapest (1895);
7. Hirsch es Frank Budapest-Salg6-Tarjani gepgyar es 
vasontd reszvenytarsulat, Budapest (1898) ;
8. Erste Ungarische Nahmaschinen- und Fahrradfabriks-AG, 
Budapest (1893);
9. Johann Weitzer Maschinen-, Waggonfabrik und Eisen- 
giesserei, Budapest/Arad (1891);
10. Ungarische Waggon- und Maschinenfabriks-AG, Budapest 
(1896) ;
b. 1912
11. Nicolaus Feher, Maschinen-Fabriks-AG, Budapest (1901);
12. Alfa-Separator reszvenyt&rsasag, Budapest (1903);
13. Fabrik fiir Maschinen- und Eisenbahnausriistung AG, 
Budapest/Kistarcsa (1907);
14. Hofherr-Schrantz & Clayton-Shuttleworth AG, Budapest 
(1908) ;
15. L. Lang Maschinenfabriks-AG, Budapest (1911);
16. Stefan Rock und Erste Brunner Maschinenfabrik AG, 
Budapest (1909);
17. Ungarische Allgemeine Maschinenfabriks-AG, Budapest
(1911);
18. Ungarische Maschinenfabrik fiir chemische Industrie AG, 
Budapest (1908);
19. Dr. Wagner & Comp. Vereinigte Fabriken AG, Budapest
(1912);
20. Debreczeni mezdgazdasagi gepgyar reszvenytarsasag, 
Debreczen (1908);
21. Kaposvari vasontdde es gepgyar reszvenytarsasag, 
Kaposvar (1906);
22. Losonczer landwirtschaftliche Maschinenfabrik AG,
21 Because of its merger with Schlick (1912) , Nicholson is 
not included as a separate company in Sample II for 1912.
22 Danubius merged with Ganz in 1911; the firm is, 
therefore, not included as an indidvidual company in Sample 
II for 1912.
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Losoncz (1911);
23. Ungarische Motoren- und Maschinenbau AG, Szombathely 
(1902);
24. Nagyv&rader EisengieBerei und Maschinenfabriks-AG, 
Nagyv£rad (1911);
25. Oscar Revai, Heizapparate- und Metallwaren-Fabriks-AG, 
Budapest (1904).
Table B.ll
SELECTED BALANCE- 
(1000
-SHEET DATA: SAMPLE II, AUSTRIA 
CROWNS OR PER CENT)
1890 1900 1912
9 comp. 14 comp. 30 comp.
BST 5,137.5 10,149.5 14,891.6
SHC 2,333.5 4,697.1 4,878.6
EQC 2,703.9 5,291.7 6,018.3
BOC 2,192.3 4,296.6 8,057.7
FXA 1,508.1 3,584.7 4,217.3
STO 1,966.8 3,173.3 4,285.0
RATIOl 52.6% 52.1% 40.4%
RATI02 115.9% 112.7% 123.8%
RATI03 29.4% 35.3% 28.3%
RATI04 77.8% 78.3% 70.8%
Table B. 12
SELECTED BALANCE--SHEET DATA: SAMPLE II, HUNGARY
(1000 CROWNS OR PER CENT)
1900 1912
12 comp. 25 comp.
BST 9,655.4 9,149.9
SHC 3,066.7 2,430.8
EQC 4,236.4 3,312.8
BOC 5,255.6 5,591.9
FXA 2,535.6 2,488.0
STO 2,108.6 2,561.9
RATIOl 48.9% 36.2%
RATI02 138.1% 136.3%
RATI03 26.3% 27.2%
RATI04 91.2% 65.6%
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APPENDIX C
A Compilation of Austrian and German Iron Prices
1870 to 1913
The following tables present data on the development of
iron prices in Austria and - in order to facilitate
comparisons - Germany, too. Sixteen prices are given in
crowns per metric ton1:
1. average price of Austrian cast iron at place of 
production (ACI; Table C.l);
2. average unit price of imported cast iron at Austro- 
Hungarian border (ICI; Table C.l);
3. unit price of imported cast inclusive of negotiated 
tariff: ICI + negotiated tariff (ICITa; Table C.l);
4. unit price of imported cast iron inclusive of 
autonomous (general) tariff: ICI + autonomous tariff 
(ICITb; Table C.l);
5. average trade price of German cast iron of category I 
in Germany (GCI1; Table C.l);
6. average trade price of German cast iron of category 
III in Germany (GCI3; Table C.l);
7. average trade price of Luxembourg cast iron of 
category III in Germany (LCI3; Table C.l);
8. wholesale price of Austrian support iron (profiles) in 
Vienna (ASI; Table C.2);
9. wholesale price of German support iron (profiles) in 
Berlin (GSI; Table C.2);
10. parity of German wholesale price of support iron 
(profiles) in Vienna inclusive of freight and tariff
1 German prices in mark (M) have been converted into crowns 
(K): 1 M = 1.18 K. Prices no. 5 to 16 are annual averages 
of quarterly figures.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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(PSI; Table C.2);
wholesale price of Austrian heavy sheet metal (plate) 
in Vienna (ASM; Table C.3);
wholesale price of German heavy sheet metal (plate) in 
Berlin (GSM; Table C.3);
parity of German wholesale price of heavy sheet metal 
(plate) in Vienna inclusive of freight and tariff 
(PSM; Table C.3);
wholesale price of Austrian bar iron in Vienna (ABI; 
Table C.4)2;
wholesale price of German bar iron in Berlin (GBI; 
Table C.4);
parity of German wholesale price of bar iron in Vienna 
inclusive of freight and tariff (PBI; Table C.4).
2 From 1870 to 1889: final prices for Styrian bar iron in 
Vienna (annually).
Table C.l
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CAST IRON PRICES (CROWNS/TON)
ACI ICI ICITa ICITb GCI1 GCI3 LCI3
1913 94 81 96 100 — — —
1912 92 81 96 100 - - -
1911 90 69 84 88 79 76 61
1910 91 72 87 91 76 74 64
1909 90 72 87 91 70 69 57
1908 92 73 88 92 89 83 64
1907 92 76 91 95 99 93 84
1906 85 82 97 101 93 84 77
1905 78 75 91 94 79 76 68
1904 82 69 85 88 78 76 61
1903 84 65 81 84 78 75 61
1902 86 65 81 84 76 71 57
1901 93 97 113 116 — — 71
1900 94 104 120 123 119 114 103
1899 85 95 111 114 90 85 79
1898 80 67 83 86 79 71 61
1897 80 69 85 88 79 71 65
1896 81 64 80 83 77 67 59
1895 83 56 72 75 75 64 53
1894 84 56 72 75 74 63 52
1893 80 60 76 79 73 64 52
1892 80 60 76 79 77 67 57
1891 87 64 83 84 71 58
1890 88 70 89 98 83 76
1889 90 60 79 79 70 60
1888 90 60 79 68 61 50
1887 84 62 81 - - -
1886 90 60 79 — — —
1885 92 64 83 — — —
1884 104 64 83 - - -
1883 115 76 95 - - -
1882 121 80 99 - - -
1881 125 78 90 — — —
1880 127 80 92 — — —
1879 139 75 87 - - -
1878 150 70 82 - - -
1877 161 76 86 93 - - -
1876 154 84 94 101 — — —
1875 160 100 110 117 — — —
1874 174 120 130 137 - - -
1873 200 110 120 127 - - -
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cont. Table C.l
ACI ICI ICITa ICITb GCI1 GCI3 LCI3
1872 196 100 110 117 _ — —
1871 210 100 110 117 - - -
1870 210 100 110 117 - — -
Sources: (1) ACI, ICI: see Appendix A, Tables A.7 and A.8.
(2) GCI1, GCI3, LCI3: k.k. Handelsministerium,
"Materialien zur Kartellenquete 1912, VIII: 
Eisenindustrie", Die Kartellfrage in Osterreich (Vienna, 
1897-1912), (hereafter "Eisenkartellenquete”), Abschnitt 
III: Tabellen und graphische Darstellungen, Figure XXVII.
(3) ICITa, ICITb: for tariffs see Handelsministerium,
"Eisenkartellenquete", Abschnitt IV: Statistische
Materialien, Table 16, p.35; k.k. Handelsministerium, 
Statistische Materialien iiber den osterreichisch- 
ungarischen AuBenhandel nebst Vergleich der Zollsatze seit 
1878, Tarifklasse XXXVIII: Eisen und Eisenwaren (Vienna, 
1912), p.3.
Table C.2
SUPPORT IRON (PROFILES) PRICES (CROWNS/TON)
AS I GSI PSI
1911 216 159 233
1910 216 159 233
1909 216 159 233
1908 225 165 239
1907 225 177 251
1906 212 165 240
1905 205 153 229
1904 200 153 229
1903 198 153 229
1902 170 152 228
1901 164 160 236
1900 200 192 268
1899 210 166 242
1898 218 157 233
1897 210 153 229
1896 204 143 219
1895 205 129 205
1894 203 130 206
1893 203 131 207
1892 222 131 207
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cont. Table C.2
ASI GSI PSI
1891 227 171 247
1890 240 202 278
Source: Handelsministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete",
Abschnitt III: Tabellen und graphische Darstellungen, Table 
XIV, pp.20-21.
Table C.3
PRICES OF HEAVY SHEET METAL (CROWNS/TON)
ASM
1911 236
1910 236
1909 239
1908 253
1907 260
1906 242
1905 235
1904 235
1903 230
1902 201
1901 197
1900 227
1899 240
1898 244
1897 241
1896 256
1895 252
1894 260
1893 275
1892 275
1891 275
1890 275
GSM PSM
163 269
160 266
147 254
152 259
185 292
183 292
160 273
168 276
172 282
172 284
249 362
253 366
211 324
184 297
183 296
168 281
152 264
168 276
183 295
191 304
203 316
279 391
Source: Handelsministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete",
Abschnitt III: Tabellen und graphische Darstellungen, Table 
XVI, pp.23-25.
Table C.4
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BAR IRON PRICES (CROWNS/TON)
1911
ABI
187
GBI
144
PBI
231
1910 184 150 236
1909 187 139 228
1908 208 144 231
1907 215 187 274
1906 203 173 260
1905 195 147 236
1904 193 148 237
1903 191 146 235
1902 176 145 234
1901 170 149 238
1900 205 236 325
1899 207 203 291
1898 216 160 249
1897 214 172 261
1896 219 156 245
1895 216 133 222
1894 218 132 221
1893 226 137 226
1892 229 - -
1891 235 — —
1890 253 — —
1889 250 - -
1888 236 - -
1887 236 - -
1886 228 — —
1885 240 _ —
1884 242 - -
1883 250 - -
1882 240 - -
1881 227 — —
1880 230 — —
1879 240 - -
1878 236 - -
1877 250 - -
1876 252 — —
1875 280 — —
1874 292 - -
1873 348 - -
1872 386 - -
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cont. Table C.4
ABI GBI PBI
1871 340
1870 328
Source: Handelsministerium, "Eisenkartellenquete",
Abschnitt III: Tabellen und graphische Darstellungen, Table 
XI, pp.16-17; Table XIII, p.19.
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APPENDIX D
Austro-Hungarian Foreign Trade in Machinery
1870 to 1913
The data on Austria-Hungary's trade in machinery, presented 
in the following, refer to mechanical engineering as 
grouped in "Tarifklasse XL” (and the equivalent earlier 
classification) of the official Austro-Hungarian and 
Hungarian foreign trade statistics1. Electrical machinery,
1 All data on Austria-Hungary's internal and external trade 
in machinery presented in this appendix are taken from or 
derived from these sources:
(a) k.k. Statistische Central-Commission, Ausweise iiber den 
auswartigen Handel Osterreichs (Vienna, 1871-1882), 1870, 
pp.56-57, 98-99; 1871, pp.56-57, 98-99; 1872, pp.56-57, 98- 
99; 1873, pp.58-59, 100-101; 1874, pp.58-59, 100-101; 1875, 
pp. 58-59, 100-101; 1876, pp. 58-59, 100-101; 1877, pp. 58- 
59, 100-101; 1878, II, pp.68-69, III, pp. 42-42; 1879, II, 
pp. 64-67, III, pp. 42-43; 1880, II, pp. 64-67, III, pp. 
42-43; 1881, II, pp. 64-67, III, pp. 42-43.
(b) k.k. Statistische Central-Commission, "Statistik des 
auswartigen Handels der osterreichisch-ungarischen 
Monarchie", Osterreichische Statistik, vol.4 (1883/84), II, 
pp. 48-51, III, pp. 26-27; vol.7 (1884), II, pp. 48-51,
III, pp. 30-31; vol.10 (1885/86), II, pp. 48-51, III, pp. 
30-31; vol.14 (1886/87), II, pp. 48-51, III, pp.30-31;
1886, vol.17 (1887/88), II, pp. 48-51, III, pp.30-31;
vol.20 (1888/89), II, pp. 48a-51a, 66b-69b, III, pp. 30a- 
31a, 42b-45b; vol.23 (1889/90), II, pp.66-69, III, pp. 42- 
45; vol.26 (1890/91), II, pp. 68-73, III, pp. 42-45; vol.29 
(1891/92), II, pp. 68-73, III, pp.42-45.
(c) k.k. Handelsministerium, Statistisches Department, 
Statistik des auswartigen Handels des osterreichisch- 
ungarischen Zollgebiets (Vienna, 1893-1916), 1895 (II),
pp.244-256, 514-520; 1896 (12), pp. 502-503, 531-532; 1899
(12), pp. 25-26, 54-55; 1900 (II), pp.241-252, 525-532;
1905 (12), pp. 26-27, 56-57; 1905 (II), pp.230-242, 512-
520; 1907 (III), pp. 176-177; 203-205; 1912 (IV), pp. 166- 
169, 224-227; 1915 (IV), pp.83-87, 142-145.
(d) k.k. Handelsministerium, Statistische Materialien iiber 
den osterreichisch-ungarischen AuBenhandel nebst Vergleich 
der Zollsatze seit 1878, Tarifklasse XL: Maschinen, 
Apparate und Bestandteile derselben (Vienna, 1913), pp. 1-
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included in the statistics under the heading of machinery 
between 1887 and 1905, is not covered here. The totals are 
reduced by the respective figures for electrical equipment 
to allow compatibility with the data sets for the later 
years. Prior to 1887 electrical goods are not separately 
listed in the statistics and thus not deductible. Judged on 
the basis of the 1887 trade figures, however, the volume of 
trade in electrical machinery seems most likely to have 
been insignificant in the early years.
The Hungarian trade statistics have been used to isolate 
Austrian (as distinct from total Austro-Hungarian) trade 
and the respective flows between Austria and Hungary 
(internal trade). In order to derive Austrian imports and 
exports, Hungarian imports and exports (exclusive of those
from and to Austria, i.e. regardless of internal trade)
were subtracted from the respective totals for the 
Monarchy:
impA = impAH - impHR0W + impAH
expA = expAH - expHR0W + expAH
Notation:
impA, expA total Austrian imports and exports
impAH, expAH imports and exports of Austria- Hungary
impHROW, expHROW Hungary's foreign trade with countries
outside the customs union of Austria- 
Hungary
impAH, expAH Austrian imports from and exports to
Hungary (internal trade).
Changes in the classification scheme of the foreign trade 
statistics were, generally, associated with alterations of 
the tariff structure2. Until the late-1870's, the only
192.
(e) Magyar Kir. Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, "A Magyar 
Szent Korona Orsz&gainak 1882-1913. £vi Kiilkereskedelmi 
Forgalma", Magyar Statisztikai Kozlemenyek 63 (Budapest, 
1963), pp.302-314.
2 Import tariffs were changed in 1878, 1882, 1887, 1892 and 
1906; see sources given in note 1.
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criteria for classifying machines other than locomotives, 
locomobiles and brass cylinders for cloth printing were the 
materials they were made of, i.e. wood, cast iron, wrought 
iron and steel, and other metals. Classification according 
to type of machinery was partially introduced in the 
foreign trade statistics during the 1880s. A substantial 
change took place in 1887 when, finally, more detailed 
categories of machinery were used. The number of entries 
rose from a mere 16 to 43 different types of machinery 
listed in the official statistics. From 1891, 52 items were 
distinguished and after 1906 the list of imported machinery 
included 106 categories3. The increasing degree of 
differentiation necessitated comprising of the data into 
broader, more representative categories. Several groups 
were formed, each of them including either similar types of 
machines (e.g. steam engines) or machinery serving 
particular purposes (e.g. agricultural implements or 
textile machines).
In addition to the overall trade figures for Austria- 
Hungary (Table D.l), Austria and Hungary (Table D.2) and 
the internal trade between the two halves of the Habsburg 
Monarchy (Table D.3), the data relating to the most 
important of these groups are reproduced in the following 
(Tables D.4 to D.ll).
Notes:
a. Unless explicitly noted, the following tables refer to 
Austria-Hungary as a whole.
b. In 1883 imports and exports of wooden agricultural 
machinery (included in overall agricultural machinery 
trade) had to be estimated by using 1884 ratios of their 
(volume) share in total wooden machinery imports and
3 The classification of machinery exports corresponds to 
that of imports; but the number of entries in the export 
statistics is smaller since a wider range of machinery was 
imported than exported. For 1891 to 1905, 35 export items 
were listed; from 1906, the number of entries was increased 
to 95.
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exports.
c. From 1870 to 1886 imports and exports of textile 
machinery include only looms and/or parts for cloth 
printing equipment. For these years most of textile 
machinery imports were almost certainly part of imports of 
non-specified machinery and apparatus. Therefore, the very 
low figures (Table D.5) do by no means fully represent 
Austria-Hungary's imports of textile machinery.
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Table D.l
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FOREIGN TRADE IN MACHINERY
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
Imports Exports
1913 122,970 54,063
1912 151,959 51,880
1911 118,965 45,611
1910 106,719 38,801
1909 91,844 32,257
1908 102,626 33,678
1907 95,658 38,338
1906 74,116 42,345
1905 62,275 31,184
1904 52,071 25,491
1903 47,757 22,592
1902 43,056 19,375
1901 42,259 27,959
1900 50,710 30,575
1899 44,686 22,500
1898 42,774 16,994
1897 37,934 11,528
1896 41,484 8,902
1895 44,632 9,386
1894 44,780 12,604
1893 38,030 11,464
1892 37,418 8,892
1891 34,794 9,812
1890 35,879 9,053
1889 41,506 11,000
1888 28,300 10,323
1887 22,349 7,627
1886 19,342 7,555
1885 23,703 7,635
1884 34,282 9,008
1883 31,922 15,480
1882 23,921 5,581
1881 27,617 9,472
1880 21,792 9,058
1879 18,795 6,943
1878 16,607 7,751
1877 13,784 7,709
1876 13,319 5,654
1875 19,063 12,659
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cont. Table D.l
1874 21,729 17,084
1873 29.782 9,974
1872 35.383 3,545
1871 30.078 5,245
1870 22.803 1.617
Table D.2
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AUSTRIAN AND HUNGARIAN FOREIGN TRADE IN MACHINERY*
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
Austria Hungary
Imports Exports Imports Exports
1913 87,002 43,841 35,968 10,222
1912 101,911 40,893 50,048 10,987
1911 82,898 32,975 36,067 12,636
1910 74,408 28,312 32,311 10,489
1909 68,940 24,396 22,904 7,861
1908 81,451 25,564 21,175 8,114
1907 72,574 30,745 23,084 7,593
1906 57,003 32,852 17,113 9,493
1905 47,451 23,495 14,824 7, 689
1904 41,214 18,740 10,857 6,751
1903 37,591 16,946 10,166 5,646
1902 35,774 13,609 7,282 5,766
1901 33,894 22,095 8,365 5,864
1900 41,681 22,827 9,029 7,748
1899 35,875 16,769 8,811 5,731
1898 33,888 11,442 8,886 5,662
1897 31,863 8,047 6,071 3,481
1896 34,923 5,934 6,561 2,968
1895 36,456 6,328 8,176 3,058
1894 36,154 8,733 8,626 3,871
1893 31,643 8, 098 6,387 3,366
1892 30,700 6,584 6,718 2,308
1891 30,912 7,636 3,882 2,176
1890 32,184 6,929 3,695 2,123
1889 34,901 9,033 3,947 1,967
1888 25,361 8,614 2,939 1,709
1887 20,680 5,796 1,669 1,831
1886 17,144 6,033 2,198 1,522
1885 19,138 6,260 4,565 1,375
1884 27,856 5,919 6,426 3,089
1883 23,562 12,491 8,360 2,989
* Exclusive of internal trade between Austria and Hungary.
Table D.3
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INTERNAL TRADE 
AUSTRIAN IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
TO HUNGARY
Imports Exports
1913 3 962 55 329
1912 7 851 72 497
1911 5 593 61 612
1910 6 156 51 075
1909 6 554 46 708
1908 6 464 48 357
1907 5 778 46 963
1906 5 690 43 821
1905 6 842 40 437
1904 5 887 35 854
1903 5 959 31 097
1902 5 162 31 250
1901 6 394 32 230
1900 7 860 33 704
1899 5 854 24 886
1898 4 252 24 776
1897 3 302 23 232
1896 2 963 24 755
1895 3 743 29 002
1894 3 610 33 059
1893 3 353 25 794
1892 2 173 24 300
1891 2 189 13 290
1890 2 296 15 298
1889 1 902 15 705
1888 1 934 10 930
1887 1 853 9 704
1886 1 711 7 824
1885 1 744 9 359
1884 3 285 14 426
1883 2 657 14 326
Table D.4
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FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
Imports Exports
1913 23,011 14,909
1912 24,321 18,031
1911 17,440 17,072
1910 15,475 15,932
1909 10,751 11,718
1908 10,216 10,841
1907 11,994 9,517
1906 8,779 10,559
1905 5,490 7,657
1904 3,429 6,673
1903 3,368 7,198
1902 2,449 5,244
1901 2,502 3,221
1900 3,288 2,996
1899 3,404 3,175
1898 3,134 3,060
1897 2,246 1,776
1896 2,604 1,348
1895 2,748 1,452
1894 3,032 1,718
1893 2,942 1,776
1892 3,536 1,628
1891 3,408 1,654
1890 2,941 1,117
1889 2,697 1,157
1888 1,824 1,235
1887 1,359 667
1886 1,652 470
1885 1,972 454
1884 3,761 936
1883 5,316 1,650
1882 4,142 600
1881 5,008 1,582
1880
1879
3,829
2,436
1,322
969
Table D.5
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FOREIGN TRADE IN SEWING MACHINES AND TEXTILE MACHINERY 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
Sewing & Knitting Mach. Textile Machinery
Imports Exports Imports Exports
1913 5 505 240 12,320 2 356
1912 6 402 298 24,573 2 501
1911 5 973 289 22,102 2 570
1910 5 102 226 22,466 2 707
1909 5 168 403 22,405 2 076
1908 4 002 591 32,466 1 992
1907 4 554 633 27,853 2 680
1906 4 343 346 17,191 2 510
1905 4 758 485 14,301 1 747
1904 4 053 526 12,896 1 542
1903 4 183 719 12,462 2 071
1902 4 100 513 11,850 1 697
1901 3 591 428 10,013 1 165
1900 3 420 375 15,211 1 296
1899 3 309 366 10,213 2 026
1898 2 932 250 10,222 2 280
1897 2 784 244 9,934 1 432
1896 3 056 242 13,094 1 156
1895 3 026 360 15,863 1 466
1894 2 520 236 18,856 2 196
1893 2 721 275 14,127 1 890
1892 2 506 208 12,792 1 090
1891 2 024 325 13,201 748
1890 1 854 611 14,295 110
1889 1 702 798 19,539 177
1888 992 1,178 13,223 177
1887 1 133 862 7,058 180
1886 1 190 1,207 619 40
1885 1 492 801 1,569 56
1884 1 811 470 2,224 28
1883 1 388 470 1,403 3
1882 8 391 234 196 -
1881 3 899 327 371 3
1880 2 988 319 187 1
1879 2 301 306 107 9
1878 1 629 361 96 -
1877 1 843 313 109 -
1876 - - 70 -
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cont. Table D.5
1875 - - 163
1874 - - 132
1873 - - 143
1872 - 59
1871 - 99
1870 - - 110
Table D.6
FOREIGN TRADE IN WORKING-MACHINERY 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
Machine Tools Wood- & Stone-Working M.
Imports Exports Imports Exports
1913 11,659 887 2,890 284
1912 13,635 781 4,506 417
1911 10,064 730 3,926 301
1910 8,846 417 3,556 249
1909 8,186 528 2,898 493
1908 11,589 363 2,740 115
1907 8,889 711 2,687 311
1906 4,867 419 1,773 545
1905 2,793 142 1,921 296
1904 1,745 117 1,251 360
1903 1,340 76 901 68
1902 1,225 130 727 150
1901 1,438 79 1,388 38
1900 2,378 161 1,696 261
1899 2,213 299 1,314 346
1898 1,796 272 946 452
1897 1,424 174 965 248
1896 974 198 1,481 56
1895 1,080 74 1,357 102
1894 1,086 90 1,356 130
1893 661 99 896 294
1892 836 49 926 321
1891 1,491 194 686 154
1890 595 — 591 25
1889 1,873 11 252 32
1888 504 17 139 29
1887 137 3 124 1
Table D.7
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FOREIGN TRADE IN STEAM POWERED WORKING 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
MACHINES
Imports Exports Imports Exports
1913 4,266 1,533 1909 2,552 501
1912 4,011 1,006 1908 2,120 1,125
1911 3,698 407 1907 1,472 494
1910 1,708 683 1906 643 276
Table 00•
Q
FOREIGN TRADE IN ENGINES (1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
Steam Engines Other Engines
Imports Exports Imports Exports
1913 1,469 11,102 5,331 1,077
1912 2,466 6,478 7,039 1,323
1911 1,709 6,562 4,721 847
1910 1,715 4,096 3,762 796
1909 1,629 2,085 2,147 751
1908 1,460 1,462 1,474 904
1907 734 1,803 1,646 562
1906 637 1,555 1,424 371
1905 322 224 1,024 342
1904 91 633 794 152
1903 82 68 634 169
1902 126 177 507 176
1901 301 158 395 118
1900 155 316 258 226
1899 549 333 244 166
1898 356 92 214 140
1897 188 164 154 96
1896 284 94 208 112
1895 508 142 288 44
1894 406 80 230 28
1893 402 24 160 32
1892 404 62 103 92
1891 1,192 50 147 30
1890 166 — 58 4
1889 169 10 90 12
1888 130 4 54 59
1887 82 91 21 2
Table D.9
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FOREIGN TRADE IN LOCOMOTIVES AND LOCOMOBILES
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
Locomotives Locomobiles
Imports Exports Imports Exports
1913 1,953 511 3,910 2,567
1912 1,124 110 5,485 3,462
1911 746 114 4,472 3,428
1910 883 185 3,322 3,392
1909 1,031 111 3,556 2,471
1908 1,828 1,403 3,112 1,809
1907 816 4,779 3,321 1,428
1906 386 4,781 3,489 2,104
1905 271 1,743 2,838 1,908
1904 427 824 2,363 1,647
1903 228 131 1,992 2,075
1902 304 1,099 1,468 1,038
1901 277 10,957 1,623 464
1900 396 5,509 1,809 458
1899 350 362 2,246 375
1898 252 1,272 2,152 258
1897 384 2 1,644 233
1896 452 — 1,418 137
1895 366 662 1,804 224
1894 111 1,834 2,024 396
1893 178 1,476 2,255 70
1892 58 338 2,922 97
1891 148 222 2,132 114
1890 194 652 1,524 74
1889 485 59 1,261 79
1888 228 - 1,235 87
1887 216 31 818 104
1886 330 114 1,138 94
1885 1,033 13 1,924 72
1884 2,209 250 3,534 40
1883 2,193 6,208 3,819 77
1882 1,047 2,715 1,939 -
1881 410 3,337 2,606 20
1880 — 337 1,780 36
1879 - 864 1,698 55
1878 - 3,583 2,100 2
1877 - 3,383 1,277 15
1876 24 149 439 -
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cont.
1875
1874
1873
1872
1871
1870
Table D.9
- 5,260 1,422 11
440 10,240 704 8
783 5,212 797 26
891 - 922 -
2,025 1,935 732 21
1,627 6 574 —
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Table D.10
AUSTRIAN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
Imports 
ROW* Hungary
Exports 
ROW* Hungary
1913 15,265 1,651 12,288 10 850
1912 17,195 2,119 13,506 14 559
1911 13,391 1,580 12,234 13 713
1910 11,360 1,651 11,471 12 671
1909 8,283 1,264 8,842 11 128
1908 7,903 1,210 8,661 10 683
1907 8,792 1,072 7,276 11 382
1906 6,052 1,185 7,241 12 928
1905 4,080 1,118 4,591 11 815
1904 2,115 1,162 4,279 11 331
1903 2,368 794 4,433 10 236
1902 1,694 557 3,313 8 595
1901 1,635 541 2,035 7 564
1900 1,922 509 1,900 8 929
1899 1,239 280 1,993 8 983
1898 361 296 1,192 10 025
1897 869 306 535 7 559
1896 1,192 241 220 6 288
1895 1,477 505 443 7 368
1894 1,377 479 538 8 321
1893 1,267 324 494 6 719
1892 2,409 177 1,056 3 177
1891 2,525 195 996 2 726
1890 2,108 227 475 2 580
1889 1,976 146 596 2 470
1888 985 241 647 2 356
1887 939 233 104 2 461
1886 1,004 246 44 1 738
1885 706 308 56 2 669
1884 2,252 239 507 3 399
1883 2,741 239 660 2 989
a ROW: rest of the world.
\
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Table D.ll
HUNGARIAN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY* 
(1000 CURRENT CROWNS)
Imports Exports
1913 18,596 4,272
1912 21,685 6,644
1911 17,762 6,418
1910 16,786 6,112
1909 13,596 4,140
1908 12,996 3,390
1907 14,584 3,313
1906 15,655 4,503
1905 13,225 4,184
1904 12,645 3,556
1903 11,236 3,559
1902 9,350 2,488
1901 8,431 1,727
1900 10,295 1,605
1899 11,148 1,462
1898 12,798 2,164
1897 8,936 1,547
1896 7,700 1,369
1895 8,639 1,514
1894 9,976 1,659
1893 8,394 1,606
1892 4,304 749
1891 3,609 853
1890 3,413 869
1889 3,191 707
1888 3,195 829
1887 2,881 796
1886 2,386 672
1885 3,935 706
1884 4,908 668
1883 5,564 1,229
* Including internal trade with Austria as given in Table D.10.
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Figure D.l: Auerage Inport and Export Unit Prices of Machinery (Crouns/100 KG)
123.5800
Inports
108.1900
92.8000
Exports
77.4100
1870 1881 1892 1903 1913
Source: See this Appendix, note 1.
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